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## WHAT IS THE DHARMAŚ CATURBHADRAH?

This question arises when we read in Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī* 2.39:

*satyatyāgaśamaprajñācaturbhadro narādhipah /  
 dharmas caturbhadra iva stūyate devamānuṣaiḥ //*

'A king blessed with the four [virtues of] truth[fulness], generosity, peace of mind and wisdom is praised by gods and men, just as the *dharmas* that is *caturbhadra* is [praised by gods and men].'

What, exactly, is the *dharmas* that is here referred to, and in what sense is it *bhadra* in terms of four – four what? What are the four (things? virtues?) that render it *bhadra*? And what, exactly, does *bhadra* mean? Why four? Why not two, three or five?

Unfortunately, the *Ratnāvalīkā* of Ajitamitra – the only Indian commentary transmitted to us – is not of much avail. It merely says:  
*bden pa la sogs pa'i chos bzī po phan yon dan bcas par bsad pa gañ  
 yin pa de dan ldan pa'i phan yon gzan yañ bden gtoñ zes bya ba la  
 sogs pas bstan te / bzañ po'i don bsgrub pa'i phyir bden pa la sogs pa  
 yon tan bzī dan ldan pa ni bzañ ba yin no // bden pa la sogs pa bzis  
 bzañ na cir 'gyur ze na / bstod ciñ bsnags par 'gyur ro // ji ltar bur  
 ze na / chos bzī po 'di bzañ ba ji lta bur te / rnam pa bzī yañ yin la  
 bzañ ba yañ yin pas de skad ces bya'o //* (ed. Yukihiro Okada, p. 90).  
 The syntax is not always quite clear:

The *caturdharmas* beginning with *satya* etc., which is stated to be beneficial, is also, with the words *satyatyāga-* etc. taught to have other benefits associated with it. Having the four virtues of *satya* etc., it is *bhadra*, because it establishes *bhadrārtha*. But what, then, if [the *dharmas*] is *bhadra* thanks to the four, viz. *satya* etc.? Then it is praised and extolled. How so? In what sense are the four *dharmas* [said to be] *bhadra*? They are said to be so because it is of four kinds and because it is also *bhadra*.

To search for an answer to our query we may first look closer at the context, and then, if possible, at parallel passages elsewhere in works by the same author, or else in works with which our author – Nāgārjuna – is known to have been familiar.

The context is clear enough. Nāgārjuna is offering his advice to a king. He has just extolled the four virtues of *satya* (34–35), *tyāga* (36), *upaśama* (37) and *prajñā* (38). It is, then, in this sense that the king is

*bhadra*, i.e. to the extent that he be in possession of the four virtues of *satya*, *tyāga*, (*upa*) *sama*, and *prajñā*. There is nothing specific Buddhist in this catalogue of virtues. Similar lists are found in many works on *dharmasāstra*. The *Mahābhārata* also gives various lists of *catvāri bhadraṇi*, e.g. *kīrti*, *āyus*, *yaśas* and *bala*; or *dharma*, *jñāna*, *vairāgya* and *aiśvarya*; or *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *bala*. See Böhtlingk and Roth, *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch*, s.v. *bhadra*. More on this later.

Likewise – and this is significant – Nāgārjuna in the preceding verses uses a terminology that is not specifically Buddhist. He, in fact, alludes to *artha*- and *nīti*sāstra, and makes the point (28) that *dharma eva parā nītir* ... If *nīti* is against *dharma*, *arthavidyā* is perverted into *anarthavidyā*, he says (29–30). Through the practice of the four *saṃgrahavastūni* the king should practise *lokasaṃgraha* and *dharmasaṃgraha*, he adds (33) – with an obvious allusion to the *Bhagavadgītā* (3.20 and 25) where the term *lokasaṃgraha* first occurs (if our dictionaries are to be relied on for this).

Before we come back to the phrase *dharmas caturbhadra*, there are a few things to be kept in mind.

First of all, it is the sense in which the author uses *dharma* in the singular that interests us here. (The meaning of *dharmāḥ*, in the plural, is an entirely different matter – but hardly to be accounted for if the meaning of the word in the singular is not properly understood.) By way of introduction, he speaks of one *dharma* that leads to *siddhi* in a *saddharmabhājana* (1.2). This single *dharma* has two 'aspects', viz. *abhyudaya*, or *sukha*, and *naiḥśreyasa*, or *mokṣa* (3–4). This *dharma* can be brought about by *śraddhā* and *prajñā* – the two are the *sādhana*saṃkṣepa of *dharma* (4–5). The *dharma* – still in the singular – can also be considered from ten (8–9), or from six aspects (10).

Nāgārjuna here shows how syncretistic Mahāyāna can be. First, he adopts the celebrated words of *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.2: *yato 'bhyudayanaiḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmah*. To be sure – should his reader not be familiar with Vaiśeṣika terminology – he glosses the two technical terms by *sukha* and *mokṣa*, respectively. When he then continues and states that first *śraddhā*, then *prajñā*, are, in brief, the two main means of bringing about *siddhi* through *dharma*, he could, as he in fact does in his *Sūtrasamuccaya* (ed. Bhikkhu Pāsādika, pp. 9–15), refer to the authority of several canonical Mahāyāna scriptures on *śraddhādurlabhatva*. Or he could even – had it not been bad tactics – have called upon the *Bhagavadgītā* 4.39:

*śraddhāvāmi labhate jñānam tatparah samyatendriyah /  
jñānam labdhvā parāṃ sāntim acireṇādhiyacchati //*

The point is, of course, that the ideal of a double *dharma* with a theoretical and a practical aspect is shared, *mutatis mutandis*, by virtually all classical Indian *darśanas*. In fact, if I am not mistaken, any *darśana* is a *dharmadarśana*, and, as such, somehow must include *karmayoga* as well as *jñānayoga*. (On the practical level, naturally, the *abhyudayadharmā* also is *dvidvidha*, RĀ 1.22: *nivṛttir aśubhāt kṛtsnāt pravṛttis tu śubhe sadā*.) The distinction between two kinds of yoga must, indeed, be an old one, and Kṛṣṇa is partly right when he says (BG 3.3):

*loke 'smin dvidvidhā niṣṭhā purā proktā mayānagha /  
jñānayogena sāmkyānām karmayogena yoginām //*

Note, again, that the *niṣṭhā* that Kṛṣṇa has proclaimed is old – and it is singular, as *dharma*. (It is in this sense that we must also understand the common dictum: *ekam sāmkyam ca yogam ca yah paśyati sa paśyati*, BG 5.5 etc.) And, therefore (5.4):

*sāmkyayogau pṛthag bālāḥ pravadanti na paṇḍitāḥ /*

*Dharma*, then, has the double character of theory and practice. Once we become aware of this we want to ask how widespread and how fundamental this notion of the double *dharma* was in ancient Indian philosophical, or religious, literature.

If we, for instance, turn to a late Jaina author such as Haribhadrasūri, we notice, in the Introduction to his *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya*, that he presupposes the common doctrine of a double *dharma*. In verse 23 he says:

*bhogamuktiphalo dharmah sa pravṛttitarātmakah /  
samyagmithyādirūpaś ca gītas tantrāntareṣv api //*

*Dharma* can either lead to *bhoga* in *svarga*, or it can, through *jñānayoga* (21), lead to *mukti*. It either consists in activity or in its opposite, viz. cessation from activity. In other texts this double form of *dharma* is expressed in terms of true and false, etc. In his commentary, Haribhadra also mentions the terminology *abhyudaya* and *naiḥśreyasa*. Another great polymath, not far in time from Haribhadra, viz. Śāntarākṣita, confirms, in his *Tattvasamgraha* 3486, that this view of the double *dharma* was shared by all scholars:

*yato 'bhyudayanisṭhā yato niḥśreyasasya ca /  
sa dharmā ucyate tādrīk sarvair eva vicakṣanaiḥ //*

Confining ourselves here to the Buddhist texts we can say that from the earliest period the Buddha, as a teacher of Dharma, is praised as being *vidyācaranaśampanna* – in full possession of knowledge and proper behaviour. He, in other words, is the embodiment of the double *dharmā*. This makes him a Bhagavat, partly human, partly divine, a *puruṣottama* teaching what he himself is.

But back to Nāgārjuna. Our initial question had to do with the meaning of *dharmā* in the expression *dharmāś caturbhadrah*. While it is easy to see that a king may be *bhadra* by having, or by practising, the virtues of *satya*, etc., it seems awkward to say that *dharmā* has or practises the virtues of *satya*, etc.

Since we have just seen that *dharmā* consists in moral and intellectual activity, or virtue (Latin *virtus*), one could make sense of the *caturbhadra* by saying that *dharmā* becomes *bhadra* through the practice of the four virtues mentioned, viz. *satya*, etc.

Still, our interpretation is not fully satisfactory. Some presuppositions are still tacit, and we are left to guess-work.

Assuming, as the commentators usually do, that *bhadra* and *kalyāṇa* are more or less synonyms, it is helpful to recall that Nāgārjuna described *dharmā* as *ekāntakalyāṇa* (1.2a). This observation can bring us a step further. In its most pure aspect *dharmā* was said to be *naiḥśreyasa*, the most beautiful. Now *bhadra*, *kalyāṇa* and *śrī* (from which we have *śreyasa*, and *śreṣṭha*, see below) are fairly close in meaning. They denote various aspects of something good and beautiful. Each term has a long prehistory that brings us back to Vedic times – and far beyond the scope of this paper. Even in Buddhist texts *bhadra* is used as a synonym of *summum bonum* (e.g. *Abhisamayālamkāra* 8.10, q.v.).

It would make sense to say that a king is praised for being good (thanks to his practice of the four virtues), just as it would be meaningful to say that *dharmā* is praised because it is good and beautiful. What makes *dharmā* good and beautiful, then, would be its association with *satya*, etc.

And yet *dharmā* is not a person. A person may be virtuous, but how can virtue itself be virtuous? A person becomes virtuous thanks to his participation in virtue. A clear distinction between *dharmā* and *dhārmika* must surely be made.

There is an old canonical saying often heard from the mouth of the Buddha: *dharmo setto jano tasmā dīṭhe c'eva dhamme abhisamparāyaṇa ca* (see e.g. *Aggaññasutta*, p. 96, ed. Konrad Meisig). Sometimes a *hi* is added after the *dharmo* suggesting that it is something obvious that is being stated. Actually, the sentence (partly metrical!) is

not all that easy to understand. I suggest something like this: *Dharma* is, of course, best (most beautiful) in such a man (a man of virtue as described above). (This is true) once *dharmā* has been experienced (personally in or by such a man, that is: in his present life) and in the future also.

So what the old adage seems to be suggesting is that *dharmā* somehow must be present in a human being in order really to be good. Virtue is nothing if it is not possessed or practised. The best thing is, in other words, that man practises *dharmā*. When practised in a cognitive or spiritual sense, *dharmā* is said to be “seen” (*dr̥ṣṭa*, *paśyati*, etc.). This idea makes sense, and as Cicero said, *virtus sola in actu posita est*. It is simply another way of saying that *dharmā* is nothing if it is not put into practice. In other words: *Dharma* is something that one must practise. No wonder, then, that *dharmā* is often construed as the grammatical object of a verb of action (such as *karoti*, etc.). *Dharma*, therefore, is also simply good karma, or proper action.

But not any sort of practice will do. To be a *dhārmika* one must, in general, be honest and decent. The most common way to express this is to speak of the *daśakuśalakarmapatha*, i.e. purity in mind, word and action. *Mutatis mutandis*, this ideal of the good and pure ways of action is recognized by virtually all classical Sanskrit texts on *dharmā*.

This, too, was clearly recognized at an early date in India. I do not need to recall the celebrated passage in the old BU suggesting how closely related *dharmā* and *satya* are: *yo vai sa dharmāḥ satyaṃ vai tat / tasmāt satyaṃ vadantam āhur dharmam vadatīti / dharmam vā vadantam satyaṃ vadatīti (Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 1.4.14)* (Note here that *satya* later on is defined as *avisamvādi(n)*.) And the two are not ‘abstract principles’, they must be present in a man of virtue: *ayam dharmāḥ sarveṣāṃ bhūtānām madhu / asya dharmasya sarvāṇi bhūtāni madhu / yaś cāyam asmin dharme tejomayo 'mṛtamayaḥ puruṣo yaś cāyam adhyātmaḥ dhārmāḥ tejomayo 'mṛtamayaḥ puruṣo 'yam eva sa yo 'yam ātmā / idam amṛtam idam brahmedam sarvam // (BU 2.5.11)* *idam satyaṃ sarveṣāṃ bhūtānām madhu / asya satyasya sarvāṇi bhūtāni madhu / yaś cāyam asmin satye tejomayo 'mṛtamayaḥ puruṣo yaś cāyam adhyātmaḥ sātyaḥ tejomayo 'mṛtamayaḥ puruṣo 'yam eva sa yo 'yam ātmā / idam amṛtam idam brahmedam sarvam // (BU 2.5.12)*.

This is a clear and simple message: *Dharma* and *satya* are almost identical. They should be present in man, and man should be present in them. Thus everything becomes Brahman.

If we can trust the *Dhammapada* 393, this was also the old Buddhist ideal:

*yamhi saccañ ca dhammo ca so sukhi so ca brāhmaṇo*

So far, then, we have seen that it was an old and common ideal that *satya* and *dharma* – hard to distinguish from one another – should be present in man, so that he could be virtuous, and thereby also happy – in possession of *sukha*.

It should, therefore, not surprise us to learn, from the verse quoted above, that *dharma* (and the person who had *dharma*) is closely associated with the virtue of *satya*.

But we still have to account for the number four, in *caturbhadra*. Buddhist texts, as known, are replete with lists of groups of fours. If we take the *Samgītsūtra*, for instance, there is a list of 50 different groups of fours. In the *Kāśyapaparivarta*, often referred to by Nāgārjuna, there are also numerous groups of fours, and likewise in many other Mahāyānasūtras. The Buddhists, in short, had a certain penchant for the number four. But it would be too facile just to discard this by speaking of four as a 'holy number'. When we speak of four elements, four *varṇas*, four *āśramas*, etc. the number is not merely 'holy'. It refers to natural facts, it is founded in the experience of the world around us. And, moreover, we are not here speaking of *dharma* in the sense that here concerns us.

There is an old and common Indian (or even Indo-european) notion that *dharma*, to be complete, must have four feet. The reader is familiar with *Manu* 1.81:

*causpatī sakalo dharmah satyaṃ caiva kṛte yuge /  
nādharmenāgamah kaścīn manuṣyān prati vartate //*

And not only so. When it comes to the *mūla* or *lakṣaṇa* of *dharma* this, too, is fourfold (2.6 and 2.12), viz. the Veda, etc. And thus one could go on.

Worth mentioning here, however briefly, is also the relationship between *dharma*, in the singular, and *dharmāḥ*, in the plural. It can be well understood in terms of fours, at least as far as Madhyamaka is concerned. In *Acintyastava* 22, Nāgārjuna refers to *dharmo 'yam* as being *antadvayanirmuktah*. As opposed to this *dharma* (= *tattva*, *paramārtha* etc.), there are the empirical *dharmāḥ*, in the plural. They are *catuṣkoṭivinirmuktāḥ* (*ibid.* 23). This suggests that *dharma* somehow is experienced (on the level of *saṃvṛtisatya*) in terms of four (*sat*, *asat*, etc.). So, here again, from a new angle, we have the notion of *dharma* as somehow being, or appearing as four.

So far, then, we can summarize by saying that it was a common Indian notion, long before Nāgārjuna wrote the *Ratnāvalī*, that *dharma*

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and *satya* are closely related, and, moreover, that they are, in numerous ways, associated with the number four. So closely, in fact, that the figure four almost comes to mean 'complete'.

There are numerous examples of this in Mahāyāna texts also. For instance, a passage from the *Gaganagañjaparivarta*, to which Jens Braarvig (in his edition of the *Akṣayamatīrdeśasūtra* II, p. xcvi) calls our attention, says: 'That Great Cart (*mahāyāna*) is well made with four wheels (*cakra*) because of the four means of attraction (*saṃgrahavastu*) ... (and it is) propelled by the power of understanding the four truths (*catuḥsatyaparijñābalagamaka*) ...'. Here the figure four also indicates something that is complete, something that 'works'. This is also suggested by the well-known image of the *dharmacakra*.

Often, we must admit, we fail to ask the most simple questions. One such simple and naive question that Buddhist scholars should have asked themselves long ago, is this: Why did the Buddha (according to tradition, at least) preach *four* Aryan Truths? Why not two, three, or five, for instance?

If the answer to this question is not already evident, it does become evident once we ask ourselves another even more simple question: When we speak of truth, which is the best translation of *satya* – we must also ask, the truth *about what*. A truth, to make sense, must be the truth *about* something, surely. And since the *deśanā* of the Buddha, no doubt, was a *dharmadeśanā*, it follows that the truths he spoke about were truths about *dharmah* / *dharmāḥ*. And, as we have seen, since *dharma* as well as *satya* somehow had to be four to be complete, we here have the most simple explanation why the Buddha – so tradition tells us – preached Four Aryan Truths. In this sense it makes sense when the Dharma is said to be *ekāntakalyāna* – altogether beautiful (i.e., perhaps, in all its four limits, or from all four angles).

Which brings us back to our starting-point, the *dharmas caturbhadraḥ*. The Buddha taught a Dharma that was *ekāntakalyāna*, or *bhadra* in the sense that comprises the four truths that make it complete. It was an old idea too obvious to need explicit mention to his contemporaries. Of course, in theory, by extension, the four good things could also refer to any positive virtues, but the fact that 'gods and men' are said to have praised the Dharma – as they praise the king – the *dharmarāja* – makes it most likely that *dharmas caturbhadraḥ* simply means – Buddhism, the teaching about Dharma in terms of the Four Aryan Truths.

In another text transmitted to us under the name of Nāgārjuna we run into a related problem of identification. This is the *Prajñāśataka*, edited and translated by Michael Hahn, *Hundert Strophen von der*

*Lebensklugheit: Nāgārjunas Prajñāśataka; tibetisch und deutsch*, Bonn 1990. The verse that here interests us is 18 which reads:

*dpe mkhyud med par smra ba dañ //  
ji skad smras bžin bsgrub pa dañ //  
chos bži űams dañ sbyar ba yi //  
mi pho rams ni bde bar 'tsho //*

Michael Hahn translates:

Wer nicht mit seinem Wissen geizt,  
wer seinem Wort entsprechend handelt  
und sich im Herzen der Moral verschrieben hat,  
der Mensch lebt (wirklich) glücklich.

To the word 'Moral', Hahn adds the note: 'So übersetzen wir hier mangels einer besseren Alternative das Wort \**caturdharma* die vier Lebensziele' (*op. cit.*, p. 39).

In a review of Hahn's excellent edition of the PŚ, published in *The Adyar Library Bulletin* 56 (1992), 203–207, I advanced five additional arguments in support of my opinion that it is 'very probable' that the PŚ must be counted among the authentic works of Nāgārjuna. Also, expressing my disagreement with Michael Hahn's identification of *caturdharma* with *caturvarga* – to which PŚ refers in 5 – I referred to *Ramāvalī* 2.39 (discussed above) for a more likely identification of the *caturdharma* (viz. *satya*, *tyāga*, *śama* and *prajñā*).

I now see that both of us were mistaken about the meaning of *chos bži*, \**caturdharma*, in PŚ 18. The full meaning of the verse only becomes clear once we identify its source. And once we identify its source we are presented with yet another argument – a very strong one, indeed – in favour of the traditional ascription of the PŚ to Nāgārjuna.

The source on which PŚ 18 is based is without any doubt *Kāśyapaparivarta* §§1–2. In these two paragraphs Bhagavat teaches Mahākāśyapa about four *dharma*s that are conducive to a bodhisattva's loss of *prajñā* (§1), and, likewise, about four *dharma*s that are conducive to his *mahāprajñatā*. And this attainment of *prajñā* is the very theme of the PŚ also. In §1 the KP lists it as one of the four faults of a bodhisattva if he were to show the *ācāryamuṣṭi* to students interested in learning about *dharma*. He must, in other words, not be secretive about the Buddhist message. Moreover, he should, in the interest of *mahāprajñatā*, explain the *dharma*s as he has learned them (*yathāśruta*) and received them (*yathāparyāpta*) as transmitted from others (§2). Likewise he should show respect towards the *dharma* and the *dharmabhānakas*, etc. The *chos bži* in PŚ 18 thus refers to the four *dharma*s listed in KP §2.

This observation has several important implications. We can now say for sure that the author of the PŚ expected his reader to be more or

less familiar with the KP. Otherwise, obviously, his reader would not be able to understand the meaning of the term *caturdharma*. (Nāgārjuna's reader would have been in much the same situation as Michael Hahn and I myself hitherto have been!)

Can we perhaps go as far as to assume that KP was more or less as familiar to Nāgārjuna and his readership, as, say, the New Testament is (or should be) to a Christian priest and his flock? Is there perchance any other independent evidence for such an assumption?

There is. First of all there is Nāgārjuna's *magnum opus*, the *Mūlamadhyamakārikā*. In this work there are several allusions to the KP. Most important is MK 13.8:

*sūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭinām proktā nihsaranam jinaiḥ /  
yeṣāṃ tu sūnyatādrṣṭis tān asādhyān babhāṣire //*

As already recognized long ago by ancient commentators (Candrakīrti, p. 248) and modern scholars (de Jong, IJ 20 (1978), 56), Nāgārjuna here refers to a passage found in KP §§63–65.

In one of his other works, the \**Bodhisambhāraka*, Nāgārjuna refers extensively to the *Kāśyapaparivarta*, as I have already pointed out in my translation of that interesting text. Thus, stanzas 123–145 are clearly inspired by the author's study of the KP. We can almost see him sitting with the text in one hand, and with the pen (ref. to pens, ink, books, etc. RĀ 3.38; *Akṣayamatīnirdeśa*, p. 437) with which he wrote down his versifications in the other. When we read his *Suhrllekha*, it is also the versificator Nāgārjuna that we hear speaking to us across the centuries. To some extent the same goes for the *Ramāvalī*, some passages of which are but versifications of some canonical text. To a very large extent it is also the versificator of numerous canonical texts who composed the *Catuḥstavaḥ*. (Here, incidentally, it makes sense when Candrakīrti refers to the 'Four Hymns' as the *saṃstuti*, the 'complete collection of Hymns' – *saṃ-* being almost synonymous with *catuḥ*, as we have seen; cf. also titles of 'complete works' such as *Catuḥśataka*, etc.)

As said the \**caturdharma* in PŚ refers to KP §§1–2. So do verses 123–125 of the same author's \**Bodhisambhāraka*:

Revere the Dharma and the teachers of the Dharma. Also put aside any animosity towards the Dharma. The teacher must not clench his hand (*ācāryamuṣṭi*). The audience must not be annoyed. One (the bodhisattva) should preach the Dharma to people without rudeness and without expectations – only with a compassionate heart, a devoted and respectful mind. Be insatiable (*atṛpta*) for learning and commit to memory what you have learned. Do not be deceitful to respected holy personalities (*punyaḥsetra*), but give pleasure to the teacher (*ācārya*).

The *Kāśyapaparivarta* has been transmitted in several recensions, and studied carefully by Friedrich Weller and others. It will be an interesting task to try to determine which recension may have been known to Nāgārjuna. However, such an enquiry falls outside the scope of this paper.

It is, as known, a *locus communis* in Mahāyāna that Prajñāpāramitā is the Mother of the bodhisattvas, and, as such, in the end also the Mother of the Buddhas (cf. Edward Conze, *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies*, Oxford 1967, pp. 243–268). This common notion of Buddhism in general is also reflected in several verses of the \**Bodhisambhāraka* (5. 6. 33 are most explicit). Nāgārjuna's *magnus opus*, also entitled Prajñā, is largely an exercise in its perfection. Intelligent analysis of the dharmas is an instrument for bringing about *jñāna* of *tattva*, which here is their *sūnyatā*.

How, then, does the characteristic Mahāyāna conception of *prajñāpāramitā* as the Mother of the bodhisattvas, their *magna mater*, compare with the concept of *prajñā* found in works such as the *Prajñāśataka*? After all, *prajñā* is an old term, found already in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and other Upaniṣads. It also plays a considerable, if not peculiar role in the *Bhagavadgītā*. And, again, if *prajñā* is so fundamental – the main thing, *pradhānam*, as RĀ 1.5c would have it – what is its relationship to the Four Aryan Truths, and to *dharma*?

Here, again, as philologists, we can make an important observation. As far as I can see, our texts speak of *dharmajñāna*, *tattvajñāna*, *sūnyatājñāna*, etc. (ref. in my *Nagarjuniana*, p. 270). In such cases the 'object' of *jñāna* is in the singular. There is *jñāna* of the *dharma*, and this is much the same as the *bodhi* of a Buddha. Quite different is the case with *prajñā*. If I am not mistaken, our texts do not speak of '\**dharmaprajñā*' or of '\**tattvaprajñā*'. In other words, *prajñā* has as its object not *dharma*, in the singular, but *dharmāḥ*, in the plural. It deals with manifold phenomena. It therefore makes sense when our texts tell us that *prajñā*, as *dharmānām pravacayah*, culminates in *dharmajñāna*. Prajñā 'goes forward', it must have objects, concepts, to work on. As opposed to this, *jñāna* is rather a 'state', realized once *prajñā* has accomplished its task. Often our texts thus speak of *advayajñāna*. It would, accordingly, be difficult to speak of '\**advayaprajñā*'. In brief, *prajñā* is discursive scientific thinking, analysis, whereas *jñāna* is intuitive, 'gnostic', but scientifically based insight, i.e. insight into the results of the activity of *prajñā*.

*Prajñā* is scientific knowledge, *scientia*. As such it is but natural that *prajñā*, when it turns to other fields of scientific research than

Buddhist dogmatics, e.g. to *arthaśāstra*, becomes practical wisdom, or *prudentia*. It is one of the attractive features of the enlightenment period of Buddhism – for this is what early Indian Mahāyāna largely was – that it emphasizes the value of an educated person's knowledge of universal science.

Very frequent is the distinction between three kinds, or degrees, of *prajñā*, viz. *śrutamayī prajñā*, *cintāmayī prajñā* and *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* (e.g. *Samgītisūtra* III.36). Again, in Madhyamaka, there are two kinds of *prajñā*: when *prajñā* is based on *tathyasamvṛtisatya* it is empirical, or practical, when it is based on *paramārthasatya* it is intuitive, or theoretical (in the Greek sense of the word). It must always start out with *samvṛtisatya* in order to reach *paramārthasatya*. This is the only way to realize the *dharma* for, as said by Nāgārjuna (MK 24.8–10):

*dve satye samupāsṛitya buddhānām dharmadeśanā /  
lokasamvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ //*

*ye 'nāyor na vijānanti vibhāgam satyayor dvayoh /  
te tattvaṃ na vijānanti gambhīre\* (or: gambhīram) buddhaśāsane //*

*vyavahāram anāsṛitya paramārtho na deśyate /  
paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇam nādhigamyate //*

The relationship between *satyadvaya* and *dharmadeśanā* is here clear enough. However, *satya* in itself is not knowledge, but rather something known that is spoken of; and the instrument by means of which *satyadvaya* is known is not directly expressed by Nāgārjuna. From the context of his MK, however – the Prajñā – the answer is clear: the instrument that, based on the two kinds of truth, gradually understands the *dharmāḥ* analytically, and then finally culminates in *dharmajñāna* (= *tattvajñāna* = *nirvāṇādhigama*, etc.) is, of course, *prajñā*.

Prajñā, scientific understanding, then, is something that must be developed, something that must be exercised to become mature. And, as such, it also has to do with general education, with *paideia*. First the student has to learn through study, then he has to understand what he has learned through reasoning, and finally he personally realizes, through *bhāvanā*. To become a civilized human being, a man of true culture – a gentleman – he must go through all three stages of *prajñā*.

This is not the place to compare Buddhist (and ancient Indian) ideas of education with those of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Still, the theme is of great interest – especially today when the old aristocratic ideals of education are being replaced by more vulgar, or 'democratic' ideas about information.

In particular, it would be fascinating to compare the Mahāyāna curriculum with the scholastic curriculum usual in medieval education in Europe. In Paris, in the thirteenth century, for instance, education began with the seven liberal arts, i.e. the *trivium* (grammar, rhetoric, logic), and the *quadrivium* (arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy). It then advanced to philosophy and culminated in theology. In terms of influence, it is probably true to say that no institution of higher education since Aristotle rivaled that of Paris. The Parisian masters were divided into four faculties: theology, canon law, medicine, and 'arts'. The medieval name for a university uniting diverse faculties was *studium generale*. The *universitas generalis* comprised *theologia*, *juris prudentia*, *medicina* and *philosophia*.

But the roots are, of course, Greco-Roman. Aristotle was, for all we know, the first to speak of 'the free sciences' (*Pol.* 1337b 15), the branches of knowledge requisite for a freeman; they included astronomy, geometry, arithmetic, music and grammar. The Greek course of encyclopaedic learning was taken over by enlightened Romans. Varro (116–27 B.C.) wrote an encyclopaedia, the *Disciplinae*, in nine books on *grammatica*, *dialectica*, *rhetorica*, *geometria*, *arithmetica*, *astrologia*, *musica*, *medicina*, and *architectura*. The first seven books provided the foundation for the seven *artes liberales*, i.e. *trivium* and *quadrivium*. In the fifth century the seven liberal arts were once more treated by Martianus Capella, and they were, as said, still prescribed in the Middle Ages. His work was widely studied, as indicated by the large number of manuscripts, commentaries, and published editions.

All this is nothing new, but it is certainly worth keeping in mind when focusing on Indian Mahāyāna ideals of education.

From numerous texts it is clear that the Mahāyāna freeman, the bodhisattva, was expected to cultivate the Buddhist counterpart to the *artes liberales*. Many different lists are given. Some lists give five *vidyāsthānas*, viz. *śabdavidyā*, *hetuvidyā*, *adhyātmavidyā*, *cikitsāvidyā*, and *śilpakarmasthānavidyā*. An expanded list of eighteen branches of knowledge is also common (see, for instance, Siglinde Dietz, *Die buddhistische Briefliteratur Indiens*, Wiesbaden 1984, p. 552 for these lists; and *Mahāvvyūpatti* 4953–4970).

A few other sources may here be listed: The *Akṣayamatirdeśasūtra* (ed. Braarvig, p. 141), under the heading *prajñābala* (as a part of the *prayogamārga*), says that *sarvaśilpakarmavidyāmanrabalasthānas* appear to a bodhisattva throughout his different births. The commentary (*ibid.*, p. 534, n. 5) lists the four *vidyāsthānas* as *śilpa-*, *cikitsā-*, *hetu-*, and *śabdavidyā*. The *Sūramgamasamādhisūtra* (tr. Lamotte, p. 145,

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1975), under *vīryapāramitā*, has this to say about the bodhisattva: "Il semble étudier les métiers (*śilpasthāna*), la médecine (*cikitsāvidyā*), la magie (*mantravidyā*), l'écriture (*lipi*), la numération (*samkhyā*), le calcul (*gaṇanā*) et les arts manuels (*karmasthāna*), mais d'avance il connaît parfaitement tout cela." The *Buddhāvataṃsakasūtra*, quoted in Nāgārjuna's *Sūtrasamuccaya* (ed. Bhikkhu Pāsādika, p. 203) mentions *las dañ bzo dañ sgyu rtsal dañ rig pa'i gnas thams cad* . . .

Bhavya, the celebrated Mādhyamika, mentions four(!) *vidyāsthānas* in his *Madhyamakahrdaya*, also known as *Tarkajvālā* (ad. IV.14), viz. *śabda-*, *hetu-*, *cikitsā-*, and *adhyātmavidyā*. The list occurs again in his later work, the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* III, with *adhyātmavidyā* being replaced by *śilpavidyā* (see *Indologica Taurinensia* 12 (1984) 166, n. 16). In this commentary to MHK/TJ (III.13) there is another list giving grammar, palmistry, enumeration, alchemy, medicine, arithmetic, charms, spells, etc.

The five *vidyāsthānas* (viz. *adhyātmavidyā* etc., as above) are listed by the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (ed. N. Dutt, p. 146, 1966) when discussing the *laukikī* and the *lokottarā prajñā* of a bodhisattva. This suggests that *vidyā* and *prajñā* are more or less synonyms. This should not surprise us for in Buddhist canonical usage *vidyā* and *prajñā* are indeed listed as such. An example is given in the *Dharmacakrapravartanasūtra*: *cakku-ñāṇam-paññā-vijjā-āloka*. The Sanskrit of the *Catuspariśatsūtra* (ed. E. Waldschmidt, p. 445), has *cakṣus-jñāna-vidyā-buddhi-* and *buddhi* is also a common synonym in Mahāyāna texts for *prajñā*.

Nāgārjuna sums this up in his *\*Bodhisambhāraka* 79 (*Nagarjuniāna*, p. 237): 'A [bodhisattva should] propagate and establish all *śāstras*, techniques, sciences and arts (*śilpasthānavidyākalā*) for the use and benefit of mankind.' The commentator lists, among the *śāstras* etc., mathematics, metallurgy, medicine, exorcism, botany, mineralogy, astronomy, oneiromancy and anatomy (*ibid.*).

The *trivium* – grammar, rhetoric and logic – covers roughly the same ground as the four or five *vidyāsthānas*.

We must not forget jurisprudence, to which, in his *Ratnāvalī*, Nāgārjuna has numerous allusions. In *dharmaśāstra* the close relationship between *dharma* and *satya*, to which I have already referred, is also fundamental. The first stanza of the *Nāradaśmṛti*, for instance, says:

*dharmāikatānāḥ puruṣā yaddāsan satyavādinah /  
tadā na vyavahāro 'bhūn na dveṣo nāpi matsarah //*

'When men [in the old days] were only concerned with *dharma* [and only] spoke the truth, then there was no [need of any] lawsuit



(vyavahāra), no hatred, no enmity.' And referring to the lawsuit it continues (1.8):

*sa catuspāc catuḥsthānās catuḥsādhana eva ca /  
caturhitas caturvyāpti catuḥkāri ca kīrtiyate ||*

A lawsuit, that is, has four feet (viz. *dharmā, vyavahāra, caritra* and *rājasāsana*) (10). It has four means, viz. conciliation etc. (12), and it is good for the four classes and stages in a civilized society. It reaches four kinds of persons, including the king, and it produces four things: *dharmā, artha, yasaḥ* and *lokapakti* (14). Thus classical Indian jurisprudence basically has to do with *dharmā* and *sarya*. And here, too, four is a "holy" number. The king is the guardian of *dharmā*. Like a bhagavat a king is responsible for *dharmagupti*. A lawsuit, to be complete, must have four feet, etc. The king is described in terms also characteristic of a good philosopher; he must be fair, attentive, reasonable, and able to distinguish what is right and what is wrong. It thus makes good sense when Nāgārjuna chose an example from jurisprudence to illustrate the *dharmāś caturbhadra* of Buddhism, as above.

It is thus clear that the bodhisattva freeman, like the educated European scholar, is expected to make himself familiar with the *artes liberales*. Just as the European scholar had to learn how to express himself correctly and convincingly in Latin, thus the Indian pandit had to learn how to express himself scientifically in correct Sanskrit.

Indian Buddhists writing in Sanskrit would have agreed with the words of Patañjali about the purpose of studying Sanskrit: *mlecchā mā bhūma ity adhyeyam vyākaranam* (cf. Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe*, 1988, p. 178). Mātṛceta, an excellent Sanskritist (*Varṇārhavarnastotra* 11.31, ed. Jens-Uwe Hartmann), praising the 'tongue' – *lingua* of the Buddha:

*yadi sā rūpiṇī kā cid asti devī sarasvatī /  
ityam sarvānavadyāṅgī prabhūrā sā bhaviṣyati ||*

'Wenn die Göttin Sarasvatī irgendeine körperliche Form annähme, dann dürfte es wohl diese an allen Gliedern tadellose Grosse (Zunge) sein.' Is *mokṣa* possible at all without Sanskrit?

The study of language and of logic – let us call it *philology* – was not seen as an end in itself. It was conceived as a necessary means and as a step on the ladder to philosophy and theology. The ultimate purpose was wisdom, salvation, or spiritual freedom.

The achievement of knowledge, of science, of wisdom, then, was seen as a gradual achievement, it was a question of education and personal maturity. A sound and broad Sanskrit education was fundamental.

Naturally, the sciences were not 'invented' by the Buddhists. I do not here have to speak of the six *vedāṅgas* etc. Famous is Kauṭilya's list of four sciences: *ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍanītiś ca iti vidyāḥ*. Only *ānvīkṣikī* poses a problem of identification: *sāṃkhyam yogo lokāyatam ca – ity ānvīkṣikī*.

The meaning of *ānvīkṣikī* in this passage has often been discussed by previous scholars (see most recently W. Halbfass, *India and Europe*, 1988, 273ff). It has, however, also been overlooked that *ānvīkṣikī* is an adjective qualifying *vidyā*. Thus, the expression simply means critical knowledge, or science, as exemplified by *sāṃkhya, yoga* and *lokāyata*. Kauṭilya quotes this verse:

*pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām upāyah sarvakarmaṇām /  
āśrayaḥ sarvadharmānām śāśvad ānvīkṣikī matā ||*

He is quite clear when saying that *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* consists in research by means of logic, or reason: *hetubhir anvīkṣamānā*. Vātsyāyana, in his commentary on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.1, also quotes this verse with the variant reading (in d): *vidyoddeśe prakīrtitā*. His quotation is introduced by the explanation *seyam ānvīkṣikī pramānādibhiḥ padārthair vibhajyamānā ... [vidyā]*. Such an *ānvīkṣikī vidyā*, he says, is a *nyāyavidyā* (or *nyāyāśāstra*), and if one were merely to state one's religious opinions without logical reasons, it would be mere *adhyātmavidyā*.

This distinction clearly corresponds to the Buddhist distinction (in the list of four and five *vidyāsthānas*) between *hetuvidyā* and *adhyātmavidyā*. The same distinction between 'faith and knowledge' finds its expression in the common Buddhist distinction between *āgama* and *yukti*. Again, the distinction, seen in the perspective of *prajñā*, is reflected in the three kinds of *prajñā* mentioned above: *śrutamayī, cintāmayī, and bhāvanāmayī*.

In order to describe this development of *prajñā*, the Indian Buddhists introduced their own peculiar terminology. In manuals of Abhidharma, *prajñā* is normally defined as *dharmānām pravacayaḥ*. It is the root *vic*, to sift, separate, discriminate, etc., that is of interest here, with or without the prefix *pra-*.

Here are some illustrative examples, keeping in mind that *prajñā, buddhi, mati, dhī*, etc. are normally used as synonyms. They show how *prajñā (buddhi, etc.)* is *instrumental* in bringing about distinction.

Often quoted is *Lankāvatārasūtra* II.198 where the first *pāda* says: *buddhyā vivecyamānam tu ...* Of this there is a possible echo in *Nyāyasūtra* 4.2.26: *buddhyā vivecanāt*. For other terms of this sort, see Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, *An Index to the Lankāvatāra Sūtra*, Kyoto 1934, under *pravacaya, pravacayabuddhi, viveka, vivikta* and *vivecyamāna*.

Showing Buddhist influence, Bhartṛhari, in his *Vākyapadīya* has the celebrated line (2.489ab):

*prajñā vivekaṃ labhate bhinnair āgamadarśanaiḥ /*

Bhavya, in MHK 3.7 has the expression *bhūtārthapraviveka* and, bringing in the first one of the two truths, writes, in 3.13:

*pūrvam saṃvṛtisatyena praviviktamatir bhavet /*

A scholar thus obtains *viveka*, he renders his intelligence *pravivikta*, by the exercise of *prajñā* (*buddhi*, *mati*, etc.). The important thing is to learn to make distinctions. This, naturally, is fundamental to any kind of serious scholarship.

When a scholar analyses specific or general *dharmāḥ* with the help of his *prajñā* or *buddhi*, i.e. in an intelligent way, he conducts a scientific investigation, a *parīkṣā*. All empirical *dharmāḥ* can, in principle, be considered from four points of view. A quote from the *Laṅkāvatāra* (p. 122) is informative: *tatra ... pravicyabuddhir nāma yad uta yayā buddhyā bhāvasvabhāvalakṣaṇam pravicyamānam* (read thus!) *catuṣkoṭikārahitaṃ nopalabhyate sā pravicyabuddhiḥ. tatra ... catuṣkoṭikā yad utai katvānyatvobhayāstīnāstīnityānityarahitāṃ catuṣkoṭikāṃ iti vadāmi .... etayā catuṣkoṭikayā ... rahiṭāḥ sarvadharmā ity ucyate. iyaṃ ... catuṣkoṭikā sarvadharmaparīkṣāyāṃ prayoktavyā.*

A bodhisattva should, in other words, undertake a *parīkṣā* of all *dharmāḥ* using his intelligence in terms of the *catuṣkoṭikā*, or tetragon. In the end his mind becomes as empty as the *dharmāḥ* it investigates. Each of the 27 chapters of Nāgārjuna's *magnum opus* is called a *parīkṣā*. Each chapter investigates certain *dharmāḥ*, and as a whole, the *sāstra* is – most befittingly – called *Prajñā*.

The term *parīkṣā*, then, corresponds to *ānvīkṣikī vidyā*. Any *Mādhyamaka-sāstra* is characterized by its employment of *yukti*, *anumāna*, *tarka*, *nyāya*, etc. to support the statements of the *āgama* upon which it is founded. Thus scientific research presupposes the activity of the faculty of *prajñā*. In the sense that *adhyātmavidyā* must thus be supported by *hetuvidyā*, we can conclude that logic serves as an *ancilla theologiae*, if by *theologia* we mean *dharmajñāna*. One could even adopt Anselm's celebrated phrase to describe this: *fides quaerens intellectum*. It was, as known, a fundamental principle of medieval scholasticism that the light of reason and that of revelation was one. Since many *Mādhyamikas* are prepared to interpret the old notion of Brahman in terms of *Dharmāḥ* (cf. Jens-Uwe Hartmann, *op. cit.*, p. 216) we can, in this sense, speak of 'Buddhist theology'. Indian Mahāyāna is certainly 'monistic' in

the sense that the manifold *dharmāḥ* of *saṃvṛtisatyā* cannot really be isolated from the original Dharma of *paramārthasatyā*.

On this background it is not only natural, but even to be expected, that Mahāyāna scholars should also be polymaths. We should not be surprised to find them writing about medicine, logic, grammar, etc. Any topic enabling the bodhisattva to develop his *prajñā* would be relevant for his spiritual development.

In the expanded list of eighteen *vidyāsthānas* the bodhisattva is required to be learned in *nīti* (*chos lugs*). Hence, for this reason also, there is nothing strange in Nāgārjuna's composing a work on *arthasāstra*, which is what his *Prajñāśāstaka*, according to his own words (1, 2, 99, or on *nīti*, *chos lugs*, 98) is all about. The study of *arthasāstra*, like that of the other secular sciences, is intended to prepare the student's mind for more serious matters. The same, of course, goes for the bodhisattva's study of any other secular science, such as medicine, etc. – even *kāmasāstra*.

If Buddhism – any kind – can be defined in terms of *catuḥsatya catuṣparīṣat*, etc., then 'Hinduism' – the Hindu confession –, likewise lends itself to definitions in terms of quaternions such as *caturyuga*, *caturvarṇa*, *caturāśrama*, *caturvarga* etc. It is never the case that Indian Buddhists entirely reject the practical reality behind these classifications. They rather tend to assimilate them, or to reform them in a more humane spirit, etc.

A good example of how the Buddhist-Hindu relationship could appear is provided by a verse in *Manu* IV.80:

*na sūdrāya matim dadyān nocchiṣṭam na haviṣkṛtam /  
na cāsyopadiśed dharmam na cāsyā vratam ādiśet //*

It has to do with *dharmadeśanā*. Some Buddhists are more opposed to the caste system, or its abuse, than others (cf. J.W. de Jong, in *Early Buddhism and Mādhyamaka*, Leiden 1990, p. 58, who first identified this verse in Avalokitavrata's commentary to the *Prajñāpradīpa*). Some Buddhists shared the view of Manu that you cannot teach anyone anything at any time. Circumstances, maturity etc. have to be taken into consideration. Other Buddhists may have been a bit more liberal, e.g. Udbhatasiddhasvāmin, who in his *\*Viśiṣṭastava* (ed. Johannes Schneider, p. 68) also refers to the said verse from Manu:

*chos 'don* (read so for 'dod!) *pa dag dmanis rigs la //*  
*blo gros sbyin par bya min zer //*  
*khyod ni gdol pa mams la 'aṅ //*  
*thugs rjes dam chos ston par mdzad //*

'The reciters of *dharma* [such as Manu etc.] say that one must not provide insight [into *dharma* etc.] to śūdras. You [the Buddha, however] have, out of compassion, taught the Saddharma even to Caṇḍālas.' – This is the common Buddhist attitude: Whether one is fit to receive *dharmadeśanā* depends on one's personal qualifications, not on one's *varṇa*, or social status. I can hardly imagine, though, that any Indian Buddhist would want to abandon the caste system in toto. The Buddhists naturally took objection to *jātivādāvalepa* as Dharmakīrti nicely phrased it in a memorable verse in his *Pramānavārtika* 1.340. To this end they tried to introduce a *catuṣparīṣat*. Another would emphasize the four social virtues, the *saṃgrahavastu* (ref. *Nagarjuniana*, p. 240). When the *Gītā* thus speaks of *lokasaṃgraha* based on *cāturvārya*, its Buddhist critics in reply emphasize *dharmasaṃgraha* based on the four *saṃgrahavastu* (cf. my paper 'Lokasaṃgraha, Buddhism and Buddhīyoga in the *Gītā*', in S.P. Narang (ed.), *Modern Evaluations of the Mahābhārata*, Delhi, 1995, pp. 199–220). Some modern authors claim that 'the Buddha' maintained that all humans were created equal, and therefore rejected the caste system as such. Nothing could be further from historical truth – and from scientific fact! Naturally, they were perceptive enough not to overlook that human beings are unequal when it comes to moral as well as intellectual achievements. Some are more *bhavya* than others. Common is, for instance, the distinction between three kinds of persons (see *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* 55; *Catuṣṣataka* 8.14; *Satapañcāśatka* 78; *Kāśyapaparivarta* §103; *Indische Sprüche* 216, etc.).

But what about the *caturvarga*? On this issue Nāgārjuna is explicit in his *Prajñāśataka* 5:

chos don 'dod dan thar pa yi ||  
'byuñ gnas chen po rig pa yin ||  
de ltar dan por gus pa yis||  
ses rab yum chen gzuñ bar bya ||

'*Vidyā* [= *prajñā*] is the great source of *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. Therefore [a man of virtue] must first, with devotion, embrace the Great Mother – *Prajñā*.'

Here there is obviously no question of flatly rejecting the *caturvarga* as such. The bodhisattva freeman can take an interest in *dharma*, in *artha*, in *kāma*, and, of course, *mokṣa*. He can even write books about *artha*- and *kāmasāstra*, though his main concern would be *dharma*- and *mokṣasāstra*. The decisive thing is that he approaches his topic as the good son of a 'great Mother' – *Prajñā*.

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We can now sum up the Madhyamaka position. Dharma is fundamental. It is altogether *bhadra*. Nothing is better or more beautiful. However, it can only be approached through its manifold manifestation as *dharmāh*. All *dharmāh* are expressed in terms of four Aryan truths. They can be reduced to two. *Prajñā* must start out on the basis of *saṃvṛtisatyā*. It analyses all *dharmāh*, and finally recognizes that they all have the same nature of *sūnyatā*. This is the *paramārthasatyā* where *prajñā* becomes *jñāna* without an object. It is, in other words, by *prajñā* that one knows *satyā*, and by *satya* that Dharma is realized. Mahāyāna is also known as the *prajñāpāramitāyāna* – the method of bringing *prajñā* to perfection.

The highly influential *Śālistambasūtra* is in the main an exposition of the old saying that by seeing, or understanding, the principle of *pratītyasamutpāda* one also sees the Buddha and the Dharma. To understand *pratītyasamutpāda* is to understand the universal principle of causality based on the six elements. Science, according to Aristotle, 'the father of modern science', has to do with the discovery of true and natural causes. In this sense one can say that Indian Buddhism is scientific in its method and in its aims.

With its emphasis on *prajñā* Buddhist philosophy thus undoubtedly has an important contribution to make to modern scientific thinking. It is therefore a great pity, that even such an excellent historian of Greek philosophy, W.K.C. Guthrie, in his *History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge 1965, p. 53, n. 1) can write: 'The motives and methods of the Indian schools, and the theological and mystical background of their thought, are so utterly different from those of the Greeks that there is little profit in the comparison.'

In a letter to Voltaire, Frederick the Great wrote, on February 25, 1766: 'Die Fortschritte der menschlichen Vernunft gehen langsamer vor sich, als man denkt.'

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(Further references to Sanskrit sources etc. are provided in the books listed above.)

*Nærum*  
*Denmark*

API VĀ "ODER AUCH / OR ALSO" – ODER WAS?  
 VOM FEHLGRIFF BEI DER WAHL IN EINER ALTERNATIVE:  
 ERSTER VERSUCH (STUDIEN ZU DEN RITUELLEN SŪTRAS III)\*

I. BHĀRADVĀJA-ŚRAUTASŪTRA VI,6,12 UND SEINE PARALLELEN

1.

Wenn ein altindischer Opferherr (*yajamāna*), der die drei heiligen Feuer angelegt hatte (*āhitāgni*), auf die Reise gehen wollte, sollte er jene Feuer, die ständig unterhalten werden mußten, in seine Reibhölzer, mit denen er sein Feuer zu erzeugen pflegte, in einem besonderen Ritual "gänzlich emporsteigen lassen." Es gab auch andere Möglichkeiten, das Feuer seinem Wesen und seiner Potenz nach mit sich zu führen. "The Bhāradvāja Śrautasūtra (6.6.12), for example, calls the depositing of the fires in the self 'the next best alternative'. See also T[aittirīya-] S[amhitā] 3.4.10.5," fand ich jüngst notiert.<sup>1</sup> Da ich mich seit längerer Zeit mit einigen Aspekten dieses merkwürdigen Rituals beschäftige, scheinen mir diese knappe Notiz und besonders die als Übersetzung apostrophierte Würdigung doch neuer Überlegung wert. Dabei ist ein Blick in das Sanskrit-Original nicht unnütz. Seine kritische Ausgabe verdanken wir C. G. Kashikar, der uns zugleich seine Translation lieferte.<sup>2</sup> Das Sūtra lautet: *api vā yā te agne yajñīyā tanūs tayehy āroha ity ātman samāropayate*. Kashikar übersetzt:

As the next best alternative<sup>3</sup>, he should consign it within himself with the verse 'Do thou come and rise up, O Agni, with that form of thine which is sacred, giving us ample wealth, dear to men. Becoming a sacrifice, do thou seat thyself in the sacrifice, thy birth-place. O Jatavedas (Agni), being born from the earth, do thou come to thy own place.'

Kashikar geht über seinen Text hinaus, indem er auch hier den dabei zu rezitierenden Mantra, im Text wie üblich nur durch den Anfang (*pratīkena*) geboten, vollständig wiedergibt; in einer Fußnote verweist er auf TS III,4,10,5; T[aittirīya-]Br[āhmaṇa] II,5,8,8. Er folgt also einer

le remarque Fujita le texte d'Ishiyama a Jaliniprabhá et la traduction tibétaine *dra-ba-can-gyi 'od*, i.e. Jālinīrabha.

M. Ducor a ajouté une bibliographie détaillée dans laquelle il donne même les dates de naissance et de décès de plusieurs savants. En ce qui concerne Feer et Foucaux il faut corriger 1830-1910 en 1830-1902 et 1811-1884 en 1811-1894.

M. Ducor a fait un travail très utile, surtout par l'utilisation de nombreux travaux japonais. Toutefois, on ne voit pas pourquoi il faut citer des textes chinois en transcription japonaise comme, par exemple, p. 36: *jinen komu shi shin, mugoku shi tai*, passage dont la traduction donnée p. 69 est à préférer.

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Peter Skilling, *Mahasutras: Great Discourses of the Buddha*. Volume II. Parts I & II (Sacred Books of the Buddhists Vol. XLVI). The Pali Text Society, Oxford, 1997. xxvi, 673 pp. ISBN 0-86013-320-6.

In volume I (cf. IJ 40, pp. 271-273) Peter Skilling announced a second volume containing an introduction and commentary. The present volume contains parts I and II of volume II. Parts III and IV (commentary and appendices) will follow later. Part I (pp. 1-220) comprises five chapters: 1. Mahāsūtras and Other Sūtra Lists; 2. Mahāsūtra as Rakṣā; 3. Tibetan Mahāsūtras: General Remarks; 4. Translators and Translation; 5. Transmission of the Mahāsūtras in Tibet. Part II (pp. 221-613). Part II is entitled "Introductions to Individual Mahāsūtras". Skilling points out that the introductions are to be read with the original texts and the Commentary. Of course, a complete view of the entire work will only be obtained after the publication of the translation volume.

When reading this volume one is overwhelmed by the mass of information it contains. Skilling seems to have read not only many Pali and Sanskrit texts but also numerous Tibetan texts not studied before by other scholars. As to Chinese sources Skilling has used existing materials in translation and has been helped by several kalyānamitras. If he had examined Chinese materials on the same scale as the Indian and Tibetan materials this volume would probably have been even more voluminous. The bibliography enumerates a great number of secondary publications but does not comprise all those mentioned in the notes.

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In his chapter on the transmission of the Mahāsūtras in Tibet Skilling points out that the Mahāsūtras were originally introduced in Tibet as a group for they are listed as such in the early ninth century IDan dkar catalogue. Later on they were scattered but were reunited by Bu ston in different order in the 14th century, in the catalogue section of his History of Buddhism. However, the Tshal pa Kanjurs kept only seven together whereas in other available Kanjurs the Mahāsūtras remain dispersed in different volumes (cf. pp. 179ff.). This simple fact shows how complicated the transmission of texts in Tibet was. Skilling draws important conclusions from this fact as to the nature of the different Kanjurs.

As to the single Mahāsūtras Skilling in each case enumerates the different versions in Tibetan, Sanskrit, Pāli and Chinese; citations; references to the text; title; classification of the text; comparison of sources; conclusions as to the significance of the sūtra and its role in Buddhist literature. Skilling pays particular attention to technical terms, and, for instance in the case of Mahāsūtra I Māyājāla-nāma-mahāsūtra, referring to many texts he examines such terms as the three trainings (*sikṣā*), the four *viparyāsa*, the four *kāyagrantha* and the *samyojana*. He then studies the two groups of six similes found in the text. Finally, he draws attention to the phraseological relationship of the text to three well-known Mahāyāna texts: the Śālistamba, Saṃdhinirmocana and Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtras. In other places Skilling discusses the school-affiliation of Aśvaghōṣa (pp. 295-296), studies the *yamakaprātihārya* (pp. 303-315) and King Bimbisāra and his role in Buddhist literature (pp. 316-326). On the Amitāyur-dhyāna-sūtra (p. 325, n. 253) see now the magisterial study by Jonathan Silk, 'The Composition of the Guan Wuliangshoufo-jing: some Buddhist and Jaina parallels to its narrative frame', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 25 (1997), pp. 181-256. In his study of *dhvajāgra* Skilling examines the meaning of *agra* and *dhvaja* (pp. 444-458). A long excursus is devoted to determining the meaning of the technical term *saṃjñā* (pp. 477-480). On pp. 538-542 Skilling discusses female deities. There is in this volume such an embarras de richesses that one can mention only a few items. It is to be hoped that a detailed index will be given in one of the forthcoming volumes.

On p. 336 Skilling lists under the abbreviation TBW a translation of the Cūlasuñnata-sutta (Majjhimanikāya 121). However, it is not to be found in the list of abbreviations.

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Ute Hüsken, *Die Vorschriften für die buddhistische Nonnengemeinde im Vinaya-Piṭaka der Theravādin* (Monographien zur indischen Archäologie, Kunst und Philologie, Band 11. Dietrich Reimer Verlag, Berlin, 1997, 519 pp. DM 148.00. ISBN 3-496-02632-4.

Ute Hüsken's book contains a comprehensive study of the rules for nuns in the Vinaya-piṭaka and the Samantapāsādika. All Pāṭimokkha rules for nuns in the Bhikkhūṇī-vibhaṅga and the commentary in the Samantapāsādika are carefully translated. The rules in Cullavagga X are also translated.

The rules for nuns were already translated by Isaline Horner in volumes III and V of her translation of the Vinaya-Piṭaka. However, Hüsken's book contains much more than a translation. She systematically compares the rules for nuns with similar rules prescribed for monks and explains the differences between the two sets of rules. In many instances, she is able to trace the development of the rules for the nuns and to elucidate the structure of their Pāṭimokkha.

For each rule Hüsken gives the text according to the edition of the Pali Text Society and between parentheses variant readings from Oriental editions. In the notes she quotes and translates the ancient commentary (*padabhājanīya*) and the relevant passage of the Samantapāsādika. She refers to the antecedents (*vatthu*), the casuistry (*antarāpatti*) and the formula of absence of transgression (*anāpatti*) as much as necessary to understand the rule. In her own commentary she refers to other rules and Vinaya texts that may shed light on the rule discussed. After having studied the rules in a group one by one Hüsken compares the rules for nuns and monks as to form and content. In the case of the Pācittiya rules the comparison of the content, subdivided in many sections (a–u), takes up no less than 35 pages (pp. 293–328). A final chapter summarizes the rules for nuns and the comparison of the rules for monks and nuns. The book concludes with a detailed bibliography, an index locorum and an index verborum.

Hüsken's book is an impressive achievement. Her work supersedes all preceding studies of the Theravāda rules for nuns which she critically reviews in a chapter entitled "Forschungsgeschichte" (pp. 30–36) and to which she refers often. One of the works quoted is a Dutch thesis by Lulius van Goor: *De buddhistische non* (Leiden, 1915) which, being written in Dutch, is rarely referred to. In several instances Hüsken is able to correct previous translations and interpretations. The Samantapāsādika proves to be very useful for the interpretation of the rules, although Hüsken rightly points out that "So spiegeln manche der zusätzlichen

Erläuterungen des Kommentars wohl die zu der Zeit gängige Praxis wider, nicht jedoch die ursprüngliche Bedeutung einer Verordnung" (p. 28).

Hüsken shows that the eight *garudhammas*, mentioned in Cullavagga, X, 1, 4, are not the subject of the instruction for the nuns (pp. 452–458). She suggests that the eight *garudhammas* originally comprised the eight chapters of the Bhikkhuvibhaṅga. When for the first time women were admitted to the *saṃgha*, it was stated that Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī had to observe the eight *garudhammas*. It seems to me that the mention of the *garudhammas* here is clearly an anachronism and does not indicate that they refer to the eight chapters of the Bhikkhuvibhaṅga. For the compilers of the Cullavagga these eight rules were of such importance that they stated that they had to be observed by the first woman admitted to the *saṃgha*.

There are remarkably few misprints for a work of such complexity. In a reference to a Chinese text (p. 106, n. 221) read T 1435 [23] 307b9–11 for T 1453 [23] 30769–11. P. 31 for Heinrich Kern read Hendrik Kern (cf. p. 487).

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Christian Lindtner, *Hīnayāna. Den tidlige indiske buddhisme; Mahāyāna. Den senere indiske buddhisme*. Spektrum/Forum Publishers, Copenhagen, 1998. 228 pp.; 255 pp. ISBN 87-7763-170-6; 87-7763-174-9.

In the series *Verdensreligionernes Hovedvaerker* Christian Lindtner has published two volumes of translations of texts belonging to the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. According to the introduction to the volume on Mahāyāna it is the fruit of more than twenty years' work. Lindtner has published extensively both in English and in Danish. It is interesting to note that Danish scholars continue to publish important works in their native language whereas in other countries (for instance Holland) English has become the usual language used for scholarly publications.

The first volume contains a brief introduction on Buddhism and its significance in which Lindtner characterizes canonical Buddhism as a form of Bhagavat religion, Bhagavatisme. Other forms of Bhagavatisme are Jainism and the religion grown around Kṛṣṇa as known from the Bhagavadgītā. In all three religions the most central concept is that of *yoga*. The Bhagavat proclaims three forms of *yoga*: *jñāna-yoga*, *karma-*

*yoga* and *bhakti-yoga*. The first brings spiritual freedom. The second teaches that by following one's moral duties one obtains rebirth in the world of the gods. All forms of Bhagavatism agree that there exists a "person" who suffers and who with the guidance of a Bhagavat and by his own energy achieves spiritual freedom from suffering. We and the world are the product of our own karma and are not created by a god. According to Lindtner his interpretation of Buddhism as Bhagatavism can be summarized by the first ten stanzas of the *Ratnāvalī* (I, 1-10).

The introduction is followed by translations of the *Catuspariṣatsūtra*, the *Aggaññasutta*, the *Mahānidānasuttanta*, selections from the *Suttanipāta*, the *Sigalovādasutta*, selections from the *Udānavarga*, the *Śālistambasūtra*, Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*, the first four chapters of Āryadeva's *Catuṣṣataka*, Udbhaṭasiddhasvāmin's *Viśiṣṭastava* and Mārceta's *Mahārajakanīṣkalekha*. Lindtner points out that, although Āryadeva is a follower of Mahāyāna, there is nothing in the first four chapters of his work that cannot be accepted by a follower of Hīnayāna.

In the introduction to the *Catuspariṣatsūtra* Lindtner remarks that the New Testament contains reminiscences of the *Catuspariṣatsūtra* which has played a great role in the expansion of Buddhism in Central Asia. Although direct literary influence on the New Testament can not be proved, the indirect influence is all the greater. In the introduction to the *Aggaññasutta* (pp. 60-68) Lindtner discusses in more detail the relationship of Christianity and Buddhism. Paulus or Saul had made Jesus and Christus one, the first the historical Jesus, a mortal human being made of blood and flesh, the second an immortal being, a god with regard to the perishable body. The concept of a human being or a god with a double nature is typically Indian and is the fundamental idea in the concept of a Bhagavat: Buddha, Mahāvīra, Kṛṣṇa, etc. The Indian doctrine of the double nature of the Bhagavat has its roots in the ancient Vedic idea of the unmanifested One, which manifests itself as the transitory diversity of this world. In the course of time the concept of Brahma(n) arises, which unmanifested is known as Brahman, but as creator-god as Brahmā. Buddhists reacted against traditional Brahmanism with the privileged place of the brahmins, the appeal to the Veda as unfailing authority, the importance attached to rituals (especially blood sacrifices) and a creator-god. Likewise early Christianity reacted against the established Jewish priesthood. Lindtner states that according to his principle these the basic ideas in New Testament Christendom can be considered as belonging to a Judaised Buddhism (*judaiseret buddhism*).

As to the *Aggaññasutta* it contains very old themes and must be read together with such Vedic hymns as 10.129 and 10.90. In the sections 1-9 the Buddha appears as a spokesman for an aryan reformation. He advocates purity in deed, word and thought. The true brahman is the personified Dharma. The following sections (10-25) describe the Buddhist doctrine of evolution of the world and society which in many respects goes back to old Vedic ideas. The good men observe with grief the decline of the Dharma (sections 26-32). The ideal Buddhist man, the aryan aristocrat, possesses perfect knowledge and conduct (section 32). This is the definition of a Bhagavat and of Tathāgata as Buddha. The Tathāgata is the person sought in *Rigveda* 10.129.6. He is the one who has known Dharma and his is the one who has proclaimed Dharma. According to Lindtner Buddhology and the comparative study of religion show that fundamental New Testament ideas on belief, sin, suffering, guilt, resurrection, justice, love for one's fellow-men, the kingdom of heaven, etc. for a great part derive from Indian sources. Finally he suggests some of the criticisms modern Buddhists would be able to make with regard to Abraham's three religions: Christendom, Judaism and Islam.

In his introduction to the translation of the *Śālistambasūtra* Lindtner points out agreements with the pre-Socratic philosophy and compares the Indian doctrine of karma with the Socratic doctrine of *arete, virtus*.

The volume on Mahāyāna begins with a brief characterisation of the main features of Mahāyāna (p. 8) and the later philosophical schools: The *Madhyamaka* and the *Yogācāra*. Lindtner remarks that in Mahāyāna ethics compassion is central. The following texts are translated in this volume. *Upālipicchāsūtra*, chapter nine of the *Samādhirājasūtra*, the *Prajñāpāramitāstotra*, the *Prajñāṣataka* (according to Lindtner compiled by Nāgārjuna), the *Prañidhānasaptati*, Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā*, Dignāga's *Alambanaparīkṣā*, chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9 of Bhavya's *Madhyamakahrdaya*, Atiśa's *Satyadvayāvatāra* and Atiśa's *Vimalaratnalekha*. Several translations are based on previous publications by Lindtner. For instance, his translation of the *Prañidhānasaptati* is based upon his edition of the Tibetan text in *Asiatische Studien* 38 (1984), pp. 100-128. For the *Satyadvayāvatāra* see his article "Atiśa's Introduction to the Two Truths, and its Sources", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 9 (1981), pp. 161-214. The pièce de résistance in this volume is the translation of seven chapters of the *Madhyamakahrdaya* (pp. 118-241). Lindtner published several articles on the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* attributed to Bhavya (cf. p. 109). He published the Sanskrit text of the fifth chapter of the *Madhyamakahrdaya* in *The Adyar Library Bulletin*

59 (1995), pp. 37–65 and the Sanskrit text and an English translation of the ninth chapter in *Studia Indologica* 4 (1997), pp. 91–123. His translation of the seven chapters is based upon his not yet published critical edition of a unique Sanskrit manuscript from Tibet. In his introduction he summarizes the contents of all eleven chapters (pp. 110–117).

Lindtner's translations are all done from the original texts in Pāli, Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese. In several instances, his interpretation disagrees with previous translations. I hope with my limited knowledge of Danish to have given some idea of the contents of these two volumes which contain many original ideas and translations of several texts not found in other anthologies. It is to be hoped that an English version of this important work will be published soon.

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Mark Allon, *Style and function. A study of the dominant stylistic features of the prose portions of Pāli canonical sutta texts and their mnemonic function* (Studia Philologica Buddhica, Monograph Series XII), The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, Tokyo, 1997. [VIII +] 394 pp.

As the main features of Pāli grammar and technical vocabulary are now fairly well known, more attention tends to focus on the stylistic idiosyncrasies of the Buddhist canonical texts, especially on the use of standard phrases or passages, with a view to determine their function, hence their origin and their role in the composition and transmission of the canon.

In fact, stylistic considerations have not been absent from the Pāli tradition: some of the most prominent facts have been summarized in a masterful analysis by Helmer Smith, in the *Saddanīti. La grammaire palie d'Aggavaṃsa* (Lund, 1949, IV, Tables, E, p. 1120 ff., in particular Sections 5.3.1, 6.1.1.3, 6.1.3.1 ...). In recent years, however, interest in Pa. stylistics has been further enhanced in the wake of Milman Parry's and his successors' research on the linguistic definition of the "formula" and on "the formulaic nature of the oral and written 'literatures' belonging to a diverse range of traditions ... (motivated in part by the fact that the presence of formulas was seen to be indicative of oral composition, or, at least, as vestiges of a previous oral tradition)" (M.A., p. 10). This general problematic is the starting point of the present

investigation by M.A. who, given the nowadays assumed "initial oral status of Buddhist texts" (p. 1), proposes a thorough analysis of a well encompassed Pa. corpus, with the aim to formalise and quantify some of the most important stereotypes of this well established Buddhist canon.

The present book includes three main "Studies", the investigation bearing on three prominent stylistic features of the prose portions of Pa. canonical texts (Intr. p. 7): it is necessarily restricted to a limited (though representative) corpus, the *D(īgha)N(ikāya)*, or "Long Corpus" (the first collection of the *Sutta-piṭaka*), conveniently edited in the Pali Text Society Series (3 vol., 1890, 1903, 1911, altogether covering 904 pages). The first Study takes into account the whole DN (34 suttas), the second and the third concentrate on one sutta, the 25th, the *Udumbarika-sihanāda-sutta* (PTS ed. vol. III, pp. 36–57, the reasons for the choice are not stated). The first Study "looks at the use of formulas and the standardisation of the diction. The second is an analysis of the tendency to proliferate similar word elements and units of meaning ...". The third "analyses repetition within one sutta of the *Dīgha-nikāya* and attempts to quantify this internal repetition" of the *Udumbarika-sihanāda-sutta* (reproduced with the necessary adaptations pp. 276–286 of the present volume). One important purpose of the book is "to attempt to determine whether early Buddhist texts were initially composed in an improvisatory manner or were designed as fixed texts which were to be memorised and transmitted verbatim" (p. 8). Study 1 and 2 provide approaches to the answer, which results more precisely from the third monograph, where it is emphasised that "it is difficult to see how the gross repetition quantified in Study 3 would function within a tradition of composition-in-performance ... this gross repetition must be understood to have had an important mnemonic function and ... it provides evidence that these texts were designed to be memorised". Various other factors should also be taken into account, including the fact that this canonical "material was performed communally, as well as individually and privately" (p. 365 f.).

As a matter of fact, Study 3, "Repetition in a Pāli Sutta Text" (pp. 273–363) considers how large units and blocks of text – thus not only formulas, but whole passages – happen to be repeated either verbatim or with various slight (sometimes more important) degrees of modification: M.A. thus distinguishes five types of quantifiable repetitions (see the Tables, p. 339 ff.). The *Udumbarika-sihanāda-sutta* having been scanned into a word processor (word count: 5871, cf. p. 274 f.), it appears that 30% of this sutta consists of passages repeated



verbatim, whereas 35% involve repetition with minor modifications. Repetitions of structure type are also taken into consideration (as well as cases of abbreviations, p. 364 ff.), finally leading to the conclusion that "repetition is undoubtedly a mnemonic device", and can be seen as a very strong indication "that these texts were designed to be memorised and transmitted verbatim" (p. 357 ff.). Conducted as it is, this third Study is original and culminates in a far-reaching conclusion. Whether this is immediately accepted or not, in any case it would be worth investigating whether other suttas, not only of the DN, but also of other *nikāyas* are based on such a high proportion of repeated blocks of text.

New as it is, Study 3 is nevertheless closely connected with "Study 2: The proliferation of similar word elements and units of meaning to form sequences or 'strings' in the prose portions of Pāli Sutta Texts, the tendency to arrange the units within such sequences according to the number of syllables of each – the waxing syllable principle (WSP) – and the sound and metrical similarities integral to these structures" (pp. 191–272). In this section also, the *Udumbarika-sihanāda-sutta* is thoroughly and exhaustively scrutinised. Though some philological implications are signalled here and there, it is conducted from a stylistic and literary perspective, with a view to determine the function of the rhythmical patterns that are convincingly – sometimes even shrewdly – isolated and analysed. According to M.A., they in particular have a mnemonic function, act as an organisational principle, and "this study indicates that the choice of words and their arrangement was heavily influenced by the fact that these texts were composed and transmitted orally" (p. 252). Should it be concluded from this study that, as we have it, the *Udumbarika-sihanāda* is composed in a conventional, or even artificial language? The question is not raised here, and the general linguistic laws which could explain how the prosodic patterns that are shown to be so prominent in this sutta arise are only cursorily referred to (p. 192, to which could be added Wackernagel (-Debrunner), *Altindische Grammatik* II 1, p. 166 ff., Nachträge p. 50 f., ubi alia; H. Smith, *Saddanīti*, l.c.; on prosody and linguistics, id., "Les deux prosodies du vers bouddhique", *Bulletin de la Société Royale des Lettres de Lund*, 1949–1950, pp. 1–43, specially p. 9 f.; S. Insler, "Rhythmic effects in Pali morphology, *Die Sprache*, 36.1, 1994, pp. 70–93). Nor are the traditional Indian views considered (for which see M.G. Dhadphale, *Synonymic collocations in the Tipitaka: a study*, Poona 1980, BORI, Government Oriental Series Class B, No. 12). On the other hand M.A. rightly draws attention to metrical patterns "of loose *vedha* type" (p. 246 ff.) that are seen to occur also elsewhere in the canon, at the beginning of paragraphs or

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important sections of texts, "and it may be that such metrical sections functioned to establish a certain rhythm to the chanting". He even discusses some possible "emendations" that would help restore such a 'vedha' rhythm (but in several cases one has to reckon simply with the common discrepancy between orthography and pronunciation, cf. pp. 205, 247 ...). Finally, drawing attention to similar features in the Jain *Ardhamāgadhī* canon, M.A. proposes "an analysis of a comparable Jain text", viz. of passages of the "*Aupapātika-sūtra*" (Amg. *Uvavāiyya-sutta*) and of the *Aṇuttarovavāiyya-dasāo*, giving a "stock-description of arahats" (Appendix 2, pp. 266–272). It is not certain that precisely these *Ardhamāgadhī*/Jain *Māhārāṣṭrī* passages are strictly "comparable", given the fact that the alleged Jain passages are hagiographic portrayals. But the suggestion is interesting (cf. A. Mette, "Vedhas in Lalitavistara und Divyāvadāna. Beschreibungen des schönen Körpers in Sanskrit und Prakrit", WZKS, XVII, 1973, pp. 21–42, ubi alia). Further it is clear that similar rhetoric devices and rhythmic patterns are to be found in both the Pa. and the Amg. canons: in particular "strings" of synonyms of the type Pa. *pāna-bhūta* (pp. 220, 245 f.) have counterparts in the many Amg. sequences of the type *pāna bhūya jīva satta, sijjhai bujjhai muccai pariṇivvāei*, etc. (W. Schubring, *Drei Chedasūtras des Jaina-Kanons*, Hamburg 1966, ANISH 11, p. 69 f.). Moreover, if the "vedhaic" pattern is as prominent as M.A. suspects, it could be asked whether it does not reflect – exaggerate (?) – an authentic linguistic tendency of the contemporary Middle Indo-Aryan. Such a conclusion could even be deduced from note 13, page 268, on "an old formulaic line" of the "*Ācārāṅga Sūtra*": M.A. points to a "loose *vedhaic* pattern", and challenges the view of Schubring who had classified it as "prose style", evidently by contrast with the many various versified sequences that he had detected and analysed in this old text.

The first Study, the longest of the three (pp. 9–190), is a detailed analysis of "the use of formulas or standardised phrases in Pāli sutta texts: approach formulas in the *Dīgha-nikāya*". The monograph is divided into two parts: "Part 1: the formulas used to depict someone approaching the Buddha, a *bhikkhu*, or another person, and a *bhikkhu* approaching the Buddha or another *bhikkhu*" (pp. 18–111), "Part 2: the formulas used to depict the Buddha approaching someone and a *bhikkhu* approaching someone other than the Buddha or another *bhikkhu*" (pp. 112–166). This typological study is conducted with utmost care, with many tables to summarise and quantify the various occurrences of the relevant formulas. In fact, in spite of the numerous variations that are analysed (cf. the references pp. 168–190), it appears that the

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been seen from several papers. Also new epigraphical material and rare manuscripts have been discovered and are presented in several papers. In the field of Buddhism papers on philosophy take a large place, cf. the papers by Cabezón, Chu, Dietz, Dreyfus, Francó, Iwata, Kapstein, Kellner, Moriyama, Muroji, Namai, Ono, Samten and Yoshimizu. Several papers deal with the Tibetan language, cf. Dhogon Sangda Dorje, Hahn, Potapova and Verhagen.

Only one paper is devoted to the history of European Tibetology: Bernard Le Calloc'h, Léon Feer et la tibétologie. According to the author there are only a few publications on Feer. He does not list them and enumerates only a few of Feer's publications without bibliographical details but with a few errors. It is perhaps useful to mention the detailed bibliography compiled by Marcelle Lalou in *Bibliographie bouddhique*, Volume two (Paris, 1931), pp. 1-17 and the one published by Shinsho Hanayama in his *Bibliography on Buddhism* (Tokyo, 1961), pp. 219-221. There is only one paper on medicine, cf. Aschoff-Peters-Tashigang-Bhatt, and one on Hippology and Hippiatry, cf. Maurer.

There are numerous papers in other fields and one must advise all those interested in any aspect of Tibetan studies to consult these two volumes which contain so much important and recent information.

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*The Dating of the Historical Buddha/Die Datierung des historischen Buddha*. Part 3 (Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung, IV, 3). Edited by Heinz Bechert (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philologisch-historische Klasse, Dritte Folge Nr. 22). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1997. VI, 171 pp. ISBN 3-525-82419-X.

Volume III is the final volume of the *The Dating of the Historical Buddha*. Heinz Bechert summarizes the state of the discussion eight years after the 1988 symposium: Einleitung: Stand der Diskussion acht Jahre nach dem Symposium (pp. 1-14). He rejects Richard Gombrich's recent attempt to date the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha in the year 404. In his most recent publication Gombrich repeats his theory and dates the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha about 405 B.C. and adds "it is worth noting that nobody has yet found a flaw in my argument" (*Kindness and Compassion as Means to Nirvana*, Amsterdam, 1998, p. 8). Bechert

points out that "die chronologischen Spekulationen im fünften Kapitel des Dīpavaṃsa in keiner anderen Quelle auch nur die geringste Stütze finden, so dass ihr Wert als historische Quelle überaus fragwürdig ist" (p. 6). Bechert discusses critically also the theories of Narain, von Stietenron and other scholars and concludes that most probably Buddha's death took place later than previously assumed by most scholars, namely in the period between 420 and 350. Claus Haebler examines the linguistic problems connected with the Roman Twelve Tables, the *Leges XII tabularum* and shows that it is impossible to obtain reliable dates from linguistic changes and the lapse of time in which they take place: Sprachwandel und Datierung. Erwägungen eines Sprachhistorikers zum Problem der Datierung der Lebenszeit des historischen Buddha (pp. 14-18). Hisashi Matsumura contributes a Bibliographical Survey of Information on the Dates of the Buddha in Some Ancient Sanskrit Buddhist Sources and Their Translation (pp. 19-41). Matsumura has a long note on *pañcavārsika* (p. 30). To the literature, mentioned by Matsumura, one must add the exhaustive study by Max Deeg: Origins and Development of the Buddhist Pāncavārsika, *Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism. Sambhāṣā* 16 (1995), pp. 67-90; 18 (1997), pp. 63-96. Sven Bretfeld is the author of an Index der in Symp IV 1-2 besprochenen Stellen aus der Pāli-literatur (pp. 42-48). Marcus Günzel gives an Übersicht über Angaben zur Datierung des Buddha im chinesischen buddhistischen Kanon (pp. 49-55). The following article: Bibliographical Information on the Dates of the Buddha in the Records of the Chinese Pilgrims in India and Sri Lanka (pp. 56-70) is based on a collection of material prepared by Junko Matsumura. Chapter V of the *Lo-yang-chia-lan-chi* relates the travels of the pilgrims Sung-yün and Hui-shēng. Matsumura mentions the translations by Neumann, Beal and Chavannes of this chapter but not the recent translation of the entire work by Wang Yi-t'ung, *A record of buddhist monasteries in Lo-yang*. Princeton University Press, 1984 (cf. *Revue bibliographique de Sinologie* III, Paris 1985, p. 235). There are also several recent annotated editions of the text (cf. S. Behrsing, *OLZ* 80, 1985, Sp. 299). The Selected Bibliography of Secondary Literature Concerning the Dates of the Historical Buddha and Buddhists Chronologies up to 1995, by Heinz Bechert (pp. 71-118) is arranged in alphabetical order and lists 650 publications. It is a pity that the bibliography is not arranged in chronological order so that one can follow the growth of the literature. Bechert mentions four publications by Kern, two with the Christian names Jan Hendrik Caspar and two with the Christian name Heinrich. As far as I know Kern always published

under the name H. Kern and it would be advisable to use this name in referring to his publications. This is the name printed on the title-page of his *Manual of Indian Buddhism*. German authors often wrongly give him the Christian name Heinrich. I have not seen the German translation of his *Geschiedenis van het Buddhism in Indië*. However, according to the bibliography in Jacobi's *Kleine Schriften*, it bears the name Hendrik Kern. His full name is Johan Hendrik Caspar Kern. The Documents Concerning the History of Research contain four texts: an extract from E. Burnouf et Chr. Lassen: *Essai sur le pali, ou langue sacrée de la presqu'île au-delà du Gange*, Paris 1826, pp. 46–65; an article by E.J. Thomas, Theravādin and Sarvāstivādin Dates of the Nirvāṇa, *B.C. Law Volume*, Vol. II, Poona 1946, pp. 18–22; an extract from Ernst Waldschmidt, *Der Buddha über die künftige Entwicklung der buddhistischen Lehre* (Sanskrit-Sondertext III des Mahāparinirvāṇa), pp. 216–217 and the Siamese text and English translation of an extract of a book by Phlu Luang on the Dates of the Buddha, pp. 299–306 (cf. p. 156). Addenda et Corrigenda to volumes 1–2 conclude the book (pp. 163–171).

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OLLE QVARNSTRÖM

STABILITY AND ADAPTABILITY: A JAIN STRATEGY FOR  
SURVIVAL AND GROWTH

INTRODUCTION

The Jain tradition does not possess any other comprehensive handbook on Jainism comparable to the *Yogaśāstra* and its auto-commentary, the *Syopajñāvṛtti*, of Hemacandra (A.D. 1088–1173).<sup>1</sup> Authors such as Haribhadra have mainly provided us with more specialized studies in the Jain doctrine and its fundamental principles.<sup>2</sup> In the capacity of an authoritative description, the *Yogaśāstra* not only holds a prominent position among the Jains, but is also acknowledged as such by non-Jains. This is evident from the fact that in the standard Vedāntic doxographical work, the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* of Śāyana Mādhava, the section on Jainism (*Ārhatadarśana*) is mainly based upon the first four chapters of the *Yogaśāstra*.<sup>3</sup>

For the historian of religion, the value of the *Yogaśāstra* is evident not only in its serving as a source of information on *which* doctrines in the Śvetāmbara canonical scriptures (*śruta*)<sup>4</sup> and exegetical tradition (*sampradāya*) were considered orthodox in the 12th century, but more importantly, in the fact that, as a *summa* of Jain dogma, it testifies to the cumulative nature of Jainism.<sup>5</sup> However, as a spokesman of a religious tradition, Hemacandra leaves us with an entirely non-historical survey of his tradition and its basic tenets; Jainism is pictured as a fixed system (*siddhānta*) of timeless and continuous truth, and not as a product of history. This ahistorical approach to religious thought could be seen as an expression of Indian self-awareness and the Indian view of tradition and traditional knowledge.<sup>6</sup> It is also connected with the notion of an unbroken tradition, and, consequently, does not accept any development or change within the tradition itself, to say nothing of any additions introduced by the author himself. On the contrary, Hemacandra tries to convince the reader of his objectivity by explicitly distinguishing between his true (*samyak*) account of the canonical and traditional teachings, and his own personal understanding of Jainism.<sup>7</sup> But from a historical perspective Hemacandra, in transmitting doctrines from the Śvetāmbara canon and tradition, also – unconsciously or not – tacitly

perpetuates the inclusion of non-Jain material which was incorporated by the Jains during the formation of their axiomatic doctrines, and during the continuous changes which the traditional dogma underwent prior to the time of Hemacandra.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, the author of the *Yogasāstra* integrates innovations of his own<sup>9</sup> as well as doctrines from non-Jain sources.

The fact that Jain authors such as Hemacandra consciously adopted material from non-Jain sources, despite the obvious peril of being accused of heresy (*mithyātva*) by the Jain community (*samgha*), as well as of undermining the stability and credibility of the Jain tradition, indicates the importance these authors ascribed to such a stratagem. The position of the Jain community, at least of those members who valued orthodoxy and orthopraxis on equal terms, must have been that any teaching which claimed to be Jain had to be in conformity with what it perceived as the true impact of the canonical scriptures.

In order to avoid this risk, Hemacandra, as well as many of his Jain colleagues, tried to adopt foreign material in a way which made them, nonetheless, look like true Jains in the eyes of the congregation and the surrounding religious communities. In the following we shall explore one possible motive behind such a conscious eclecticism by considering it as an expression of an overall strategy for survival and growth.

#### A TOLERANT ATTITUDE

In the 10th century *Yaśastilaka* of the Digambara Somadeva, Yaśodhara's mother, a mouth-piece of the Brāhmanical orthodox position, expresses her fear for her son's future:

Ah, now the Jaina wind seems to have taken possession of my son. These Jains are difficult people to deal with, because like thieves, they beguile the minds of men, though long protected by the doctrines of other schools. Once the mind is imbued with their ideas, Brahman itself cannot divert it into other channels.<sup>10</sup>

This quite tendentious statement regarding the activities of the Digambara Jains of southern India does not reflect the skill with which the Jains, on the whole, propagated their teaching during the medieval period. From their 'non-violent' perspective, the way of converting anyone was not by one-sided (*ekānta*), dogmatic force, but through leniency towards non-Jain practices. Jains had to respond skillfully to the religious heritage of potential converts, or at least not ideologically offend or humiliate people of other faiths. Consequently, without endangering their own fundamental principles, and their moral and disciplinary vows, they tried to make 'ideological room' for potential converts, who

could not completely discard their former beliefs and practices. Thus, even though Jainism, as any other religion, preferred to welcome those who had deliberately adopted its faith, it tried to show considerable leeway to converts who were unable to abandon their religious heritage entirely. *Ergo* – in the language of Somadeva – they should be given a "mixed reception" (*miśrānumāna*).<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, throughout its history, Jainism was willing to let some aspects of lay activity, such as marriage, follow local customs (*deśācāra*), whereas in matters related to salvation, the Jain *dharma* should be observed.<sup>12</sup>

However, such a liberal and noncommittal stance is not only found as part of a missionary strategy, or ancient custom, it is also discernible in texts which deal with the examination of [other] ideologies (*dharmaparīkṣā*), as well as in philosophical treatises (*sāstra*). Despite the fact that the intent behind these texts, composed by authors such as Amitagati and Haribhadrasūri, is often fundamentally the same as the one behind the notion of *miśrānumāna*, these texts display a rather neutral attitude with relatively few normative or idealizing implications.<sup>13</sup> Jain philosophers by and large seem to be less critical, or, affirmatively speaking, more 'understanding' towards dissidents than their Buddhist and Brāhmanical colleagues.<sup>14</sup> This is amply displayed by a comparison of doxographical texts belonging to the Mādhyamika, Vedānta and Śvetāmbara traditions.<sup>15</sup>

One way in which Jain philosophy seems to have conceptually captured and defined such an attitude of tolerance<sup>16</sup> is as the doctrine of *anekāntavāda*. This was instrumental in both protecting the conceptual consistency of Jainism – including the canonical scriptures, which as an embodiment of the irrefutable and catholic truths of the Tīrthaṅkaras could not encompass any anomalies – and allowing a certain flexibility on the part of the dogma. The *anekāntavāda* signifies both an ontological theory of the manifold nature of reality (*nayavāda*) and a philosophical methodology.<sup>17</sup> The latter is called the doctrine of "Maybe" (*syādvāda*), or the "Seven-limbed Predication" (*saptabhaṅginaya*),<sup>18</sup> and states that no philosophical statement may be taken as absolutely valid. This did not imply, however, that the Jains were "yes-men", since it demanded that seven different perspectives (*naya*) should be included in any ontological statement. If one were excluded, the statement was rendered invalid. The fact that the Jains, through such theories of perspectives, were both difficult to influence, and, at the same time, sympathetic towards others, made them perhaps also better equipped to cope with matters challenging their survival and growth.<sup>19</sup>

## OPPOSITION AND ABSORPTION

One example of how the Jains consciously adopted material of a foreign provenance in order to update their dogma and thereby attract new converts, as well as to keep the congregation intact, may be gathered from their response to the various devotional schools. According to Jaini,<sup>20</sup> these socially and politically powerful movements, which flourished from the fourth or fifth century onwards, constituted a potential threat to Jainism, not only owing to their attractive force, but also because they actually sought to deprive Jainism of its self-identity. The response of the Jains took the form of both opposition and absorption.

The suggestion of the Vaiṣṇavas that Rṣabha, the first Jain Tīrthānkara, was an incarnation of Viṣṇu,<sup>21</sup> was met with serious opposition from the Jains.<sup>22</sup> Hemacandra in his *Yogaśāstra* attacks the moral character of Viṣṇu and his *avatāras*, depicting Viṣṇu as a false god (*adeva*, *kudeva*), incapable of leading mankind to liberation. In contrast to the Tīrthānkaras, who are bereft of passion, hate and delusion, Viṣṇu is depicted as someone devoted to women, weapons and rosaries. His immoral character shows itself as well in his violation of the vows of celibacy (*brahmacarya*) and non-violence (*ahiṃsā*), and in losing his composure through distractions such as dancing (*nṛtya*), gaiety (*aṅghāsa*) and music (*saṅgītā*).<sup>23</sup>

The other approach of the Jains to the devotional movements, that of absorption, is illustrated by the production of Jain Epics and Purāṇas.<sup>24</sup> In the Jain versions of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata*, the main *dramatis personae*, Rāma and Kṛṣṇa, are subjected to Jain moral standards. Accordingly, the Jains did not jeopardize their doctrinal identity, since the stories were cast in a Jain mould; the notion of a supreme God never developed within Jainism. According to Jaini, the Buddhists failed to respond adequately to a similar threat. They neither explicitly refuted the notion of Buddha as an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu, nor did they make any attempts to assimilate the popular Hindu deities into Buddhist mythology.<sup>25</sup>

A similar attitude to that of the Jains, however, is found within the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition prior to this event. The Mādhyamika philosopher, Nāgārjuna (2nd century A.D.), not only tried to match Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika notions of *apavarga* to the Buddhist *nirvāṇa*, but also attempted to absorb the deities of popular religion (Brahmā, Indra, Viṣṇu, Rudra, etc.) by interpreting them as emanations of the Buddha.<sup>26</sup>

Another salient feature of Jain absorption or inclusiveness, as a competition nosed by the devotional trends,

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were the goddess cults. As shown by Cort, however, these were not simple rituals including Hindu goddesses.<sup>27</sup> There is extensive textual, archaeological and epigraphical evidence for the presence of *bhakti* in the earliest strata of the Jain tradition.<sup>28</sup> The goddess cults became important during the medieval period as the Jain component of the *bhakti* movement. The goddesses inhabiting the Jain cosmos, particularly Jvalāmālīnī and Padmāvatī, were subjected to an extensive Tantric cult.<sup>29</sup> The former inhabited as a *vidyādevī* the middle world (*tiryakloka*) of the Jain cosmos, whereas the latter, being a *yakṣā*, occupied the lower world (*adhholoka*).<sup>30</sup> The *Vidyādevīs* administered the magic spells (*vidyā*), the usage of which was condemned by the Jain canon and the tradition until the 4th or 5th century, since they were not instrumental in bringing about liberation.<sup>31</sup> This very reason, which worked against the employment of *vidyās*, became with the appearance of Tantrism one of the substantial arguments in support of their usage. They formed as it were part of a "Jain Mantravāda"<sup>32</sup> without being in conflict or interfering with the orthodox path to liberation.

The adoption of goddesses into Jain doctrine and worship can be viewed as a conscious adoption in order to meet the challenges from the flourishing *bhakti* movements, thereby preventing Vaiṣṇava and Saiva devotional movements from influencing the Jain laity.<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, it did not imperil the singularity or doctrinal stability of Jainism, since neither the cult practice itself nor the goddesses were capable of helping anyone to attain liberation. They were regarded as mere spirits, who were inferior even to the Jain mendicants, and whose capabilities were restricted to the worldly sphere. Furthermore, the fundamental doctrine of the non-human (*apauruṣeya*) origin of the world was never in danger of being synthesized with Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava doctrines of a supreme divinity. According to Jaini, this was the case with the doctrines of the Buddhists. Through the notion of *bodhisattvas*, they were subjected to such a synthesis.<sup>34</sup>

Despite the fact that Hindu Tantrism and Jainism were conceptually incompatible, the Jains were therefore able to adopt certain Tantric elements by regarding Hindu Tantrism as basically a system of different means (*sādhana*), not for the attainment of liberation (*mokṣa*), but for merely mundane objectives (*bhukti*). It was therefore possible for the Digambaras to adjust to the prevailing devotional trends in their religious environment by adopting gods and goddesses, who were then made the objects of Tantric worship. Goddesses were not foreign to Śvetāmbara doctrine and practice either as demonstrated in Hemacandra's *Triṣaṣṭīśalākāpuruṣacaritra*.



## STRUCTURAL AND TERMINOLOGICAL ADOPTION: JAIN AṢṬĀṄGAYOGA

Early Jain canonical meditation (*dhyāna*) was no more than an adjunct to asceticism (*tapas*). As such it constituted only one aspect of a more general attempt to stop all physical and mental activity, and thereby effect liberation from rebirth and suffering.<sup>35</sup> However, during the medieval period, meditation appears not only to have held a more prominent position within the soteriological scheme of Jainism, but was also subjected to Śaiva influence at the close of the 11th century. This resulted in a notable change, considering the relatively independent position of Jain meditation in comparison to Buddhism, which, at least in matters of structure and technical terminology, was more dependent on the Brāhmanical tradition. This change of scenes must be viewed in light of the growing interest in the practice and intellectual understanding of meditation, displayed by the surrounding Brāhmanical and Buddhist traditions. Consequently, the Jains adopted foreign elements in order to compete with their fellow participants in the pan-Indian philosophical and religious discussion on this topic, without, however, sacrificing a strong sense of separateness and identity in terms of ideology.

What is possibly the earliest surviving detailed portrayal of a path to liberation is found in the *Ācārāṅgasūtra*.<sup>36</sup> According to this text, the most essential aspect of the path is austerity. The same is true for the slightly later *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra*, even though meditation is advocated for the termination of karmic matter.<sup>37</sup> Therefore, at the time of the composition of these canonical texts, the practice of meditation constituted a comparatively minor aspect of Jain soteriology. For a more exhaustive description, we have to address the later *Sihānāṅgasūtra*, which introduces four types of meditation, termed *ārta*-, *raudra*-, *dharma*- and *śukla-dhyāna*.<sup>38</sup> These were then systematized by Umāsvāti in his post-canonical *Tattvārthasūtra* (4–5th century A.D.)<sup>39</sup> and formed as part of the three jewels (*ratnatraya*) – correct knowledge (*samyagjñāna*), true faith (*samyagdarśana*) and proper conduct (*samyakcāritra*) – integrated components of the path to liberation (*mokṣamārga*).<sup>40</sup>

An examination of the composition of the *Yogasūtra* shows that Hemacandra synthesized divergent and independent Jain doctrines, such as the twelve vows (*vratā*) and the thirty-five qualifications of a layman (*śrāvakaḡuna*), and systematized them according to the eightfold path of the *Yogasūtra*.<sup>41</sup> The Jain path to liberation was thus changed structurally into an eightfold path of Brāhmanical provenance with which

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the Śaivites of Gujarat, as well as king Kumārapāla (A.D. 1143–1172),<sup>42</sup> certainly felt closely associated.

The “Jain” eightfold path to liberation may be construed in the following concise manner: As a precondition of entering the path, the layman has to meet the requirements posed by the thirty-five qualifications (*guṇa*) or duties (*dharma*) of a householder (*grhastha*).<sup>43</sup> The first and the second step, *yama* and *niyama*,<sup>44</sup> corresponds to the “three jewels” (*ratnatraya*): correct knowledge, faith and conduct. The first two “jewels” involve developing a certain degree of understanding of the basic principles of Jainism (*samyagjñāna*) and an inclination towards these principles (*samyakdarśana*).<sup>45</sup> The third jewel, which is related to correct conduct, amounts to the observance of the twelve vows.<sup>46</sup> If the layman, in addition, cultivates generosity and compassion,<sup>47</sup> and complies with the prescripts of a special daily routine,<sup>48</sup> he is considered an *exceptional* layman (*mahāśrāvaka*).<sup>49</sup> He may now formally become a mendicant (*sādhu*) by accepting the five great vows (*mahāvratā*).<sup>50</sup> However, it is not sufficient for the mendicant – whether recently recruited or not – to understand and believe in the basic principles of Jainism and to act in accordance with the different vows. He has to know, believe and behave *correctly*. For this the mendicant needs to be constantly in touch with their common source, the Self (*ātman*). Only through this eighth step is it possible to eliminate suffering, which is basically the result of the ignorance of Self, caused by *karman*.<sup>51</sup> Consequently, *dhyāna* must be complementary to *tapas*. However, there are several preconditions of *dhyāna*, constituting the intermediate steps between asceticism and meditation. First of all the yogic postures (*āsana*) have to be mastered,<sup>52</sup> the breath has to be controlled (*prāṇāyāma*),<sup>53</sup> then the senses must be withdrawn from their objects (*pratyāhāra*), and finally, concentration (*dhāraṇā*) needs to be cultivated. *Ergo*, the eight “steps” or “limbs” (*aṅga*) of the path deal in broad outlines with the individual’s relation to the environment (*yama*), with his inner mental and physical cultivation (*niyama*), with his bodily limbs (*āsana*) and his breath (*prāṇāyāma*), with the relationship between his senses and their objects (*pratyāhāra*), between his senses and his mind (*dhāraṇā*), his mind and his Self (*dhyāna*), and with his actual Self (*samādhi*).<sup>54</sup>

Nonetheless, Hemacandra’s attempt to organize the preconditions and precepts of an ideal way of life within the framework of an eightfold path, classically formulated by Patañjali, and used by the Brāhmanical as well as the Tantric traditions, seems to be no more than window dressing. Jain *aṣṭāṅgayoga* amounts in substance to a mere reorganization and change of centre of gravity. The division of the path within the

shape of the "three jewels" (*ratnatraya*) could very well be kept intact by categorizing *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma*, etc., under the third jewel, proper conduct (*samyakcāritra*). The objective is also familiar; through cosmetic changes, leaving the very core of Jain doctrine unaffected, to harmonize with the ideological environment and thereby appease the laity as well as attract new members.

#### STRUCTURAL AND TERMINOLOGICAL ADOPTION: JAIN TANTRIC MEDITATION

The last eight chapters of Hemacandra's *Yogaśāstra* (V–XII) include elements which in substance derive from the post-classical yoga tradition. However, part of these 'new' elements are presented by Hemacandra as 'old' in order to integrate them with the orthodox practice of virtuous meditation (*dharmadhyāna*).<sup>55</sup> Consequently, the *Yogaśāstra* deals with the subject of *dharmadhyāna* in a manner different from the canonical scriptures and the exegetical tradition by appending four additional subvarieties to the classical four.<sup>56</sup> This extended version first occurs in Śubhacandra's *Jñānārṇava*.<sup>57</sup> Hemacandra, who either acquired his information from this 10th century Digambara philosopher or from the same source as the latter, was then the first author to introduce it within the Śvetāmbara tradition.<sup>58</sup> He was thereby also instrumental in prolonging its footing within Jainism because of the normative status which the *Yogaśāstra* came to hold in the future.<sup>59</sup>

Analogous with the canonical and traditional versions of *dharmadhyāna*, the supplementary practice introduced in the *Yogaśāstra* requires a fourfold support (*ālambana*) for its performance, termed *pinda*, *pada*, *rūpa* and *rūpātīta*. The first kind of meditation is accordingly designated *pindasthadhyāna* and consists in the visualization of material objects (*pinda*). *Padasthadhyāna*, on the other hand, involves the mental repetition of holy syllables (*pada*), whereas *rūpasthadhyāna* encompasses a process of identification with the external nature (*rūpa*) of the enlightened Jina. Finally, *rūpātītheadhyāna* deals with a similar process, now in relation to the intrinsic nature of the Jina. The latter is said to result in a state of identity between the subject, object and process of knowledge, wherein the inner Self (*antarātman*) merges into the supreme Self (*paramātman*). However, it is not equivalent to siddhahood, for which the subsequent *śukladhyāna* is required.<sup>60</sup>

The question then arises, where do we find such a terminology and does it also display an underlying pattern which it was possible for Hemacandra to adopt without being regarded as unorthodox by the Jain

community? Considering that Śaivism for centuries had dominated the religious scene of Gujarat, and that during the time of Hemacandra Śaivism was strongly influenced by the pan-Indian vogue of Tantrism, an appropriate basis for our investigation of these terms would be to look into the Kashmirian Śaiva tradition. This was first suggested by A. N. Upadhye, and later by Muni Jambūvijaya and R. Gnoli. But this is not an easy task due to our scant knowledge of the Tantric tradition and the unintelligible nature of its textual corpus.<sup>61</sup> Fortunately, we have at our disposal the *Tantrāloka* of Abhinavagupta (11th century A.D.), which is an invaluable source of early Tantric thought, ritual and literary history. Our textual selection is substantiated by the fact that Gujarati Jain authors were familiar with the intellectual achievements of Kashmir, and more significantly, that Hemacandra in his work on Sanskrit poetics, the *Kāvyaṇuśāsana*, quotes Abhinavagupta extensively. Abhinavagupta<sup>62</sup> and his commentator Jayaratha, in their elaboration of the terms *pindastha*, *padastha*, *rūpastha* and *rūpātīta*, appear to describe – without necessarily attaching it to a specific philosophical or theological position – a formal structure of meditation, including four different states of meditation which are analogous to four states of consciousness.<sup>63</sup> Such a 'phenomenology of meditation' underlies various Śaiva and Śākta texts, especially those belonging to the Kaula lineage.<sup>64</sup> Besides the *Tantrāloka* and the *Ṭikā* of Jayaratha,<sup>65</sup> we find the same terminology and formal structure in texts such as the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra*, the *Yoginīhrdayatantra*<sup>66</sup> and the *Kubjikāmatatantra* (11–15th century).<sup>67</sup>

The common objective of the exegeses of these terms seems to be the integration of theories of different states of meditation with the terminology and structure of the Upaniṣadic doctrine on the four states of consciousness, thereby maintaining doctrinal continuity with the Vedic revelation (*śruti*). If we consider the account given in the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* as paradigmatic,<sup>68</sup> the texts under consideration appear to say that the well-known Upaniṣadic nomenclature of four different states (*avasthāna*) of consciousness, waking (*jāgrat*), dream (*svapna*), sleep (*śuṣupta*) and the "fourth" (*turya*), in their systems are merely given alternative names, just as in classical texts such as the *Gaudapādīyakārikā*.<sup>69</sup> *Jāgrat* is designated *pindastha*. *Svapna* is termed *padastha*. *Śuṣupta* is rendered by *rūpastha*, and *turya*, finally, is titled *rūpātīta*.<sup>70</sup> The first three states of consciousness are characterized by a duality between the subject and the object of knowledge, whereas the fourth is without duality. The method of attaining these states involves the visualization of or identification with various "intentional objects", ranging from physical (*pinda*) to immaterial entities.<sup>71</sup>

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the survival of the non-Vedic *śramaṇa* traditions, such as Jainism and Buddhism, during their formative periods. They needed an active support in order to acquire the material wealth, and the increase in status, which was the net result of royal support. Since the Buddhists and the Jains operated in the same geographic area, they would often compete for such *largesse*.<sup>78</sup> However, in this respect, the Buddhists seem never to have constituted a threat to the Jains, and because of their distinctive conceptual differences, the latter were also never attacked or influenced by the Buddhists.

Throughout history, the Jains appear to have been skilled in procuring kingly advantages, which may have to do with their methods of internally and externally directed propaganda. The peaceful and propitious settlement in Magadha (present Bihar) seemed to have ended at the same time as the history of India began to be better known to us through the newly-opened connection with the Western world, as a result of Alexander the Great's renowned march towards the East. Shortly after the Macedonian invasion, which perhaps coincided with the death of Alexander (323 B.C.), Candragupta came to power. His empire covered almost the entire Indian subcontinent, except for southern Deccan, and there are certain indications that during his reign there emerged a Brāhmanical counter-offensive against the steadily growing sects; neither Jainism nor Buddhism seem, therefore, to have been encouraged by those in power. With the conversion of Candragupta's grandson, Aśoka, to Buddhism, the Jains slowly moved away from Magadha and by the 5th or 6th century the Digambaras were settled in modern Maharashtra and Karnataka, and the Śvetāmbaras in Gujarat, Rajasthan, and Punjab. This was the situation throughout the major part of the medieval period. It was not until the 11th and 12th centuries that the renaissance of Śaivism in south India – especially in the form of Viraśaivism – and the reorganization of the Vaiṣṇavism by Rāmānuja, along with the expansion of Islam in the north, shattered by the flourishing Jain communities and forced them to retreat geographically into their present area of concentration.<sup>79</sup> From the 14th century onwards, the Jains had lost their relations with those in power, and were reduced to the role of a dispersed and no longer missionizing minority.

If we leave aside the possible personal reasons for Kumārapāla (or for that matter an Aśoka, or a Constantine) to become a convert, royal patronage seems to have been of importance even during medieval times, if not for the immediate survival of Jainism, at least for its growth. This is indicated by the fact that the Śvetāmbaras experienced a 'golden age' during the reign of Kumārapāla. This former Śaivite

king not only personally converted to Jainism under the influence of his preceptor and advisor Hemacandra, but also offered recognition to Jainism in Gujarat during his reign, promulgating, for example, state ordinances in accordance with Jain ethics. However, with the Muslim invasions, the happy times came to an end, and once the dynasty was restored Śaivism again prevailed.

#### CONCLUSION

Every minority is forced to develop means of survival and growth, as a group and as an ideology. One may either pursue a localizing, exclusive, 'defensive' strategy, in which one sets up high walls around one's own system, and leaves everything else outside that system as something that is other, thereby recognizing the autonomy of the 'other', or a cosmopolitan, inclusive, 'offensive' strategy of incorporating other within a totalizing system, in some ways thereby denying the autonomy of the 'other'. Hemacandra and his associates seem to have advocated a strategy that lies between these two extremes. The main feature of this was to adopt material from outside – such as terminology, ideas and organizing principles – in a manner which would not jeopardize or oppose what were then perceived as the fundamental principles of Jainism. Elements borrowed or appropriated were therefore viewed as surface features, in no way compromising the basic tenets of Jainism. In other words, one was open to change, but not at the expense of one's fundamental doctrines. The decisive reason for Jain authors to deliberately incorporate such novel elements seems to have been to propagate more effectively their religion within and outside the Jain community. If Jainism had not been brought into conformity with the prevalent religious and philosophical requirements of the intellectual and socio-political milieu, it would have faced the immediate danger of being absorbed or overshadowed by various Brāhmanical systems. This would have been an impediment to proselytizing activities as well as to the cohesion of the congregation, leading eventually to the disintegration of Jainism. The balance between doctrinal stability and adaptability brings to our attention a recurrent pattern in the history of religions.

The process involved in the formation of any orthodoxy implies the requirement of conformity of the traditional exegesis to the dogma of the canonical scriptures. When new ideas are introduced into a tradition they are often presented or just tacitly incorporated as if they were old or original. For one reason or another they have been lost or forgotten,

The question is now whether the terminological similarities between these Tantric texts, on the one hand, and the *Yogasāstra*, on the other, are merely arbitrary, or if there is a fundamental pattern which ties the different arguments in the textual passages together. This would provide us with at least a plausible, or hypothetical, explanation of why we find such a non-Jain terminology in the very *summa* of orthodox Śvetāmbara Jainism. First of all, we have to be aware that the terminological resemblances are not that extensive. If we compare the nomenclature related to the subcategories of *pinḍa*, etc., we find differences both among the Tantric texts, and between any one of these texts and the *Yogasāstra*. Still, the possibility of a purely terminological transference is not unlikely. There are many instances of the Jain appropriation of extraneous terminologies or manipulation of verbal ambiguity for the sake of overcoming doctrinal differences and thereby acquiring a better position to effectively propagate their own ideology.<sup>72</sup> However, if we try to extract the basic pattern underlying the various elaborations of *pinḍa*, *pada*, *rūpa* and *rūpāṅga*, we may, in light of the notion that the four successive meditational states are compatible with four states of reality, define such a pattern in the following manner: In the first three states, the object, process and subject of knowledge, respectively, predominate, whereas in the fourth they coincide. If we assume hypothetically that the *Yogasāstra* not only adopted a terminological sequence from a Tantric text similar in content to any of those mentioned above, but also borrowed the formal structure constituted by these terms, we may view the four alternative subvarieties of *dharmadhyāna* as four meditational practices. These may then involve a gradual process of identification with material and immaterial objects, resulting in four distinctive states of consciousness. In *pinḍasthadyāna*, the object of knowledge is predominant since it involves the visualization of extentional objects. *Padasthadyāna* relates to the usage of *mantras*, thereby emphasizing the process of knowledge. *Rūpasthadyāna* consists of identification with the inner nature of the Jina, thereby gravitating around the subject of knowledge. Lastly, *rūpāṅgasthadyāna* deals with the assimilation of the inherent nature of the Jina, which Hemacandra describes in Tantric terminology as a state of identity (*samarasibhāva*) or an act of identification (*ekikaraṇa*) between the subject, object and process of knowledge.<sup>73</sup>

One of the reasons why we find such material in the *Yogasāstra* likely has to do with a Jain response to Śaivism in Gujarat. However, this must have originated prior to Hemacandra since part of the discussed material is also found in the 11th century *Jñānārṇava* of Śubhacandra.

What complicates the matter is that inscriptional evidence indicates that the major brand of Śaivism in Gujarat during the rule of the Solanki kings, from Mūlarāja (942–96) to Jayasimha Siddharāja (1094–1143), was Pāśupata. Hemacandra seems to have been aware of this state of affairs, and gives a derogatory account of Pāśupata morals, etc., in the *Svopajñavṛtti*.<sup>74</sup> The adoption of Kashmirian Śaivite elements directly or indirectly through the *Jñānārṇava*, accordingly, may not reflect an overall Śvetāmbara embracing of such elements, but may be a textual feature with strategic implications. Hemacandra's motivation for including these elements in his presentation of what he considered to be orthodox Jainism may therefore have been neither purely didactic, nor for the sake of encyclopedic completeness, *apropos* the subject of *yoga*. Instead, he may have anticipated future advantages in including material familiar to the cultural heritage of his employer, the newly converted king Kumārapāla.

The later *Yogasāra* of *Yogīndradeva* (or *Yogīndu*)<sup>75</sup> and the commentary by Śitalaprasādaji, as well as the *Tattvārthasārādīpaka* of Sakalakīrti (15th century), display different versions of this basic account given by the *Yogasāstra*, at least if we can rely on the accounts given by Tukol and Bhandarkar.<sup>76</sup> Similarly there are different versions among the Tantric texts. In addition to the general theme of these texts, the *Yoginīhrdayatantra* and *Kubjikāmatatantra* relate *pinḍa*, *pada*, *rūpa*, and *rūpāṅga*, to the different *cakras* or spiritual centres located in the subtle body (*liṅgasarīra*), according to Tantric physiology. The latter text also identifies the terms with the four main *pīthas* of their goddess.<sup>77</sup>

Both the Śaivite and the Jain texts, therefore, display a recurrent pattern within the history of religion: The disconnection of a structure from its collateral doctrinal content, serving the purpose of supporting one's own doctrines. This structure, or way of organizing material, may then become part of the standard repertoire of how a tradition presents its ideology. It then becomes mandatory of any teaching which wants to be affiliated with the tradition. If a specific teacher's *own* ideology or the *principal* ideology of the tradition has undergone any change, it should still be organized according to the set structure.

#### ROYAL PATRONAGE

Finally, let us consider the role which royal patronage played in the Jain struggle for survival and growth. A tolerant and benevolent attitude towards all religions on the part of royalty dates from ancient times in India. Nevertheless, such a mere acceptance was not sufficient for

- 26 See Lindtner 1982: 250, nn. 197–98. Cf. also the bodhisattvas Gadgadasvara and Avalokiteśvara as described in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarikāsūtra*, chs. 23 and 24 respectively.
- 27 Cort 1987: 235–36; Jain/Fischer 1978, pt. II: 20–29.
- 28 See Cort (forthcoming) "Expanding the Field of Vision: Bhakti in the early Jain Tradition".
- 29 The most significant texts of the cults of Padmāvatī and Jvalāmālīnī, and thereby the most important Digambara contributions to Tantric literature are the *Jvalāmālīnīkalpa* by Indranandin (10th century) and the *Bhairavapadmāvatīkalpa* by Malliṣeṇa (11th century). The main concern of the latter is the practice of magic rites by means of *mantras* and *yantras* in relation to the goddess Padmāvatī. The text is edited with Bandhuṣeṇa's commentary by K. V. Abhyankar in Jhavery 1944: 1–74. Editions of some other, minor texts on the worship of Padmāvatī and other Jaina goddesses are also found in Jhavery 1944. Cort (1987: 245–246) draws our attention to the description of the "six acts" (*ṣaṭkarman*) in the *Bhairavapadmāvatīkalpa*. These acts, which together constitute the Tantric *kāmya* ritual, are identical to those described in Hindu Tantric texts, except for one, the rite of liquidation (*maraṇa*). In accordance with the vow of non-harm (*ahiṃsā*), the Jains often replaced this with the rite of attraction of women (*stri-ākṛṣṭi*). Similarly, when the Jains adopted the five Brāhmanical *mahāyājanas*, they avoided components involving animal sacrifice. See Handiqui 1949: 333.
- 30 On Jain *yakṣī* workshop granted the status almost equivalent to that of Jinās, see Jaini 1991: 196–97.
- 31 Cort 1987: 237–38.
- 32 YŚ V-XI *passim*.
- 33 See Jaini 1991: 196.
- 34 Jaini 1980: 36.
- 35 See Bronkhorst 1986: 29–41. On early Jain meditation, see also Bronkhorst 1993: 151–55; Cort 1991: 391–99; Bruhn 1987.
- 36 *Ācārāṅgasūtra* I. 8 (7). 2-8/228–253. See Bronkhorst 1986: 29–31.
- 37 *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra* XXIX. 27, 37.
- 38 *Sihāndāṅgasūtra* IV.1.61–72. Cf. Schubring 1978: 314. According to Bronkhorst (1986: 41, n. 20), these four types of *dhyāna* may have been derived from the *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra* XXX. 35. For a summary, see Tatia 1951: 285–290; Jaini 1979: 254–256. The Jains seem to have a very wide definition of meditation, at least compared to the classical exegesis of the *Yogasūtra* (YSū) III. 2. Cf. Dundas 1992: 144; Bronkhorst 1993: 151. The two first types of meditation, *āria* and *raudra*, were by the canon and the exegetical tradition considered not commendable. Cf. the Buddhist concept of the ten impurities (*asubhā*) in the *Samyuttanikāya* IV. 111; V. 320.
- 39 Dundas 1992: 74.
- 40 TAS IX. 29: *ārtaraudradharmyaśuklāni | pare mokṣahetū ||*.
- 41 SV V. 1 refers to YSū II. 29. On the correlation between the organizing principle of Patañjali and that of Haribhadra, see Bronkhorst 1993: 156.
- 42 On Kumārāpāla, see Majumdar 1956: 89–125, 314–319.
- 43 YŚ I. 47–56.
- 44 YŚ/SV IV. 34; III. 130: *yama = mālaguṇas = 5 aṇuvratas, niyama = uttaraguṇas = 3 guṇavratas and 4 śikṣāvratas*.
- 45 YŚ I. 15–17. The seven basic principles (*tattva*) are: the sentient (*jīva*), the insentient (*ajīva*), karmic flux (*āsrava*), stoppage of karmic influx (*saṃvara*), dissociation of bound karman (*nirjarā*), bondage (*bandha*) and liberation (*mokṣa*).
- 46 The twelve vows include the five minor vows (*aṇuvrata*), the three complementary

- vows (*guṇavrata*) and the four educational vows (*śikṣāvrata*). See YŚ II. 18–115; III. 1–88. The *aṇuvratas*, which were modeled on the five *mahāvratas*, are identical to *yama* as defined in YSū II. 30. The five major vows of the mendicant (*mahāvrata*) are attested in the second book of the *Ācārāṅgasūtra* (4–5th century A.D.). Cf. Jacobi 1989: xxii ff.; *Tattvārthasūtra* VII. 5–6; YSū II. 30.
- 47 SV III. 119. The layman should out of devotion (*bhakti*) share his wealth in the following "seven fields" (*ṣeṭra*): Jain images (*jinabimba*), temples (*bhavana*), scriptures (*āgama*), male mendicants (*sādhu*), female mendicants (*sādhvī*), laymen (*śrāvaka*) and laywomen (*śrāvika*). He should also out of compassion (*dayā*) give to the non-Jain needy.
- 48 YŚ III. 121–147.
- 49 SV III. 119; Cort 1989: 306–340, 315, n. 19.
- 50 YŚ I. 25–46. If the layman is approaching the end of life, he should take the vow of ritual death (*saṃlekhaṇā*), after which he lives in heaven for aeons and attains liberation within eight lifetimes (YŚ III. 148–154).
- 51 YŚ IV. 3–4.
- 52 Cf. YSū II. 46 with Vyāsa's commentary. The postures described in YŚ IV. 124–136 are all found in *Gheraṇḍasaṃhitā* II. 1–45 and *Hathayogapradīpikā* I. 18–55.
- 53 Cf. YSū I. 34; II. 49. YŚ/SV (V. 1–3; VI. 1–5) opposes the idea of *prāṇyāma* as a means to enlightenment. Nonetheless, it may be helpful in improving one's physical health (*kāyārogya*) and determining one's longevity (*kālañjāna*). The doctrines and terminology found in YŚ with respect to *prāṇyāma* are definitively postclassical. The combination of breathing exercises and mantras, for example, which we find in Mādhyama's *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* and in the *Yogasārasamgraha* of Vijñānabhikṣu, not to speak of the different Hathayoga treatises, are not testified in classical texts on yoga. YŚ also presents breathing exercises which are definitely Tantric. As far as terminology goes, technical terms such as *pūraka*, *recaka* and *kumbhaka*, are not attested, according to Tuxen (1982: 153), in any text prior to Vācaspatimīśra's and Bhoja's commentaries on YSū. However, Tuxen may have overlooked Bhavya's *Mādhyamakaratmapradīpa* in which these terms occur based on earlier sources.
- 54 The treatment of *pratyāhāra* and *dhāraṇā* in YŚ VI. 6–8 follows YSū II. 53–54, III. 1. Hemacandra describes, however, the preconditions of meditation differently in YŚ IV. 1–123. This delineation suggests that the *aṅgas* should be regarded as 'limbs' rather than 'steps', as if the body of *yoga* consists of eight limbs which develop simultaneously. Hemacandra explains that, in order to acquire knowledge of the Self (*ātman*), the passions (*kaṣāya*) have to be controlled. This is only possible if one controls the senses (*indriya*), for which mental purity (*manasuddhi*) is required. The latter is obtained once attachment (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*) is eliminated through equanimity (*samaiva*). Equanimity results from non-attachment (*nirmamatva*), which in turn results from contemplation (*bhāvanā/anuprekṣā*). Equanimity and meditation are mutually interdependent and to even attempt to practise meditation without equanimity is nothing but mockery, according to Hemacandra (cf. *Bhagavadgītā* III. 6). After this description, Hemacandra urges the adept to cultivate benevolence (*mairī*), appreciation (*pramoda*), compassion (*kāruṇya*) and tolerance (*mādhyasthya*) as a direct means of assisting with respect to the practice of meditation. See YŚ IV. 118–123; TAS VII. 11. The *brahmavihāras* seem to be very old aspects of Indian yoga and probably belong to the earliest Brāhmanical and Buddhist practice. See for example YSū I. 33; *Abhidharmakośa* VIII. 196–203. Compare the *bhāvanā/anuprekṣā*s with the eight first Buddhist *anussatis*: *buddha-*, *dhamma-*, *saṅgha-*, *stīla-*, *tyāga-*, *devatā*, *ānāpānasati-*, and *maraṇa-anussati* (*Aṅguttaranikāya* I. 30).
- 55 In the same manner, Somadeva in his *Yasastilaka* tries to legitimize various

but have now been rediscovered and reintroduced into the tradition. By means of such a reintroduction of ideas which from our historical perspective are new or at least partly new, but from the point of view of tradition are considered old, the tradition considers itself as being reformed in accordance with the impeccable (*orthos*) doctrines (*doxa*) of the basic scriptures. In this way it has been "purified" from heterodoxy which in the course of time had become a part of its teaching.

The integration, from our perspective, of something new may be an unconscious act; a particular author may, for example, uncritically transmit materials from the previous stages of the tradition, including the canonical scriptures, unaware of its ideological origin, or, more likely, in the firm belief that his tradition does not encompass any fundamental changes. It may also be a conscious act necessitated by various kinds of external challenges in order to propagate one's teachings and thereby maintain one's economical, social and political position. Furthermore, it may serve the purpose of keeping the religious community intact by updating its doctrines in accordance with the intellectual and religious milieu. The tradition must therefore reconcile, on the one hand, the demand for doctrinal stability in order to conform to the absolute truths stated in its canonical scriptures and, on the other hand, whenever and for whatever reasons this stability is endangered, the adaptation to new situations in order to survive and grow.

Through the integration of a new element or – as a matter of perspective – reintroduction of an old, the foundation is laid for the advent of a future reformation of the current tradition. History frequently documents the need on the part of a later representative to once again purify the teaching from what he views as 'heterodox' elements but which his predecessor(s) may have viewed as orthodox elements. The concepts of stability, adaptability, integration and purification seem, therefore, to be valuable tools for the historian of religion in order to outline the survival and growth of a religious tradition and its underlying mechanics.

#### NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> The present author is preparing an annotated English translation of the *Yogasāstra* (YŚ) in the light of the *Svapajñavṛtti* (SV). For a biography of Hemacandra, see Bühler 1889.
- <sup>2</sup> On the date and doxographical scholarship of Haribhadra (8th century A.D.), see Qvarnström 1996.
- <sup>3</sup> See Nakamura 1968.
- <sup>4</sup> Bruhn (1981: 11–12) draws our attention to the difficulties involved in the distinction between a 'canon' and 'exegetical' works. However, in this paper such a distinction is based on how the Jain Śvetāmbara tradition, as reflected in the scholarship of one

of its representatives, viewed this matter, not on historical-critical considerations. On scripture and continuity in the Jain tradition, and the concepts of "scripture" and "canon", see Dundas 1992: 53–73; Folkert 1989; 1993: 35–83, 85–94.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Carrithers 1990.

<sup>6</sup> Halbfass 1988: 350.

<sup>7</sup> YŚ XII. 1: *śrutasiṅdhora gurumukhato yad adhiṅgataṃ tad iha darśitaṃ samyak / anubhavasiddham idānim prakāśyate tattvam idam amalam* // "I have here [in the preceding eleven chapters] correctly explained that which was obtained [by me] from the ocean of the scriptures and from the mouth of [my] teacher. In the following [twelfth chapter], I will describe the [same] pure reality proved to me by [my own] experience". Cf. YŚ I. 4.

<sup>8</sup> The adoption of Buddhist doctrines is mainly restricted to Jainism as a systematic philosophy (*darśana*). Despite the fact that a faint Buddhist influence may be detected in the scholarship of Jain authors, such as Kundakunda and Umāsvāti, Jainism was not considerably influenced by Buddhism until the fifth or sixth century A.D. By that time, e.g., the *pramāṇa*-theories belonging to the epistemological school headed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti had obtained admission into Jainism as testified in Siddhasena's *Nyāyavāitāra*.

<sup>9</sup> Hemacandra's inventive ability is displayed in YŚ III. 121–47. Based upon Haribhadra's *Dharmabindu*, he introduced a "daily routine" (*dinacarya*), designed for the layman, but including the six obligatory duties of a mendicant (*āvāśyaka*). Furthermore, the list of thirty-five *śrāvaka-guṇas*, which were to serve as the preconditions of receiving the twelve vows of a layman, as well as the systematization of the seven fields (*kṣetra*) of charity (*dāna*), were also Hemacandra's creations. See Cort 1991: 391–392, 394 with n. 12, 395–396.

<sup>10</sup> Handiqui 1949: 318.

<sup>11</sup> Handiqui 1949: 254, n. 2.

<sup>12</sup> YŚ I. 48. Cf. Somadeva's distinction in his *Upāsakādhyāyana* 477 (quoted by Jaini 1991: 188; Lath 1991: 27–29) between *laukika*- and *pāralaukika-dharma*.

<sup>13</sup> See Halbfass 1979: 199, 201, n. 23.

<sup>14</sup> See Halbfass 1980: 349–368; Qvarnström 1989: 98–101.

<sup>15</sup> On doxography in India, see Folkert 1975; 1993: 229–409; Halbfass 1988: 349–368; Qvarnström 1996.

<sup>16</sup> On the issue of understanding and tolerance, see Folkert 1993: pts. II–III (esp. 215–227).

<sup>17</sup> See Matilal 1981: 25.

<sup>18</sup> The *anekāntavāda* is not systematically formulated in the Śvetāmbara canon, even though faintly suggested in the *Bhagavatsūtra*. It is first with Mallavādin's *Nayacakra* (4th century A.D., see Wezler 1981: 359) that it becomes methodically expressed. See Dundas 1992: 197–200; Matilal 1981: 24–25. On the *nayavāda*, see e.g. *Syādvādamāñjarī* XXVIII.

<sup>19</sup> On the disappearance of Buddhism and the survival of Jainism, see Jaini 1980.

<sup>20</sup> Jaini 1980: 85.

<sup>21</sup> See Jaini 1977.

<sup>22</sup> There are exceptions though: Jinasena in his *Ādipurāṇa* (9th century A.D.) attempts to assimilate the tīrthaṅkara Ṛṣabha and various Hindu gods. See Dundas 1985: 187 with n. 181.

<sup>23</sup> YŚ II. 7, 49. Cf. Haribhadra's *Lokastatvanirṇaya* 23–31.

<sup>24</sup> See Cort 1993; Jaini 1993, 1977; Kashalikar 1970. In his article on Jain Purāṇas, Cort (1993) argues against the Jain Purāṇas being simply borrowings of Brahmanical narratives.

<sup>25</sup> Jaini 1980: 85.

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
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Thus, while Nāgārjuna does specifically raise objections in MMK I against various Buddhist theories of causation, the underlying dynamic of the chapter is the conflict between the two fundamental positions that the effect already exists in some sense prior to its being caused and that it does not, i.e., the positions prominently represented in Indian philosophy by Sāṃkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.<sup>8</sup> These two views are pitted against each other throughout. Thus *kārikā* 8: “There cannot be a condition of an existent or a non-existent thing. Of what would a

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Assuming that Nāgārjuna has the Sāṃkhya *satkāryavāda* in mind as the first alternative of *kārikā* 3, it seems easy to interpret *kārikā* 5 so that it does not commit the fallacy Hayes sees in it. *Kārikā* 5 reads:

na hi svabhāvo bhāvānām pratyayādiṣu vidyate /  
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Hayes offers as his initial translation:

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When the verse is read in this way, it is evident that the second statement in no way follows from the first; it only appears to in the original Sanskrit if one does not notice the shift in the meaning of *svabhāva*. However, the juxtaposition of the statements suggests that Nāgārjuna thought them to be logically connected. Hence, *kārikā* 5 appears to embody a fallacy.<sup>11</sup>

Now Hayes's construal of *svabhāva* in the first half of *kārikā* 5 as ‘causal independence’ would seem to be dictated by his construal, at the same time, of the expression *pratyayādiṣu* as a locative absolute, viz., ‘when there are causal conditions’. But suppose we were to follow

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JOHN A. TABER

ON NĀGĀRJUNA'S SO-CALLED FALLACIES:  
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH

In a recent contribution to the *Journal of Indian Philosophy* Richard Hayes examines what he takes to be certain fallacies in the argumentation of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (MMK).<sup>1</sup> The principal type of fallacy that Hayes believes himself to have identified is a fallacy of equivocation in which the term *svabhāva* is used in different senses in the premises and conclusions of arguments. While Hayes mentions at least one other fallacy that he believes Nāgārjuna to commit in the MMK, it is the use of *svabhāva* upon which he focuses and which indeed would be devastating to Nāgārjuna's philosophy were it in fact a fallacy. I shall argue in this paper, however, that Nāgārjuna employs *svabhāva* univocally, in the sense of 'nature', 'essence' or more exactly (but awkwardly), 'own-being', in the arguments in question. Moreover, I shall hold that the arguments that turn on this concept, in particular those in MMK I and XV, are not without plausibility, though they are certainly not immune to criticism, either.

In a final section of the paper I shall consider a further fallacy pointed out by Hayes as well as by a number of other scholars, which I refer to as "the principle of coexisting counterparts." In attempting to show that this, too, is not really a fallacy – at least not a fallacy in the way Nāgārjuna employs it in the MMK – I shall be obliged to consider the question of the interpretation of Nāgārjuna's philosophy as a whole.

Throughout the discussion I shall find it helpful to make references to other Western and Asian philosophical traditions. I hope that the justification of a comparative methodology will be self-evident in each case.


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*svato nāpi parato na dvābhyām nāpy ahetutaḥ /  
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No entities ever arise either from themselves, from other things, both from themselves and other things, or from no cause at all.

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Now Hayes's construal of *svabhāva* in the first half of *kārikā* 5 as ‘causal independence’ would seem to be dictated by his construal, at the same time, of the expression *pratyayādiṣu* as a locative absolute, viz., ‘when there are causal conditions’. But suppose we were to follow

other translators in taking *pratyayādiṣu* as a simple locative?<sup>12</sup> Then a completely different possibility presents itself, namely, that the first half of *kārikā* 5 is not a hypothetical statement but a categorical one: "There is no identity/own-being/essence of entities in the causal conditions . . ."

That could be taken to mean simply that entities do not exist in their causal conditions prior to arising.<sup>13</sup> Hence, with the first half of the *kārikā* Nāgārjuna would be elaborating his rejection of the Sāmkhya *satkāryavāda* stated in *kārikā* 3: entities cannot arise "from themselves. That is, they cannot arise from themselves because we do not perceive them in their causes. Causes have altogether different properties from their effects. A lump of clay, for example, may be the cause of a pot, but you can't carry water with a lump of clay!<sup>14</sup> Thus cause and effect are certainly different.<sup>15</sup> Construing the first half of *kārikā* 5 as an elaboration of *kārikā* 3 in this way, moreover, allows one to make a better sense of the continuative particle *hi* at the beginning of the verse. However, it also allows one to see that *svabhāva* is employed univocally in both statements of the verse, in the sense of 'own-being' or 'essence' or, following Hayes, 'identity'. Having, that is, stated in the first half of the verse that entities do not pre-exist in their causes, Nāgārjuna goes on to say in the second half that nothing different from them exists in them either. If the essence of the effect does not exist in the cause, then neither can that which is different from the effect (*parabhāva*). Hence, things can neither arise from themselves nor from other things. The refutation of the *asatkāryavāda* follows immediately from that of the *satkāryavāda*!

If any fallacy is committed in *kārikā* 5, then, it is not a fallacy of equivocation but rather the kind of fallacy Hayes identifies in *kārikā* 7,<sup>16</sup> namely, the fallacy – if it is a fallacy – that a thing cannot be a certain type unless its counterpart exists simultaneously with it. I shall call this the principle of coexisting counterparts.<sup>17</sup> Various scholars have noted that this principle is applied throughout the MMK. Nāgārjuna employs it here in *kārikā* 5 when he argues that there can be no *other* thing from which an entity arises if the essence of that entity is not already present, in contrast to which something *other* than it can be conceived; in short, if there is no *svabhāva* or "own-being" of the effect pre-existent in the causes, there can be no *parabhāva* or "other-being," either. In *kārikā* 7 Nāgārjuna applies this principle directly to the notion of cause itself: if the effect does not already exist, then nothing could count as its condition; for, it is implied, nothing can be conceived as a causal condition unless in contrast to an effect. So it would seem

that the effect must already exist in order for it to have a condition; a thing and its counterpart must exist simultaneously. But then, as he goes on to point out in *kārikā* 8, why is a condition needed at all? What would it do? Similarly, Nāgārjuna argues essentially in the chapter on time (MMK XIX) that the present is defined only in contrast to the future and the past, in which case past and future must exist now, in the present, in order for there to be a present. But then, obviously, the distinctions of time collapse. And so on.

It seems obvious that this reasoning is fallacious. But what exactly is the defect in it? Different scholars have characterized it differently. Charles Hartshorne suggests that it rests on a failure to see that although one thing exists only in relation to another, the other thing can exist independently of the first. "... I think about Caesar and Caesar is thought about by me. But whereas the relation attributed to me cannot be omitted from the description of me without obvious loss there is no scintilla of evidence that the supposed relation of being thought about by me was in Caesar."<sup>18</sup> He thus terms it "the fallacy of misplaced symmetry." Claus Oetke believes it to rest on a confusion of conditions of predication – what has to be the case for something to be considered an X – with conditions of reality – what has to be the case for something to function as an X. One might have to have the effect in view in order to consider something a cause, but the effect does not already have to be present for it to function as one.<sup>19</sup> Hayes, similarly, suggests that this sort of reasoning (specifically in its application to causation in *kārikā* 7) rests on a failure to distinguish "between saying that a thing exists at all and saying that it exists under a given description."<sup>20</sup>

I shall not quibble with these formulations. They all appear to be more or less on the mark. Yet I prefer the following analysis. The principle of coexisting counterparts appears *prima facie* to ignore the fact that a thing in the first instance is what it is by virtue of its inherent properties and is only secondarily related to its counterparts, whatever those may be.<sup>21</sup> A thing's being related to its counterparts can be said to be contingent in the sense that it derives from more basic properties that define the thing as such as well as other, external circumstances. Thus a dog is something other than a cat. But its being a dog is prior to whatever relation it may have to other creatures; it is a dog by virtue of the properties inherent in it. Only because it has those properties – and a cat has the properties that it has – is it *other* than a cat. Similarly, a woman is a mother of a child only secondarily. First and foremost she is a woman, and it is by virtue of her properties as a woman, as

well as other circumstances, that she is a mother. She does not depend on the child in order to exist as a woman.

Even if one were to conceive of a woman as essentially a bearer of children – as one might think of a seed as essentially the cause of a tree – that would not entail that she can only exist simultaneously with her offspring! This point was understood in Indian philosophy by the Naiyāyikas long before any modern scholars ever considered the matter. At Nyāya Sūtra II.1.8 ff. we find objections raised against the Nyāya concept of *pramāṇa* similar to ones developed in Nāgārjuna's *Vaidalyaprakarana*. One objection is that a *pramāṇa* is “not established in any of the three times [past, present, or future] (*traikālyāsiddheh*)” with respect to its *prameya* or object (NS II.1.8). That is to say, a *pramāṇa* cannot exist prior to its object; for then the cognition of the object would not be caused by the *prameya* (NS II.1.9). Nor can a *pramāṇa* exist after its object; for without a *pramāṇa* there could be no *prameya*, which by definition is that which is known by a *pramāṇa* (NS II.1.10). Finally, they could not exist simultaneously; for then whenever a *prameya* is given so will a *pramāṇa*, so that, multiple *prameyas* being given at once (for everything that exists is a *prameya*), there would be multiple simultaneous cognitions of them through their *pramāṇas* (NS II.1.11).<sup>22</sup>

Pakṣilasvāmin, commenting on this line of argument in his *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*, notes that the Mādhyamika fails to take it into account that something is referred to by a certain term not necessarily because it is actively functioning in a certain way, but because it has the capacity to do so. Something is called a *pramāṇa*, e.g., because it is, has been, or will be the cause of cognition. Thus one can refer to something as a *pramāṇa* even though it exists prior to its *prameya*. Similarly, someone is called a cook if he is able to cook, if he has cooked in the past and will cook again in the future, and not just if he is actively cooking.<sup>23</sup>

In sum, the principle of coexisting counterparts appears to embody a metaphysical mistake. It tells us that things exist only insofar as they are related to their counterparts – things opposite or correlative – moreover, to those counterparts only insofar as they exist concurrently. But ordinary experience tells us that both parts of this view are wrong. A thing is what it is by virtue of its positive, non-relational characteristics. Its being opposite to something else depends first and foremost on what it is (and what its opposite is). A thing's being cause of an effect depends on those properties inherent in it that determine that it yields a certain effect in certain conditions. But even if we conceive of a thing

under a certain description as standing essentially in relation to another thing, e.g., as its cause, that does not mean that its counterpart must exist concurrently. For it could stand in relation to a counterpart that is located in the past or the future, or indeed, to a counterpart that may never actually occur.

Let us grant, then, for the time being that the principle of coexisting counterparts is a fallacy, though I shall devote the entire last section of this article to the matter. Even considering that MMK I.5 and 7 express fallacious arguments insofar as they appeal to this principle, the basic point of the chapter that there is no coherent account of causation may still be valid. Indeed, there are clearly other arguments against causation in the chapter that do not appeal to this principle.

Certainly, if one thinks about the matter independently one immediately sees that there are serious problems with the *satkāryavāda*, i.e., the notion that the effect already exists in some sense in its cause. This model may fit certain types of transformation, in particular, cases in which there is an obvious continuity from cause to effect, e.g., when milk changes into curds. But it does not fit cases where such continuity is lacking, as when two gases combine to form a liquid. Nor does it fit the situation of one event causing another, as when a spark ignites an explosion or a *karman* gives rise to its *phala*.<sup>24</sup> However, the *asatkāryavāda* has its problems, too. It fits the phenomenon of emergence well, that is, the origination of something possessing properties not possessed by its constituents. It can also account for causal relations between events. But it does not fit cases of transformation, such as when milk turns into curds or a lump of clay is made into a pot. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this is that it would be a mistake to attempt to account for all types of causation in terms of just the one theory or the other.

Nāgārjuna knew well how to point up the shortcomings of both theories. Thus, again, *kārikā* 8 states,

*naivāsato naiva sataḥ pratyayo 'rthasya yuyate /  
sataḥ pratyayaḥ kasya, sataś ca pratyayena kim?!!*

There cannot be a condition of an existent or a non-existent thing. Of what would the condition of a non-existent [thing] be? And for something that exists, why is a condition needed?

The first half of the second line, “Of what would the cause of a non-existent [effect] be?,” at first glance seems to be another application of the principle of coexisting counterparts (already employed in *kārikā* 7), as if to say that something can be a cause only if its effect exists simultaneously with it. However, it also suggests another, more forceful argument against the *asatkāryavāda*, namely, that in certain types of



transformation the effect must exist in some sense prior to becoming manifest because an efficient cause must be able to operate on an existing substance. A potter, for example, requires an existing lump of clay out of which to fashion a pot. In such cases, if the effect in no sense existed prior to its origin, it could not be brought about by the functioning of its cause. Such an idea is expressed in *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* 9, which lists the reasons for the *satkārya* doctrine, by the expression, “because there is no making of that which doesn’t exist.”<sup>24</sup> The *Yuktidīpikā* explicates the idea with the following verse:

*asatvān nāsti sambandhaḥ kārakaiḥ satvasaṅgibhiḥ /  
asambandhasya cotpattim icchato na vyavasthitih //*

Because [according to the *asatkāryavāda*] [the effect] does not exist, there is no connection [of the effect] with the causal factors [that bring forth the effect from the cause], which are connected [only] with what [already] exists. And for one who considers there to be an arising of that which is without a connection [with causal factors], there is no fixing [of any relation between cause and effect].<sup>26</sup>

In other words, if the effect did not exist already in some form so that the various forces of efficient causation have something to work on, then the fully manifest effect would never emerge. On the other hand, it seems absurd to suggest that the effect already exists. That is the sense of the last statement of MMK I.8: if the effect already exists, why resort to a cause? What would a cause do?<sup>27</sup> So the *satkāryavāda* cannot be true, either. In sum, neither the *asatkārya*- nor the *satkāryavāda* seems valid.

A further argument against the *asatkāryavāda* is brought forward in *kārikā* 14:

*atḥasad api tat tebhyaḥ pratyayebhyaḥ pravartate /  
apratyayebhyo 'pi kasmāt phalaṃ nābhipravartate //*

If, though it does not exist [yet], it arises from those conditions, then why doesn't the result arise from things which are not [its proper] conditions?

That is to say, if cause and effect are not ultimately identical, what accounts for their necessary connection? If the effect arises from something different from itself, why from the particular thing that is designated its cause and not any other thing that is different from it? This is a quite cogent argument. Indeed, David Hume asked a similar question about causation.

This argument, also, was probably current in *Sāṃkhya* circles in Nāgārjuna's day. The third reason in favor of the *satkārya* doctrine that is stated in *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* 9 is *sarvasambhavābhāvāt*, “because

everything does not arise,” i.e., because not just anything arises from a certain cause but only a certain type of thing.<sup>28</sup>

Thus in the end the refutation of the two basic alternative theories of causation considered in MMK I does not seem far-fetched at all. In fact, it seems that Nāgārjuna made use of stock objections to those theories that were current in his day. His method in MMK I is simply to argue with those objections without really considering how the theories might be defended against them. Indeed, perhaps the most legitimate complaint to be made against Nāgārjuna in MMK I is that he does not make a conscientious effort to understand the facts that speak in favor of the theories he is criticizing or consider how the latter might be revised in response to the objections raised against them. Rather, with the first hint of a difficulty he wants to jettison an entire theory. In the end, Nāgārjuna in MMK I does not really seem to want to get at the truth.<sup>29</sup> In particular, it can be asked why he does not weigh the possibility of an intermediate position. His critique of the *satkārya*- and *asatkāryavāda* seems driven by the assumption that all types of causation must be explained by either theory. Yet it would seem most reasonable to adopt the position that some causal phenomena are explained by one theory, others by the other – i.e., to assert, not their conjunction, which is the third alternative rejected in *kārikā* I.3, but their disjunction. In fact, Abhidharma philosophers did not put all their eggs in one basket but appealed to a variety of types of causes in explaining phenomena. Of course, Nāgārjuna does not rest content with a critique of the two basic alternatives discussed above but also criticizes the four types of causes recognized in Abhidharma philosophy, which are stated in *kārikā* 4. This is considered to be an exhaustive list; the *kārikā* itself says, “there is no fifth kind.” Having refuted these four types, it would indeed seem that, at least for Buddhists, Nāgārjuna has refuted causation *berhaupt*.

Whether the refutations of these types of cause (*kārikā* 9–12) are final, of course, remains to be seen. At least one of the arguments, that directed against cause in the sense of “object of cognition” (*ālambana*) in *kārikā* 10, may appeal to the questionable principle of coexisting counterparts. The arguments of the other verses, however, are not without substance. Verses nine and twelve, interestingly, appeal to the idea that entities have no definable reality – they neither exist, do not exist, etc. – so that the very idea of one thing bringing another into existence, or being the condition of another's arising, is problematic. I shall consider this idea further in the next section.

However, at this point in my discussion I wish to draw only a rather minimal conclusion: that Nāgārjuna's refutation of causation in MMK I does not completely collapse with the discovery of a fallacy in the fifth verse – which in any case would not be the fallacy Hayes thinks he sees there but rather a fallacy based on the principle of coexisting counterparts – nor in the seventh. Rather, that chapter succeeds in casting considerable doubt on the two main Hindu theories of causation that were current in Nāgārjuna's day, and it may in addition raise serious questions about various Buddhist theories. Overall, the argument of MMK I is complex and considerably more work has to be done to evaluate it properly. In any case, it remains to be seen how it is corrupted by fallacies.

2

Hayes sees fallacies of ambiguity similar to the one he believes to occur in MMK I in MMK XV. In MMK XV the term *svabhāva* again plays a crucial role.

MMK XV.1–3 read as follows:

1. *nu sambhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ /  
hetupratyayasambhūtaḥ svabhāvah kṛtako bhavet //*
2. *svabhāvah kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham? /  
akṛtrimah svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ puratra ca //*
3. *kutaḥ svabhāvasyābhāve parabhāvo bhaviṣyati? /  
svabhāvah parabhāvasya parabhāvo hi kathyate //*

1. The arising of own-being/essence from causal conditions is not possible. An essence that has arisen from causal conditions would be caused (*kṛtaka*).
2. For how could there be an essence which is caused? For an essence is uncaused and not dependent on anything else.
3. How, in the absence of an essence, will there be other-being? For other-being is said to be the essence of that which is other.

Nāgārjuna seems to be arguing here that there cannot be any own-being or essence (*svabhāva*), since an essence is the sort of thing that does not arise or come into existence; an essence, that is, is something eternal. He seems to presuppose that all that we observe undergoes change. The existence of essences is precluded by the fact that everything is always changing. Given that there are no essences, that there is nothing that a thing can be said to be essentially, it follows that there are no contrary essences, that there is nothing that a thing can be said not to be.

At first glance this last argument also seems to turn on the principle of coexisting counterparts. But it may be construed in another way that makes it appear more sound, namely: if things do not have essences

when they are in no way determinate. Thus something can no more be determinate non-X than a determinate X. Nāgārjuna then proceeds in the following *kārikās* to argue that, if a thing is not determinate, it cannot exist; for in order for something to be, it must be a determinate something (*kārikā* 4). But if nothing exists, then nothing can be said to exist, either; for the notion of non-existence has significance only in contrast to that of existence (*kārikā* 5). Thus it is wrong to assert of things either that they exist or do not exist. Neither view is in keeping with the Buddha's teaching (*kārikās* 6 and 7). The view that things exist is the heresy of Eternalism. The view that they do not is the heresy of Annihilationism (*kārikā* 10).

Where are the fallacies in MMK XV? Hayes, to begin with, sees a fallacy of equivocation in the transition from *kārikās* 1 and 2 to *kārikā* 3. In 1 and 2, Hayes believes, the term *svabhāva* is used, not in its ontological sense, as I have translated above, but in its causal sense, meaning 'independent thing'. In *kārikā* 3, however, he thinks that it is used in its ontological sense, meaning 'identity'. Thus in 1 and 2 Nāgārjuna is making the rather straightforward, indeed trivial, assertion that that which is causally independent cannot arise in dependence on causal conditions. That which is causally independent is not fabricated. Thus, if we accept that everything exists as a result of the operation of causal factors – as it seems we must – then there is nothing that is causally independent, there is no *svabhāva*. But in *kārikā* 3 he appears to construe *svabhāva* in the sense of 'identity' – or as I prefer, 'essence' or 'own-being' – arguing that if there is no essence of entities, as he seems to have established with *kārikās* 1 and 2, then there is no difference between other-being (*parabhāva*), either. And so Nāgārjuna is on his way to proving that things neither exist nor do not exist. If Nāgārjuna is employing *svabhāva* in different senses in this way, then he is indeed guilty of committing at least one glaring fallacy in MMK XV.

Is there, however, any way in which Nāgārjuna could be employing *svabhāva* univocally in *kārikās* 1 through 3? Specifically, is there any possibility of making sense of the claim that the essence of something cannot be conceived as coming into existence through the operation of causes, so that *svabhāva* could be taken to mean 'essence' or 'own-being' in *kārikās* 1 and 2 as it clearly does in *kārikā* 3? I believe that there is, and that seeing that there is is one of the keys to understanding not only this chapter of the MMK but Nāgārjuna's thought as a whole.

In order to explicate the idea that I believe is behind MMK XV.1–3 I shall have recourse to a parallel in Western philosophy. Although I believe that it can be shown that this idea is anticipated in other texts

of Indian philosophy – indeed, I will proceed to do so in the sequel – is not as fully developed in that tradition as it is in Western philosophy. In fact, the passage from Nāgārjuna presently under discussion is the fullest treatment of the idea to be found in Indian philosophy, as far as I know. Thus, in order to achieve a broader perspective on the problem I adopt here a comparative methodology.

I take as my parallel the first part of Spinoza's *Ethics*. At the beginning of Part One Spinoza defines substance as "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself."<sup>30</sup> That is, a substance is that which does not depend causally on anything else; for Spinoza also says with Axiom Four that "the knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of the cause." Anything that is caused by another, in other words, is conceived through that other. To say that substance is conceived through itself, then, is to say that it is not caused by anything else.

Spinoza employs this concept of substance to prove that there can be only one, infinite substance, God. From the definition of substance and the implication that a substance cannot be caused by anything else, which Spinoza takes to mean that it is self-caused (*causa sui*), it follows that "it is of the nature of substance to exist."<sup>31</sup> From the concept of God as a substance of infinite attributes, then, we must conclude that God exists. However, since two substances cannot share the same attributes for substances are differentiated only by their attributes, God alone can exist; for God has all possible attributes.<sup>32</sup> That is to say, there is no attribute that God does not already have that might constitute the unique essence of some distinct substance.

Spinoza's conception of substance, which was shared by the other rationalist philosophers, clearly goes back, through Medieval philosophy to the notion of substance in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. In that work Aristotle sought to determine the primary sense in which things can be said to be. He decided that substance is the primary mode of being and that all other modes of being are somehow derivative of substance. A prominent characteristic of substance for Aristotle is that it is *per se*; it is definable in terms that are unique to itself and it is not able to be produced by something else.<sup>33</sup> On the one hand, this means that an individual substance can arise only from a substance of the same type: a man begets a man, not a horse. Thus it would seem that Aristotle did not consider substance to be fully eternal. On the other hand, insofar as he considered substance to be ultimately the substantial form that combines with matter to make an individual concrete substance, and that substantial forms are immaterial, intelligible, and not subject to

change – indeed, that they are eternal objects of contemplation in the mind of God – he believed substance to be eternal.

While it would certainly be far-fetched to suggest that Nāgārjuna conceives of *svabhāva* as an Aristotelian substantial form, it seems not implausible to suggest that he thinks of essence as that which is conceived through itself without reference to anything else. That is what makes an essence an essence; that is how an essence determines a thing's uniqueness. But then an essence cannot be produced by something else; for it would then bear the marks of that production. It would reflect its origin in some way, thereby ceasing to be what makes a thing unique. An essence or own-being, therefore, must be *per se*. The notion of a caused essence is a contradiction in terms (*kārikā* 2).

Nāgārjuna seems to be explicating this very idea with MMK XV.8 and 9.

*yady astivam prakṛtyā syān na bhaved asya nāstīti /  
prakṛter anyathābhāvo na hi jātūpapadyate //  
prakṛtau kasya cāsatyām anyathātvam bhaviṣyati? /  
prakṛtau kasya ca satyām anyathātvam bhaviṣyati? //*

If something existed by nature, it could not not exist; for the changing of the nature [of a thing] never occurs at all.

If there is no nature [of a thing] what could become otherwise? And if there is a nature [of a thing] what could become otherwise?

Nāgārjuna appears to be saying in these verses that if a thing were to exist by virtue of having a certain "nature" – he shifts now from the word *svabhāva* to the word *prakṛti*, which appears to mean roughly the same thing – then it would be eternal; for its nature being uncaused by anything else, it would be independent of everything. Therefore, no change in circumstances could possibly affect it, in particular, result in it no longer existing. If things have natures, they cannot ever become different from what they are; for that would constitute a change in nature, which is invulnerable to change. On the other hand, how can things be without any nature at all? In that case, too, we could not talk about something becoming different or changing, because that would imply passing from one determinate state to another.

In sum, if there were natures or essences, there could be no change. Reality would be completely static. (Even Spinoza did not think the attributes of substances could change. Rather, according to Spinoza only the finite modes of the two known attributes of substance, thought and extension, can act on each other.) But in fact we observe change. Therefore, reality cannot be rooted in natures or essences. However, if there are no natures or essences, then one cannot really speak of that

which is. That being the case, one cannot speak of that which is not either. And so on.<sup>34</sup>

The core of the argument, as I have suggested, is that an essence cannot depend on something else because it is by definition that which is unique to a thing. If it depended on something else it would somehow reflect the fact; it would share some property with its cause and thus lose its uniqueness. I believe that this principle derives from a deeper principle, namely, that what is cannot not be and what is not cannot be. In the Western tradition this thought, of course, was first expressed by Parmenides:

Only one story, one road, now is left: that it is. And on this there are signs in plenty that, being, it is ungenerated and indestructible, whole, of one kind and unwavering and complete. Nor was it, nor will it be, since now it is, all together, one, continuous. For what generation will you seek for it? How, whence, did it grow? That it came from what is not I shall not allow you to say or think – for it is not sayable or thinkable that it is not. And what need would have impelled it, later or earlier, to grow – if it began from nothing? Thus it must either altogether be or not.<sup>35</sup>

But come, I will tell you . . . the only roads of enquiry there are to be thought of: one, that it is and cannot not be, is the path of persuasion (for truth accompanies it); another, that it is not and must not be – this I say to you is a trail devoid of all knowledge.<sup>36</sup>

That which is there to be spoken of and thought of must be. For it is possible for it to be, but not possible for nothing to be.<sup>37</sup>

Parmenides was not reluctant to accept the consequence of a theory of “what is” that Nāgārjuna points out: there indeed can be no change. Nāgārjuna could not accept such a consequence without qualification: as a Buddhist he had to adhere, at least on the level of conventional truth, to the doctrine that everything is constantly changing. But Parmenides was not thus constrained and was eager to deduce that the world of change and diversity is completely unreal.

One could say that Aristotle’s and Spinoza’s theories of substance represent refinements and modifications of Parmenides’s original doctrine. Insofar as they define substance as that which is *per se* or *causa sui*, they spell out why being in its primary sense is eternal and not subject to change. Yet insofar as they give accounts of how the substantial form is able to combine with matter, or how the finite modes of the attributes of substance can influence each other, they explain how change is possible after all.

Now, something akin to the Parmenidean doctrine is also to be found in Indian philosophy. It is attested by some of the earliest Sāṃkhya writings, which however, like the writings of Parmenides, exist only in fragments. Thus we have the following passage from Vārsaganya in the *Abhidharmakośa*:

*asty asty eva tad, yan nāsti nāsty eva tad. asato nāsti sambhavaḥ, sato nāsti bhāḥ.*<sup>38</sup>

which exists only exists. That which does not exist can only not exist. There is no coming to be of what is not nor destruction of what is.

This statement obviously goes beyond the *satkāryavāda*. It states, not just that something must exist before it becomes manifest, but more generally that being is absolutely eternal and non-being absolutely impossible. Similarly, we find at *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* I.1.29 the statement, *nāsata āmalābhah, na sata ātmahānam*, “There is no coming to be of what is not, nor destruction of what is.” And *Bhagavadgūā* II.16ab reads: *asato vidyate bhāvo, nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ*, “There is no existence of that which is not nor non-existence of that which is.”<sup>39</sup> Wilhelm Halbfass associates these texts with Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.2.1–2:<sup>40</sup>

In the beginning, my dear, this world was just Being (*sat*), one only, without a second. Be sure, some people say: “In the beginning this world was just Non-being (*asat*), one only, without a second; from that Non-being Being was produced.”

But verily, my dear, whence could this be? . . . How from Non-being could Being be produced? On the contrary, my dear, in the beginning this world was just Being, one only, without a second.<sup>41</sup>

And, indeed, the Upaniṣad goes on to deny the reality of a plurality of entities and change, as Parmenides did – if not as emphatically or in exhaustive detail. However, the implication of a completely static cosmos was not drawn in Sāṃkhya.

It is my contention that just as Aristotle and Spinoza can be seen as unpacking Parmenides’s thought in developing their theories of substance, so Nāgārjuna can be seen as unpacking the theory of the eternity of being reflected in Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI and the Sāṃkhya texts cited above, with his account of *svabhāva* as uncaused (*akṛtrima*). I do not presume to prove this here; I merely propose it as a reasonable hypothesis upon which one might base an interpretation of the use of the term *svabhāva* in MMK XV different from that of Hayes.<sup>42</sup>

Thus I suggest that the term *svabhāva* be taken univocally throughout MMK XV in the sense of ‘identity’, ‘own-being’, or ‘essence’ and that Nāgārjuna should be taken to be asserting that there cannot be any change – hence, ultimately, any being or non-being – because there is no change, at least from the standpoint of conventional truth. For an essence cannot change insofar as it is completely uncaused. This certainly provides for a more felicitous reading of *kārikās* 1 and 2. On Hayes’s interpretation they are practically tautologies:

Birth of an independent thing from causes and conditions is not reasonable. An independent thing born from causes and conditions would be a fabrication.

2. But how could an independent thing be called a fabrication, given that an independent thing is not a fabrication and is independent of anything else?<sup>43</sup>

On my reading, however, Nāgārjuna can be seen to be saying in these verses that essence is independent of causes, thereby appealing implicitly to the notion of essence as *per se* and *causa sui*. (See my translation at the beginning of this section.) Thus there is no shift in the meaning of *svabhāva* from *kārikās* 1 and 2 to *kārikā* 3, as Hayes alleges. With the phrase, "How, in the absence of an essence . . . ?," *kārikā* 3 is simply stating the conclusion to be drawn from *kārikās* 1 and 2, that there is no essence or own-being. It then goes on to state that there can be no other-being, either.

Hayes also sees a fallacy of equivocation in the transition from *kārikā* 3, where he believes the terms *svabhāva* and *parabhāva* are used in the sense of 'identifiable thing' and 'difference', respectively, to *kārikā* 4, where he believes that they are used in the sense of 'causal independence' and 'causal dependence', respectively. The verses read, as Hayes translates them:

3. How, in the absence of an identifiable thing, could there be a difference, given that the identity of a different thing is called a differentia?  
4. How can there be existence without either independence or dependence, given that existence is established when there is either independence or dependence?

The fallacy according to Hayes lies in drawing the conclusion that there is no existence (i.e., nothing that exists) without *svabhāva* or *parabhāva* qua causal independence or dependence, from the fact that there is no *svabhāva* or *parabhāva* in the sense of identity or difference – an obvious equivocation. (This meaning shift is the exact opposite of the one Hayes perceives in the transition from *kārikās* 1 and 2 to 3. Thus in Hayes's view Nāgārjuna moves from meaning A to B, then back to A again for each term in the course of four verses!) But I would suggest that Nāgārjuna intends *svabhāva* and *parabhāva* as 'essence'/'own-being' and 'difference'/'other-being' in both verses. The gist of the fourth verse, then, is that something cannot exist unless it is determinate as *essentially X* or *different from X*.

Therefore, Nāgārjuna does not commit any fallacy of equivocation based on the use of *svabhāva* and *parabhāva* in MMK XV. Rather, each of these terms is used univocally throughout.

Perhaps other fallacies could be found in MMK XV if one searched hard enough. But it seems more to the point to note at this stage, as I did in relation to MMK I, that the argument of MMK XV seems sound overall. There are indeed serious problems with the notion of being taken in its strictest sense, as it is at least by Parmenides. As already

ed, if one is committed to such an idea then the realm of change and diversity cannot be accounted for. Not only can there be no coming into or passing out of existence, but there cannot be a plurality of entities, since that would of necessity depend on one thing *not being* another, which is a kind of non-being.<sup>44</sup> If we take being in the strictest sense, then reality would have to be completely static and homogeneous.

Nāgārjuna appears to be developing just this thought in MMK XXIV, where he considers the objections of an opponent (*kārikās* 1–6).<sup>45</sup> If we say that everything here is "empty," i.e., neither has own-being nor other-being, then there are no Four Noble Truths. As we saw, one cannot speak of things being caused to arise, in which case one cannot speak of thirst as the cause of suffering and the removal of thirst as the cause of the end of suffering. Without the Four Noble Truths, there can be no insight into them, no getting rid of undesirable states of mind, no practice nor realization. Without those things, there are none of the stages on the path, no "entering the stream" or "having only more more to attain," etc.; and if there are no stages, then there are no people who have attained those stages, no one "who has entered the stream" or "who is to be born only one more time," etc. In short, there is no path for anyone who follows the path, and so there is no *saṅgha*. And in the absence of the Four Noble Truths, there is no *dharma*; and if there is no *saṅgha* and no *dharma*, how could there be a Buddha? Thus, with the doctrine of the emptiness of everything one undermines all the teachings essential to Buddhism.

Nāgārjuna's response is to turn the tables on the opponent. You say that there are no Four Noble Truths, etc., if everything is empty. But I, Nāgārjuna, say that you can have none of those things if you accept that things exist essentially. "If you see the existence of entities to proceed through their essence, then you see entities to be without causes or causal conditions" (*kārikā* 16). And that will invalidate the Four Noble Truths, since one can no longer speak of the arising of suffering dependent on certain conditions. More directly, if you take suffering to exist essentially, then it must be eternal and there can be no cessation of it (*kārikā* 23). And if suffering is eternal, then it cannot be removed by practising the Noble Eightfold Path (*kārikā* 25). If a person is whatever he is essentially, then, being unenlightened, he cannot become enlightened (*kārikā* 26). If a stage on the path is "yet to be attained" essentially, it can never be attained. And so forth. In sum, if you believe in essence and that things exist through their essences, then there is no *dharma*, no *saṅgha*, and no Buddha – because, fundamentally, there would be no change; everything would be, so to speak, cemented in. Throughout this

text Nāgārjuna emphasizes that it is the notion of *svabhāva* that leads to this consequence. The idea of essence in its strictest sense renders not just all things the Buddhists say false, but also all the beliefs about action and agency that pertain to everyday practice (*kārikās* 36 and 37).

Thus the strict notion of being, as that which is grounded in essence, is highly questionable. It precludes change. Changing things, it seems, can present themselves to us only insofar as they are without essence, i.e., neither completely real nor completely unreal. Thus Nāgārjuna equates emptiness with dependent origination in MMK XXIV.18: "Dependent origination, that is what we call emptiness." The absence of essence entails the emergence of things only in relation to other things, and vice versa. That, however, does not mean that there is any *real* arising of entities, either, for only *real things* can arise. In sum, it would seem that Nāgārjuna's final position, if you will, is indeed that empirical reality is an illusion. In that respect he ultimately agrees with Parmenides. But that does not mean that talk about the Four Noble Truths, etc., is completely mistaken. Statements pertaining to the cause and elimination of suffering Nāgārjuna tells us, have provisional validity up to the moment of enlightenment. Yet, while they are ultimately false,<sup>46</sup> nevertheless they are closer to the truth than any statements suggesting that things have essences.

In conclusion, it is my belief that the argument of MMK XV is plausible and that if it is to be criticized, it should be challenged not on grounds that it is fallacious, but on grounds that like the first chapter it is one-sided and incomplete. Nāgārjuna does not consider any reasonable alternative positions in regard to being. One may well hold that that which truly is, is eternal, but also believe that change is nevertheless possible. Things might arise insofar as eternal being – say, *qua* substantial forms – is brought into combination with matter. Such, more or less, was Aristotle's doctrine. Or there could be a plurality of entities – atoms – each in itself eternal, whose interrelationships are constantly shifting. Such is the teaching of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Finally, one may simply reject the premise that true being cannot not be and hold instead that, while it must remain identical in essence, it may still undergo accidental modification. Such is the thrust of Jaina philosophy, or in the West, of Spinoza's. It is his refusal to consider these sorts of alternatives, similar to his refusal or inability to consider alternatives or modifications of the *saikārya*- and *asatkāryavādas* in MMK I, that renders Nāgārjuna's discussion in MMK XV ultimately unsatisfactory.

wish now to return to what I have termed the principle of coexisting counterparts. Is this principle really a fallacy?

Let us first review some of the ways the principle is applied in the MMK. I have already noted some of its applications to the concepts of causation, time, and the means of knowledge (*pramāna*). In MMK III Nāgārjuna critiques specifically the *pramāna* of perception, focusing on the faculty of vision. For vision there must be a seer, an object seen, and the act of seeing itself (*darśana*). In *kārikā* 6ab he makes the claim that "there is no seer who does not exceed (*atiraskṛya*), nor [a seer] who exceeds (*tiraskṛya*), the seeing." That is to say, the seer can be neither dependent on nor independent of the seeing. If the seer existed independently of the seeing, that is, if he did not see, then he would not really be a seer. On the other hand, the seer cannot be altogether dependent on the seeing, either; for a relation of dependence presupposes separate terms. To be a seer one must in some way be able to execute an independent act of seeing and not be completely bound up with seeing.

The first part of this argument would seem to involve some application of the principle of coexisting counterparts. A thing cannot be a seer unless it is already accompanied by its correlative, the act of seeing. Having established that there can be no seer in this way Nāgārjuna proceeds in *kārikā* 6cd to deny that there could be a seeing or an object of seeing, either. For seeing, the object of seeing, and the seer are counterparts (correlatives), and if one is eliminated so are the other two. This seems yet another appeal to the principle in question.

In MMK VI Nāgārjuna analyzes the concept of desire (*rāga*), which is of central importance to Buddhist philosophy. In *kārikās* 1 and 2 his argument is much the same as above. If the desirer (*rakta*) existed prior to the desire, then desire could be said to arise in dependence on a desirer. But, it is implied, this is impossible: how can there be a desirer, i.e., one who desires, without any desire?<sup>47</sup> On the other hand, it does not make sense to say that desire can arise *without* a desirer, for it must inhere in something. Thus desire cannot occur either with or without a desirer, and so is impossible. Again, the notion that something has no reality independently of its correlative – specifically here and in the previous example, independently of the activity it typically executes – plays a central role.

A final example: In MMK VII Nāgārjuna critiques the concept of action, specifically, the relation between cause of action (*kāraka*) and action itself (*karman*). In the first verse he lays out what he takes

to be exhaustive alternatives. An existent (*sadbhūta*) *kāraka* cannot bring about an existent *karman*, nor can a non-existent *kāraka* bring about a non-existent *karman*. An existent *kāraka*, he continues in the second verse, will not have an action that it carries out; thus in turn any action will be without an agent and any agent will be without an action. Candrakīrti explains this idea as follows.<sup>48</sup> A real or existent (*sadbhūta*) *kāraka* is one that is already possessed of an action insofar as it is a *kāraka*. But in that case it will not need to bring about a further action, hence it will not effect the *karman* in question and the *karman* will be without a *kāraka*. The appeal to the notion of coexisting counterparts is once again obvious and is quite similar to the two previous examples. Nāgārjuna then in *kārikā* 3 quickly dispenses with the other half of the dilemma. If a non-existent (*asadbhūta*) *kāraka* – i.e., one devoid of action – produced a non-existent *karman*, then the *kāraka* would “be without a cause,” i.e., without any basis for being called a *kāraka*, and the *karman*, in the absence of a real *kāraka*, would be without a cause as well.<sup>49</sup>

We see in all these examples that the upshot of the principle of coexisting counterparts is that the things that fall within its range stand in relations of mutual dependence. To say that the desire must exist simultaneously with the desirer is to say that neither desire nor desirer can stand by itself; both must come into being together. The impossibility of the desirer without desire seems dictated by the principle of coexisting counterparts proper, while the impossibility of desire without a desirer seems required by the much less questionable, indeed valid, notion that you cannot have a property or action without a substratum. The situation is the same for the pairs of seer/seeing and cause of action/action. The cases discussed in Section One of this paper are a bit different, however. A cause presupposes its effect by the principle of coexisting counterparts but the effect presupposes its cause by the principle of causation itself, viz., you can't have a certain effect without its cause. For the pair means of knowledge/object of knowledge, however, both concepts seem to presuppose each other by virtue of the principle of coexisting counterparts, and each of the concepts past, present, and future seem to presuppose the other two by this principle.

Nāgārjuna, then, in all of these cases attempts to show that insofar as a thing and its counterpart are mutually dependent, they are unreal. In being dependent on its counterpart and its counterpart being dependent on it, a thing presupposes itself. Or else, in presupposing its counterpart a thing presupposes that which it is supposed to function independently to bring about. Or else, in not existing independently of its counterpart

thing ceases to be fully distinct from it.<sup>50</sup> These are all absurd consequences.

As pointed out in the first section of this paper, the principle of coexisting counterparts clearly seems erroneous, at least from the standpoint of common sense. In common experience a thing exists just by virtue of what it is, not by virtue of what it is related to. The nature of a thing in most cases is prior both logically and temporally to the things to which it gives rise, to the actions it carries out, to the things it is not, etc. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if the principle of coexisting counterparts is a fallacy that Nāgārjuna himself commits. That is to say, is it, in the arguments in which he employs it, a premise of his own or a belief of those he is critiquing?

The Prāsāngika interpretation of Nāgārjuna, which most scholars seem to prefer, would support the latter alternative. Nowhere does Nāgārjuna present a thesis of his own, presumably not even as a premise in an argument; rather, he is always merely showing how others' views lead to absurdity.<sup>51</sup> In that case, even if the principle of coexisting counterparts were a fallacy, it would not be a fallacy that Nāgārjuna himself is guilty of. However, is it at all plausible that Nāgārjuna's opponents adhered to anything like the principle in question?

Recent work by Kamaleswar Bhattacharya suggests how Nāgārjuna might have thought so. Bhattacharya has shown how certain grammatical notions underly many of Nāgārjuna's arguments.<sup>52</sup> The main grammatical notion to which Nāgārjuna seems to appeal is that a *kāraka*, a grammatical function such as subject, object, instrument, etc., is conceived in relation to the action (*kriyā*) expressed by the verb. Thus the subject of a sentence is that which independently carries out an action,<sup>53</sup> the object that which undergoes it (or, according to Pāṇini's definition, that which is most desired to be accomplished [by the action] of the agent"),<sup>54</sup> and so forth. Taking this grammatical principle quite literally, Nāgārjuna is able to insist that something is not the agent of a certain action unless it is actively engaged in it. However, the very notion of a subject as that which independently, i.e., only occasionally and of itself, carries out an action is thereby violated. Hence, the very definitions of the grammatical cases lead to paradox when they are taken together. All of the arguments considered above exhibit this paradox in specific ways. Bhattacharya specifically discusses the argument of MMK VII as an application of the above grammatical principle.<sup>55</sup>

Thus the principle of coexisting counterparts seems in many cases reducible to a certain grammatical notion current in the thought of Nāgārjuna's day, but interpreted very literally by him. And so he

cannot be accused of committing the fallacy of coexisting counterparts himself, since he could say that he employs it in his *reductio ad absurdum* arguments only insofar as it is a belief held by those he is criticizing. In that case, the most appropriate objection to Nāgārjuna's employment of this principle would be, once again, not that in doing so he is guilty of a fallacy, but that he is taking an idea more rigidly than those who hold it would ever accept. This is, essentially, what is known in Nyāya dialectic as *chala*, the dialectical trick of construing an opponent's view differently from the way it is intended.

Nevertheless, this solution is not entirely satisfactory because it does not account for all applications of the principle of coexisting counterparts. The opposition between *svabhāva* and *parabhāva* is perhaps the most obvious example. Nāgārjuna says that there can be no other-being without own-being. Similarly, he says that there can be no non-being (*abhāva*) without being (*bhāva*). Again, he says that there can be no cause without a (coexisting) effect. None of these cases involves any reference to action, as the grammatical examples do.

There is another way, however, in which Nāgārjuna can be seen as employing the principle of coexisting counterparts only provisionally for the sake of argument, and that is that he understood it as an expression of the doctrine of dependent origination, which all Buddhists, who are the main target of his criticism, believe.

There is some evidence in support of this hypothesis in the MMK itself. Nāgārjuna suggests in the opening two verses of the MMK (MMK I.1-2) that dependent origination is the gist of the Buddha's teaching. Presumably that is what he intends to expound in his own treatise. While he does explain, in rather conventional fashion, the classical twelve-fold chain of dependent origination in the twenty-fifth chapter of the MMK, the latter is not what he is occupied with throughout the work. Rather, we meet again and again with applications of the principle of coexisting counterparts. And, clearly, the coexistence of counterparts is a kind of dependent arising of entities: X cannot occur without its counterpart and vice versa. Moreover, it is clear from the MMK that Nāgārjuna understood dependent origination in an unusual way. Dependent origination entails for him the non-existence of that which arises, hence, ultimately, the unreality of dependent origination itself. Thus in the opening couplet he speaks of a dependent origination that "without cessation, without origin, without destruction, not eternal, not distinct, not separate, without coming, without going, without conceptual construction." Perhaps he thinks of dependent origination in this way

because he thinks of it as the *mutual* dependence of entities, which as we saw above tends to imply their illusoriness.

There are various passages in some of the works attributed to Nāgārjuna by Christian Lindtner that suggest a reconceiving of dependent origination as mutual dependence. Thus *Lokāṭīastava* 8-9:

That an agent is self-dependent (*svatantra*) and [his] action also is, You [the Buddha] have [only] expressed conventionally. Actually, You are convinced that both are established in mutual dependence (*parasparāpekṣit... siddhiḥ*). [In the ultimate sense] no agent exists and no experiencer exists. Merit and demerit are dependently born (*pratyajam*). You have declared, O Master of words, that that which is dependently born is unborn!<sup>56</sup>

The notion of mutual dependence and dependent origination seem to fit together in this passage. Consider as well *Lokāṭīastava* 10:

[An object of knowledge is] no object of knowledge unless it is being known, [but] [this is impossible since] consciousness does not exist [previously] without it! Therefore You have said that knowledge and the object of knowledge do not exist without own-being.<sup>57</sup>

The relation of mutual dependence between consciousness and object of knowledge implies that each lacks own being. But at MMK XXIV.18 Nāgārjuna clearly implies that things lack own-being insofar as they arise dependently. Nāgārjuna seems to be thinking of mutual dependence and dependent origination in the same way.

Consider also *Sūnyatāsaptati* 13-14:

A father is not a son, a son is not a father. Neither exists without being correlative (*anyonya*). Nor are they simultaneous. The twelve members likewise. Just as pleasure and pain depending on an object in a dream do not have [a real] object, thus neither that which arises dependently nor that which it arises dependently from exists.<sup>58</sup>

Verse 13 suggests that the twelve members of the chain of dependent origination are mutually dependent on each other like father and son. Assuming verse 14 to be a continuation of the thought of 13, Nāgārjuna refers in 14 both to the relation of mutual dependence between father and son and the twelve-fold chain as dependent origination.

Finally, at *Sūnyatāsaptati* 27-28 Nāgārjuna practically sums up his mature philosophy as follows:

The marked (*lakṣya*) is established from a mark (*lakṣana*) different from the marked. It is not established by itself. Nor are the [two] established by each other [since] the unestablished cannot establish unestablished. In this [manner] cause (*hetu*), effect (*phala*), feeling (*vedanā*), feeler (*vedaka*), etc., seer (*draṣṭṛ*), visible, etc. (*draṣṭavyādī*), whatever it may be, are all explained without exception.<sup>59</sup>



Everything, he says here, can be seen as non-existent by virtue of dependent origination, according to which merely the arising of one thing is conditioned by the presence of another, but the principle of coexisting counterparts, i.e., mutual dependence. Yet Nāgārjuna has stated that the Buddha's teaching boils down to the doctrine of dependent origination. Thus again it would seem that by dependent origination Nāgārjuna understands ultimately mutual dependence or the coexisting of counterparts.

Thus, in employing the principle of coexisting counterparts in his arguments Nāgārjuna could claim simply to be going along with an assumption that any Buddhist would make, i.e., that things arise dependently. Hence in this way, too, the principle of coexisting counterparts would not be a fallacy that he himself commits. It is not a premise of his own but one that is ultimately to be attributed to the theorists he is attacking.

What, however, might have inspired Nāgārjuna to reconstrue dependent origination as mutual dependence? Perhaps it was a more profound experience of his own of the truth of dependent origination. This leads us to consider yet a third, and to me the most interesting, way in which the principle of coexisting counterparts might not in fact be a fallacy.

The coincidence of opposites or the interconnectedness or interpenetration of all entities is a teaching that is found in a variety of mystical traditions, East and West. Consider, for example, the following passage from the *Chuang Tzu*:

Everything has its "that," everything has its "this." From the point of view of "that" you cannot see it, but through understanding you can know it. So I say, "that" comes out of "this" and "this" depends on "that" – which is to say that "this" and "that" give birth to each other. But where there is birth there must be death; where there is death there must be birth. Where there is acceptability there must be unacceptability; where there is unacceptability there must be acceptability. Where there is recognition of right there must be recognition of wrong; where there is recognition of wrong there must be recognition of right. Therefore the sage does not proceed in such a way, but illuminates all in the light of Heaven. [Here Nāgārjuna might say, the sage understands everything through a non-conceptual knowing, a *nirvikalpakajñāna*.] He too recognizes a "this," but a "this" which is also a "that," a "that" which is also "this." His "that" has both a right and a wrong in it; his "this" too has both a right and a wrong in it. So, in fact, does he still have a "this" and "that"? [I.e., are these things real?] A state in which "this" and "that" no longer find their opposites is called the hinge of the Way.<sup>60</sup>

This passage, which may be compared, e.g., with the second chapter of the *Lao Tzu*, expresses a necessary interdependence of opposites that is reminiscent of the principle of coexisting counterparts. A similar teaching of the interconnectedness of all entities, now explicitly linked to the doctrine of Emptiness, is also to be found in Avatamsaka and

the Hua Yen literature. In the West, the doctrine can be seen reflected in some of the fragments of Heraclitus and in the *Monadology* of Leibniz. Obviously, it would take us too far afield to try to document the idea in all these sources, and it would be impossible to show conclusively that it is precisely the same idea that is expressed in all of them. I can only assert somewhat baldly here, with the hope that the reader shares the impression, that the notion – or different versions of the notion – that everything in the cosmos is intimately tied together, so that the existence of one implies the existence of all, even of that to which it is essentially opposed, occurs in a range of texts.

I propose that the MMK be seen as an attempt to articulate this vision, which for Nāgārjuna is ultimately based not on discursive reasoning but on some kind of non-discursive insight.<sup>61</sup> In that case, the MMK should be seen as a transformative text which does not attempt to demonstrate the truth of interconnectedness, but rather to illustrate its implications in complete detail – the main implication for him being that the world of appearances is unreal – and thereby ultimately evoke the intuitive insight upon which it is based in the reader.<sup>62</sup> The principle of coexisting counterparts, then, which contains the idea of the interconnectedness of all entities in seed form, is not employed by Nāgārjuna as a *premise* – of his own or anyone else's – in his arguments. Rather, it represents his *final position*; it is the realization with which his philosophy begins and ends. As such, it cannot be criticized from the standpoint of common sense, and so cannot be declared a "fallacy;" for that would beg the very question at issue in Nāgārjuna's thought.

Thus I suggest that Nāgārjuna might only pretend in the MMK to demonstrate in rigorous philosophical fashion the illusory nature of the world. In reality his arguments serve only to describe the interconnectedness, hence illusoriness, of all phenomena, not establish it as true. They function to convey knowledge simply by displaying the perspective of highest truth in the fullest possible terms. The reader is not compelled to adopt that perspective by rigorous logic, but is invited to do so by making a paradigm shift, if you will – a leap beyond ordinary experience. Viewed in this way, the principle of coexisting counterparts can once again hardly be dismissed as a fallacy, a mere mistake of reasoning, because it expresses Nāgārjuna's main metaphysical insight. While it may be false, it cannot be trivially so. It hardly seems satisfactory to dismiss it on grounds of common sense, since the chief of the principle is to call common sense into question.

Perhaps, indeed, the safest hypothesis of all is to attribute Nāgārjuna's use of the principle of coexisting counterparts to a lack of sophistication

of logic in his day. Logic developed much more slowly in India than in the West. There was no Aristotle at the beginning of Indian logic who discerned the nature of the syllogism so as to require only minor revisions over the next millenia. Proper argument forms were for a long time poorly understood. Reasoning was, for the most part, merely by analogy. That a relationship of invariable concomitance must exist between middle and major terms of a syllogism became clear, it seems only with Vasubandhu. Before that, formal fallacies could not be properly analyzed. Many kinds of arguments that are not considered valid today occur in early texts. Some scholars believe that Nāgārjuna himself made the mistake of affirming the consequent in several passages.<sup>63</sup>

Moreover, it is often difficult to detect that an argument really is a fallacy, to say exactly what is wrong with it. Throughout the history of philosophy philosophers have used arguments that were conclusively shown to be fallacies only centuries later. It is possible, then, that just as Zeno employed fallacious arguments to deny motion and plurality, the mistakes in which were not fully understood until much later, so Nāgārjuna could have employed fallacies, based e.g. on the principle of coexisting counterparts, that were not fully apparent to him and the adherents of his school – but are to us. It is certainly not beyond the pale to suggest that Nāgārjuna committed fallacies in the MMK, or even that fallacies are at the heart of the argument of the text; that would not require us to deny that he was a great philosopher.

Nevertheless, it is really doubtful that Nāgārjuna would have been unaware that the principle of coexisting counterparts is a blatant contradiction of common sense. It also seems implausible that he would not have realized – any less than Zeno – that his reasoning would appear simply fallacious to most people, especially given the objections of the Nyāya philosophers. If he adhered to the principle of coexisting counterparts himself, *then it must have been because he ultimately thought that the perspective of common sense must be overthrown*. In that case, however, his philosophy can hardly be criticized from that standpoint.

Thus, I continue to maintain that it remains to be shown exactly how Nāgārjuna's thought is vitiated by fallacies.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> "Nāgārjuna's appeal," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 22 (1994): 299–378.

<sup>2</sup> See *Abhidharmakośa* II.61cd–62.

<sup>3</sup> Candrakīrti refers several times to the holders of the first of the four positions as Sāṃkhya. See his *Prasannapadā* in *Madhyamakāśāstra*, ed. P.L. Vaidya (Darbhanga

Philosophy Institute, 1960), pp. 6, 6–7; 7, 5–6; 7, 9, etc. Bhāvaviveka also mentions Sāṃkhya in connection with this position.

Bhāvaviveka identifies the Vaiśeṣikas as defenders of the second position along with Jain "Ābhidharmikas." See William L. Ames, "Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 21 (1993): 224–225. Candrakīrti makes no such identification. It is not implausible that Nāgārjuna would have a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory in mind here, since he extensively attacks Nyāya doctrines in his *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* and *Vigrahavyāvartanī*.

Bhāvaviveka, however, identifies – somewhat implausibly – certain Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsaka philosophers as defenders of the third position. See Ames, p. 226.

For that matter, MMK I.3 is quite similar to NS IV.1.48: *nāsan na san na sadasat, sadasator vaidharmyāt*, "[The result of action] is neither existent, non-existent, nor both existent and non-existent, [not the latter in particular] because of the difference of the existent and the non-existent." Only the first three of the four alternatives mentioned in MMK I.3 are mentioned in this *sūtra*, but the resemblance is close enough to raise the question whether Nāgārjuna in MMK I is continuing a debate that was carried on between Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and earlier, i.e., pre-Nāgārjunan, Madhyamikas.

Johannes Bronkhorst, however, has argued that various apparent references to Madhyamaka doctrines in the fourth *adhyāya* of the Nyāya Sūtra – specifically NS IV.1.14, which expresses the view that "entities arise from non-being" (*abhāvād bhūtopattih. . .*); NS IV.1.36, which asserts that the own-being of things is not established because they are dependent on other things (*na svabhāvasiddhir apeṣikarvāt*); and NS IV.2.32–33, which suggest that *pramāna* and *prameya* are illusory, comparable to a dream or a "city of Gandharvas" – all of these apparent references to Madhyamaka may not have been part of the Nyāya Sūtra that Nāgārjuna knew but later interpolations ("Nāgārjuna and the Naiyāyikas," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 13 [1985]: 107–132). For one thing, *sūtras* IV.1.11–43 do not fit well in the sequence of topics of the *sāstra*. Bronkhorst believes that all of the *sūtras* in this section may originally have been *vārttikas* in Paksilasvāmin's commentary on the Nyāya Sūtra that were later misconstrued as *sūtras*.

However, there are apparent references to Madhyamaka doctrines at the beginning of the second *adhyāya* that cannot easily be dismissed as later interpolations, since they fit well in their context. II.1.8–11 state that perception, etc., are not *pramānas* because they are "not established in any of the three times" (*traikālyāsiddheh*), i.e., a *pramāna* can be neither prior to, subsequent to, nor simultaneous with its *prameya*; II.1.17–18 make the point that the *pramānas* themselves cannot be proven by other *pramānas*. The first idea seems to be the same as that presented at *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* 12; the second seems to allude to the topic discussed at length at *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 31 ff. Bronkhorst, however, wants to hold that these are really references to Sarvāstivāda doctrines.

Without going into Bronkhorst's reasoning in detail I shall merely point out that much depends on his rather dubious interpretation of NS II.1.11, *yugapatsiddhau pratyarthaniyatavāt kramavṛttiivābhāvo buddhīnām*: "If [*pramāna* and *prameya*] were established simultaneously, then since [*pramānas*] are fixed in regard to their object, there would be no sequential occurrence of cognitions." Bronkhorst writes that "it is hard to see why a Madhyamika should say that mental acts would not occur in sequence in case objects and means of knowledge were to exist simultaneously" (p. 108). Thus he suggests that this *sūtra* refers to Sarvāstivāda philosophy, which does emphasize the point that two cognitions cannot occur at the same time. Thus, if *pramāna* and *prameya* were both taken as *cognitions*, as in the case of the cognizing of a mental or emotional state – desire, attachment, etc. – then their simultaneous occurrence would immediately violate the principle that cognitions must occur one

after the other. But the *sūtra* admits of a more straightforward solution. The principle that mental acts cannot occur simultaneously would be overthrown by the assumption that *pramāna* and *prameya* (the latter conceived no longer necessarily as a mental state) exist together just because numerous *pramānas* – e.g., the various sense organs – and their corresponding objects – color, taste, etc. – would all exist at the same time.

In light of the fact, then, that the Nyāya Sūtra itself does seem to refer to Madhyamaka arguments in the second *adhyāya*, it is not implausible to hold that the mentioned passages of the fourth *adhyāya*, including IV.1.48, also refer to Madhyamaka. The upshot of these observations is that Nāgārjuna was not the first Madhyamaka. Rather, earlier versions of Madhyamaka arguments are cited in the Nyāya Sūtra. Nāgārjuna in turn modifies and defends them against Nyāya objections in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and *Vaidalyaprakarana*.

<sup>7</sup> Nāgārjuna may also have had a canonical passage, Saṃyutta Nikāya II.18–21, in mind when he framed the tetralemma of MMK I.3. There the Buddha is asked by Kassapa whether the suffering one suffers is caused by oneself, by someone else, both by oneself and by someone else, or neither by oneself nor by someone else. The Buddha denies each of the four alternatives, referring Kassapa instead to the twelve-fold chain of dependent origination as the explanation of the arising of suffering.

<sup>8</sup> T.R.V. Murti also views MMK I in this way. See *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955), pp. 168–178.

<sup>9</sup> See also *kāṣ* 9 and 14.

<sup>10</sup> It is interesting to compare here the *Āgamaśāstra* commentary on the Mādhyamika Upaniṣad, which is attributed to Gaudapāda. The fourth part contains a reworking of the Madhyamaka critique of causation from an Advaita perspective. The absence of any change, the text argues, indicates changeless consciousness as the ultimate reality! *ĀS* IV.22 is parallel to MMK I.3: *svato vā parato vāpi na kiṃcid vastu jāyate / sad asat sadasad vāpi na kiṃcid vastu jāyate //*. Verses 3–5 of that treatise lay out the dialectical strategy of the work:

*bhūtasya jātim icchanti vādinah kecid eva hi /  
abhūtasypāre dhīrā vivadantaḥ paraspāram //  
bhūtaṃ na jāyate kiṃcid abhūtaṃ naiva jāyate /  
vivadanto 'dvayā hy evam ajātim khyāpanti //  
khyāpyamānām ajātim tair anumodāmahe vāyam /  
vivadāmo na taiḥ sārḍham avivādāṃ nibodhata //*

"Disputing among themselves, some theorists believe in the origin of that which already exists (*bhūta*), while other wise men [believe in the origin] of that which does not already exist. Nothing that already exists arises; nor does that which does not exist ever arise. Disputing thus, [these philosophers], who are really non-dualists, establish the absence of arising (*ajāti*). We [for our part] approve the non-arising that is established by them. We do not dispute with them. Know that [for us] there is no dispute." One is reminded of course of Nāgārjuna's claim in the *Virgrahavyāvartanī* that he has no position.

<sup>11</sup> Hayes, pp. 312–313.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. David Kalupahana, *Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1986), p. 107; Jay Garfield, *The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 3; Frederick Streng, *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967), p. 183.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Prasannapadā*, p. 26, 14–15: *yadi hi hervādisu parabhūteṣu pratyayeṣu samasteṣu vyasteṣu vyastasamasteṣu hetupratyayasāmagryā anyatra vā kvacid*

*anām kāryānām utpādāt pūrvam sattvam syāt, syāt tebhyaḥ utpādah.*

See *Yuktītipikā*, ed. Ram Chandra Pandeya (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967), pp. 48–49, for a rehearsal of the standard objections against the *satkāryavāda*, including the objection that the effect cannot exist in the cause before its origination because it is not perceived" (*agrahaṇāt*), p. 48, 17 ff.

This would appear to be a simple application of Leibniz's Law: identical things must have identical properties.

I take it that *karikā* 7 is what Hayes refers to as "Nāgārjuna's second critique of the notion of causal relations" and presents in schematic form on pp. 314–

David Seyfort Ruegg calls it "the principle of the complementarity of binary concepts and terms" in his article "The Uses of the Four Positions of the *Catuskoṭi* and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism" (*Journal of Indian Philosophy* 5 [1977]: 1–71); Jacques May refers to it as "le principe de solidarité contraires," *Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti* (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1959). 'Counterpart' translates the Sanskrit terms *pratipakṣa* and *pratiśvandvin*. In the *Prasannapadā* the principle is stated in general terms as follows: *yasya ca pratipakṣo 'pi tad asti, dlokaṇḍhakāravat pārāvaravat saṃśayanisācayavac ca*, p. 37, 24–25.

Satōkara, Nāgārjuna, and Fa Tsang, with Some Western Analogues," in *Interpretations Across Boundaries*, ed. Gerald J. Larson and Eliot Deutsch (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 105.

"On Some Non-Formal Aspects of the Proofs of the Madhyamakakārikās," *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka*, ed. David Seyfort Ruegg and Lambert Schmithausen (Leiden: Brill, 1990), pp. 91–109.

Hayes, p. 315.

I shall not attempt a precise definition of 'counterpart' here. In general, I understand counterpart to be something in contrast to which a thing is typically conceived. Both opposites and correlatives serve as counterparts in Nāgārjuna's text: being and non-being, self and other, own-being and other-being, etc., are opposites; cause and effect, past, present, and future, desire and desirer, etc., are correlatives. Thus a thing will not have a unique counterpart but will usually have several; obviously, something can have many correlatives. But the principle of coexisting counterparts as I construe it implies that a thing cannot exist without the simultaneous existence of any of its counterparts. Thus in order to question the coherence of a particular concept Nāgārjuna need only show that a thing falling under the concept necessarily stands in a relation of mutual dependence with any one of its various counterparts. I stress that "the principle of coexisting counterparts" is not something Nāgārjuna himself explicitly formulated, though Candrakīrti did (see note 17). He does come rather close to an explicit formulation, however, in MMK XIV.5–7. Thus XIV.6: *anyad anyad anyasmād anyasmād apy rte bhavet / tad anyad anyad anyasmād na nāsti ca nāsty atah //*; "If an other could exist without its other, then it would be an other indeed. But an other does not exist without an other, therefore it is not an other." See also *Acintyastava* 11–16.

See note 6.

NSBh ad NS II.1.11, *Nyāyadarśanam*, ed. Taranatha Nyāya-Tarkatīrtha (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1985), pp. 422, 10–424, 7. See Bronkhorst, pp. 115–117.

Nevertheless, the *satkāryavāda* is somewhat reminiscent of Laplace's conception that all states of a system are contained in its initial conditions. Thus an omniscient being who knew the position of every particle in the universe together with all the forces acting on it would be able to predict all subsequent events. See *A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities*, trans. Frederick W. Truscott and Frederick L. Emory (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1917), p. 4.

*asadakaranāt.*

<sup>26</sup> *Yuktīpikā*, p. 52. This argument also seems to be implied by MMK I.13cd: *pratyayebhyaḥ katham tac ca bhaven na pratyayeṣu?*

<sup>27</sup> See *Yuktīpikā*, p. 48, 32 ff., which begins, [*pūrvapakṣa*:] *itāś cāsatkāryam, kartṛprayāśāphalyāt*; that is, the *asatkāryavāda* must be true, "because the effort of the agent has a purpose."

<sup>28</sup> Note also the second half of the verse cited from the *Yuktīpikā* above.

<sup>29</sup> It may well have been in response to the Madhyamaka way of arguing that the Nyāya school emphasized the distinction between *saṃvāda*, debate carried out in a spirit of cooperation for the sake of discovering truth, from *jalpa* and *vitandā*. See NY I.2.1–3, IV.2.47–49. These categories were already recognized in the *Carakasamhitā* but the Nyāya Sūtra offers an expanded treatment of them. The Nyāya Sūtra also treats *chala*, the deliberate misconstrual of an opponent's intention, more extensively than it is treated in the *Carakasamhitā*. Many of Nāgārjuna's dialectical moves can be seen, I believe, as varieties of *chala*. The fact that certain logical tropes that are prominent in Madhyamaka works, in particular *chala* and *vitandā*, are extensively dealt with in the Nyāya Sūtra is yet another indication that even the earliest version of the latter, which probably dealt exclusively with matters of logic and debate, was cognizant of Madhyamaka. See again note 6.

<sup>30</sup> *The Ethics and Selected Letters*, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982), Part I, Def. 3.

<sup>31</sup> Part I, Prop. 7.

<sup>32</sup> An attribute constitutes the essence of a substance, Part I, Def. 4.

<sup>33</sup> *Metaphysics* Z.4, 7–8.

<sup>34</sup> Hayes, oddly, takes *kās* 8 and 10 to amount to a categorical assertion on Nāgārjuna's part that there can be no change: "We can now add the following as one of the claims that Nāgārjuna is unambiguously making: 'Nothing can undergo the process of change'" (p. 321). I, however, read these verses as making the hypothetical claim that if, as the opponent believes, there is "nature" (*prakṛti*), then there cannot be any change.

<sup>35</sup> Jonathan Barnes, trans. and ed., *Early Greek Philosophy* (London: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 134.

<sup>36</sup> Barnes, p. 132.

<sup>37</sup> Richard McKirahan, *Philosophy Before Socrates* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1994), p. 153, 11.6. The Barnes translation of this passage is somewhat awkwardly worded.

<sup>38</sup> *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu*, ed. Prahlād Pradhān and Aruna Haldar (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975), p. 301, 2–3.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *Śūnyatāsaptati* 4: "Being (*sat*) does not arise since it exists. Non-being (*asat*) does not arise since it does not exist . . . ." Christian Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana* (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982), p. 37.

<sup>40</sup> *On Being and What There Is* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 59, n. 44.

<sup>41</sup> Robert E. Hume, trans., *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 241.

<sup>42</sup> Of course, the concept of *svabhāva* found in Nāgārjuna is not to be confused with the more ancient notion of "nature" as a cosmological principle, which is documented, e.g., in the *Mahābhārata*. See V. M. Bedekar, "The Doctrines of Svabhāva and Kāla in the Mahābhārata and Other Old Sanskrit Works," *Journal of the University of Poona, Humanities Section* 13 (1961): 1–16.

<sup>43</sup> Hayes, p. 318.

<sup>44</sup> "Nor is it divided, since all alike is – neither more here . . . nor less; but it is all full of what is," Barnes, *Early Greek Thought*, p. 134. McKirahan defends the plausibility of a monistic interpretation of Parmenides, p. 169.

The following is a loose paraphrase of the contents of MMK XXIV.  
MMK XXIV.7–12.

Here I am following the interpretation of the *Prasannapadā* ad VI.1.

*Prasannapadā*, p. 75, 11 ff.

*Prasannapadā*, p. 76, 3 ff.

Cf. MMK XIV.5: *anyad anyat pratītyānyan nānyad anyad rte 'nyataḥ / yat anyā ca yat tasmāt tad anyan nopapadyate //*; "An other is dependent on an other; other is not an other without an other. But that which is dependent on something is not be other than it."

He himself notoriously denies at *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 24 that he has any position.

"The Grammatical Basis of Nāgārjuna's Arguments: Some Further Considerations," *Indologica Taurinensia* 8–9 (1980–81): 35–43.

*Aṣṭādhyāyī* I.4.54: *svatantraḥ kartā*.

*Aṣṭādhyāyī* I.4.49: *kartur īpsitatamaḥ karma*.

Bhattacharya, pp. 39 ff.

Lindtner, p. 131. All translations are Lindtner's, sometimes slightly amended.

Lindtner, p. 133.

Lindtner, p. 41.

Lindtner, p. 47.

*Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings*, trans. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 34–35.

See in this connection Lindtner's discussion of the role of *prajñā* in Nāgārjuna's thought, pp. 269–277.

See my *Transformative Philosophy: A Study of Śāṅkara, Fichte, and Heidegger*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983).

See Richard Robinson, "Some Logical Aspects of Nāgārjuna's System," *Philosophy East and West* 6 (1957): 291–308. But cf. Seyfort Ruegg, "The Uses of the Four Positions of the Catuskoṭi," pp. 55–56.

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THE MANDALA OF CANDI GUMPUNG (SUMATRA) AND THE  
INDO-TIBETAN VAJRASEKHARATANTRA

Approximately a dozen years ago, Boechari (1985) published preliminary findings of the excavation of Candi Gumpung (Muara Jambi).<sup>1</sup> This temple he holds to have been built from between the middle of the ninth to the beginning of the tenth century and to have been enlarged at least once in the eleventh or twelfth centuries. Among the material found at the site are 21 inscribed gold plates which together furnish the names, or fragments of the names, of some 22 deities. Boechari interprets these as belonging to the Vajradhātumaṇḍala, a maṇḍala which traditionally in the secondary literature has been seen to have been present in the Indonesian Archipelago.<sup>2</sup> Recently, the present writer published a study in which it was proposed that, despite the authority of the scholastic traditions of the West, no clear textual trace of this historically important maṇḍala is to be found in Indonesia and that, in consequence, the syncretic maṇḍalas of the *yogatantras* such as the Sakalajagadvinaya, Sarvadurgatipariśodhana and Trilokavijaya which may be shown to be extant in the Archipelago are chronologically prior to the Vajradhātu, which is orthodox insofar as it is inhabited by Buddhist divinities alone.<sup>3</sup> That is, the *yogatantra* maṇḍalas populated by both 'Hindu' and 'Buddhist' divinities are necessarily earlier than the Vajradhātumaṇḍala which, the Tattvasaṃgraha explicitly holds, the other maṇḍalas reflect.<sup>4</sup>

Since these conclusions have significant consequences for the history of the Buddhist tantra, indeed, for the religious history of India itself, in addition to the implications they have for the religious and cultural history of Indonesia, to wit, that syncretic features of its culture(s) are not necessarily of indigenous origin and that the primary influence of tantric Buddhism in Indonesia must have occurred before the compilation in India of the Tattvasaṃgraha as the fundamental text of the *yogatantras*, that is, in all probability sometimes before 700 A.D., it is of some interest to determine whether the data furnished by Candi Gumpung on Sumatra provide evidence either confirming or belying these interpretations reached on the basis of textual data from the Archipelago. It is the thesis of this paper that this reading indeed remains substantially unchallenged

comme celle des modernes Thugs, qui assassinait les gens pour couper leurs doigts et s'en faire une «guirlande sacrée» [brackets are of the original]" (p. 108). Like Beal, Grousset inserts this sentence into his running translation without indicating that he is adding to the text on his own account rather than reproducing Hsüan-tsang.

<sup>26</sup> The temporal (*deśavakāśika*) or life-time (*digvrata*) vow to abide only in a certain restricted area is a classical form of Jaina practice (cf. P. Jaini: *The Jaina Path of Purification*. Berkeley, 1979: pp. 178–80).

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, traduit et annoté, Paris-Louvain 1923–1931 (reprint 1980): vol. III (= chapter 4), p. 147, n. 2. Here the passages in question are cited.

<sup>28</sup> In K.R. Norman's translation of the Theragāthā: "Truly it is a long time since a seer, an ascetic, honoured by me, entered the great wood". In the Ven. Nyanamoli's translation of the Majjhimanikāya: "Oh, at long last a sage revered by me, this monk has now appeared in the great forest".

<sup>29</sup> Neither the content nor the precise wording of the equivalent Chinese passages translated from the *āgamas* supports G.'s conjecture in the least way (Taishō vol. 2: 281a16f., 378c15–18, 720b16f.).

<sup>30</sup> Each *pāda* of the *tutthubha* metre consists of eleven syllables. G.'s emendation contradicts his earlier statement (p. 144), no doubt an oversight, that in the version of the P.T.S. the first *pāda* consists, like the third *pāda*, only of ten syllables.

<sup>31</sup> E. Waldschmidt et al.: *Sanskrihandschriften aus den Turfanfunden* (VOHD, 10), Stuttgart, 1965: 1, no. 160, line 5, as published in: Fumio Enomoto: *A Comprehensive Study of the Chinese Samyuktāgama*. Part I: \*Samgītapāta. Kyoto 1994: p. 22.

The wording *cirassa(m) vata* at the beginning of a verse is also attested in the Jātakas (II 439,23f., III 314,27f. IV 476,24ff., V 23,12f. and V 112,13f.) and (in the Sanskrit equivalent) in the verse *cirasya bata paśyāmi, brāhmaṇaṃ parinirvṛtam / sarvavairabhayāttam, itṛnam loke viśaktikām //*, which is preserved in the aforementioned Turfan finds (5, no. 1250b), in the Devatāsūtra (23), in the Śarīrārthagāthā (5.3) of the Yogācārabhūmi (all texts adduced in Enomoto, op. cit., p. 12), and – in Pali – in Saṃyuttanikāya I 1 and 54.

<sup>32</sup> G. tries to substantiate his interpretation of Aṅgulimāla by referring to other supposed traces of Śaivic/Śakta practices in the Buddhist canon. Thus he refers to Theragāthā 151 where we hear of Kālī, a large lady of dark complexion who breaks bones and who, in the translation of K.R. Norman, piles them up. G. changes the reading *abhisandahivā* to *abhisannahivā*, so that Kālī does not pile the broken bones up but strings them together, supposedly so as to wear them as an accoutrement (p. 159). It is – according to G.'s interpretation of Theragāthā 151–52 – while visualizing Kālī as taking limbs from corpses, breaking them up and stringing them together that Mahākāla, the arhant who utters the two verses in question, comes to attain arhantship upon reflecting that his body may be put to similar use. According to G.'s interpretation Mahākāla (lest he be some kind of Pratyekabuddha) had continued with his tantric visualization practices even after having become a follower of the Buddha, and this all the way up to the attainment of arhantship! Such an interpretation seems hardly possible and also uncalled for because verses 151 and 152 may very well and much more plausibly refer to the standard Buddhist contemplation of the foul and impermanent nature of the body (*aśubhabhāvanā*) as practised in cemeteries. It is indeed remarkable that the monk in question is called Mahākāla, a frequent synonym for Śiva. However, it would seem more appropriate to take *kālī* as a derogatory term, possibly referring – as the commentary on the verse in question has it (Theragāthā-atthakathā vol. II, p. 27: *ath' ekadivasam kālī nāma iṭṭhi chavadāhikā*; cf. Dhammapada-atthakathā I 68: *atha ekā susānagopikā Kālī nāma chavadāhikā therassa thitaṭṭhānam ...*) – to the female guardian of a cemetery (*susānagopikā, chavadāhikā*) – a figure also attested in the Vinaya (I 152).

in the same way the other occurrences of the words *kālī, śiva, iśāna* or *mahesakṣha* (possibly on the basis of the C.P.D. and Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* [on *śrikā* III, 14–15; in Wogihara's edition part 1, p. 279,25–27], G. suggests the derivation of *mahesakṣha* from Sanskrit *mahā-śva-ākhyā*, "called Mahēśa" alias Śiva), which G. adduces from the Buddhist canon (pp. 160–62), are also not unambiguous enough to suffice as a proof for the existence of a (proto-)Śaiva/Śakta cult.

Thus G. raises the question as to what kind of a person Aṅgulimāla was, a question which will not find a ready answer, though it is tempting to argue that the point of the Aṅgulimāla story is that no matter how evil a sinner one is, there is yet the chance for betterment and even arhantship in this very life.

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Charles S. Prebish, *A Survey of Vinaya Literature*. Taipei, Jin Luen Publishing House, 1994. x, 158 pp.

Prebish's bibliography has been in preparation for many years. As he points out in his preface I read the manuscript in the early 1970s. Prebish never sent me a later version nor did he have the courtesy to send me a copy of his book.

A very full and meticulously compiled bibliography was published in 1979 by Akira Yuyama: *Systematische Übersicht über die buddhistische Sanskrit-Literatur*. Wiesbaden, 1979 which includes publications up to 1976. According to Prebish it provided a valuable source for cross-referencing his own materials.

It would have been useful to publish a supplement to Yuyama's bibliography comprising recent publications. However, Prebish's has not followed Yuyama's example. His work is divided into three parts: Introduction, Survey of Vinaya Literature and Secondary Literature. The Vinaya Literature has been arranged systematically according to the different schools but the Secondary Vinaya Literature is arranged in chronological order.

In his preface Prebish remarks that "This survey is not intended to be encyclopedic in any sense of that word. Instead, it is true to its title. With regard to the texts and translations, it is quite thorough, but not exhaustive." No bibliography can be exhaustive but Yuyama's work is not far removed from this ideal goal. Let us examine only one section of Prebish's Survey, the one dealing with Mūlasarvāstivāda Literature, to see which information it contains and how "thorough" it is with regard to texts and translations.

On p. 87 Prebish says that the Chinese version of the Prātimokṣasūtra of the monks is found in Taishō 1454, (XXIV), pp. 500b13–508b4. Yuyama indicated 500b13 v.1.–508a4. Prebish omitted v.1. (von links) which he probably did not understand and changed 508a4 to 508b4. According to him the Prātimokṣasūtra of the nuns begins on p. 508a11. Here again Prebish left out the indication v.1. Moreover, he did not see that it is impossible for one text to end on 508b4 and for a second to begin on 508a11. It would have been better if Prebish had not wrongly copied Yuyama's indications but had referred the reader to his work. It seems superfluous to repeat in each Vinaya bibliography these indications.

On the same page (p. 87) Prebish lists five Tibetan editions of the Prātimokṣas of the monks and nuns: Peking, Tōhoku, Taipei, Snar-thang and Co-ne editions. In the list of abbreviations Yuyama gives full information on the abbreviations Co-ne, Peking, etc., but one looks in vain in Prebish's book for information on these five editions. There is no Tōhoku edition, but a catalogue of the Derge edition published by the Tōhoku University in Sendai (mentioned p. 122, n. 57). As to the Taipei edition, this must be a reprint of a Tibetan edition.

On p. 88 is mentioned Prebish's translation of the Sanskrit Prātimokṣasūtras of the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Mūlasarvāstivādins. Yuyama lists two reviews: J.W. de Jong, *IJ* XIX (1977), 127–130 and H. Bechert, *JAOS* XCVIII (1978), 203–204 to which one can add Michael Carrithers, *Times Literary Supplement* July 16 1976, 895. Prebish does not give any information on reviews although, in some instances, a review can be more important than the book reviewed. For instance Prebish mentions Marcel Hofinger's brilliant (sic) *Étude sur la* (sic) *concile de Vaiśālī* (p. 130) but one has to consult Yuyama's work for a reference to Paul Demiéville's brilliant; *A propos du concile de Vaiśālī* (TP XL, 1951, 239–296).

On p. 90 Prebish mentions three books containing editions of portions of the Vinayavastu. He does not indicate that Gnoli's edition of the Saṅghabhedavastu was published in two parts in 1977 and 1978. Vogel's book was published by the Deutsche Morgenländische (not Morgenländischen) Gesellschaft. Not mentioned are the edition of the Tibetan translation of the Pravrajyāvastu in two volumes by Helmut Eimer (Wiesbaden, 1983): *Rab tu 'byuñ ba'i gzi*, Heinz Bechert, *Bruchstücke buddhistischer Verssammlungen aus zentralasiatischen Sanskrithandschriften, I: Die Anavataptaḡāthā und die Sthaviragāthā* (Berlin, 1961), Volkbert Näther, *Das Gilgit-Fragment Or. 11878A im Britischen Museum zu London* (Diss. Marburg, 1975), Claus

Vogel and Klaus Wille, *Some Hitherto Unidentified Fragments of the Pravrajyāvastu Manuscript Found Near Gilgit* (NGAW, 1984, 299–337) and Claus Vogel and Klaus Wille, *Some More Fragments of the Pravrajyā Portion of the Vinayavastu Manuscript Found Near Gilgit* (*Sanskrit-Texte aus dem buddhistischen Kanon: Neuentdeckungen und Neueditionen* II (Göttingen, 1992), 65–109. Also omitted is one of the most important publications on the Vinayavastu in recent years: Klaus Wille, *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung des Vinayavastu der Mūlasarvāstivādin*. Stuttgart, 1990.

On p. 92 Prebish mentions Kun Chang's book on the Kathinavastu but omits to indicate that it contains a new edition of the Sanskrit text (pp. 51–64). In the list of Tibetan titles of the vastus one must correct Dpag-dbye'i gzhi to Dgag-dbye'i gzhi (p. 93) and Dge-dun-dbyen-pa'i gzhi to Dge-'dun-dbyen-pa'i gzhi (p. 95).

Prebish is very careless in the spelling of German and French titles. One finds la culte (p. 123), le section (p. 112) and sons plein développement (p. 128). P. 77 he mentions "Nouveaux Fragments d'un ſikṣās". Read: "Nouveaux fragments de la Collection Stein. 1. Fragment d'un recueil de Śikṣās." German titles fare no better. On p. 40 one finds Heinz Bechert, "Asoka's 'Schismedikt' under der Begriff Sanghabheda." Incidentally, there is no reference to this article in the index of authors nor in the index of articles. On p. 90 Istituto is twice spelled Instituto.

In the third part of his book which lists secondary Vinaya Literature in chronological order Prebish writes: "In 1952 we witness the beginning of what later becomes a steady flow of research on Vinaya from Japanese scholars" (p. 131). This steady flow is represented by the enumeration of articles (often of no more than two pages) in a single Japanese journal: *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū*. Although Prebish's book deals with the Vinaya of the Hinayāna schools (Prebish excludes Mahāyāna Vinaya, cf. p. 129) he includes many Japanese articles which have nothing to do with his topic. To quote only one example, on p. 132 Prebish mentions "an article of interest: Eishun Ikeda's "On the Śīla and Vinaya Doctrines by Unshō". It may be of interest but when reading it Prebish must certainly have noticed that the doctrines of Unshō (1827–1909) are only of importance for the recent history of Japanese Buddhism.

In his bibliography Yuyama gave much valuable information on the contents of books and articles but did not give any value judgments. It is obvious that he carefully consulted the literature quoted. Prebish does not refrain from adding in many instances such qualifications as brilliant, important, interesting, etc. but information on contents is often

absent or inadequate. One can only hope that Yuyama will publish a supplement listing publications which appeared since 1976.

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Oskar von Hinüber, *A Handbook of Pāli Literature* (Indian Philology and South Asian Studies, Volume 2). Berlin – New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1996. XIII, 257 pp. DM 195,-/öS 521,-/sFr 187,- ISBN 3-11-014992-23; ISSN 0948-1923

Oskar von Hinüber's Handbook covers the whole of Pāli literature with the exception of the titles listed by H. Smith in the Epilegomena to the *Critical Pali Dictionary* under 2.9.22 "Medicine", 2.9.23 "Law", and 5. "Philology". K. R. Norman's *Pāli Literature* (Wiesbaden, 1983) included only texts published in Roman script whereas von Hinüber studies many later Pāli texts published in Oriental editions or existing only in manuscript form.

Von Hinüber's book pays particular attention to the formal structure of the texts, their mutual relationships and their chronology. In these fields much remains to be done and von Hinüber renders a great service to Pāli studies by his many illuminating remarks in the course of his work.

For each text von Hinüber indicates editions, and translations, in abbreviated form for those listed in the Epilegomena, and in full for those published after 1948. Additions and corrections to the numerical system of the Epilegomena are listed in Section XVIII (pp. 256–257). Moreover, in the notes von Hinüber refers to a great number of publications which are all listed in a lengthy bibliography (pp. 208–228). The bibliographical information given by him is very comprehensive and includes the most recent publications. At most one could add a few Japanese publications by, for instance, K. Mizuno, the Grand Old Man of Pāli studies in Japan of whom only one article is mentioned.

Von Hinüber examines in detail the commentaries for which as he remarks the structure has hardly been investigated. There is much new and stimulating in the chapter on the commentaries (pp. 100–153). In the remaining chapters he deals with the handbooks, the subcommentaries, anthologies, cosmological texts, poetry, collections of stories, Pāli literature from South East Asia, letters and inscriptions, and lost texts

and non-Theravāda texts quoted in Pāli literature. In these pages one will find studied and analyzed an enormous amount of material, some of which is hardly known or is completely unknown in the West.

One must be grateful to von Hinüber for this publication which contains so many new insights. In the introduction he promises a comprehensive treatment of Pāli literature. Also under preparation are a study of the development of the Pātimokkha and an examination of the form of a Jātaka typical for different Buddhist schools (cf. pp. 11 and 56). The future of Pāli studies looks very bright!

There is only one serious complaint that one can make with regard to this publication. DM 195,- for a little over 250 pages makes this book out of reach for many students and scholars of Pāli. Let us hope that soon a paperback edition will be published for a more reasonable price.

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*Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden und der kanonischen Literatur der Sarvāstivāda-Schule*, 9. Lieferung *ka - kukkutyāṇḍavat*. Bearbeitet von Michael Schmidt und Siglinde Dietz, pp. I–IV, 1–80. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996. DM 45.00

Le neuvième fascicule contient la section *ka - kukkutyāṇḍavat*. Michael Schmidt a rédigé la première partie (*ka - kamaugha*), Siglinde Dietz la deuxième (*kāya - kukkutyāṇḍavat*). On trouvera dans ce fascicule comme dans les précédents de nombreuses corrections des textes édités. Les éditeurs n'ont pas hésité, le cas échéant, à corriger des traductions qui leur semblaient erronées, cf. par exemple, p. 62b la traduction de *kāra* par Lobpreis, etc. Tous les textes cités sont soigneusement traduits. Rarement pourrait-on suggérer une autre interprétation. Sub voce *kāra-saṃgraha gaṇ gi phyir 'di gñis ni dus mñam pa'i rgyu(s?) sgrub pa'i phyir* est traduit "weil diese beiden in bezug auf die Zeit durch die gleiche Ursache bewirkt werden". *Dus mñam pa'i rgyu* est une 'gleichzeitige Ursache'.

Il faut signaler la discussion du sens d'*artha-karana* dans laquelle l'éditeur réfute les traductions données pour *atta-karana* par Rhys Davids et par le CPD (seat of judgement, court-room). D'après lui le sens est



## REVIEWS

Ryokai Shiraishi, *Ascetism in Buddhism and Brahmanism* (Buddhica Britannica Series VI). Tring, U.K., The Institute of Buddhist Studies, 1996. X, 257 pp. ISBN 0-9515424-5-1, ISSN 0954-859

According to the preface the author of this work attempts to depict and ascertain the style and nature of ascetic life during the period of Śākyamuni Buddha and his immediate disciples. His sources are selected texts in the Pāli Tripiṭaka and a selection of Dharmasūtric texts. The greater part of his work is taken up by his study of the Dharmasūtras, i.e. Gautama, Bauddhāyana, Āpastamba, Vāsiṣṭha and Mānava, and their commentaries. His bibliography mentions Bühler's translation of the Dharmasūtras but the author has preferred to use his own translations. The Sanskrit texts are quoted in the notes. However, the words are often wrongly separated and this is reflected in the translations given. For instance, p. 36, n. 43: *yāni ca bhojanārthāni kām syādīni*, "a winnowing basket (*sya*) and so on for eating"; p. 49, n. 138 quotes Haradatta's explanation of the word *vaiṣka*: *viṣkā duṣṭamrgā vyāghrād ayastair hatam māmsam vaiṣkam tad apy upayujjita*. According to Shiraishi "the commentators say that this [i.e. *vaiṣka*] refers to flesh of animals defeated or killed by weapons." Nobody seems to have pointed out to him that one must read *vyāghrādayas tair*. P. 123 Shiraishi remarks that according to Haradatta pain does not disappear through one's own inactivity. In n. 245 he quotes Haradatta as follows: *paraloke bhavam api duḥkham etena vyākhyātam na svair acārīnām nivartata ihi!* Correctly quoted Sanskrit texts are completely misinterpreted. For example, Manu VI.93:

*daśa lakṣaṇāni dharmasya ye viprāḥ samadhīyate /  
adhītya cānuvartante te yānti paramām gatim /*

Shiraishi translates: "The twice-born ones who thoroughly study the tenfold rule, once they pass over its obedience, enter the supreme state" (p. 116).

In chapter five Shiraishi studies the life of Buddhist monks: He quotes Nakamura's opinion that Buddhist preaching and the rules of discipline

must have originally been composed as gāthās or in short sutta style (cf. p. 140, n. 10). No mention is made of the fact that in Japan (e.g. S. Murakami and S. Matsumoto) and other countries Nakamura's opinions are not universally shared. Shiraishi often quotes the Suttanipāta, for instance 810: *paṭilīnacarassa bhikkhuno bhajamānassa vivittamānasam*. Although he does not correct *ānasam* to *āsanam* he translates: "The bhikkhu wandering about being free from attachment obtains a solitary seat" (p. 166).

Shiraishi has certainly spent much time reading Dharmasūtras, their commentaries and Pāli texts. He could have avoided many mistakes if, instead of presenting his own translations, he had made use of, for instance, Bühler's translations of the Dharmasūtras and Norman's translations of Pāli texts.

As to the interpretation of the data found in the texts, Shiraishi jumps easily to conclusions. Pp. 160–162 he quotes verses from the Suttanipāta and the Theragāthā about monks living far away from the village or town, in solitude and he remarks that "the life of Buddhist monks historically shifted from wandering alone to dwelling in a monastery". Similar hasty conclusions are drawn with regard to statements found in the Dharmasūtras. Shiraishi remarks that he was unable to make full use of P. Olivelle's book: *The Āśrama System* (New York, 1993). A thorough study of this book would probably have been very useful.

Shiraishi was awarded the Degree of Philosophy at the University of Delhi for his work. According to the preface Dr. T. Skorupski read the entire text in its original format and made a number of constructive suggestions. He does not seem to have noticed the elementary mistakes made by Shiraishi in translating Sanskrit texts. The editorial board of the *Buddhica Britannica* comprises no less than thirteen eminent scholars. I am afraid that not one of them read even part of the manuscript of this book.

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N.L. Jain, *Glossary of Jaina Terms*, Jain International, Ahmedabad 1995.

Es ist wohl eine unbestrittene Tatsache, daß unter den indologischen Teildisziplinen die Jinistik gegenwärtig eine Rolle spielt, deren Geringfügigkeit ihrer wirklichen Bedeutung nicht entspricht. Trotz

vergänglicher Leistungen aus der Vergangenheit – es seien hier H. von Glasenapp, H. Jacobi, Jinavijaya, E. Leumann, R. Pischel, Ratnachandra, W. Schubring und A. Weber genannt – verharret die Jaina-Forschung durchaus im Schatten der Buddhologie. So traf K. Bruhn die deutliche Feststellung: "Trotz vielseitiger und andauernder Anstrengungen besteht hier (auf dem Gebiet der Jinismus-Forschung, K.M.) eine Diskrepanz zwischen Erreichtem und noch zu Verwirklichendem, wie sie sonst in der Indologie nicht begegnet."<sup>1</sup> Doch ist die Erforschung des Jinismus gerade für die Indologen nicht zuletzt deshalb von Wichtigkeit, weil sich seine Grundlehre im Unterschied zum Buddhismus über die Jahrtausende hinweg weitgehend unverändert erhalten hat.

Hilfsmittel zum Studium des Jinismus sind also sehr willkommen. Mit Recht verweist N.L. Jain in seiner *Introduction* auf den Umstand, daß sich die spezifische Jaina-Terminologie in einer verwirrenden Fülle englischer Äquivalente niederschlägt. Es wird daher versucht, einer Vereinheitlichung und damit Standardisierung den Weg zu bahnen. Das Buch, ein erstes Werk dieser Art, wurde von einer Gruppe von Jaina-Gelehrten unter Koordination durch J. verfaßt.

Bei der Durchsicht ist man zunächst ein wenig überrascht, daß die Stichwörter nicht in Ardhamāgadhī, sondern ausschließlich in Sanskrit gegeben werden. Vornan steht eine Transliteration; es folgen das Sanskrit-Lemma in Devanāgarī und die englische Übersetzung. Das Ganze ist nach dem lateinischen Alphabet geordnet, doch wird dieses Prinzip vielfach durchbrochen, so in den Reihenfolgen *mādhyasthya* – *madhvāsrava*, *ṛṣi* – *rogaparīṣaha*. Wortart bzw. Geschlecht der Lemmata werden nicht angegeben.

Mit über 3000 Stichwörtern darf das Glossar immerhin eine gewisse Reichhaltigkeit für sich in Anspruch nehmen. Die wichtigsten Kategorien aus der Religion im engeren Sinne und der Philosophie sind erfaßt. Bestimmte Lacunae (wenn wir denn beim Sanskrit bleiben wollen: *akṣiramadhusarpīṣka*, *agrha*, *ākhyātapravrajyā* u.a.) werden nie ganz zu vermeiden sein und sollten nicht überbewertet werden. Recht nachteilig ist dagegen die ungenügende Berücksichtigung der Kosmographie und der Hagiographie: dort würde man *dhātakikhandā*, *rainaprabhā*, *lavanoda* und *harikṣetra* – hier Arjuna, Nami, Prasenañit und Baladeva vergeblich suchen.

Belegstellen werden nicht gegeben; man würde sie auch in einem Glossar dieser Art nicht erwarten. Der Sanskrit-Druck ist fast durchweg korrekt. Leider muß man bemerken, daß es bei der Verwendung der diakritischen Zeichen in der Transliteration sowie bei den englischen

stehen sich graphisch nicht sehr fern." In §11 it would be better to read *dravyam niṣkrāmya tiṣṭhati*, taking *dravyam* as object of *niṣkrāmya*. In both §11 and §31 the translation has to be changed accordingly.

Already the detailed table of contents (pp. 27–29) shows the great variety of topics dealt with in the text. The text itself contains a table of contents but this covers only the first part of the text, §§1–50. §50 contains a verse:

*bhṛūmadhye yo bhaven nityam sa uṣṇīṣa iti smṛtaḥ |  
lambakabhūpanandasya ācāryasya mahātmanah || iti ||*

According to George the second line is the colophon of the first part of the *Ṣaṇmukhakalpa*: "Dies ist [das Werk] des Mahātman, des Lehrers, des Sohnes des Lambaka-Königs." However, it is more likely that both lines form a complete verse: "That which is between the two brows is the *uṣṇīṣa*. So is said by the Mahātman, the master, the son of the king of Lambaka." With § 51 begins a new section with the words: *athāta uttaratantrasya dīksām samkṣepato vakṣyāmi*.

George has taken great trouble to explain the numerous practices mentioned in the text. His commentary is an excellent contribution to the study of the popular magic described in the text and will be very useful for further studies of similar texts. In an appendix George lists items relating to *Ṣaṇmukha* (names, titles, parentage, *Ṣaṇmukha* as commander, his courage and heroic deeds, his companions, iconographic descriptions, names related to the contents of the *Ṣaṇmukhakalpa*), names of other gods, plants, animals, and *mudrās*. Dieter George's work is a dissertation submitted in 1966 to the university of Marburg. We must be grateful to the Stiftung Waldschmidt for having published this interesting work of Dieter George whose untimely death in 1985 was a great loss for Indian studies.

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Richard King, *Early Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism. The Mahāyāna Context of the Gauḍapādīya-kārikā*. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1995. X, 341 pp. \$19.95 ISBN 0-7914-2514-2 (pb.)

Much has been written on the Gauḍapādīya-kārikā (GK), although Richard King remarks that "There have been little more than a handfu

works exclusively devoted to an appraisal of Gauḍapādian thought". In his critical review of recent work on the GK King discusses no more than eleven books and one article, which is a considerable amount of literature for a text of no more than 215 verses (16 pages in King's 'running translation'). He does not mention Walleser's pioneer work *Ältere Vedānta* (Heidelberg, 1910) one of the great merits of which consisted in showing that verses of the GK are quoted by Bhāvaviveka and by Tarkajvālā and by Śāntiraksita in his commentary on verse 93 of the *Madhyamakālaṅkāra*. In King's book there is only one reference to Walleser's book, whom he reproaches for having maintained that *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (MHK) 8.13 is a verbatim quotation of GK. King forgets to mention that Walleser could not know the Sanskrit as Olle Qvamström points out in his book *Hindu Philosophy in a Buddhist Perspective* (Lund, 1989), p. 24, n. 16. Apart from Tilmann's article mentioned by King there are many more which ought to have been cited, beginning with Louis de La Vallée Poussin's 'Vedānta and Buddhism' (*JRAS* 1910, pp. 129–140).

According to King "As yet, no one has provided a study of the GK which displays anything like an adequate consideration of the Mahāyāna philosophical context to which the GK is undoubtedly indebted. Consequently, their assessment of Gauḍapādian thought has been sadly deficient" (pp. 11–12). It is not only the Mahāyāna philosophical context which King examines in his book. In chapter two "The Vedāntic Heritage of the Gauḍapādīya-kārikā" he studies the Upaniṣadic heritage of the *Bhagavadgītā* and the GK and the doctrines of the *Brahmasūtra*, without adding anything important to what is already well-known. For instance, on p. 65 King remarks that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣads* are the Upaniṣadic texts to which the GK seems most indebted, something already pointed out in 1943 by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya in his book *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*, p. ciii. The use of the terms *svabhāva* and *dharma* in the GK is for King the reason to write a lengthy chapter on "The Abhidharma Context of the 'Origination'". In a note he enumerates the verses in which *svabhāva* and the related notion of *prakṛti* occur (p. 275, n. 3). He includes I.23 and III.32 in which neither *svabhāva* nor *prakṛti* are to be found. King discusses at length Abhidharma ideas (pp. 91–108) before studying the Mahāyāna understanding of *dharma* and *svabhāva*. In chapter 4 King arrives at last at one of the most important aspects of the GK, the relation between the fourth prakaraṇa and Madhyamaka thought: "On-Origination in the GK: Early Vedāntic Ontology and Madhyamaka Buddhism". Here too, one looks in vain for some new point of view.

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Chapter 5 is entitled "Asparśa-yoga in the GK". The word *asparśayoga* occurs twice in the GK: III.39 and IV.2. In III.39 *asparśayoga* is said to be *durdarśaḥ sarvayogibhiḥ* and in IV.2 to be *sarvasattvasukho hitaḥ* and *avivādo 'viruddhaś*. The word *asparśayoga* does not seem to occur anywhere else apart from a late Buddhist work in which there is a reference to a yoga *asprśayogotvāt* (sic), cf. Bhattacharya, *op. cit.*, p. 305. Although the GK gives very little information on the exact meaning of *asparśayoga*, much has been written about it. King's chapter contains no less than 41 pages and concludes by remarking that "it refers both to a form of meditative practice (yoga) and to the goal of that practice (*samādhi*). As such, it also presupposes a specific epistemological theory – the theory that the mind does not touch an external object" (p. 181).

In the following chapter "Gauḍapāḍian Inclusivism and the Mahāyāna Buddhist Tradition" King tries to show that the authors of the GK rely upon Buddhist ideas and arguments for the formulation of their own distinctive position. This was already made abundantly clear by Bhattacharya and even before him by Walleser (*op. cit.*, p. 37). In the last chapter "Buddhism in the GK and the Mahāyāna: the Tathāgatagarbha Texts" King enters new territory. He gives a brief history of the Tathāgatagarbha theory in India and even in Tibet, reproaching previous scholars for having restricted the scope of analysis to the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra scholastic works. Of course, the tathāgatagarbha theory existed in India before the GK and its influence on the GK cannot therefore be excluded. Paul Williams has hinted that possibly Gauḍapāda was influenced by Tathāgatagarbha texts (cf. *Mahāyāna Buddhism*, 1989, p. 100). However, nobody has been able, so far, to demonstrate evidence of such influence and King himself is forced to acknowledge that "There is little textual evidence, however, that might suggest that the author has been specifically influenced by the notion of the tathāgatagarbha or by texts which utilize that notion as their central concept" (p. 234). In fact, one looks in vain in this chapter for even a little of the textual evidence referred to by King.

King's work shows many traces of negligence. There are numerous misprints in the Sanskrit quotations. Errors have not been corrected. On p. 35 King states that an entire chapter (chapter III) is devoted to the views of the Vedānta in Bhāvaviveka's MHK, whereas all his references are to chapter VIII. On p. 309 he writes that according to Ruegg "only in the late Madhyamaka of Kumāṛila (sic) aspects of the tathāgatagarbha strand of thought were integrated into Indian Buddhist

scholasticism". Of course, Ruegg mentioned Kamalaśīla, not Kumāṛila. The Appendix comprises a running translation of the GK in which verses IV.73–86 are omitted without any word of explication.

However, the main objection to this work is that King has not taken the trouble to study carefully the text of the GK. For instance, he renders on p. 209 GK IV.93 (*ādisāntā hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva sunirvṛtāḥ, sarve dharmāḥ samābhinnā ajam sāmīyam viśāradam*) as follows:

"By their very nature all dharmas indeed are quiescent from the very beginning, non-arising, liberated and homogeneous. [Reality] is non-separate, devoid of fear and uniformly unoriginated". *Anutpannāḥ* does not mean 'non-arising'; *prakṛtyā* belongs to *sunirvṛtāḥ*; *samābhinnā* qualifies *sarve dharmāḥ* and *sāmīyam* does not mean 'uniformly'. That King does not take any care in rendering GK verses, is also obvious from the fact that he gives an entirely different translation of the same verse on p. 89. King several times mentions Tilmann Vetter's article 'Die Gauḍapāḍīya-kārikās: zur Entstehung und zur Bedeutung von (A)dvaita', *WZKM* 22 (1978), pp. 95–131, but seems to have overlooked his careful translation of GK IV.93: "Alle Gegebenheiten sind nämlich von Anfang an zur Ruhe gekommen, nichtentstanden, von Natur aus schon gut erschlossen [und daher] gleich und nichtverschieden; die Gleichheit ist unentstanden [und] furchtlos" (p. 98). In his article Vetter examines in depth the meaning of *dvaita* and *advaita* and concludes that *dvaita* does not mean duality but 'Vielheit'. King does not seem to have paid any attention to Vetter's arguments. In translating Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 18.5 (*karmakleśakṣayān mokṣaḥ karmakleśā vikalpataḥ, te prapañcāt prapañcas tu śūnyatāyām nirudhyate*) King refers to Kalupahana's translation and renders this verse in the same way: "On the cessation of the karmic defilements, there is liberation. For the one who constructs (*yikalpataḥ*) the karmic defilements [exist] due to conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*), but this conceptual proliferation ceases with emptiness" (p. 135). There are many translations of Nāgārjuna's kārikās but few translators have managed to make as many mistakes as Kalupahana who does not seem to know the meaning of the suffix *-taḥ* in *vikalpataḥ* (for Kalupahana's work see Lindtner's review, *JAOS* 108, 1988, pp. 176–178). The same elementary mistake is made by F. J. Streng in his book *Emptiness* (Nashville, 1967) to which King refers several times (cf. Streng, p. 204: "for pains of action exist for him who constructs them"). It would take too much space to point out all of King's wrong translations but it is necessary to draw attention to his translation of IV.51 (*viññāne spandamāne vai nābhāsā anyatobhavaḥ, na tato nyatra viññānaḥ na viññānam viśanti*): "When consciousness (*viññāna*)

is vibrating, the images do not derive from anywhere else. When it is not vibrating, [they] do not reside elsewhere, nor do they enter consciousness" (p. 177). In quoting the Sanskrit text of this verse King completely overlooks the fact that in the addenda and corrigenda of his book Bhattacharya corrected *vijñānān* to *nispandāt*.

Apart from the carelessness with which King has studied the text of the GK one finds many instances of strange comments. For instance, after quoting GK IV.93 King states: "Here the author of GK IV appears to be endorsing the concept of *ādibuddha* in the light of his absolutistic view that all things, insofar as they possess a *svabhāva*, are unoriginated and already essentially in *nirvāna*" (p. 209). The term *ādibuddha* occurs in GK IV.92 where it is said that all dharmas are *ādibuddhāḥ* which King renders with "enlightened from the very beginning" (p. 209). What this has to do with the concept of the *ādibuddha* King fails to explain. Neither does he explain what 'enlightened dharmas' are.

In his discussion on the date and authorship of the GK King does not bring forward any new evidence. He remarks that no author makes any reference to the fourth prakaraṇa. Lindtner has noted the similarity between MHK 5.6 and GK IV.24. According to him GK IV.21 is based upon MHK 5.6. King seems to agree with Lindtner although he does not exclude the possibility that the fourth prakaraṇa was already in existence at the time of Bhāvaviveka (p. 40). One text which is not mentioned at all by King is the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*. Already in 1932 B. L. Atreya noticed "much common between *kārikās* (i.e., GK) and *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, not only in thought, but also in language" (cf. Bhattacharya, *op. cit.*, p. lxxxvi). The *Yogavāsiṣṭha* is generally considered to be post-Śāṅkara (cf. Qvarnström, *op. cit.*, p. 16, n. 13) but in a recent study Walter Slaje has proved that the oldest layer of the text teaches a pre-Śāṅkara Vedānta (*Vom Mokṣopāya-Śāstra zum Yogavāsiṣṭha-Mahārāmāyaṇa*, Wien, 1994). In the Kashmiri recension of *Yogavāsiṣṭha* 7.195.63 the text is almost entirely identical with GK IV.1 which has *sambuddhas* instead of *samboddhā* (Slaje, *op. cit.*, p. 94). The rather uncommon term *amanastā* in GK III.32 is also found in *Yogavāsiṣṭha* 5.91.37 (Slaje, *op. cit.*, p. 194). In the light of Slaje's work it would certainly be useful to reconsider the relationship between the GK and the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*.

The GK is an important text and needs further study and research. However, without an intensive study of the text and its terminology, it is not possible to arrive at satisfactory results. In his article Vetter has given an example of the importance of the study of some key concepts of the GK. Similar studies would be very welcome. In the second place, one has to take into account text such as the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*

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importance of which for the study of Vedānta in the period before Śāṅkara has been demonstrated by Slaje.

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Pfeiffer, Martin  
Indische Mythen vom Werden der Welt. Texte – Strukturen – Geschichte. Berlin, Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1994. XIII, 432 pp.  
DM-198,- ISBN 3-496-02515-8

This book Martin Pfeiffer has collected 300 texts relating to the formation of the world from the Indian subcontinent (including also Nepal and Sri Lanka). His material consists of texts of the Sanskrit tradition and texts of non-Sanskrit traditions. Pfeiffer distinguishes three historically defined Sanskrit zones: Rgveda and Atharvaveda (RAV); Vedic literature (BRA); Yajurveda, Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads; Epics, Purāṇas and related texts (EPU) and nine geographically defined non-Sanskrit zones: Sri Lanka (SLA); South-India (SIN); West Central India (WZI); East Central India (OZI); North India (NIN); North-West frontier region (NWG); Northern Frontier region (NGR); North-East frontier region (NOG); Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANT).

In chapter two Pfeiffer examines the methodologies and models developed by Vladimir Propp, Alan Dundes and Claude Bremond. From Dundes he takes over the concepts 'Motivem' and 'Allomotiv' which he defines as follows: "das unter dem Aspekt seiner Funktion betrachtete Element als Motivem bezeichnet wird und alle Varianten, die im Ablauf dieselbe Funktion haben, Allomotive dieses Motivems genannt werden" (p. 32b).

Chapter three is entitled "Ein deskriptiv-funktionales Textmodell indische kosmogonische Mythen". Pfeiffer develops three partial models (Teilmodelle): eine Übersetzungsversion (auf deutsch); eine Allomotivversion (in einer deskriptiven Modellsprache – dMS); eine Motivemversion (in einer funktionalen Modellsprache – fMS). Pfeiffer discusses the problems which the German translation of sources in different languages presents and the necessity to preserve as much as possible the literary qualities of the original texts. In order to develop a descriptive model language Pfeiffer rephrases the texts so that only principal clauses which consist of the following constituent parts remain: (a) subject field (modal, local and temporal determination). The

acted out of malice. In b4 the text has the correct reading *anyathābhāgi tadadhikaranam*. The editor remarks that one must correct *bhāgi* to *bhāgi* because this reading is found in the Turfan fragment! The following leaf contains rule 10 in which the expression *vigṛhya tiṣṭhet* "would stand inimically" is translated as "insist on". In a note it is said that it means literally "leaning, he stands", (*uperšis' stoit*) and that this is a compound-intensive (*složnointensivnyi*) verb where *sthā* "to stand" functions as an auxiliary verb!

Section IV includes four fragments of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, three fragments of the Bodharājakumārasūtra and two fragments of the Nagaropamasūtra. Section V contains an edition of a fragment of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, a fragment of the Vajracchedikā, two fragments of the Samādhirājasūtra and two fragments of the Samādhirājasūtra.

Section VI contains an edition of thirteen fragments of the Buddhanāmasūtra. The fragments were identified by Keiya Noguchi who compared them with the Tibetan and Chinese translations. In sections IV–V all fragments are edited but not translated.

In editing the fragments in sections IV–VI the editors were assisted by Japanese scholars who were able to identify several of the fragments.

We must be grateful to the two Russian scholars for having published so many interesting texts. However, it is obvious that in many respects this edition is far from satisfactory. Not only seem the editors not to know Tibetan and Chinese and did not compare the texts edited by them with the corresponding Tibetan and Chinese texts, their knowledge of Sanskrit appears to be inadequate. The blunders made in the translation of the *avadāna* are rather disturbing. The notes which accompany the edited texts contain strange statements such as the one on *vigṛhya tiṣṭhet*.<sup>3</sup> However, it will be useful to see more texts romanised and reproduced in facsimile. For a proper scholarly edition the help of other scholars will be essential.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Oskar von Hinüber, 'Sanskrit und Gāndhārī in Zentralasien', *Sprachen des Buddhismus in Zentralasien* (Wiesbaden, 1983), pp. 27–34; 'Upāli's Verses in the Majjhimanikāya and the Madhyamāgama', *Indological and Buddhist Studies* (Canberra, 1982), pp. 243–251.

<sup>2</sup> In b5 *pratiṣṭhed* must be corrected to *pratiṣṭhet*.

<sup>3</sup> See also p. 206, n. 2; *adattādanena* is rendered by "with a gift not given to him!"

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John Powers, *The Yogācāra School of Buddhism: A Bibliography* (ATLA Bibliography Series, No. 27). Metuchen, N. J., The Scarecrow Press, 1991. VII, 257 pp. \$29.50 ISBN 0-8108-2502-3.

Powers's bibliography of the Yogācāra will be welcomed by scholars. There is a great need for systematic bibliographies in the field of Buddhist studies, especially since the *Bibliographie bouddhique* has ceased to appear. Power's bibliography is divided into two main sections: primary sources in Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese and secondary sources. The first section comprises four subsections: 1. Sūtras and commentaries (Daśabhūmikasūtra, Laṅkāvatārasūtra, Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and Śrīmālādeviśiṃhanādasūtra); 2. Philosophical and historical texts by Indian, Tibetan and East Asian Buddhist authors: Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese and translations; 3. Works by Tibetan authors; 4. Indian philosophical texts in which Yogācāra doctrines are discussed. The second section comprises two sub-sections: 5. Studies by modern non-traditional scholars; 6. General works on Buddhism. There are five indexes: 1. Modern authors and technical terms; 2. Traditional Indian authors; 3. Titles of Sanskrit works; 4. Tibetan authors and titles; 5. Traditional Chinese and Japanese authors, Chinese and Japanese works.

In his preface Powers points out that in section 5 "the majority of listings in this section refer to works by Japanese scholars, but the bibliography only hints at the wealth of published research that has come from Japan." In some cases Powers gives the Japanese title of a book or an article, in others an English title although the article is written in Japanese. For some titles an English translation or explanation is added; other titles are left untranslated. It would have been preferable to have all the articles and books in Japanese in a separate section for the number of Western scholars who read Japanese works on Buddhism is very limited.

In his preface Powers remarks "Where a particular work is known to me, brief notes concerning the focus and subject matter of the work are mentioned, along with occasional personal evaluations of its quality." Powers's remarks are useful but are limited to a small number of items. It is to be hoped that in a second edition they will cover more publications.

No bibliography is without errors. In view of a future revised edition I mention the ones I have noticed. P. 38 I-tsang; read I-tsing. P. 43 Nr. 13 has to be omitted. Sylvain Lévi did not edit the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā but wrote a preface for Yamaguchi's edition. P. 56 nr. 15 is an English translation of de La Vallée Poussin's French translation of the first two chapters of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. P. 57 nr. 26 is a translation of the loka

chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* by Yamaguchi and Funahashi. P. 119 Brjanskij; read Brjanskij; the *Bukkyōgakukankeizasshironbunruimō-kuroku* is not a compilation of Japanese scholarship on Buddhism but a bibliography of articles and dissertations. P. 122 the review of Diana Paul's *Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century China* is not due to Conze but to J. W. de Jong. P. 133 refers wrongly to a reprint of Paul Griffith's article: On Being Mindless. In 1986 Griffith published a book with this title. On pp. 142, 152 and 196 Powers lists a book entitled *Yuishiki shisō*. Tōkyō, Shunjūsha, 1982. As far as I know none of the three authors mentioned (Kajiyama, Hirakawa and Takasaki) has published a book with this title in 1982. P. 159 Kuomi; read Kumoi. P. 161 Libentahl; read Liebenthal. P. 165 Jacques May's article is published in the *Études asiatiques* and not also in the *Journal asiatique*. P. 169 Nagao's article 'Tranquil Flow of Mind: An Interpretation of Upeksā' was published in *Indianisme et Bouddhisme. Mélanges offerts à Mgr Étienne Lamotte*, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1980. On p. 170 Powers mentions translations of the *Abhisamayālamkāra* and *Abhisamayālamkāra-nāma-prajñāpāramitopadeśa-śāstra* in two volumes by Nagasawa, Jitsudō and by Nakamura, Hajime. Something must be wrong here. P. 181 two works by Sasaki, Gesshō are attributed to Sasaki, Genjun: *Kanyaku shihon taishō shōdaijō-ron* and *Yuishiki nijūron no taiyaku kenkyū*. Pp. 194 and 195 two articles by Takakusu, Junjirō are attributed to Takasaki, Jikidō: The Date of Vasubandhu the Great Buddhist Philosopher; A Study of Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu and the Date of Vasubandhu.

Powers lists many articles published by Funahashi, Naoya; Suguro, Shinjō; Ye, Ah-yueh and Yokoyama, Kōitsu but omits important books written by these scholars: Funahashi, *Nepāru shahon taishō ni yoru Daijō-shōgongyōron no kenkyū*, 1985; Suguro, *Shoki yuishiki no kenkyū*, 1989; Ye, *Yuishiki shisō no kenkyū*, 1975; Yokoyama, *Yuishiki no tetsugaku*, 1979. Also not mentioned is Odani, Nobuchiyo, *Daishōshōgongyōron no kenkyū*, 1984.

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Ian Charles Harris, *The Continuity of Madhyamaka & Yogācāra in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism* (Brill's Indological Library, vol. 6). Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1991. X, 191 pp. Gld. 120,—; US\$ 61.54. ISBN 90-04-09448-2.

In his book Harris tries to prove the continuity of the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools. His main argument is that both schools recognized an

ontologically indeterminate reality. He remarks on p. 17: "By the rejection of false dichotomies an entity or state is still posited, though from an ontological point of view its status must be considered indeterminate." This ontologically indeterminate realm is further described as being reality (*tattva*), dependent origination (*pratīyasamutpāda*) and emptiness (*śūnyatā*), cf. pp. 58 and 59. Although Harris speaks of an ontic realm identified with *pratīyasamutpāda* (p. 3) and of the identity of dependent origination and emptiness (p. 59) he declares elsewhere that *śūnyatā* is not a metaphysical ontological concept and has no ontological dimension (pp. 56–57). It is difficult to understand how emptiness can be synonymous with *tattva* and *pratīyasamutpāda* and be an ontologically indeterminate state, but at the same time lack an ontological dimension. According to Harris *śūnyatā* refers ultimately to a condition which transcends epistemology and ontology (pp. 59–60). For Harris emptiness is an ontologically indeterminate state but without ontological dimension, and transcends both epistemology and ontology!

On p. 74 Harris explains that "Nāgārjuna can be said to progressively combine the doctrine of *cittamātra* with that of complete non-substantiality." In this way it is not difficult to state that "the same can be maintained by a careful analysis of the work of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu" (*ibid.*).

The relationship between the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra has not yet been sufficiently clarified although important work has been done, for instance, by Nagao of whom Harris mentions two articles, of which the first is attributed to Gadjin N. An article by Hattori is listed in the bibliography under the name Maasaki! It would be necessary to analyse carefully the critiques of Yogācāra by Bhāvaviveka in chapter 25 of the *Prajñāpradīpa* and in chapter 5 of the *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā* (cf. Yamaguchi's *Bukkyō ni okeru mu to u tonō tairon*, Tokyo, 1941) and by Candrakīrti in his *Madhyamakāvātāra* because they are the first documents that testify to the existence of two opposing schools. Harris seems to rely mainly on secondary sources from which he takes not only the quotations of Sanskrit and Pali texts but also the translations without indicating his sources. For instance, one will find most of the quotations and translations on pp. 85, 86, 91 and 92 in Jayatilleke's *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (London, 1963), pp. 361–365. Sometimes Harris copies wrongly his sources. The translation of the text quoted on p. 52, n. 40 is taken from Murti's *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London, 1955), p. 214. However, Murti wrote: "The treatise and the spiritual discipline, as leading to this end, receive the same appellation." Harris writes "the same application." On p. 18 Harris quotes four lines in French in which there are no

less than four misprints. The whole book is riddled with misprints, especially in the Sanskrit quotations.

Let me quote one example to illustrate the carelessness of the author, i.e. his reference to *nūattha* and *neyyattha*. On p. 3 he mentions "implicit (*nūattha*) language, and that which is termed explicit (*neyyattha* [sic])"; on p. 91 it is said that Pali commentators allied *nūattha* with *sammūti* and *neyyattha* with *paramattha*! He is also inconsistent in translating technical terms. Usually he renders *abhūtaparikalpa* by "the imagination of the unreal", but on p. 82 it is rendered as "non-existent imagination" in a translation of a quotation of the *Trimsīkābhāṣya*. It is possible that this translation is not Harris's own translation but taken from another work. It is perhaps a good thing that Harris has taken over many translations because his own efforts are hopelessly inadequate. For instance on p. 151 he quotes *Mūlamadhyamakārikā* XXV.24:

*sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ prapañcōpaśamaḥ śivaḥ/  
na kvacit kaścid dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ//*

This is rendered in the following way: "All perceptions as well as false dichotomies are [essentially] of the nature of cessation and quiescence. No dharma whatsoever of any kind was ever taught by the Buddha." Different renderings of the same stanza are to be found on pp. 49 and 95! It is a pity that in this case Harris did not copy Eckel's translation (*Indiske Studier V: Miscellanea Buddhica*. Copenhagen, 1985), p. 45: "It is bliss (*śiva*) to lay all grasping (*upalambha*) to rest and bring all conceptual diversity (*prapañca*) to an end: the Buddha taught no dharma to anyone." In this stanza Harris renders *upalambha* by "perception". Elsewhere he translates it by "appropriation" (pp. 50 and 53) and by "support" (p. 81).

Some of his etymological speculations are unacceptable as, for instance on p. 56: "in many cases it [the term *gocara*] implies ranging in the sense of wandering." Harris states: "As in the cow (*go*, *gaus*) is an undisciplined animal wandering wherever its fancy takes it, so also is the mind of an unenlightened being."

Several times Harris refers to Bhāvaviveka's *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* without pointing out that with good reasons Schayer, Yamaguchi and Seyfort Rugg do not ascribe this work to Bhāvaviveka, the author of the *Prajñāpradīpa* (cf. D. Seyfort Rugg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India*, Wiesbaden, 1981, p. 66; J. W. de Jong, *III* 32, 1989, p. 211).

Harris quotes several times from the *Catuhstava* which he includes in the logical corpus (*rigs-tshogs*), cf. p. 9. However, the Tibetan tradition does not

consider the *Catuhstava* to be one of the six texts of the *yukti*-corpus (cf. D. Seyfort Rugg, *op. cit.*, p. 8; Paul Williams, *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 12, 1984, p. 74).

In 1973 Warder suggested that Nāgārjuna was not a Mahāyānist since no Mahāyāna texts are quoted in the *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikās* (cf. M. Sprung, ed., *The problem of the two truths in Buddhism and Vedānta*, pp. 78–88). Harris seems to agree with Warder (p. 60) and remarks that "the central core of MMK deals with doctrine which differs very little from that contained in much of the early Buddhist writings" (p. 60). He also agrees with Warder that Nāgārjuna was not influenced by the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature. Harris does not seem to have read Robinson's list of parallels between the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* and the *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikās* (Richard H. Robinson, *Early Mādhyamika in India and China*, 1967, pp. 177–180). Nevertheless, he states that "implicit in his [Nāgārjuna's] system is a concept of mind . . . structurally related to the idea of *prajñā* found in both the early Buddhist writings and the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature" (p. 60).

Harris often makes statements that are unsubstantiated. For instance, on p. 139 he writes that "the *Abhidhārmika* must accept his ultimately real dharmas as being devoid of suffering (*sukha* [sic]), permanent (*nitya*) and possessing self (*ātman*).

It is to be hoped that future volumes in Brill's Indological Library will be more carefully vetted before being accepted for publication.

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Édith Nolot, *Règles de discipline des nonnes bouddhistes*. Le Bhikṣuṇīvinaya de l'école Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin. Traduction annotée, commentaire, collation du manuscrit (Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation indienne, Fasc. 60). Paris, Édition-Diffusion de Boccard 1991. XX, 549 pp. ISBN 2-86803-060-2.

Dans son édition du Bhikṣuṇīvinaya des Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin Gustav Roth a ajouté des notes détaillées à fin d'éclaircir les nombreux problèmes que pose l'interprétation du texte. Roth a apporté une contribution extrêmement importante à l'étude de ce texte qui fourmille de leçons douteuses et de mots obscurs ou inconnus. Il va de soi qu'il n'est guère possible de résoudre tous les problèmes du premier coup. C'est pourquoi il faut savoir gré à Édith Nolot d'avoir entrepris de traduire ce texte.

L'oeuvre de E. N. représente un grand pas en avant dans l'étude du



aru to) agree with Stcherbatsky but Nagao translates that "it (the argument) does not correspond to (*anyāya*) true reasoning." I believe that Nagao's interpretation is not correct but I do not quite agree with the translations given by Stcherbatsky, Yamaguchi and Tanji (I have not been able to consult the translations of the Prasannapadā by Megumu Honda and Takeki Okuzumi), and would prefer to translate *anyāyato* by "in the wrong way".

In the last chapter "The role of reason" Nagao makes a distinction between 'true reason' (*yukti*) and 'knowledge based on criteria' (*pramāṇa*). Nagao remarks that Candrakīrti often uses the term 'true reason'. On p. 125 Keenan translates 'truly reasoned wisdom' but the Japanese text has *shōri* which he rendered on p. 121 by 'true reason'. Nagao follows Tsoṅ-kha-pa's interpretation according to which *yukti* understands the world of the absolute meaning whereas *pramāṇa* plays its role in the conventional world. However, *yukti* is not often used by Candrakīrti and seems to have no other meaning than 'reasoning, correct reasoning' in the Prasannapadā. Tsoṅ-kha-pa seems to superimpose on Candrakīrti an interpretative scheme which is not justified. It remains to be seen in how far in this regard Tsoṅ-kha-pa has correctly understood Candrakīrti's philosophy.

Nagao's book is stimulating reading even though it is not always possible to agree with him. We must be grateful to John P. Keenan to have undertaken the difficult task to make his work accessible to the Western reader.

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R. M. L. Gethin, *The Buddhist Path to Awakening. A Study of the Bodhi-Pakkhiyā Dhammā* (Brill's Indological Library, volume 7). Leiden—New York—Köln, E. J. Brill, 1992. xii, 382 pp. Gld. 195.00/US\$ 111.50 ISBN 9004904423.

The *bodhipakkhiyā dhammā* or conditions that contribute to awakening from seven sets: 1. four *satipaṭṭhānas* (establishings of mindfulness); 2. four *sammā-ppadhānas* (right endeavours); 3. four *iddhi-pādas* (bases of success); 4. five *indriyas* (faculties); 5. five *balas* (powers); 6. seven *bojjhaṅgas* (factors of awakening); 7. the *ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo* (the noble eight-factored path). They are collectively known as the 'thirty-seven *bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā*' but this expression does not occur at all in the Pāli canon but is found in para-canonical texts such as the Peṭakopadesa and the Milindapañha and in Pāli commentaries. The *bodhipakkhiyā dhammā* have been studied by modern scholars and Gethin refers to Har Dayal's *The*

*Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature* (London, 1932, pp. 80—164) and Étienne Lamotte's *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna* (III, Louvain, 1970, pp. 1119—1137).

Gethin's work is primarily based upon the Pāli sources and tries to take into account every passage in Pāli canon and in para-canonical texts where the seven sets are discussed either individually or collectively. Gethin has cast his net very wide because his study extends to the Abhidhamma literature and the Pāli commentaries. His study does not aim at distinguishing various strata of historical development. In his introduction he points out that previous attempts at stratification of the Pāli canon have largely failed because they "have suffered from envisaging the problem too much in the terms of a tradition of fixed literary texts". Gethin tries to explain the logic and coherence of the teachings of the Nikāyas in the light of Abhidhamma tradition. He is guided by the principle that the concerns of the Abhidhamma must be taken as "real concerns that arise directly out of the concerns of the Nikāyas".

In the first part of his book Gethin examines one by one the seven sets. He carefully studies the precise meaning of each term with detailed references to the texts which are quoted in full in the notes. No problem is neglected in the course of his examination. For instance, in one passage on the four *satipaṭṭhānas* the expression *ekāyana* occurs. Gethin surveys the usage of this term in Pāli and Sanskrit literature and comes to the conclusion that the principal notions expressed by *ekāyana* in the *satipaṭṭhāna* context are 'going alone' and 'going to one' (pp. 59—66). He points out that *ekāyana* can be used both in a literal meaning and in a specific spiritual and mystical meaning. In discussing the meaning of *kappāvesesa* (p. 96) Gethin rejects the interpretation 'more than a kappa', although Buddhaghosa explains it in this way. Lamotte reproached 'Les Occidentaux' for translating *kalpāveseṣa* by 'the remainder of a kalpa' (*L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti*, Louvain, 1962, p. 258, n. 17). However, Chinese translations render it not always by 'more than a kalpa', cf. for instance, Lamotte, *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, I, Louvain, 1944, p. 95: "pendant un Kalpa ou une fraction de Kalpa."<sup>1</sup> Gethin tends to believe that in the Mahāparinibbāna-suttanta *kappa* refers to the *mahā-kappa* and not the *āyu-kappa* but no evidence for this interpretation can be found in the Pāli scriptures. Other terms studied by Gethin are *saddhā* (pp. 106—112), *saddhānusārin* and *dhammānusārin* (pp. 129—133), *pariyāyena* and *nippariyāyena* (pp. 133—138), *bala* and *indriya* (pp. 140—145), *dhamma* and *dhammas* (pp. 147—154) and *ariya* (pp. 205—207).

The main thrust of Gethin's book is the study of the context in which the

seven sets are mentioned and the explication of the connections of them with other teachings in the light of the Abhidhamma tradition. He has made a very thorough study of the Abhidhamma texts, the complicated knots of which he unravels with great skill. One has sometimes the impression that Gethin sees a greater degree of coherence than the texts warrant. It is only when he discusses expanded lists of the seven sets that he raises the question whether they are accidental chance compositions. According to Gethin "it would be difficult to answer such a question definitely without a detailed comparison of the Pāli sources with the Chinese Āgamas" (p. 270). It would probably be useful to extend this comparison also to the other Nikāya texts studied by Gethin. On p. 9 Gethin remarks that there appears to be a general agreement concerning the nature and core contents of the Vinaya- and Sūtra-piṭakas. However, very few comparative studies have been made of Sūtras and it remains to be seen if the different lists studied by Gethin are to be found in the Chinese Āgamas in an identical form.

The great merit of Gethin's book is his exhaustive study of the Pāli materials which were only briefly treated by Har Dayal and Lamotte. He handles the Pāli materials with great skill and is successful in showing how the seven sets were developed as a description of the Buddhist path to awakening.

In the appendix Gethin gives detailed references to passages dealing with the seven sets in Pāli and non-Pāli sources, and a resolution of Buddhadatta's summary of the presence of *indriyas*, etc. in the classes of *citta*. There are very few misprints. P. 231, n. 9 read reproches for rapproches; p. 368, 1.6 read verglichen for verligen. On p. 223 in the quotation from Vibh-a read musical instruments of five kinds (*pañcaṅgikam*) for of four kinds. P. 238, n. 43 Lamotte's article on "La critique d'authenticité dans le bouddhisme" was published in 1947, three years after the appearance of *Traité I* (1944), not two years before its appearance.

Gethin's book is an important contribution to the study of Buddhist path to awakening in the Theravāda texts. The following passage from his work deserves to be quoted in its entirety: "This study contains ample evidence, I think, to suggest that before we come to any conclusions about the chronological stratification of the Nikāyas we need to pay much more careful attention to the nature of the processes that govern the creation and spread of oral literatures: before we throw away the Abhidhamma and the commentaries, we need to be very sure that we have understood what it is they are saying, and how it is they are actually interpreting the texts" (p. 344).

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## NOTE

<sup>1</sup> See also L. de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, II (1923), p. 124, n. 3; VII (1925), p. 83, n. 3; *La Siddhi de Hiu-an-tsang*, II (1929), pp. 803 and 809; Fujita Kōtatsu, *Genshi jōdo shisō no kenkyū* (Tōkyō, 1970), pp. 328–9, n. 13; Takasaki Jikido, *Nyorai-zō shisō no keisei* (Tōkyō, 1974), p. 184, n. 11.

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Stephan V. Beyer, *The Classical Tibetan Language*. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1992. xxv, 503 pp. ISBN 0-7914-1100-1. Paper \$18.95.

It is not a matter for surprise that for a long time grammars of Tibetan were based upon the categories used to describe the grammar of Indo-European languages. A contributory factor is the fact that the majority of Tibetan texts studied were translated from a Sanskrit original. It is only in recent years that scholars have attempted to find new ways for describing the grammar of Tibetan. In his foreword Matthew Kapstein mentions Jacques Bacot's *Grammaire du tibétain littéraire* (Paris, 1946). Other works to be mentioned in this regard are R. A. Miller's 'A grammatical sketch of classical Tibetan' (*JAOS* 90, 1970, pp. 76–96)<sup>1</sup> and Heinz Zimmermann's *Wortart und Sprachstruktur im Tibetischen* (Wiesbaden, 1979).<sup>2</sup>

Beyer's book is based upon a wide range of classical texts not translated from Sanskrit. He quotes from Tibetan manuscripts from Central Asia, Sa-skya paṇḍita's *Legs-par bsad-pa rin-po-che'i gter*, the biography of Mi-la ras-pa and many other texts. All examples are carefully translated and it is only seldom that one must disagree with Beyer's translation of an example. P. 392 *chos mñon-pa-las 'di-skad-du* does not mean "From the abhidharma, this, in words", but "From the Abhidharma in these words".

In the first chapters Beyer deals with the transliteration, Tibetan in context, and the writing system. Important are his remarks on variation in Old Tibetan as found in manuscripts from Tun-huang and Chinese Turkestan and in inscriptions. After a brief chapter on sounds Beyer examines the structure of syllables (pp. 68–96). Here he makes the following distinctions: length constraints define the number of phoneme slots available in the syllable; slot-filler constraints define what phonemes in one slot can occur together with other phonemes in other slots. His treatment is lucid and original and is helpful in understanding the structure of the syllable which is the basic unit in Tibetan. The next chapter 'Words' (pp.

## AVALOKITEŚVARA IN THE WICK OF THE NIGHT-LAMP

The *Siṃhalāvadāna*, a famous Buddhist re-birth legend, has come down to us in several versions. It relates the adventures of the caravan-leader Siṃhala who, together with five hundred other merchants, is shipwrecked in the vicinity of Sri Lanka. The merchants, as we are told in this story, are well received by the witches (*rākṣasi*) living on the island — they have disguised themselves as beautiful ladies — but only Siṃhala comes to know the truth. The most important versions are the *Valāhassajātaka* in the Pali recension of the Buddhist Canon, the *Dharmalabdhajātaka* contained in the *Mahāvastu*, which, surprisingly, provides us with two variants of the same story, further the *Siṃhalāvadāna* given in the *Divyāvadāna* and, finally, the Siṃhala legend as it is told in the *Kāraṇḍa-* and the *Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha* respectively. As I have shown in my book *Die Abenteuer des Kaufmanns Siṃhala*,<sup>1</sup> the narrative resolves itself into three major parts: the first ending with the happy return of the caravan-leader, who is not named in the *Valāhassajātaka*, but, in the *Mahāvastu*, is called Dharmalabdha; the second part finishing with his coronation as king of his native country; while the third part, a much later addition, describes King Siṃhala's victorious war with the Ceylonese witches. The legend has been extremely wide-spread, as there also exist versions in Tibetan, Chinese, Khotanese, Japanese and there is even a Jaina version in Prakrit.

As regards our sources in Pali, the *Valāhassajātaka* only relates Part I, while another re-birth story, the *Telapattajātaka*,<sup>2</sup> gives what can be considered a Pali variant of Part II of the story. The *Kāraṇḍavyūha*, the Jaina and the Khotanese versions also narrate only Part I; the *Mahāvastu*, however, contains both the first and the second part, while only the *Divyāvadāna* and the *Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha* give us all the three parts of the story. For other, mainly minor, divergences I refer again to my above-mentioned book.

The *Kāraṇḍa-* and the *Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha* are in prose and verse respectively, the first dating back to a period before the 6th century A.D., the second to as late as the 16th century. Both texts introduce the figure of Avalokiteśvara: it is he who, when Siṃhala spends the night together with the queen of the witches and his mistress has fallen asleep, suddenly appears in their room and warns Siṃhala of the witches; and it is Avalokiteśvara who, some days later, manifests himself as the white horse Balāha and

undertakes to rescue Siṃhala and his companions. In neither of these two scenes is Avalokiteśvara, however, mentioned by name. Whereas in the scenes connected with Siṃhala's rescue it easily becomes clear to the reader that Balāha, in the *Mahāvastu* called Keśin, is no less a being than the Bodhisattva himself, the night episode has remained enigmatic to the present day. While the *Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha* here speaks of a *dīpa*, a 'lamp', the *Kāraṇḍavyūha* uses the word *ratikara*, an expression which puzzled both Franklin Edgerton and Constantin Regamey.

Edgerton translates *ratikara* tentatively as 'lamp' but adds a question-mark and makes the following comment on this entry: 'possibly a corruption for some other word of that m(eanin)g; this mg. is proved by Burnouf, Introd(uction à l'histoire du Bouddhisme indien) 223 infra, where in a transl(ation) of a verse recension of K(āraṇḍa)v(yūha) it is a *lamp* which gives the merchant Siṃhala(rāja) the information which in the prose Kv he receives from a *ratikara*; no plausible em(endingation) occurs to me'<sup>3</sup>. Regamey, who gives a very detailed account of the passages in question and also discusses the Chinese and Tibetan versions,<sup>4</sup> considers *ratikara* to be a 'hapax legomenon'. He rightly discards the idea, suggested to him personally, by Raghu Vira, that *ratikara* might be a corrupted form of *rātrikara*, that is to say, 'Moon'.<sup>5</sup> In a post-scriptum added to the same article, he, however, regards another conjecture proposed by Paul Horsch as quite possible.<sup>6</sup> According to this, *ratikara* might possibly be interpreted in the sense of *ratipradīpa*, a lamp illuminating the nocturnal love-enjoyments of an amorous couple. As a matter of fact, the word *ratikara* is attested in poem 856 of Vidyākara's *Subhāṣitaratnakośa*<sup>7</sup>, while a synonymous compound, *suratapradīpa*, was used much earlier by Kālidāsa (*Kumārasambhava* I, 10). Noting the fact that *kara*, from the *Rāmāyaṇa* onward, can also mean 'ray (of light)', Regamey estimates that 'l'identification, dans le langage poétique, de *ratikara* avec *ratipradīpa* serait donc probable'.<sup>8</sup> When taking into consideration the context of the relevant passages, we can state that, if *ratikara* were to be read as *rātrikara*, it would be the Moon that warns Siṃhala of the dangerous witches, while, if *ratikara* were to be understood as *ratipradīpa*, the caravan-leader is warned by a lamp. The first possibility appears odd, the second, however, agrees to some extent with the *Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha* version, where, as has already been mentioned, the imperspicuous *ratikara* has been replaced, not by *ratipradīpa*, but by *dīpa*, i.e., 'lamp'.

Let us now look at the texts and, to begin with, briefly summarize the events described in these parts of the legend: When the merchants had, for some days, lived happily on the island, each together with one of the

witches, Siṃhala, one night, looks around in the room he shares with the queen of the witches. The lady has just fallen asleep, when he suddenly hears that somebody laughs and a gentle voice tells him that their beautiful hostesses are not ladies at all but are real witches. As Siṃhala doubts this the same voice exhorts him secretly to set out southwards where he would soon see the so-called 'iron fortress', in which numerous other merchants, who were shipwrecked before, are incarcerated to be successively devoured by the witches. Siṃhala immediately does so. He is greatly shocked at the sight of the prisoners and, after returning to his quarters, has another conversation with the unknown speaker. The voice urges him to flee together with all his companions and prophesies moreover that, after their flight to the coast of the island, a wonderful horse, Balāha, would carry them over the ocean back to the continent Jambudvīpa.

In the *Kāraṇḍavyūha*<sup>9</sup> the passages narrating these two events, that is to say, (1) Siṃhala's first conversation with the mysterious speaker, who here is termed *ratikara*, and (2) that he has after returning from the iron fortress, read as follows:<sup>10</sup>

(1) *sa rātrau śayitah / evaṃ yāvat paśyati ratikarahasanam tadāham  
vismayam āpannah / na kadācit syān mayā dr̥ṣṭam vā śrutam vā  
prajvalitam eva ratikarahasanam / tadaiva mayā tasya pratyāhārah  
kṛtaḥ / kiṃ kāraṇam tvam hasase / iyaṃ siṃhaladvīpanvāsini  
rākṣasī / sā tava jīvitāntarāyaṃ kariṣyati / tadā me tasya pratyāhā-  
rah kṛtaḥ / (katham) tvam jānāsi rākṣasīti / sa kathayati / yadi na  
pratīyasi dakṣiṇapanthalikāṃ gṛhitvā anuvicaran gaccha /  
tatrāyaṃ sa nagaram ūrdhvam uccam gavākṣatoranaviprahīnam  
cāpratihatam / tatrānekāni vaṇigjanāni bhakṣayitvā asthīni  
prakṣiptāni / anye ca jīvanto anye ca mṛtāḥ / yadi na pratīyasi tad  
api mārgam gaccha / gatvā ca mārgam nirīkṣasva tadā me  
śraddhāsyaṣi / tadā tasyās tena mohajālā nāma nidrā nyastā<sup>11</sup> /*

(1) "In the night, when he (i.e., Siṃhala) thus was lying (on his bed), he suddenly saw that the *ratikara* laughed. I (i.e., Siṃhala) was amazed, for I had never seen nor heard (that) a burning *ratikara* (could) laugh. Then I said to him: 'Why do you laugh?' (He said): 'This (lady)<sup>12</sup> living in Siṃhaladvīpa is a witch. She will kill you'. Then I said: 'How do you know she is a witch?' He said: 'If you do not believe me, go along the road (to the South). There is a very high iron fortress, indestructible and without windows and doors. Into that (the witches) have thrown the bones (of) many merchants (they already) devoured. Some are (still) alive, others

are dead. If you do not believe, go along (that) road, and having gone along (that) road, look carefully! Then you will trust me.' Thereupon he (i.e., the *ratikara*) threw the net of illusion called sleep upon her (that is to say, Siṃhala's mistress)."

- (2) *tadāhaṃ campakavr̥kṣād avatīrya punar eva dakṣiṇām panthali-kām gr̥hītvā anuvicaran tvarita āgacchāmi sma / tato pravistāḥ / atha ratikaro mām etad avocat / dr̥ṣtas te sārthavāha madvacanam / uktaṃ ca mayā / dr̥ṣtaṃ yuṣmākam satyaṃ sām̐kathyakṛtam / tadā me 'sya pratyāhārah kṛtaḥ / satyam eva / ka upāyo 'smākam / atha sa ratikara etad avocat / asti me mahā-sārthavāhopāyo yenopāyena siṃhaladvīpāt svastikṣemābhyāṃ jambudvīpaṃ nirgacchasi / punar eva jambudvīpaṃ apasarasi / atha sa ratikaro mām etad avocat / asti tasminn eva dvīpe mahā-samudratīre devabālāho nāmāśvarājo hīnadīnānukampakaḥ / sa ca bālāho 'śvarājāḥ . . . /*

- (2) "Having descended from the Campaka-tree, I came hastily back, having again taken the Southern road. Then I entered. Now the *ratikara* said to me: 'Have you, o caravan-leader, seen what I said?' And I answered: 'I have seen. What you have told (me) is true.' Then I said to him: 'It is very true. (But) is there a means (of escape)?' Then the *ratikara* replied: 'I have, o great caravan-leader, a means by which you will escape to Jambudvīpa safe and sound. You will go away to Jambudvīpa'. Then the *ratikara* said to me: 'There is on this very island, on the shore of the Great Ocean, a king among horses, the heavenly Balāha, who takes compassion on those (who are) poor and afflicted. And Balāha, the king among horses, . . .'"

As we can see from these excerpts, both passages call the person, who at first warns and, in the second episode, again addresses the caravan-leader, *ratikara*. The term can no doubt be taken to mean 'bestower'<sup>13</sup> of (amorous) pleasure'. Though, at the very first glance, this meaning would seem to fit rather well into the atmosphere of the story, it loses its value, as soon as we try to apply it. Edgerton is certainly right in presuming that *ratikara* is probably a corrupt form of some other expression. However, all manuscripts of the *Kāraṇḍavyūha* that have hitherto come to light read *ratikara*, while, most unfortunately, *ratikara*, or a similar term, is missing in the Gilgit manuscript, which is the oldest of all but, due to damage to both margins, is fragmentary.<sup>14</sup>

That the Tibetan translator also had considerable difficulties in interpreting these passages is proved by the fact that no equivalent for *ratikara* is to be found in the Tibetan version. To begin with, the term is totally absent, while, later on, an endeavour is made to connect the laugh, or the person who laughs, with Siṃhala's witch. The text, which is also presented by Regamey<sup>15</sup>, reads as follows:

*re ṣig nub mo ṅal te gr̥īid kyis log pa dañ gad mo sñan par rgod pa ṅas mthoñ nas ṅa no mtshar du gyur te / gr̥īid log bžin du gad mo sñan par rgod pa ṅas nam yañ ma mthoñ ma thos so / sñam nas de'i tshes ṅas de la khyod ci'i phyir rgod ces smras pa dañ / mo na re 'di dag ni siñ gha la'i gliñ na gñas pa'i sñin mo lags te / khyed kyi srog bcad de re ṣes zer nas de'i tshes ṅas de la 'di dag sñin mo yin par kho bos ji ltar ṣes par bya ṣes dris pa /*

"One evening, when I laid down and (she?) had fallen asleep, I saw (the *ratikara*?) laughing pleasantly. I was amazed and I thought I had never seen nor heard (a *ratikara*?) laughing thus while asleep. Then I said to him/her: 'Why do you laugh?' S h e said to me: 'These (ladies) are witches living in Siṃhaladvīpa. They will kill you.' Then I asked him/her: 'How can I know that they are witches?'"

We thus see: After the caravan-leader had asked 'Why do you laugh?', it is s h e (Tib. *mo*), i.e., the witch, in whose abode Siṃhala stays, who replies to Siṃhala's question. Regamey puts forth the idea that the Tibetan translator perhaps treated the word *ratikara* as being feminine, *ratikarī*, and thus identified the *rākṣasī* with the *ratikarī*, that is to say, made Siṃhala's witch-act as the 'bestower of (amorous) pleasure'. On the other hand, Regamey finds it possible that the expression *sñan par rgod pa*, 'laughing pleasantly' or, more correct in this context, '(one) who laughs pleasantly', stands for Skt. *ratihāsana*, which, as a contamination of *ratikara* with *hasana*, replaces *ratikara*<sup>16</sup>.

The Chinese translation<sup>17</sup>, which is later than the Tibetan version, does not render the term *ratikara* at all but simply transcribes this word phonetically as *lo ti kia lan*. It is noteworthy, however, that, not unlike in the Tibetan version, *ratikara* = *lo ti kia lan* here appears as the name of the Queen of the witches, in whose abode Siṃhala stays. It is Lo ti kia lan who, animated by the enjoyment of amorous pleasure, suddenly laughs. The rest of the episode is told in much the same manner as in the Tibetan version: Siṃhala finds it strange that a *rākṣasī* should laugh in this way. When he

asks why she laughs, she discloses the truth and informs Siṃhala of the iron fortress situated near the road to the South. In the Tibetan and Chinese versions Siṃhala's mistress thus acts as a traitress, who, out of love for the caravan-leader, betrays all her fellow-witches.

We now return to the Sanskrit versions of the *Siṃhalāvadāna* as related in the *Kāraṇḍa-* and *Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha*. Both texts were already known to E. Burnouf, who in 1844<sup>18</sup>) summarized the Siṃhala legend. Since Burnouf found that his manuscript of the *Kāraṇḍavyūha* contained too many mistakes, he based his abstract mainly on the *Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha*, an — unpublished — translation of which he prepared in 1837.<sup>19</sup> He renarrates the above-quoted passage in the following way: "Siṃhala, après avoir passé la nuit dans les bras d'une de ces femmes, apprend de la lampe qui les éclaire, qu'il est tombé entre les mains d'une ogresse dont il sert les plaisirs et qui doit le dévorer. Il est averti que d'autres marchands naufragés comme lui ont été, depuis son arrivée, jetés dans une prison d'où les Rākchasis les tirent chaque jour pour se repaître de leur chair. Instruit par les révélations de la lampe, il se rend avec ses compagnons sur le rivage, . . ." As Burnouf did not wish to rely on his inaccurate manuscript of the *Kāraṇḍavyūha* and, moreover, held the opinion that, with the exception of a few instances only, the prose and the metrical *Kāraṇḍavyūha* versions agree extremely well one with another, we find no mention at all of the *ratikara*. In perfect accord with what is said in the *Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha*, we are simply told that it was from the lamp illuminating his room that Siṃhala came to learn the truth of the witches.

This leads us directly to the text of the *Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha*. The Siṃhala legend contained in this version was edited in 1967 by Yutaka Iwamoto.<sup>20</sup> As pointed out previously, the word *ratikara* has here been replaced by (*pra*)*dīpa*, which clearly means 'lamp'. In one passage, however, *ratikara* does appear. The term is used, quite surprisingly, as an attribute referring to *dīpa*. Our two episodes are presented as follows:

- (1) *tadā tatrālaye dīpaḥ sampradīpta mahojjvalaḥ /*  
*rākṣasyāṃ nidritāyāṃ sa prāhasat samprabhāsayan // 1*  
*taṃ pradīptaṃ hasantaṃ sa dr̥ṣṭvātivismitāśayāḥ /*  
*suciraṃ samnirīkṣyaivaṃ dhyātvā caivaṃ vyacintayat // 2*  
*aho citra kim arthe 'yaṃ pradīpo yat prahasyate /*  
*evam hi hasito dīpo dr̥ṣṭo naiva śruto 'pi na // 3*  
*iti dhyātvā ciraṃ paśyan siṃhalaḥ sa samutthitaḥ /*  
*samupāśritya taṃ natvā papracchaivaṃ kṛtāñjalīḥ // 4*  
*kim arthe hasase dīpa tad atra me samādiśa /*  
*ko 'tra dīpe praviṣṭo hi mayānujñāyate bhavān // 5*

*iti tenābhisampr̥ṣṭe pradīpaḥ sa samujjvalan /*  
*siṃhalaṃ taṃ samāmantrya prahasann evam abravū // 6*  
*siṃhala kim na jānāsi rākṣasiyaṃ na mānuṣī /*  
*ramitvāpi yathākāmaṃ bhakset tvāṃ naiva saṃśayaḥ // 7*  
*sarvās tāḥ pramadāḥ kāntā rākṣasyo naiva mānavāḥ /*  
*sarvāns tāns tvatsahāyāṃś ca bhakṣiṣyanti na saṃśayaḥ // 8*  
*iti dīpasamākhyātaṃ śrutvā bhūtas sa siṃhalaḥ /*  
*kim idam satyaṃ evam syād iti taṃ paryapṛcchata // 9*  
*satyaṃ eva pradīpeyaṃ rākṣasi yan na mānuṣī /*  
*kathaṃ bhavān vijānāsi satyaṃ etat samādiśa // 10*  
*iti samprār̥thite tena sa pradīpaḥ punar hasan /*  
*siṃhalaṃ sār̥thavāhaṃ taṃ samāmantryaivam ādiśat // 11*  
*satyaṃ etan mayākhyātaṃ yadi tvam na<sup>21</sup> pratīcchasi /*  
*dakṣiṇasyāṃ mahārāṇye gatvā paśya tvam ātmanā //<sup>22</sup> 12*

- (1) "Then, while the witch had fallen asleep, the lamp in their room (suddenly) laughed, flaring up with a big flame and illuminating (the entire abode). Having seen it flaring up and laughing, (Siṃhala) was extremely amazed. He looked for a while, pondered and thought: 'O (how) strange that the lamp laughed. I have never seen nor heard that a lamp laughed like this'. Having pondered for a while, Siṃhala, (still) looking, arose. Having come near and bowed down, he asked, with his hands placed side by side: 'Why do you laugh, lamp, tell me that! And please excuse (my asking): Who has entered the lamp?' Having been asked, the burning lamp called upon Siṃhala and told him, laughingly, this: 'O Siṃhala, do you not know? This is a witch, not a human being. Though having made love as much as she likes, she will devour you, there is no doubt. All these beloved girls are witches, not human beings. There is no doubt, they will devour all your companions.' Having heard what the lamp said, Siṃhala, frightened, asked it: 'How can this be true? How do you know, o lamp, that this, in reality, is a witch, not a human being? Tell me that truly!' Having been asked by him, the lamp, laughing again, told Siṃhala, the caravan-leader: 'What I said is true. If you do not believe, proceed to the Southern forest (and) look by yourself!'"

<sup>18</sup> Verses 1 and 5—7 are also quoted in Regamey (1965, p. 196f). Regamey, who had not seen Iwamoto's edition (published in 1967) has a few variants: *prābhasat samprabhāsayan* (instead of *prāhasat samprabhāsayan*) in 1d, *bhasase* (instead of *hasase*) in 5a and, finally, *prabhasan* (instead of *praha-*

sann) in 6d. Tucci,<sup>23</sup> trying to remove what he thought was an incorrect mixture of two verbs, interpreted *prābhasat*, *bhasase* and *prabhasan* as forms derived from the root *bhas-*. A comparison with the other text passages cited above proves, however, quite clearly that the reverse is correct: the lamp (or the *ratikara*) does first laugh, since it wishes to attract the caravan-leader's attention. The forms derived from *has-*, i.e., *prāhasat*, *hasase* and *prahasann* are, therefore, correct, while only *samprabhāsayan*, which is preceded by *prāhasat*, must be interpreted as a verb formed from *bhas-*.

(2) *iti tad uktam ākarṇya siṃhalaḥ sa prabodhitah /  
avatīrya drutam vrkṣāt sahasā svālayam yayau // 1  
tatra ratikaram dipam uddiptam tam samikṣya sah /  
sāñjaliḥ pranatiḥ kṛtvā purataḥ samupāśrayat // 2  
tam purastham samālokya pradīpaḥ sa samujjvalan /  
sādho satyam tvayā drṣtam ity evam samapṛcchata // 3  
iti dipoditam śrutvā punar āha vismitah /  
sarvam satyam mayā drṣtam ādiṣtam bhavatā yathā //<sup>24</sup> 4*

(2) "When he had listened (to what the prisoners in the iron fortress) had said, Siṃhala, awakened, descended quickly from the tree and went straight to his quarters. Looking at the lamp, (which) burned pleasantly, he came nearer to it and bowed down, with his hands placed side by side. While the burning lamp looked at him, (who stayed in front), it asked (Siṃhala): '(Well), (my) dear, did you see it is true?' Having heard what the lamp said, (which) flared up (before him), he said amazed: 'All what you told me is true. I have seen.'"

In episode 1 the lamp is three times called *pradīpa* and five times *dīpa*, in episode 2 *pradīpa* once and twice *dīpa*. The first *dīpa* in episode 2 is, however, as has already been noted, preceded by the attribute *ratikara*, which, if understood in the sense mentioned above, would describe the night-lamp as 'producing (amorous) pleasure'. This makes undoubtedly sense but does not really help to interpret the word *ratikara*, which in the *Kāraṇavyūha*, as we saw, is employed, not as an attribute, but as a noun. Since the speaker in the *Kāraṇavyūha* version appears to be the *ratikara*, in the *Guṇakāraṇavyūha*, however, the lamp, one may feel tempted to think that the two terms, *ratikara* and (*pra*)*dīpa*, may either have the same or at least a similar meaning. An important clue to the interpretation of these passages is offered by verse 5 of the first episode cited from the

*Guṇakāraṇavyūha*. Here Siṃhala not only enquires why the lamp laughed, he also adds to this query another, as we shall presently see, very justifiable question, namely, who it was that had entered the lamp. This question may indicate that, though the warning given to the caravan-leader comes from the lamp or the *ratikara*, the actual voice emanating from it belongs to somebody who has entered the lamp or, in conformity with the *Kāraṇavyūha* version, somebody who has entered the *ratikara*. This somebody is, as can be guessed from the story, no one but Avalokiteśvara, who, further on in the legend, manifests himself as Balāha, the horse of horses. As a matter of fact, when asked by Siṃhala about a possible means of escape, only Avalokiteśvara could have told him the news that the merciful horse would be waiting for him and his group near the shore of the ocean.

Though the texts we discussed do not mention Avalokiteśvara at all, a Newari painted scroll edited by me<sup>25</sup> shows Avalokiteśvara in both of the scenes which illustrate the event. The Newari inscriptions accompanying and explaining these parts of the painting even make mention of Karuṇāmaya (-Avalokiteśvara): "When his beloved had fallen asleep, the venerable Karuṇāmaya descended into the light of the lamp-stand and told Siṃhala-sārthabāha that this woman is not a beautiful girl but a witch and deceitful" (19).<sup>26</sup> "When Siṃhala-sārthabāha had returned (from the fortress), convinced (of what he was told), he reported to the venerable Karuṇāmaya, who dwelled in his room in the lamp-stand. At this time Karuṇāmaya gave him advice and (then) disappeared" (22).<sup>27</sup> Though the Nepalese painted scroll is only some hundred and fifty years old, it preserves the tradition very well. Since it follows the *Guṇakāraṇavyūha* version, the lamp or, to be more correct, lamp-stand appears, which in Newari is called *tvādevā*. Though we are told in these texts that it is Avalokiteśvara who, descended into the light of the night-lamp, speaks to Siṃhala in both episodes, the Newari version cannot help us to understand the term *ratikara*. In order to arrive at a satisfactory explanation of this term, it will be necessary to discover a semantic link which connects (*pra*)*dīpa* with *ratikara*, though we must not forget that *ratikara*, as presumed by Edgerton, is likely to be 'a corruption for some other word of that meaning', that is to say, 'lamp'. We can easily understand that in these nocturnal scenes Avalokiteśvara enters the lamp and from within its flame addresses the caravan-leader. It is a well-known fact, attested all over the religious world, that gods and benevolent spirits are invariably connected with light; evil spirits, however, with black and darkness.

There can be no doubt that *ratikara*, which in the *Kāraṇavyūha* replaces (*pra*)*dīpa*, is just another — corrupt — lexeme of the very same or a

similar meaning. The term it incorrectly stands for is *vartikara*, 'the ray of the wick'. We may suppose that, already at an early period, *vart(t)i*, 'wick', has been misspelt as *rati*, since *va* could easily be misread as *ra*. Moreover, when rewriting the oldest manuscripts and mistakenly substituting *va* by *ra*, the scribes rendered *vart(t)ikara*, not, as might be expected, as *\*rart(t)ikara*, but as *ratikara*. In order to explain this phenomenon, we must first consider the fact that, with the exception of the Gilgit manuscripts, the text of the *Kāraṇḍavyūha* has been known through manuscripts transmitted and preserved in Nepal; secondly, attention must be paid to the idiosyncrasies of Newar handwriting: since a superscript *r* frequently served a merely decorative purpose, *r*, when preceding a doubled consonant — in our case *tt* — could often be dropped and the consonant-pair reduced to a single consonant only.<sup>28</sup> *varttikara* was thus turned into *ratikara*. This means that, while according to the *Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha* the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara enters a 'lamp' (< *pra* > *dīpa*), in the *Kāraṇḍavyūha* he manifests himself in the 'ray of a wick' (*vartikara*).

Though I have interpreted *ratikara* as a corrupted form of *vart(t)ikara* ever since I began work on the *Kāraṇḍavyūha* and *Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha* respectively,<sup>29</sup> I only recently came across a passage which corroborates my hypothesis. This passage is not old either and, like the painted scroll mentioned above, also stems from Nepal. It is to be found in the *Bhāṣāvamsāvalī*,<sup>30</sup> the well-known Buddhist chronicle written in Nepali, an English rendering of which has been published by D. Wright. This chronicle, composed around 1800, contains a short summary of the *Siṃhalāvadāna* which, when renarrating our episode, most surprisingly uses the expression *vattī*, that is to say, the Nepali tadbhava for Skt. *vart(t)ikā*, 'wick'. The relevant lines (fol. 10 r<sup>31</sup>) run as follows: . . . *rātrī/ mā. sārthavāha sutī rahadā. uskā ghara jāi. vattī vālī rāsyākā vattī mā pasī. āryāvalokiteśvarale. āphnā sarūpa deṣāi. ājñā ga/rdā bhayā. he siṃhalasārthavāha . . .* (lines 1—3), ". . . in the night, when the caravan-leader was (already) sleeping, the venerable Avalokiteśvara came to his room; (he) entered the wick that was kept burning (there) and said (to Siṃhala), after having manifested his own (true) form: 'O caravan-leader Siṃhala, . . .'"<sup>32</sup>

It is not worth while speculating on the ways in which the original term *vartikara* was converted into *ratikara*. It is, however, interesting to note that, though the scribes read their manuscripts to be copied inattentively, the erroneous *ratikara* proved nevertheless not to be completely devoid of meaning and could, therefore, persist. As we have seen, *ratikara* in the sense of 'giving (amorous) pleasure' fits well into the contexts of the two scenes. Besides this, the scribes' substitution of *vartikara* by *ratikara* may

have been influenced by the fact that *rati(m)kara* also denotes the super-natural rays of light that emanate from Bodhisattvas.<sup>33</sup> In this particular meaning, *rati(m)kara* is well attested in *Śikṣāsamuccaya* 335, 5 (stanza).<sup>34</sup>

NOTES

S. Lienhard, *Die Abenteuer des Kaufmanns Siṃhala. Eine nepalische Bilderrolle aus der Sammlung des Museums für Indische Kunst Berlin*, Berlin 1985, p. 32.  
 See *ibid.*, p. 18f.  
 F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*, Vol. II: *Dictionary*, Delhi-Patna-Varanasi 1970 (reprint), *sub verbo*.  
 G. Regamey, *Le pseudo-hapax ratikara et la lampe qui rit dans le 'sūtra des ogresses' bouddhique*, *Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asiatiques* XVIII—XIX (1965), p. 175ff.  
*Ibid.*, p. 199f.  
*Ibid.*, p. 204f.  
 See D. D. Kosambi and V. V. Gokhale, *The Subhāṣitaratnakōṣa compiled by Vidyākara*, Cambridge, Mass. 1957, p. 157.  
 Regamey (1965), p. 205.  
 P. L. Vaidya, *Mahāyāna-Sūtra-Saṃgraha*, Vol. I, Darbhanga 1961 (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, 17), p. 284ff. (*Aśvarājavarṇana = Siṃhalāvadāna*).  
 I render the text mainly according to P. L. Vaidya (1961), as his edition is easy of access. Other, partly better, readings are indicated in Regamey (1965), who quotes the same passages p. 184f.  
 Vaidya (1961) reads: *nidrāni sā*.  
 In the Tibetan version plural; cf. Regamey (1965), p. 184, note 1.  
 Literally, 'producing', 'producer (of)'.  
 Cf. Regamey (1965), p. 184.  
*Ibid.*, p. 193.  
*Ibid.*, pp. 193—95.  
 Taishō, 1050, p. 56; cf. Regamey (1965), pp. 188—92.  
 E. Burnouf, *Introduction à l'histoire du Bouddhisme indien*, Paris 1844, p. 223f.  
 Burnouf (1844), p. 197.  
 Y. Iwamoto, *Bukkyo setsuwa kenkyu josetsu (= Studies in Buddhist legends)*, Kyoto 1967, p. 247ff.: *Guṇakāraṇḍavyūha* 16: *Siṃhalasārthavāhoddhārana*.  
 In Iwamoto's edition: *yadi tam tvam pratīcchasi* (stanza 204b).  
 Iwamoto (1967), p. 264ff., stanzas 193—204.  
 G. Tucci, *La redazione poetica del Kāraṇḍavyūha*, *Atti della Reale Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche* 58 (1922/23), p. 271ff.  
 Iwamoto (1967), p. 267f., stanzas 236—39.  
 See Note 1.  
 Lienhard (1985), p. 75.  
 Lienhard (1985), p. 76.  
 On the use of the superscript *r* in Newar orthography see J. Brough, *The Language of the Buddhist Sanskrit Texts*, BSOAS 16 (1954), p. 354: ". . . the use of the superscript *r* is of interest. Since the following consonant is regularly doubled, a bond seems to have been established between a double consonant and a superscript *r*, and as a result any double consonant may attract to itself a superscript *r*. The alternations of spellings with and without the *r* then would seem to have led to its occasional use over other conjuncts and even over single consonants, and to its equally frequent omission where it is historically required; and it is difficult to avoid the impression that the sign was felt to be a mere ornament of the



handwriting . . . Cf. also S. Lienhard (with the collaboration of Th. L. Manandhar), *Nepalese Manuscripts. Part 1: Nevāri and Sanskrit*, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Stuttgart 1988 (VoHD XXXIII, 1), p. XXVIII and *ibid.*, footnote 34.

<sup>29</sup> Lienhard (1985), pp. 115 and 119 (footnote 227).

<sup>30</sup> Cambridge University Library, manuscript No. Add. 1952 A.

<sup>31</sup> I am much indebted to David Gellner, Oxford, who kindly copied this passage for me from the Cambridge manuscript.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. D. Wright, *History of Nepal. Translated from Parbatya by Munshi Shew Shunker Singh and Pandit Sri Gunanand. With an Introductory Sketch of the Country and People of Nepal by the Editor*, Calcutta 1958 (2nd ed.), p. 51.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Edgerton (1970), *sub verbo*.

<sup>34</sup> See P. L. Vaidya, *Śikṣāsamuccaya of Śāntideva*, Darbhanga 1961 (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, 11), p. 178, line 5. — Prof. O. von Hinüber kindly informs me that the word *ratikara* also occurs in a *dhāraṇī* edited in his article *Dhāraṇīs aus Zentralasien*, IT XIV (1987–88), p. 234: *rama rama ratikare*.

## REVIEW ARTICLE

Vittorio A. van Bijlert: *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority. The Development of Epistemology and Logic in the Old Nyāya and the Buddhist School of Epistemology with an Annotated Translation of Dharmakīrti's Pramānavārttika II (Pramānasiddhi) vv. 1–7*. Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, Wien 1989, pp. 191, ÖS 230,—.

## I

As the author declares in his preface (p. V), this book was previously brought out as his PhD thesis. Originally it had been his intention to add some new findings concerning the beginnings of Indian epistemology and logic as well as a further discussion on the interpretation of Buddhist logic. However, these materials are now intended for a separate, later publication of the same way as a translation and interpretation of *Pramānavārttika* II 8–34 (cf. p. XXII, footnote 9).

The present work contains four chapters besides a Table of Contents, Abbreviations, an Introduction with Notes and an Index comprising names of authors and texts, technical terms as well as textual passages mentioned and discussed in the book. The main part of the book consists of the four chapters: (I) "The Beginnings of Systematic Epistemology and Logic" (pp. 1–44), (II) "Buddhist Epistemology and Logic before Dharmakīrti" (pp. 45–91), (III) "Dharmakīrti's Logic" (pp. 93–114), (IV) "The Pramāṇa-definitions of the Pramānasiddhi chapter of PV, vv 1–7" (pp. 115–180).

As one can gather from these titles, it is the author's aim to present Dharmakīrti's epistemology and in particular his views propagated in the first seven verses of the second chapter of the *Pramānavārttika* (PV) both in the perspective of Dharmakīrti's own philosophy and in the historical context of the previous development of epistemology and logic in the Brahmanic and Buddhist schools. For this purpose v.B. begins with a discussion of selected passages, mainly from the *Nyāyasūtras* (NS) and the *Nyāyabhāṣya* (NBh), dealing with "the highest Good" (= final emancipation) (§1.1), the four means of valid cognition which are accepted in the Nyāya-school, viz. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *śabda* (§§1.2–1.6), the theory of proof (§1.7) and the question of the trustworthiness of the speaker who

*the impression of being historically acceptable*" (p. 8); "The fact that the nucleus of this passage coincides with the noble eightfold path is . . . a reason for me to consider it the oldest stage of the detailed description of the dhyāna path" (p. 12); ". . . a meditative exercise that, in my opinion, belongs to the oldest level of transmission . . ." (p. 26); etc. In all these cases we must grant Vetter the benefit of the doubt, and assume that there may be objective reasons supporting his conclusions; one regrets that these objective reasons are not specified.

If the above remarks are rather critical, it is not because Vetter's conclusions are necessarily incorrect or unacceptable. The reason is rather that in many cases an independent study would be required to find out. The book is therefore not complete. One would have hoped that it had taken up the challenge posed by the present state of Buddhist studies and tried to convince those belonging to the opposite camp. By not doing so it preaches, so to say, to the already converted. One fears, therefore, that it will be ignored by those who do not recognize the 'principle of imperfection', or, what is worse, that it will confirm them in their opinions.

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Charles Dillard Collins, *The Iconography and Ritual of Śiva at Elephanta*. State University of New York Press (Albany 1988), pp. xvi + 331.

The great rock-cut temple on Elephanta Island in Bombay harbour is one of the most important monuments of Indian art. Noted for the first time in 1534 by the Portuguese physician, Garcia da Orta, the cave-temple attracted the attention and interest of visitors and became the subject of serious studies by art-historians in the second half of the nineteenth century. The sectarian affiliation of the cave-temple is obviously Śaivite as the sculptural reliefs inside mostly represent aspects of the god Śiva, either in his meditative (*yogeśa-mūrti*), heroic (*andhakāsuravadha-mūrti* and others), or domestic (*kalyānasundara-mūrti* and others) life.

The gist of the book presently under review is to be found in the author's article of 1982, which he published under the title, 'Elephanta and the Ritual of the Lakulīśa-Pāśupatas' in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 102, 605–617. In this book, which is apparently his dissertation

submitted to the University of Iowa 1980, the author studies this same cave-temple in a more systematic and comprehensive way, examining the construction of the temple itself, and the arrangement of the relief-sculptures from various points of view such as history, mythology, iconography, literature and religion. Thus, in the six chapters into which the book is divided, the author discusses these points one after another.

In the first chapter, which is entitled 'Historical Background of Elephanta' (pp. 4–15), the author assumes that the cave-temple was constructed under royal patronage, rather than through the piecemeal donations of the pious. The royal family in question is the Kalacuris, who were powerful in that region during the sixth century, and who called themselves *paramamāheśvaras*. Following the studies done by V. V. Mirashi and W. Spink, the author assigns the probable date of construction to the reign of the second Kalacuri ruler Kṛṣṇarāja (550–575) or to his son Śaṅkaragaṇa (575–600).

In the second chapter, which is entitled 'Previous Descriptions of Elephanta and Its Sculptures' (pp. 16–30), the author gives a brief, but interesting survey of the progress of Elephanta studies. As mentioned above, the first person to leave a record of his visit to Elephanta cave-temple was Garcia da Orta, and, since that time, the temple became known to Portuguese, Dutch, French, and English visitors and scholars. The names of Dom João de Castro, Diogo de Couto, Jan Huygen van Linschoten, Anquetil du Perron, W. Hunter, W. Erskine, J. Burgess, and others are mentioned here, extending until the end of the nineteenth century. More scholarly and detailed works by T. A. Gopinatha Rao, D. R. Bhandarkar, S. Kramrisch, J. N. Banerjea, M. Neff, W. Spink, Heimo Rau, and others in the twentieth century are introduced and outlined.

The brief third chapter, entitled 'Mythological Sources for the Elephanta Sculptures' (pp. 31–40), is an introduction to the lengthy fourth chapter. Here the author surveys the mythological sources relevant to the Elephanta sculptures. Herein are included passages from the Vedic literature (the Śatarudriya section of the Vājasaneyī-samhitā, Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad, and some later Śaivic Upaniṣads), two Epics, and some Purāṇas (Mārkaṇḍeya, Matsya, Vāmana, Kūrma, Liṅga, and Viṣṇudharmottara), as well as Kālidāsa's works.

The fourth chapter, which is entitled 'Iconographical Analysis of the Elephanta Sculptures', is the longest one in the book comprising more than fifty pages (pp. 41–94). Here the relief-sculptures of the Elephanta cave-temple are discussed individually in comparison with the mythological sources outlined in the previous chapter. Thus, the eight major relief-panels, *Rāvaṇānugraha-mūrti*, *Yogeśvara-mūrti*, *Nṛtta-mūrti*, *Andhakāsuravadha-*

It draws extensively upon the work of recent scholars, among whom E. Frauwallner and L. Schmithausen may be mentioned.

This is not to say that the book is without interest for the professional. Particularly interesting is, for example, Vetter's position in the controversy dividing scholars of Buddhism, whether or not early Buddhism rejected the existence of a soul/self. He states (p. 41):

To have a view (whatever it may be) in this matter distinguishes Buddhist tradition and modern scholars from an ancient, purely practical, approach where such questions were thought to be an obstacle to spiritual progress and where it was not considered problematic to leave matters undecided.

Also Vetter's attempt to make sense of the *prāṭīyasamutpāda* (p. 45f.) will evoke interest. He is further of the opinion that the earliest message of the Buddha concerned immortality rather than cessation of suffering (pp. 5–6, 8–9, 15, 27).

An expression that will strike many readers as odd is 'experience of release' and its synonyms ('experience of salvation', 'feeling released', 'the experience of having found salvation', etc.) frequently used in this book. The Buddhists, we read on p. XVI, "strive for an *experience* in which and after which the fear that suffering will be without end can no longer arise" (my emphasis). It seems, to be sure, more than plausible that the Buddha had had an experience of release, but it would be a mistake to think that that is what early Buddhism is all about. The aim is not an *experience* of release, but *release*. By ignoring release and speaking about an experience, the emphasis of the early texts is shifted in such a way that Buddhism becomes a search for mystical experience. This may seem plausible to those with a Christian background, but does not appear to do justice to the texts. No justification for this unusual way of speaking is given.

Clearly the weakest aspect of the book is the meagre argumentation provided to support its conclusions. The choice of readership (beginning university students) is no doubt responsible for the fact that the emphasis is on results rather than on philological proof. This is not to say that the book never provides any arguments, but more often than not they are only hinted at, hardly ever rigorously worked out. In a field where there is disagreement about the very possibility of obtaining results, this is to be regretted.

Arguments are not fully presented even where new theories are launched. The treatment of karma and its effects in earliest Buddhism is a good example. Vetter does not doubt "that the Buddha believed that . . . good deeds would result after death in a good consequence, and bad deeds in a bad consequence" (p. 77). Which are those consequences? According to

Vetter, they are heaven and the underworld respectively, and these alone, at least at the beginning of the Buddha's career. The idea that these good and bad deeds can also be requited in a next existence in the human world, was introduced later, probably by the Buddha himself (p. 77–78). The realms of animals and hungry ghosts were introduced in this context ever later.

Which are the reasons for believing that such a development took place? According to Vetter, examples of deeds which lead to a good or bad situation in the human world cannot be found in the oldest documents (p. 77). How do we know that the texts which do not mention the human world in this connection are older than the ones that do? And how do we know that the beliefs they represent — supposing that they do represent different beliefs — are to be thus ordered chronologically? Moreover, are we not in danger of scholastically imposing upon the texts rationalizations of our own making, so that the presumed contradictions and inconsistencies, too, might be of our own making? These questions are not satisfactorily answered. Yet p. 91 proclaims that "it has been shown that originally [only] heaven and the underworld were the places for retribution of good and evil karma". We are here obviously confronted with a weakness that may be inherent to a book that tries to be both a scholarly research publication and a student manual, and therefore risks to be neither fully.

A certain tendency to rationalize into the text is no doubt responsible for an affinity of method to the early scholiasts, esp. Buddhaghosa, the author of the *Visuddhimagga*. While discussing the 'sphere-meditation', Vetter points out that the canonical passages lack clear information regarding its outcome. He then continues (p. 68):

When we do find some information, it is in apparently late (parts of) suttas. Here we detect a somewhat different method which is evidently influenced by discriminating insight. These passages, however, are also not clear enough and that is why I think it permissible to call upon evidence in the *Visuddhimagga*. Although this work was written roughly 400 A.D., in my opinion it has preserved the method influenced by discriminating insight very well. (my emphasis)

How can we know that the *Visuddhimagga* preserves a method from canonical times if the canonical texts are not clear? And if the old texts are not clear to us, were they any clearer to the author of the *Visuddhimagga*? By imposing rationalizations upon the text, rationalizations which, if need be, can be borrowed from the scholiastic tradition, one fears that philology is abandoned in favour of theology.

The above quoted lines invoke the personal impression of the author as a reason for believing his conclusion. This happens often. Some further instances are: "The beginning of the *Dhamma-cakka-ppavattana-sutta* gives

the Buddha himself. But such disagreements concern the practical application of the 'principle of imperfection', they should not cast doubt on its validity in general.

Critics have none the less sarcastically raised the question whether the incoherence of the first verse of St. John's gospel — "the Word was with God, and the Word was God" — justifies the conclusion that two authors wrote this verse. Of course, no biblical scholar will be tempted to ascribe this verse to two different authors; many, on the other hand, will recognize the hand of two authors in the two creation accounts in the first three chapters of Genesis. Criteria like incoherence and inconsistency must obviously be used with great care; those who do not wish to understand this can easily turn them into objects of ridicule.

The two creation accounts of Genesis deserve to retain our attention somewhat longer. Elaine Pagels sums up how orthodox tradition explained them in the following words: "Jewish teachers in antiquity, like many Christians after them, turned to theological ingenuity rather than historical or literary analysis to account for contradictions in the texts" (*Adam, Eve, and the Serpent*, London 1988, p. xxii). This directs our attention to an important feature of religious traditions: they may preserve inconsistencies, but are at the same time likely to explain them away. This observation should be heeded by those who point to traditional interpretations of seeming inconsistencies. (See e.g. R. Gombrich in *Studies in Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka*, ed. D. S. Ruegg and L. Schmithausen, Leiden 1990, p. 11–12. In his *Theravāda Buddhism* (London and New York 1988, p. 21) Gombrich expresses the opinion that modern scholarship should begin by examining the tradition; see J. W. de Jong's criticism of this position in *IJ* 32 (1989), 239–240.) Pagels further points out "that during the first two centuries the Christian movement may have been even more diversified than it is today" (*op. cit.* p. 151). If, therefore, the study of early Buddhism can learn from the study of early Christianity, then it is this: tradition may be a very unreliable guide in the interpretation of its earliest documents.

All this is not to deny that the practical task of identifying inconsistencies which could be relevant for historical reconstructions can be extremely difficult. (The easiest cases are those where a certain practice or belief is recommended in one part of the Buddhist canon, and rejected in another; a fair number of such cases exist.) Some critics think that those practical difficulties are so great that we cannot hope to reach results. S. Collins (*JRAS* 1987, p. 375), for example, appears to think that any solution to the questions here considered must be 'very . . . complex and difficult'. This, of

course, is like rejecting Newton's law of gravity for being too simple, and for not correctly describing the motion of falling apples, which indeed it doesn't. Collins further considers 'indispensable' independent, external evidence: "epigraphical, archaeological, or other". Does he similarly consider textual evidence 'indispensable' for the palaeontologist, besides fossils? Moreover, does a text gain independence by being carved in stone, rather than being incorporated in one of the collections which constitute the different 'canons' of early India?

The book under review, inevitably, has to choose between the two opposing camps, and it leaves no doubt as to its preference; it squarely accepts the value of the principle of imperfection for historical research. It takes as its point of departure the "large number of contradictions and deviations [that] have clearly become apparent" in the Buddhist scriptures (p. IX). Discarding the view that inconsistency is a characteristic of each religious consciousness, at least where ancient Buddhism is concerned, it "look[s] for a way out of the dilemmas by assuming a development of thought".

The book is an adapted translation from the Dutch. Like its Dutch original, it is primarily meant to introduce university students to early Buddhism. This explains why it does not normally enter into detailed discussions as to why and how. Vetter is aware "that things are sometimes much more complicated" (p. VII) and refers to his contribution to *Studies in Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka* (ed. D. S. Ruegg and L. Schmithausen, Leiden 1990, pp. 36ff.) — a portion of which, adapted and deprived of its notes, constitutes, incidentally, the appendix on 'mysticism in the Atthakavagga' of the volume under review.

The contents are as follows. After an Introduction which gives some background information (pp. XI–XVI) and a short section on 'literature and abbreviations' (XVII–XIX), follows 'An outline of the most ancient form of Buddhism' (XXI–XXXVII). The main part of the book — i.e., the part with page numbers in Arabic numerals — consists of four sections, which deal with dhyāna-meditation (pp. 1–32), discriminating insight (33–60), sphere-meditation (61–73) and karma (75–100) respectively, each of them studied in their historical development. An appendix on mysticism in the Atthakavagga (101–106) and an index (107–110) complete the volume.

There can be no doubt that the book will be welcomed by many students, teachers and general readers. It presents all the important tenets and practices of early Buddhism in relatively few pages, as well as a historical frame which shows that it is not necessary to believe that all these tenets and practices were introduced all at once by the historical Buddha.

*nirākaragunotare*. The second stanza of the Abhicāradīpikā is also quoted in a corrupt form; a much better version is again found in the Indrajāla-vidyāsamgraha, p. 22, as the second stanza of the Kāmaratna. And one wonders which relation may have existed between the YC and the popular publication by Devacarana Avasthī called Kautukaratnabhāṇḍāgāra, Bombay 1983, which features in the Bibliography.

The Introduction enumerates five editions and ten manuscripts (including the Abhicāradīpikā) as the basis for T.'s critical edition. Other existing sources are not referred to, although two other editions of the YC were mentioned by T. himself in his article "The Indian sorcery called Abhicāra", WZKSA 29, 1985, p. 69–117, on p. 111, where the reader is also referred to Aufrecht's Catalogus Catalogorum for other mss. Still other data are available: the Catalogue of the India Office Library (Vol. II, Pt. 1: Sanskrit Books, ed. C. J. Napier, IV, London 1957, p. 3118) mentions an edition with Telugu translation by S. B. Somayājigāri, Madras 1906; while the Alphabetical List of Mss. in the Oriental Institute, Baroda, by R. Nambiyar (Vol. II, 1950, p. 1380) lists seven other mss. kept at that place. — The edition by Baladeva Mīśra (YCb) dated by T. in 1967 has been published already in 1929. The India Office possesses a specimen of this year printed on the Lakshmi Venkatesvara Press. This might be the same edition which was used by Jean M. Rivière for his French translation (see his p. 42). — To summarize: the Introduction gives the impression of having been made up rather hastily, the reader being left unacquainted with some essential information concerning the nature and tradition of the YC.

The text of the YC has generally been treated with care, and the result looks like a reliable approach to what Dāmodara may have written himself. There are a number of printing errors (one example: 6,12d *ksipte* for *ksiper*) and small lapses such as 2,35b *-sādyādi sādhaḥ* for *-sādhyādi sādhaḥ*; 9,93d *doṣaḥ* for *doṣaḥ* (but all mss. read *doṣam*); at 3,197a (note 1050), read *ḍakāram* (with the editions) for *hrakāram*; at 5,51c, read *pādasprsto* for *pādaprsto*. One can differ of opinion with the editor concerning the question how far we should go in correcting grammatical "errors" in the YC, especially the wrong use of genders, such as in 3,126c (n. 668) or 5,44ab (emendation *-e*, for ungrammatical *-au* found in practically all mss.). T. himself holds that such features may go back to the author himself. Why then emend them away against the evidence of the sources? On the other hand, the difference between the Kāvya style of Pandit Dāmodara's introductory and concluding stanzas and the body of the YC is not explained. The critical notation is to my mind a little overdone: evident mistakes by single scribes need hardly be reproduced. In 3,50c.

72  
12

however, the information given in note 260 is not sufficient: the critical text reading *hrīm yaṃ pratidalam lekhyam*, the note indicates that seven sources omit *lekhyam*, thus suggesting that they all have only six syllables in this quarter. This is by no means the case. The Benares edition (by R. Pandeya) of "Kautukaratna-bhāṇḍāgāra", however substandard, prints *hrīm yaṃ* twice (p. 76), and in this way a correct *pāda* of the "first Vipulā" type is produced. Rivière's translation (consistently ignored by T.) confirms this state of affairs.

Notwithstanding the limitations shortly indicated above, we must appreciate the work done by Türostig which is an important step forward to better knowledge of the theory of magic in Hinduism. Further study in this field would be welcome: we suggest an annotated translation of the YC accompanied by a thorough analysis of its textual history.

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Vetter, Tilmann, *The Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early Buddhism*. E.J. Brill, Leiden/New York/Köbenhavn/Köln. 1988. ISBN 90-04-08959-4. xxvii + 110 pp. Price: 42.50 guilders (ca. US \$21.25).

The palaeontologist Stephen Jay Gould, in his recent book *Time's Arrow, Time's Cycle* (Penguin Books, 1988, p. 84), draws attention to the tension in evolutionary biology between optimal design and history. Already Darwin he recalls — understood that the primary proofs of evolution are oddities and imperfections that must record pathways of historical descent. Gould then points out that "This principle of imperfection is a general argument for history, not a tool of evolutionary biologists alone. All historical scientists use it . . .".

One wishes Gould were right. The 'principle of imperfection', unfortunately, still appears to be unknown to some of those who make pronouncements about the earliest period of Buddhism. Here too we must derive our evidence from sources that are, at least in part (and it is not immediately evident which parts), later than the period concerned. And here too we must make the best use we can of the 'imperfections' — usually inconsistencies, sometimes plain contradictions — which those sources contain. In practice this is no easy task. One may disagree as to whether a particular feature is or is not an 'imperfection'. One may maintain that a certain inconsistency or contradiction constitutes no evidence of 'history', but was introduced purposefully, perhaps by one single person, perhaps by

handwriting . . . Cf. also S. Lienhard (with the collaboration of Th. L. Manandhar), *Nepalese Manuscripts*. Part 1: *Nevāri and Sanskrit*, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Stuttgart 1988 (VoHD XXXIII, 1), p. XXVIII and *ibid.*, footnote 34.

<sup>29</sup> Lienhard (1985), pp. 115 and 119 (footnote 227).

<sup>30</sup> Cambridge University Library, manuscript No. Add. 1952 A.

<sup>31</sup> I am much indebted to David Gellner, Oxford, who kindly copied this passage for me from the Cambridge manuscript.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. D. Wright, *History of Nepal. Translated from Parbatiya by Munshi Shew Shunker Singh and Pandit Sri Gunanand. With an Introductory Sketch of the Country and People of Nepal by the Editor*, Calcutta 1958 (2nd ed.), p. 51.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Edgerton (1970), *sub verbo*.

<sup>34</sup> See P. L. Vaidya, *Sikṣāsamuccaya of Śāntideva*, Darbhanga 1961 (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, 11), p. 178, line 5. — Prof. O. von Hinüber kindly informs me that the word *ratikara* also occurs in a *dhāraṇī* edited in his article *Dhāraṇīs aus Zentralasien*, IT XIV (1987–88), p. 234: *rama rama ratikare*.

## REVIEW ARTICLE

Vittorio A. van Bijlert: *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority. The Development of Epistemology and Logic in the Old Nyāya and the Buddhist School of Epistemology with an Annotated Translation of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika II (Pramāṇasiddhi) vv. 1–7*. Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, Wien 1989, pp. 191, ÖS 230,—.

## I

As the author declares in his preface (p. V), this book was previously brought out as his PhD thesis. Originally it had been his intention to add some new findings concerning the beginnings of Indian epistemology and logic as well as a further discussion on the interpretation of Buddhist logic. However, these materials are now intended for a separate, later publication in the same way as a translation and interpretation of *Pramāṇavārttika* II.8–34 (cf. p. XXII, footnote 9).

The present work contains four chapters besides a Table of Contents, Abbreviations, an Introduction with Notes and an Index comprising names of authors and texts, technical terms as well as textual passages mentioned and discussed in the book. The main part of the book consists of the four chapters: (I) "The Beginnings of Systematic Epistemology and Logic" (pp. 1–44), (II) "Buddhist Epistemology and Logic before Dharmakīrti" (pp. 45–91), (III) "Dharmakīrti's Logic" (pp. 93–114), (IV) "The Pramāṇa-definitions of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of PV, vv 1–7" (pp. 115–180).

As one can gather from these titles, it is the author's aim to present Dharmakīrti's epistemology and in particular his views propagated in the first seven verses of the second chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) both in the perspective of Dharmakīrti's own philosophy and in the historical context of the previous development of epistemology and logic in the Brahmanic and Buddhist schools. For this purpose v.B. begins with a discussion of selected passages, mainly from the *Nyāyasūtras* (NS) and the *Nyāyabhāṣya* (NBh), dealing with "the highest Good" (= final emancipation) (§1.1), the four means of valid cognition which are accepted in the Nyāya-school, viz. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *śabda* (§§1.2–1.6), the theory of proof (§1.7) and the question of the trustworthiness of the speaker who

is the source of the reliable statements (§1.8). In the second chapter the author outlines the epistemological theories of Vasubandhu and Dignāga, whereas the following section deals with some principal features of Dharmakīrti's logic, namely the question of the utility of drawing valid inferences (§3.1), the definition and the nature of a valid logical reason (§3.2), the types of valid reasons and their subdivisions (§§3.3—3.6), and the role of the example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) in inference (§3.7). The final chapter, which contains an exegesis of PV II, verses 1—7, gives not only translations and paraphrases of the textual segments of this passage, but also quotes excerpts from Devendrabuddhi's commentary *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (PVP). Being the oldest, and according to v.B., the most authoritative commentary on PV II (cf. p. 120), the author hopes that its use together with relevant passages from other texts written by Dharmakīrti, in particular PV I, will enable him to give an adequate elucidation of the first section of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter of the PV, which deals with the general explication of the concept of *pramāṇa*.

In the chapters I—III, which introduce the reader to the topic dealt with in the last chapter of the book and which by their size occupy two thirds of the work, v.B. gives a readable and mainly reliable description of the epistemological and logical theories dealt with. The translations are aimed at precision and accuracy and the methods used for the interpretation of the textual passages are sound. Therefore v.B.'s book meets the most important requirements for conveying a truthful picture of the epistemological and logical issues discussed.

This does, however, not mean that all parts which are relevant in this field have been touched in the treatise. For example, the doctrines of the Sāṃkhya-school, in particular the theory (theories) which are to be found in the *Śaṣṭitantra*, ascribed to the Sāṃkhya-master Vāṛṣaganya, should hardly possess less importance for the question of the beginnings of systematic epistemology and logic than the views expounded in the NS and the NBh which are quite broadly discussed in chapter I of the book. With regard to the logic before Dharmakīrti, the chapter on inference in Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharṃasamgraha*, even if depending on Dignāga's logical achievements, contains important material for a precise identification of essential features of the theory of inference before Dharmakīrti. It is probable that the views of the Nyāya-author Uddyotakara and those of Dharmakīrti's alleged teacher Īśvarasena not only clarify the contrast between Dharmakīrti's theory of *anumāna* and those of his predecessors and/or contemporaries but also help us to a more adequate understanding of the reasons which motivated Dharmakīrti for developing his theory of inference in the way he

did. Therefore, many more things of importance could be said with respect to the "historical background" of Dharmakīrti's epistemology and logic, even if we leave sources out of account which are neither Buddhist nor Brahmanic. It is true that not all of this is immediately relevant for the exegesis of the seven verses of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter dealt with in the fourth chapter, but the same holds good also for many of the topics which are discussed by the author in the preceding chapters. Therefore it is best to regard the background information given by v.B. in his book as a presentation of selected material which indirectly pertains to the exegetical aims pursued by the last chapter. The indirect nature of relevance might excuse the fact that no clear criteria justifying the selection are given.

## II

Despite the faithfulness of v.B.'s descriptions and interpretations in general, there are a number of problematical points, some of which seem relevant and should be noted. I will mention and discuss them in the order in which they appear in the book.

p. XIX: According to v.B., before Dharmakīrti wrote PV II. 1—7, "no general *pramāṇa*-definitions had been given in any of the older epistemological treatises". It is claimed that therefore PV II. 1—7 occupies a rather unique place in Indian epistemology.

It is not wholly correct to say that no general *pramāṇa*-definitions had been given before Dharmakīrti. For example NS 1.1.3, which runs:

*pratyakṣānumānopamāṇasābdāḥ pramāṇāni*

"Perception, inference, comparison and word are (the) means of valid cognition" can be very well understood as embodying a general *pramāṇa*-definition. For it seems plausible to interpret the statement of NS 1.1.3 in a way according to which necessary and sufficient conditions of something's being a *pramāṇa* should be given. The import of the *sūtra* would accordingly be that any x is a *pramāṇa* if and only if x is either (an instance of) *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna* or *upamāna* or *śabda*. Therefore (at least as long as the term 'definition' is not used in a special sense) no reason exists for denying a statement of this sort the status of a definition and if so, the definition deserves the attribute "general", since it pertains to *pramāṇa* in general and not to any subclass of *pramāṇas*.

Possibly v.B. aims at saying something else than what he actually says, namely that no *pramāna*-definition before PV II. 1—7 had been presented which besides giving a definition also furnishes a justification for the fact that something is credited with the status of a *pramāna* and therewith yields a criterion of adequacy of *pramāna*-definitions like the one of NS 1.1.3. If this is so, the clarification is not unimportant. The difference between giving a definition and giving a justifying principle entailing a criterion of adequacy of definitions concerns levels of different order. But as the precision would make clear that a difference of level of philosophical reflection is involved and that the contrast between what is to be found in the NS on the one hand and in Dharmakīrti's PV on the other is something more than a mere improvement, it would be imprudent to dismiss this point as negligible.

2.

pp. 7—10: (1) The alleged support for the hypothesis that NS 1.1.4 originally read *indriyārthasannikarsotpānam jñānam pratyakṣam* by the alleged fact that *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (VS) 3.1.18 *ātmendriyārthasannikarsād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat* contains a definition of perception closely resembling the one corresponding to the proposed wording of the original form of NS 1.1.4 is fragile. The reason lies in the doubtfulness of the presupposition that VS 3.1.18 represents a definition of perception. There are good reasons to believe that this *sūtra* had nothing to do with an explication of the concept of perception, but was intended to state that perceptual knowledge, resulting from the contact of soul, sense-organs and object must, because of this fact, be something different from the soul, thus fulfilling a necessary requirement for the status of a logical indicator, namely that it be different from the thing which is indicated (cf. pp. 303—313 of my book: *'Ich' und das Ich. Analytische Untersuchungen zur buddhistisch-brahmanischen Ātmankontroverse*, Stuttgart 1988).

(2) v.B. takes the passage of NBh p. 28, 1—29, 1<sup>1</sup>, which comments on the term *avyapadeśya* in NS 1.1.4, as conveying that the view that knowledge is and can only be, received through language is false and that perceptual knowledge is not expressible in any language, i.e., it is an immediate and purely non-verbal form of cognition of outer objects. Taken together with the remark on p. 58 that Dignāga's dictum that perception should be free from any name-giving and should not be influenced by our linguistic consciousness reminds us of NS 1.1.4, where *pratyakṣa* has been defined as *avyapadeśya*, this suggests the supposition that according to v.B. both the

author of the NS and the writer of the NBh advocated the view that perception is not connected with linguistic conceptualization or that it even lacks any kind of conceptualization.

It is, however, doubtful that these writers had such an opinion. In particular, it has to be questioned that the authors of the NS and of the NBh regarded perception as entirely devoid of conceptualization.

With regard to Paṅśilasvāmin, the author of the NBh, he interprets the term *avyabhicāri* occurring in NS 1.1.4 as possessing the function to rule out cases of hallucination from the realm of perception. At least the formulation *udakam iti jñānam* (p. 198, 12 in the ed. of A. Thakur) = "the knowledge 'water'", which is used to describe one example of hallucination suggests that the cases to be ruled out comprise instances where particulars are brought under concepts or where something is classified as such and such. It seems also obvious that the author of the NBh thinks that the hallucinations which are spoken of in the passage of 198, 11—14 are not ruled out by the term *avyapadeśyam* in NS 1.1.4, as interpreted by himself. But if hallucinations are excluded from the sphere of perception proper by the word *avyabhicāri* as a subset within a larger realm of experiences involving conceptualization, some experiences involving conceptualizing and classifying must constitute cases of perception. Now, one could perhaps think that Paṅśilasvāmin only expresses his view in a misleading manner by the above cited expression. However, in the following sentence the same author characterizes a "knowledge" (*jñāna*) which is "erroneous" (*vyabhicārin*) as *atasmims tad iti* = "[a knowledge] 'it is that' with respect to something which is not that" and "non-erroneous" (*avyabhicārin*) knowledge as *tasmins tad iti* = "[a knowledge] 'it is that' with respect to something which is that". This sounds as if the term *avyabhicārin* characterizing perceptual knowledge according to Paṅśilasvāmin's interpretation of NS 1.1.4 refers to cases where a particular is judged as being something (being F) and the particular in question actually is this (is F). If however one supposes that the author of the NBh used such formulations only because of the theorem stated earlier in this text (198, 5—8) that individual *jñānas* must be expressed by terms of the form *X iti jñānam* = "the/a knowledge 'X'", thus wrongly suggesting a judgmental nature, it is still difficult to understand, why Paṅśilasvāmin did not use an alternative way to characterize the entities which should be ruled out by the term *avyabhicārin*. For if the author of the NBh adhered to the view that the word *avyapadeśya* already excludes all kinds of knowledge involving conceptualization he could hardly assign to the term *avyabhicārin* any other role than that of ruling out those instances of non-conceptual knowledge which either actually produce or are



apt to produce erroneous judgments. Theoretically this would be a problematical position, since it threatens to blur the distinction between perception insofar as it is a *pramāṇa* on the one hand and non-perception on the other.<sup>2</sup> However, whatever the theoretical difficulties of such a view might be, regarding the *interpretation* of Pakṣilasvāmin's remarks another point is important: the hypothesis that the author of the NBh saw the function of the term *avyabhicārin* in ruling out non-judgmental and non-conceptual experiences giving rise to wrong judgments makes it difficult to explain, why he did not explicitly characterize the relevant experiences in such a way. One must ask, why Pakṣilasvāmin did not characterize the hallucinatory experiences which should be ruled out from the domain of perception in the appropriate manner, namely as experiences which (*can*) cause the judgment/"knowledge": '(there is) water' — instead of describing them as the knowledge: '(there is) water'. Moreover, Pakṣilasvāmin's explanations regarding the term *vyavasāyātmakam* in NS 1.1.4 (198, 15–22, ed. Thakur) equally suggest that experiences involving some kind of judgment or conceptualization are at stake.

Therefore, the possibility of an alternative understanding of Pakṣilasvāmin's remarks with respect to *avyapadeśya*, in NS 1.1.4 — which have been often taken as proclaiming the non-conceptual nature of perception<sup>3</sup> — should be taken seriously.

There is one alternative, which, put into a nutshell, assumes that the comments on *avyapadeśya* are aimed at excluding not verbal (conceptual) knowledge, but the verbalization (conceptualization) of knowledge from the realm of perception. In the passage of 197, 20–198, 10 (Thakur = 13, 1–14, 5 Jhā) Pakṣilasvāmin argues as follows: There are name-words for all things, by these names things are recognized and from the cognition of objects (communicative) practice (*vyavahāra*) originates. From the contact of sense-organ and object the cognition of objects like 'form/colour' (*rūpa*), 'taste' arises, and the words 'form', 'taste' are names of objects. By this knowledge (*jñāna*) is expressed (*vyapadeśyate*) [as e.g., if one says]: he knows 'form/colour', he knows 'taste'. Being expressible by a name-word the undesired result follows that perceptual cognition is of a verbal nature and in order to avoid this consequence it has been said by the author of the *sūtra* 'not expressible' (*avyapadeśya*). The knowledge of the object which is there when the connection of word and object has not been employed is not expressed by a name-word, even if this connection is/has been grasped. But, when this object is (actually) grasped that knowledge of the object does not become different from what it was before. However, there is no other appellation (*samākhyaśabda*) of this object-knowledge by which being

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11  
cognized it could serve for (communicative) practice — and there is no (communicative) practice by something not cognized. Therefore it is expressed by the term (*saṃjñāśabda*) of the object to be cognized joined with the word *iti*, [as e.g.,]: "the knowledge 'form/colour'" or "the knowledge 'taste'". Thus this appellation is not used at the time of the cognition of the object, but it is used at the time of (communicative) practice. Therefore the object-knowledge which arises from the contact of sense-organ and object is non-verbal.<sup>5</sup>

It is true that Pakṣilasvāmin explicitly declares the object-knowledge arising from the contact of sense-organ and object as non-verbal, thereby obviously implying that perception is non-verbal. However, the context does not suggest that the author of the NBh aimed by this statement at the distinction between object-knowledge which involves and object-knowledge which does not involve conceptualization. Especially the immediately preceding remarks seem to show that Pakṣilasvāmin had another difference in mind, namely the difference between having object-knowledge on the one hand and verbalizing or conceptualizing that object-knowledge on the other. This suggests a distinction between (1) being in some (mental) psychological state and (2) recognizing one's being in that state or having an awareness that one is in a state of a kind one actually is in. Some reflection shows that this, as a matter of fact, amounts to a substantial difference. It most clearly emerges, if one considers states which are describable in a negative manner, states where experiences of some kind do not occur. It is one thing to be free from pain and another thing to realize that one is free from pain. (Sometimes a toothache has stopped, but we become only later aware of the fact that the toothache has gone in the meantime). However, even in "non-negative" cases there is a real difference. When I have a prickling sensation in the left hand, I can describe my experience in different ways, some of which might be erroneous, e.g., "(I have) a prickling sensation in my left hand", "(I have) some sensation in my hand", "(I have) the same sensation in my left hand, I felt yesterday at 8.30 p.m.", "(I have) a sensation in my left hand, I never felt before" etc. etc. Therefore Pakṣilasvāmin would be probably right, if he drew a distinction between being in a mental state and having a cognition of that state or knowing that one is (or is not) in a state of such and such a kind. Since awareness of being in a perceptual state can equally result from what is described in the NS as contact between sense-organ and object, he had a proper reason to emphasize that awareness of perceptions should be differentiated from perception proper. This does not mean that Pakṣilasvāmin and other Naiyāyikas were also right in acknowledging some kind of "inner perception". The distinction between mental

states and the conceptualization or awareness of mental states on the one hand and the existence of inner perception on the other pertain to different issues. For even if one acknowledges the former difference it does not follow that in order to take the step from being in a mental state to conceptualizing that state one has to perceive that state with some kind of inner eye thus risking an infinite regress. Nevertheless, if Paṅśilasvāmin with his remarks concerning *avyapadeśya* aimed at the above described distinction, he could be credited with the perspicacity of having distinguished between two kinds of *jñāna* which can result from the physical setting that generates perception, namely *jñāna* in the sense of perceptual experience and *jñāna* in the sense of knowledge resulting from perceptual experience originating from some particular setting in the physical world.

The decisive point is that this distinction by itself does not entail that perceptual experience must be free from all verbalization or conceptualization. It is compatible with the view that on the one hand perception must or at least can involve that the objects perceived are subsumed under concepts or associated with words whereas on the other hand it is excluded that the state of knowledge expressed by any ascription, in particular by self-ascriptions of perceptual states — when somebody asserts that he has some kind of perception — belongs to the realm of perception (as defined in the NS). In other words: not conceptualization of perceived objects, but conceptualization of perceptions is possibly at stake in the discussion of NBh 197, 20—198, 10.

Nevertheless it has to be admitted that it would also be possible to understand Paṅśilasvāmin's remarks in such a way that they are meant to rule out associations of words and objects in perception. But even if it should be correct to interpret the NBh in this manner it does not yet follow that the author of the text intended to say that perception must be devoid of any conceptualization. In view of the subsequent remarks on the words *avyabhicāri* and *vyavasāyātmakam* it would be natural to ascribe to Paṅśilasvāmin a view which entails a differentiation between linguistic and non-linguistic conceptualizations. After all, it seems that qualitatively indistinguishable visual and other perceptual experiences are apt to generate different dispositions to linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour according to the circumstances. A person, on account of his having a visual experience might be disposed to (re)act, as if he saw a snake, while under different circumstances the same experience might (have) cause(d) a disposition to (re)act as if there were a rope. It is not implausible that Paṅśilasvāmin envisaged to cover by his concept of perception the acquisition of dispositions to behaviour induced by sensual experience. This comprises dispositions to

linguistic behaviour, although the disposition itself is not of linguistic nature. Lacking the concept of a disposition to behaviour Paṅśilasvāmin was led to conceive this phenomenon as something akin to conceptualization expressed in linguistic utterances and to present the matter as if a rudimentary form of conceptualization were involved. This could account for the fact that the exposition of the issue in the comments of the NBh on NS 1.1.4 sometimes appears cryptical at first glance.

If this is so, it would be misleading to say that Paṅśilasvāmin claimed that perception "is an immediate and purely non-verbal form of cognition of outer objects".

(3) v.B. offers a hypothesis regarding the original form of NS 1.1.4 (cf. above), but does not discuss the question as to whether Paṅśilasvāmin's interpretation is correct with respect to the *sūtra* in its present form. As regards NS 1.1.4 in the wording presupposed by the NBh, the above given interpretation of Paṅśilasvāmin's remarks might indeed also reflect the intentions of the person who created the *sūtra* in its present form. However, one should be aware of the fact that this is merely one possibility. Two points must be considered in this connection:

- (1) It is unclear whether the attributes *avyapadeśyam*, *avyabhicāri* and *vyavasāyātmakam* are meant in a restrictive or in an attributive sense.<sup>6</sup>
- (2) It is not entirely certain whether NS 1.1.4 was always meant as furnishing a definition of perception or whether it initially should rather characterize a subclass of perceptions, namely veridical perception, perception which is a *pramāṇa* — in view of the preceding *sūtra* that defines *pramāṇa*. If a general definition was intended, it still remains open whether the definition was intended to entail that all instances of perception are veridical or not.<sup>7</sup>

These points concern questions which transgress the issue of the exact meanings of the words *avyapadeśyam* etc., albeit the latter has a bearing upon them.

3.

p. 20ff = §1.7

- (1) p. 22: According to v.B., Paṅśilasvāmin states in his comment on NS 1.1.34 (p. 526, 24 Thakur = 46, 8 Jhā) that the *probans*, the *hetu*, is present in the subject, and the author of the NBh is credited with the view that the only logical connection between *probans* and *probandum* is the

fact that both are always seen together in the example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*). It should be noted, however, that what Pakṣilasvāmin explicitly says in the cited passage is that a *hetu* is the *statement* that the property which is remembered as occurring both in the subject of inference and in the example is a means of proof (*sādhanaivāvacana*).<sup>8</sup>

(2) p. 24: v.B. interprets and translates *dr̥ṣṭānta* in the sense of “a generally accepted fact”. Although the author admits that this interpretation is not explicitly given in the NS he regards it as a very likely one, or, rather, he thinks that such an interpretation reflects an idea the authors of the NS and the NBh envisaged or intended to convey — without expressing it in an explicit manner. However, there cannot be any doubt that the concept of *dr̥ṣṭānta* according to both the NS and the NBh is nothing like a fact. The wording of NS 1.1.35 *sādhyaśādharmyāt taddharmabhāvi dr̥ṣṭānta udāharanam* as well as Pakṣilasvāmin’s explanation of this *sūtra* clearly show that *dr̥ṣṭānta* is conceived as an entity which exemplifies both the proving property and the property to be proven — or an entity which lacks both properties in the case of a negative *dr̥ṣṭānta*. Therefore the extension of *dr̥ṣṭānta* must comprise concrete particulars — things like mountains, pots etc. — or at best genera or kinds — entities like “the sound” — but cannot consist in facts, not even in the fact that some particular exemplifies both the *probans* and the *probandum*. Pakṣilasvāmin’s remarks are perhaps based on the view that a *dr̥ṣṭānta* serves to illustrate the fact that *probans* and *probandum* are invariably connected. However, this does not entail that a *dr̥ṣṭānta* is itself a fact. Moreover, it is questionable whether even this would correspond to the view of the author of (the relevant portion of) the NS. For it is very well possible that for the writer of NS 1.1.32–39 a *dr̥ṣṭānta* illustrates that *some* entity exemplifies both the *probans* and the *probandum* — or that *some* entity lacks both properties. This position, by the way, is theoretically not so unsatisfactory as v.B. seems to think.

(3) It should be noted that the five members of a “syllogism” as they are defined in NS 1.1.33–39 constitute a “hybrid” collection, since it consists both of entities which are events (speech acts) and entities which are properties or substances. It seems as if Pakṣilasvāmin strived to eliminate this heterogeneity, since he interprets NS 1.1.34 in a somewhat artificial way so that *hetu* can be taken as referring to speech acts, but does not entirely succeed because the wording of NS 1.1.36 makes it difficult to interpret *udāharana* in such a way that it refers to the act of illustrating something.

p. 56: v.B. illustrates the opposition between *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* in Dignāga’s theory by a passage from Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh). It is doubtful that the latter passage illustrates the relevant distinction, since it seems that the opposition between *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* in AKBh 349, 11–13 consists in the distinction between properties which are peculiar to one type of things and properties which are exemplified by all types of things, but not in the opposition between what pertains to (numerically) one particular vs. what pertains to more than one particular.

p. 67: v.B. claims that Dignāga discovered that inseparable connection is insufficient to make a deduction valid, since “it is true that smoke can reveal the presence of fire in general on the grounds that smoke is always connected with fire”, but “the converse is not always true”. The thesis that Dignāga was the first to recognize the fact that connection by itself does not guarantee validity but that, so to speak, the “direction” matters too, is in all probability historically not correct. Already in (some younger parts of?) the *Saṣṭitantra* the awareness of this fact is clearly attested.

p. 75: The terms *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* hardly refer to entities like classes or sets, as v.B. suggests, at least not in the sense of ‘class’ and ‘set’ as these words are used as technical terms nowadays. Such a conception is ruled out by statements like the ones which say that the proving property must or must not be/occur in the *sapakṣa* or the *vipakṣa*. These formulations would however be compatible with a conception of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* as realms or collections of particulars, namely of those particulars which instantiate or do not instantiate the property to be proven (*sādhya*dharma). — There is no advantage of merging the concepts of collections and classes or sets as suggested by v.B. in footnote 16 on p. 90.

p. 96: v.B.’s translation and interpretation of PVSV p. 2, 5–6 *sajāñīya eva*

*sattvam iti siddhe 'pi vijātiyavyatireke sādhyābhāve 'sattvavacanavat* by: "[The statement of the second criterion that the reason . . .] is present only in the [class of objects] similar [to the subject] is comparable to the statement [of the third criterion, i.e.] of the absence [of the reason] at the absence of the probandum . . . although [this third criterion] is [already] established . . ." is hardly correct. Accordingly, v.B. seems to misinterpret this textual passage because he assumes a too narrow scope for *-vat*. The context, in which the cited phrase occurs makes it clear that in the passage of PVSV 2, 4–6 Dharmakīrti wants to say the following: Even if the presence of the logical reason (as well as of the property to be proven) in the property-bearer of the example is already conveyed by the words "pervaded by a part of the [subject]", one could still suspect that a second reference to the property-bearer of the example serves the purpose of a restriction, thereby clarifying and explicating the intended import of the first (indirect) reference to the property bearer of the example, in the same manner as, despite the fact that the absence of the logical reason in dissimilar instances (i.e., instances where the property to be proven does not occur) is already established by a statement to the effect that the logical reason occurs only in similar instances, its non-occurrence in instances where the property to be proven does not occur is also stated, with the effect that the implied import of the first statement is made explicit. This means that by the use of *-vat* the issues of a repeated reference to the property-bearer of the example and the repeated statement of a criterion of a valid reason by different means of expression are compared. Therefore, in the cited passage Dharmakīrti does not, as v.B. assumes, tell us that the second and third condition of *trairūpya* are (logically) equivalent, but presupposes this.<sup>9</sup>

8.

p. 101: v.B. deals with Dharmakīrti's theorem that the same types of effects cannot result from different kinds of causes, but does not mention the problematic character of this doctrine. In particular, he does not take note of the fact that in the textual passage v.B. cites as elsewhere Dharmakīrti argues in a way as if he commits a "fallacy of scope", namely of deriving from the proposition "It is necessary that every effect has its cause" or "Every effect necessarily has some cause" the (disputable) proposition: "Every effect has its cause necessarily" (= "If some *x* is the effect of *y*, then *y* is necessarily the cause of *x*", or: "If some *F* is the effect of some *G*, then the/any *F* is necessarily the effect of some *G*").

p. 102: v.B.'s translation and interpretation of PVSV 4, 2–3 *tādātmyam hy arhasya tanmātrānurodhiny eva nānyāyatte* is obscure and it is not clear why the author deviates from Steinkellner's shorter and simpler translation which he quotes in footnote 11. For, in contradistinction to Steinkellner's rendering, neither v.B.'s translation nor his explanations make it clear, how the statement made by this sentence relates to PV I.2 c–d *svabhāve bhāvopī bhāvamātrānurodhini*. It obfuscates the fact that Dharmakīrti obviously wants to justify the attribute *bhāvamātrānurodhini* by pointing out that the *tādātmya*-relationship requires that one entity depends for its existence on nothing but the mere existence of another entity, in particular that the (quasi-)relatum which is the "self" = essence of the other entity (e.g., the individual feature of being a tree) must not depend on any causal factor except those which are responsible for the existence of the other relatum (e.g., of the individual feature of being a palm, a tamarind, a *śimśapā* etc.).<sup>10</sup>

10.

p. 108: PV I, 27

*tadbhāvahetubhāvau hi drṣṭānte tadavedinaḥ /  
khyāpyete, viduṣāṃ vācya hetur eva hi kevalaḥ //*

is translated by v.B. thus: "For in the generally accepted fact (*drṣṭānta*), the [reason's being] the essence of the [probandum] or [the reason's] having the [probandum] as [its] cause, are communicated to him who does not know that [i.e., the invariable concomitance]. To those who know [the invariable concomitance], only the bare reason needs to be told".

It is in all probability better to translate the passage as follows: "For in the example the (fact of) being this [very same thing in the form of being its *svabhāva*] [or] the (fact of) being its cause are told to the one who does not know [these facts and only to such persons] because to those who know [this] only the logical reason has to be stated."

According to the latter interpretation there is no disanalogy regarding the grammatical analysis of the expressions *tadbhāva* and *hetubhāva* as assumed by v.B. (namely: *having* the [probandum] as cause vs. *being* the essence of the [probandum]). Moreover, it does not locate the reason for the dispensability or indispensability of the citation of an example in the fact that somebody knows or does not know that invariable concomitance holds good.

Rather the latter interpretation implies that the dispensability of examples depends on whether or not some person knows that one of the two types of *svabhāvapratibandha* is exemplified in some particular case. This difference is theoretically important. The above proposed interpretation is also supported by Dharmakīrti's remarks in his *svavṛtti* on PV I.27.<sup>11</sup>

11.

p. 121: The following passage of Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (PVP), which forms part of the comment on PV II 1. a—b, runs: *mi bslu ba de yañ don yoñs su bcad nas hjug pa na don gyi rañ gi nus pa grub pas ji ltar ḥdod paḥi don de lta buḥi ño boḥi mi slu ba ni yul gyi chos dañ / deḥi de lta bur gyur pa rtogs pa na śes paḥi mi bslu ba ni yul can gyi chos yin no // de gañ la yod pa de ni bslu ba med pa can gyi śes paḥo //* (p. 2a. 5—2b.1, Peking ed. No. 5717).

This has been translated by v.B. as follows: "And further, this trustworthiness — when [on the part of the perceiver] there is activity [directed towards a thing] after the thing has been fully ascertained [by him through means of valid cognition] — being the trustworthiness of [this thing] whose form conforms to [the thing's] desired purpose [i.e., desired and expected by the perceiver] though the establishing [i.e., ascertainment] of the thing's own power [to serve the desired purpose], is a property of the object (*yul*, *viśaya*) [of cognition]. And when there is the cognition that has become [of] such [a form, i.e., of the form] of the [thing], then the trustworthiness of this knowledge is a property of [the valid cognition] related to the object (*yul can*, *viśayin*). This [knowledge] in which the [trustworthiness of the object and the trustworthiness of the cognition] is present, is "knowledge possessing trustworthiness"."

Although this translation does not plainly contradict grammatical rules it contains some problematical features. In particular, the interpretations of the phrases *ji ltar ḥdod paḥi don de lta buḥi ño boḥi mi slu ba ni* as "the trustworthiness of [this thing] whose form conforms to [the thing's] desired purpose" and of *deḥi de lta bur gyur pa rtogs pa na* as "when there is the cognition that has become [of] such [a form, i.e., of the form] of the [thing]" are questionable.

Perhaps it is better to understand the genitive of *ño boḥi* in an explicative sense and to take *deḥi de lta bur gyur pa* as the object of *rtogs* instead of hypostatizing an interpretation implying that the phrase is equivalent to *deḥi de lta bur gyur paḥi* (*rtogs pa*). Thus the above cited passage could be translated as follows:

"And what regards that trustworthiness in its turn, the [property of] being trustworthy, which consists in that the thing is (turns out to be) thus as one wishes<sup>12</sup> on account of the fact that the thing's own (causal) potentiality has been cognized/brought to effect (*sidh*) if one acts after having properly ascertained the thing, is a property of the object (*viśaya*); and the trustworthiness of the cognition [which exists] if one has recognized the [thing]'s being thus is a property of the object-possessor (*viśayin* = cognition). That [entity] where that [property] exists is the cognition which possesses trustworthiness."

Devendrabuddhi's formulation leaves it open whether the property of being trustworthy with respect to cognitions is based on the fact that one has cognized *that* some object possesses trustworthiness in the sense explicated in the preceding sentence or whether the author wants to say that trustworthiness of cognitions occurs if somebody has cognized properties of a thing which *actually* fulfill the criterion of objective trustworthiness laid down by the preceding explanation, i.e., if somebody has such a cognition of a thing that what he thereby holds true of the thing leads him to success in his activities — which would be a more plausible position than the former one. However this may be, if our linguistic analysis of the cited passage is correct, quite a number of obscurities disappear which evolve from v.B.'s translation and interpretation.

12.

pp. 141—147: v.B. interprets PV II 3bd—4ac as if these verses exclusively refer to knowledge gained by statements of an expert and trustworthy authority and not to conceptual knowledge in general. One wonders, why the remarks of these verses could not aim at all kinds of inferential knowledge, and v.B. apparently gives no argument justifying his restrictive readings.

13.

pp. 147—150: Devendrabuddhi's comments on PV II 4d—5b seem to have been incorrectly understood by v.B. so that also the import of the corresponding *Pramāṇavārttika*-verses gets distorted.

(1) PVP, p. 5b. 5—6 *rañ rig pa las ḥhad ma źes bya baḥi śes pa deḥi śes pa yod pa ñid grub pa yin gyis* (correct: *gyi?*) / *ḥhad ma ñid ni ma yin no*, by which Devendrabuddhi explains PV II 4d *svaṛūpasya svato gatiḥ*, is translated as follows:

"Even though by the self-awareness [of the mind's cognition] the cognitive nature (*śes pa yod pa ñid*) of this cognition which is called "means of valid cognition" is established, [still the cognition by the conceptualizing mind] is not a means of valid cognition" (p. 148).

One wonders, why in the present context the commentator should emphasize a contrast between the fact that the cognitive nature is established by self-awareness and the fact that cognition by the conceptualizing mind is not a means of valid cognition. Besides, the circumstance that there should be a change of the grammatical subject which has been left inexplicit as it is presupposed by v. B.'s interpretation appears strange. Moreover, the translation does not make understandable the fact that in the immediately following sentence Devendrabuddhi formulates an objection by a hypothetical opponent pointing out that (the property of) validity (*pramānatva*) being not different from the being/the existence of cognition (*jñānabhāva?*) should be grasped together with the latter.<sup>13</sup> However, all these difficulties can be easily avoided as soon as one interprets the phrase *čhad ma ñid ni ma yin no* as elliptical for *čhad ma ñid ni grub pa ma yin no*. This kind of ellipsis in connection with *yin pa* is very common in (Classical) Tibetan.<sup>14</sup> Accordingly, one should translate the sentence as follows:

"On account of self-awareness the being (of) a cognition of/regarding a/the cognition (called): '*pramāna*' is established, but not [its] nature of [being a] *pramāna*."

It cannot be entirely ruled out that the expression *śes pa yod pa ñid* renders a word of the Sanskrit original intended to mean 'cognitive nature'. It is however important to notice the fact that an alternative interpretation is possible: The expression translated by *śes pa yod pa ñid* has the linguistic meaning of "the existence of a/the cognition" and Devendrabuddhi wants to say something like this: Whenever somebody possesses a cognition, which *actually* is a *pramāna*, self-awareness allows him to know of the mere existence of that cognition, but does not enable him to ascertain *that* the respective cognition is *in fact* a *pramāna*. But it is possible that even the following still further-reaching theorem is implied: Whenever somebody has a thought with the content: '*pramāna*', i.e., if somebody conceives some cognition he presently has as valid, self-awareness allows him to know of the existence of a cognition with such a content, but it is insufficient for the knowledge that the present cognition *actually* is valid. It is therefore possible to take the Tibetan wording strictly literal in order to gather a plausible thought from the passage.

If this is meant by Devendrabuddhi and if this even corresponds to Dharmakīrti's intentions in connection with PV II 4d—5a, it would be an

interesting thought. First of all, it should be noted that if we replaced the notion of validity (*pramānatva*) by the notion of truth that idea would come close to a theorem which, stated in modern terminology, would say that by self-awareness one recognizes that one believes something, but that practice reveals whether or not what one believes is true. It is however important to be aware of the fact that this latter thought *could* be linked up with the theorem that truth *is* success in practice (that being true *is* leading to successful practice), but that this is not necessarily so. It could also be combined with the idea that truth itself is something else, but that success of practice (and only success in practice) *reveals that* a particular belief is true. Analogously, what is said in PV II 4d—5a and in the cited passage of Devendrabuddhi's commentary, would be compatible not only with the position that validity (*prāmānya*) is success in practice but also with the tenet that successful practice is a criterion which allows one to decide whether validity is instantiated in a particular case. This distinction is relevant for the assessment of the thought stated in PV II 5b. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the idea that self-awareness reveals the existence of cognitions/thoughts/beliefs and practice their validity would entail that practice is at best sometimes, but not always the standard of validity, if it were assumed that the instantiations of self-awareness concerned are also valid (cognitions). (This would also hold good if one assumed that self-awareness reveals something like "the proper form of cognitions" etc.). If on the other hand the pertinent cases of self-awareness are refused the status of validity, this would be remarkable for several reasons: First it would raise the question as to the justification of such a restriction. Second it would rule out a possibility of validity which could be ascertained without (further) criteria. Its analogue in the realm of truth would be the denial of self-evident propositions. Thirdly, even if Devendrabuddhi's remarks and the phrase of PV II 4d *svarūpasya svato gatiḥ* primarily refer to non-conceptual cognition, there is no doubt that the topic brought up at this place is *connected* with the issue of the conditions of self-ascriptions of beliefs. But the problem of self-ascriptions is linked up with Dharmakīrti's position regarding the validity — in the sense of *prāmānya* — of those conceptual cognitions which arise on the basis of and subsequent to perceptual cognition. In this way, the entire problem highlights the whole significance of the interconnection in Dharmakīrti's theory between validity (*prāmānya*) and the postulate that something not already grasped before should be grasped. It also underlines the fundamental difference between *prāmānya* and truth. Notwithstanding the existence of certain *analogies* between both notions, it is philosophically utterly reckless to translate *prāmānya* by 'truth' or to

characterize the issues of the initial section of PV II as a "theory of truth". The most one could say is that the questions discussed in PV II vv 1-6 might be of relevance for a theory of truth. That validity as *prāmāṇya* can never be equated with truth follows also from the fact that according to Dharmakīrti anything which is a valid cognition, a *pramāṇa*, must be either an instance of perception or an instance of inference. This implies that truth cannot be sufficient for validity; not any "cognition" the content of which happens to be true is a *pramāṇa*. This status can only be granted to those "true" cognitions which also have the genesis required for this status. There is at best an indirect connection between "validity" and "truth" in the sense that validity involves origination in a way ensuring the truth of what is originated. But even then, the connection would only pertain to a special notion of truth since our concept of truth is not restricted to cognitions or other mental entities. It refers equally — and perhaps even primarily — to objects connected with speech, either to what is said by an utterance, or (depending on the respective theoretical assumptions) to sentence-tokens, sentence-types, speech acts or even abstract entities like propositions, pairs of sentences and circumstances of utterance etc. etc.<sup>15</sup>

(2) Introducing PV II 5b *śāstram mohanivartanam* Devendrabuddhi says the following: *gal te tha sñad kyis čhad ma ñid rtogs pa yin pa dehi čhe bstan bcos don med pa can yin pahi phyir brčam par bya ba ma yin par hgyur ro // don med pa can ma yin te gañ gi phyir. . . .* (PVP, p. 6a, 2-3) This is translated by v.B. in the following way:

If the validity [of the cognition by the mind] is known [only] through activity [based on this cognition and directed towards the cognized particular], then, since a [meaningful scientific] treatise [made of sentences mediating such cognition] is useless [as its validity can only be established after the indicated particular has really been experienced], [such a treatise] should not be composed [at all]. [However, Dharmakīrti says that a scientific treatise] is not useless, because. . . . (p. 149)

v.B. gathers from these remarks that according to Devendrabuddhi it would be natural to object that the statements made in a treatise on *pramāṇa*-theory serve no purpose, "since their validity as *pramāṇa* is proved only afterwards, not immediately". This is the reason, why he adds twice 'only' in square brackets within the above cited translation. The difficulty is not merely that additions are made at all but also the thought conveyed according to v.B.'s interpretation does not appear very convincing: Why should a treatise on *pramāṇa* be useless on account of the fact that whether or not a "cognition" is valid cannot be proven "immediately", but only afterwards"? v.B. gives not further explanation which shows, why one should find this thought plausible. But one should not take too much trouble looking for an

answer. Devendrabuddhi's remark probably has an altogether different import: His point is not that treatises on *pramāṇa* could seem useless because validity cannot be proven immediately, but that the fact that validity of cognitions can be established by other means, namely by (successful) practice, threatens to deprive the establishment of a theory of *pramāṇa* any point. Not uselessness in the sense of inapplicability or impracticability is at stake, but uselessness in the sense of superfluosity. Accordingly, one should translate the above cited passage as follows: "If [somebody objects:] since, as soon as validity is recognized as such by [successful] practice a treatise [on *pramāṇa*] is without any purpose, it turns out that [such a treatise is something which] should not be undertaken, then [we answer:] it is not without any purpose, because. . . ." (The expression *gal te* has been taken as indicating an objection, its scope being the whole sentence till *hgyur ro*. The main import could however be also preserved, if one took *gal te* as correlative with *dehi čhe*, as v.B. does).

It is not improbable that Devendrabuddhi's remarks at this place give a correct explication of Dharmakīrti's intention. Accordingly, the understanding of PV II 5b is also affected. v.B. thinks that both Devendrabuddhi and Dharmakīrti attribute to treatises on *pramāṇa*-theory a mediate purpose: being of verbal nature, such treatises do not reveal the (really existing) objects themselves, but only describe "the useful effects the object is expected to produce". But since a treatise on *pramāṇa*, as a matter of fact, does not give us much concrete information about the causal potentiality and the behaviour of different types of objects, the purpose attributed to these works by Dharmakīrti according to v.B. appears little convincing. However, Dharmakīrti's remark of PV II 5b probably aims at something else: Whether some particular actually instantiates the concept of validity is established by practice, but the theory of *pramāṇa* tells us, among other things, what the concept of validity is. Seen in this way, the author of the PV would not merely offer us a flimsy excuse of a philosopher for the pursuit of his business. Dharmakīrti is surely right in maintaining that the task of giving (correct) explications of concepts is not made superfluous by the fact that whether the concepts are instantiated in particular cases is recognized by something else. An explication of the concept of *prāmāṇya* can be credited its proper purpose, since a) the fact that whether something actually is a *pramāṇa* has to be established by practice does not make the correctness of some particular explication trivially obvious and b) the doctrine that instantiations of validity are recognized as such by practice is itself a theorem of *pramāṇa*-theory and cannot be taken as granted independently of any theoretical considerations. For these reasons, there prob-

ably is much more in Dharmakīrti's position than what v.B.'s remarks on PV II 5b allow us to gather. In order to be fair, however, one has to add that the same holds good of Dharmakīrti's own remark *śāstram mohanivartanam* = "A treatise (on *pramāna*) [serves to] dispel error", which is very inexplicit and leaves, by itself, (too) much room for interpretation.

14.

p. 162: In the phrase PVP p. 7b.7 *gañ gi che skye ba yin pa dehi che yul dan dus dan ran bzin gyi nes par mi run bahi phyr de ni glo bur bar rigs pa ma yin no zes don gyis* v.B. hypostatizes a narrow scope for the negation in *ma yin no*, translating: "When [this higher knowledge of the Buddha] comes into being, then — since it is not correct that [this higher knowledge] is limited . . . to [some particular] place, time and nature . . . [but developed over many lives] — this [knowledge] is not suitable for being [regarded as merely] incidental . . .". This assumption probably distorts the structure of thoughts expressed in the passage of PVP 7b. 6—7, which, if one assumed a wide scope for the negation embracing the whole sentence cited above, could be reconstructed as follows: The higher knowledge of the/a Buddha arises piecemeal and is not from the start determined with respect to its nature. In order [to show] that it is not correct to regard this knowledge as merely incidental (*ākasmika*) on account of the fact that it is not determined with respect to place, time and nature at the time it begins to arise, [Dharmakīrti] shows its cause [in PV II 7 cd, thereby implying that it is caused].

### III

Though some of the above mentioned divergences are rooted in apparently minor details they are all of importance for the interpretation of larger textual units discussed in v.B.'s book. A number of them might even possess relevance for the understanding and evaluation of the logical and epistemological doctrines involved and for the picture of the historical development preceding Dharmakīrti. Therefore the lucidity and carefulness of v.B.'s investigation should not deter the reader from evaluating the results carefully. But in view of the difficulties and intricacies of the texts and problems involved this is only natural and does not decrease the great value of the book.

Since v.B. attaches no little importance to Devendrabuddhi's commentary for the interpretation of Dharmakīrti's work and frequently quotes from the

PVP, it might have been worthwhile to add a critical edition — and perhaps even a translation — of the whole section pertaining to PV II 1—7.

### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> According to the edition of P. Sāstri/H. Sukla 1983 = p. 13, 1—6 in the edition of G. Jhā 1939 = pp. 197, 20—198,2 in the edition of A. Thakur 1967.

<sup>2</sup> Since one and the same visual experience could actually give rise to different judgments based on this experience, some of them being true and some false, the status of being a veridical perception would become relativized. On the other hand, tendency of producing correct or incorrect judgments is rather a matter of degree than something on which a strict dichotomy could be based. Moreover, there should be hardly any experience which is not able to form as a basis of wrong judgments. — Even if there is no defect in one's sense faculties the perception of the moon could cause the wrong judgment that an electrical light is in front of oneself and even a long series of non-defective perceptions of the moon could induce the false belief that there is a divine celestial eye in the sky etc. etc.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. in this connection also the footnotes on p. 20 and 22 in the translation of the NS and the NBh of G. Jhā (1939).

<sup>4</sup> There is no need to question the position of the *danda* behind the expression *grhīte 'pi ca śabdārthasambandhe asyārthasyāyam śabdo nāmadheyam iti*. It is not clear, however, whether the *locativus absolutus* is meant to convey that the connection between word and object has been grasped = is established in the linguistic community or whether it should express that the perceiving person has formerly already grasped = learned the relevant connection or whether it is intended to refer to the fact that the perceiving subject has realized the connection between word and object in the situation without employing it for describing his own perceptual state.

<sup>5</sup> NBh 197, 20 (Thakur) *yāvadartham vai nāmadheyaśabdās tair arthasampratyayah, arthasampratyayāc ca vyavahārah / tairdam indriyārthasannikarṣād utpannam arthajñānam rūpam iti vā, rasa (G. Jhā: rasah) ity evam vā bhavati, rūparasaśabdāś ca viṣayanāmadheyam / tena vyapadiśyate jñānam rūpam iti jānīte, rasa iti jānīte / nāmadheyaśabdena vyapadiśyamānam sat śābdam (G. Jhā: sacchābdam) prasajyate / ata āha avyapadeśyam iti / yad idam anupayukte śabdārthasambandhe arthajñānam, na tat (G. Jhā: tan) nāmadheyaśabdena vyapadiśyate, grhīte 'pi ca śabdārthasambandhe asyārthasyāyam (G. Jhā: -e'syā-) śabdo nāmadheyam iti / yadā tu so 'rtho grhyate, tadā tatpūrvasmād arthajñānāt na (G. Jhā: tat pūrvasmād arthajñānāt na) viśisyate, tat (G. Jhā: tad) arthavijñānam tādy eva bhavati / tasya tv arthajñānasānyāḥ samākhyāśabdo nāsti (G. Jhā: nāstīti), yena pratīyamānam vyavahārāya kalpeta / na cāpratīyamānena vyavahārah / tasmā jñeyasyārthasya samjñāśabdenetikarāṇayuktēna nirdiśyate rūpam iti jñānam, rasa iti vā jñānam iti / tad evam arthajñānakāle (G. Jhā: arthabhānakāle) sa na samākhyāśabdo vyāpriyate, vyavahārakāle tu vyāpriyate / tasmād aśābdam arthajñānam indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam iti //*

<sup>6</sup> The formulation of the *sūtra* does not betray whether these expressions have the function to put further restrictions on the realm of objects singled out by the expression *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam* or whether they are meant to give additional information about the entities belonging to the realm in question. The possibility that the terms were not originally intended in a restrictive sense cannot be ruled out entirely. If e.g., the hypothesis that the *sūtra* formerly did not contain these words were correct, they could go back to remarks in an older commentary from which they crept into the *sūtra*. These remarks might have been meant to give further details regarding that kind of knowledge which most immediately results from the contact of sense-organ and objects.

<sup>7</sup> It is true that in the latter case the preceding *sūtra* 1.1.3 should at best give a necessary



and not a necessary and sufficient condition of being a *pramāna* and thus lose the status of a definition in the strict sense. However, there is no warrant that NS 1.1.3 was meant in such a sense from the very beginning and the possibility that formerly not all perceptions were regarded as veridical cannot be ruled out. It is obvious that this difference between a narrow and a broader conception of perception affects the indispensability of the words *avyapadeśyam*, *avyabhicāri*, *vyavasāyatmakam* and the probability of their constituting the original core of the *sūtra*.

<sup>8</sup> In view of the phrase *sādhye pratisandhāya dharmam udāharane ca pratisandhāya tasya sādhanatāvacaṇam hetuḥ* one should probably interpret the expression *prajñāpanam* within the preceding phrase in the sense of "that which makes known" or "that by which . . . is made known", thus being able to refer to a linguistic utterance, and not in the sense of "that which shows = proves" as taken by v.B.

<sup>9</sup> Besides the circumstance that v.B.'s interpretation does not fit the context, his presupposed syntactical analysis of the above cited phrase is improbable for the following reasons: 1. the use of *-vat* = "(be) like" would be quite improper, if it should carry the burden of conveying the concept of logical equivalence, 2. the use of the concessive clause expressed by *siddhe 'pi vijātiyavyatireke* would be less smooth than in the alternative interpretation, since one would have to regard it as depending on a constituent within the compound *'satrvavacanavat*, requiring an analysis like "like the statement of . . . [which is made] although . . .", 3. the use of *vacana* would be less appropriate if the sentence should express the equivalence between the second and third condition, since the word suggests that a comparison is made with some act of stating whereas in reality the comparison would pertain to stated propositions. 4. the relevant thought could have been expressed differently and not less economically but much less ambiguously (e.g., *sajātiya eva sattvam iti sādhyābhāve 'satrvam itivat siddhe 'pi vijātiyavyatireke yad uktam*).

<sup>10</sup> v.B.'s translation of the cited phrase of PVSV 4, 2–3 runs: "For the fact that an object possesses the essence of the [other object belonging to the same class] is [possible] only in [an object] conforming to being solely [i.e., in the fullest measure] the [class of similar objects], not in [an object that is] dependent upon another [object or class of objects for its being]". It remains unclear, on what grounds the author assumes that *tādātmya* consists in that *different* objects belonging to one and the same class possess one and the same essence. Neither the individual features of something's being a *śimśapā* and of being a tree nor the corresponding universals belong to the same class. Rather they are considered by Dharmakīrti either as being essentially identical since they constitute merely different aspects of numerically one particular or (in the case of universals) as being essentially not different because they are not constituents of ultimate reality and cannot represent different entities on that level.

<sup>11</sup> PVSV 17, 20 *dr̥ṣṭānte hi sādhyadharmasya tadbhāvas tanmātrānubandhena tatsvabhāvātayā khyāpyate* corroborates the interpretation of *tadbhāva* as a nominal transform of a "deep-structure"-sentence, where *sādhyadharmā*, not *hetu* is the subject, namely "(that) the property to be proven is the essence of the *probans*" and not "(that) the *probans*/the reason is the essence of the property to be proven/the *probandum*". — The interpretation, according to which *sādhyadharmasya tadbhāvas* were equivalent to *sādhyadharmasya tatsvabhāvabhāvas* and the component *tatsvabhāva* were taken as a *bahuvrīhi* so that the expression would be equivalent to "that the property to be proven has the essence of that — the *probans*" would require the assumption that the author of the PVSV expressed his thoughts in a "pragmatically" inadequate manner, since he, as it seems without necessity, chose an expression which in its most natural reading suggests something else than what it was meant to say.

The analysis of *tad-* in *tadavedināḥ* as referring to *tadbhāvetubhāvau* and not as a

substitute for "invariable concomitance" is supported by PVSV 18, 9 *yeśāṃ punaḥ prasi-  
dhāv eva tadbhāvetubhāvau teṣāṃ / viduṣāṃ vācyo hetur eva hi kevalaḥ* which betrays  
that the object of the relevant knowledge is *tadbhāvetubhāvau*, which in its turn suggests  
that the relevant knowledge which the "non-knowers" lack is the fact that one of the two  
types of *svabhāvapratibandha* is instantiated.

or more literally: ". . . the being trustworthy/not deceptive [which is the property of] the  
things having such a nature as it is wished . . ."

PVP 5b.6 *gal te śes pa yod pa ñid la tha dad pa med paḥi phyir éhad ma ñid kyañi gzuñ  
ñid yin no ze na /*

(It is moreover indicated by the particle *ni*, which has here the same function as contrastive stress in English.

The concept of truth resulting from an implicative connection between *prāmānya* and truth would be very special, if not unusual, also because of the fact that in Dharmakīrti's theory one of the *pramānas*, namely perception, is declared to be non-conceptual. Thus an implicative junction of *prāmānya* with truth possesses the consequence that truth has to be conceived as also applying to cognition of allegedly non-conceptual and non-judgmental nature.

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misprints to be corrected: p. 1, 1.10: read *-pratyekabuddhās*; p. 11, 1.10: read *-svakārthaḥ*; p. 15, 1.13: read *-dharmakṣānty-*; p. 23, n. a: read all other MSS.; p. 41, verse 26c: read *kalpanāvātām*; p. 67, verse 51d: read *arthu*.

In verse 30c Cüppers reads *na kleśa dhyāyī na ca asti manyanā* because of the parallels in 29c and 31c: *na kāyasākṣisya ca asti manyanā; na satyadarśisya ca kāci manyanā*. However, a gen. *dhyāyī* is not attested anywhere else. Both 29c and 31c have only one negation. It seems preferable to read *dhyāyina* gen. pl.

In verse 55a the Gilgit text has: *thā nācarante sugatāna śikṣām*. Cüppers proposes to correct *thā* to *tām* which is found in the Nepalese manuscripts. However, it is difficult to make *tām* refer to *śikṣām*.

Appendix A comprises an edition and translation of the Tibetan version of Mañjuśrīkīrti's commentary Kīrtimālā. On p. 114 the Tibetan text has: *no tsha śes pa dañ ldan pa źes bya ba ni bdag dañ gźan gyi dbaṅ du byas nas sdig pa'i las mi byed pa'o*. Cüppers' translation of *bdag dañ gźan gyi dbaṅ du byas nas* is rather far-fetched: "both by a mechanism of self-control (*attādhipateyya*) (his own conscience) and by the pressure of others (*lokādhipateyya*)."  
*Dbaṅ-du byas* probably translates *adhikṛtya* "with reference to", cf. Akira Hirakawa (ed.), *Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Part three (Tokyo, 1978), p. 186.

I have noted a number of misprints: P. XI: read Lamotte, E. *La concentration de la marche heroïque; L'enseignement de Vimalakīrti*; p. XIV: read Matsunami; p. 42, verse 26a: read *med de*; p. 46, verse 29d: read *sparis*; p. 48, verse 32d: read *bsnal* p. 94, note 5: read *samskr̥tas*.

The remarks made above concern only minor matters. One cannot but admire the care with which Cüppers has studied the Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese texts. His work is exemplary and it is to be hoped that the other chapters of the *Samādhiraśasūtra* will be edited and translated in the same way.

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Raghunath Pandeya (ed. and tr.), *The Madhyamakāśāstram of Nāgārjuna* with the commentaries Akutobhayā by Nāgārjuna, Madhyamakavṛtti by Buddhapālita, Prajñāpradīpavṛtti by Bhāvaviveka, Prasannapadāvṛtti by Candrakīrti critically reconstructed. Two volumes. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1988—1989, XXX, 272 pp. and reproduction of the Peking edition of the

Tibetan translations of the Akutobhayā, Madhyamakavṛtti and Prajñāpradīpavṛtti; XII, 297 pp. Rs 325 and 300. ISBN 81-208-05554-2 and 81-208-05555-0. Set ISBN 81-208-05553-4.

According to the preface this work is an attempt to reconstruct the lost original Sanskrit from the extant classical Tibetan versions. Pandeya seems to believe that it is possible to reconstruct from the Tibetan translation the original Sanskrit text. It is easy to see that Pandeya has not been able to reconstruct the original text if one compares his reconstruction of a passage of Bhāvaviveka's commentary with the original text as quoted by Candrakīrti (ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, pp. 7.6—8.1). The passage is as follows:

*ṽipsārthavāt pratyupasargasya, eteḥ prāptyarthavāt, samutpādaśabdasya ca sambhavārthavāt, tāms tān pratyayān pratītya samutpādaḥ prāpya sambhava ity eke. prati prati vināśinām utpādaḥ pratīyasamutpāda ity anye.* In the Peking edition the Tibetan translation of Bhāvaviveka's commentary renders this passage as follows: *kha-cig na-re rten-ciñ źes bya-ba'i tshig-gi phrad ni zlos-pa'i don yin-pa'i phyir dañ / 'brel-par źes bya-ba ni phrad-pa'i don yin-pa'i phyir dañ / 'byuñ-ba źes bya-ba'i sgra ni skye-ba'i don yin-pa'i phyir rten-ciñ 'brel-par 'byuñ-ste / de-dañ-de la rten-ciñ phrad-nas 'byuñ-ba'o źe'o // gźan-dag na-re so-so 'jigs-pa dañ-ldan-pa rnam-skyi 'byuñ-ba ni rten-ciñ 'byuñ-ba'o źe'o //*. According to this translation the Sanskrit text omitted the words *pratyayān* and *samutpādaḥ*. Pandeya's reconstructed text has:

*ṽipsārthakatvāt sam iti prāptyarthakatvāt, utpāda iti śabdah prādurbhāvārthakatvāt / pratītyasa mutpādam tadetaḍ atra pratītya prāpya samutpādam iti / anyaiḥ prati-prati vināśiyuktānām utpādaḥ pratīyasamutpādam ity uktam* (p. 6.8—9). Although Pandeya edited Candrakīrti's commentary he seems not have noticed that in it Bhāvaviveka's commentary was quoted although this is made abundantly clear in the notes of La Vallée Poussin's edition.

Pandeya's reconstructions are written in very strange Sanskrit. For instance, the first verse of the Akutobhayā is: *gañ-gis skye dañ 'jig-pa dag / 'di-yi tshul-gyis rab-sparis-pa // rten-ciñ 'byuñ-ba gsuñs-pa yi / thub-dbañ de-la phyag-'tshal-lo //*. Walleser translates this verse as follows: "Der Entstehen und Vergehen aus diese Weise aufgegeben und den pratītya-samutpāda (das abhängige Entstehen) verkündet hat, ihn, den Herrscher der Weisen (munīndra), verehere ich!" Pandeya renders this verse in the following way: *yenoṭpādabhaṅgapratītyasamutpādadeśitaḥ / vṛtenānena prahānam munīndrāya tasmai namaḥ!*

Even the most simple constructions are completely misinterpreted. Let us mention one example: *bdag-tu lta-ba de dañ / de rnam-par bzlog-pa'i phyir*

is rendered as *ātmadr̥ṣṭis tadvinivṛttaye* instead of *tattadātmadr̥ṣṭivivivṛttaye*, cf. Walleser: "um . . . sie von allen möglichen Ansichten eines Selbstes zu befreien" (p. 1).

The edition of the Prasannapadā is probably based on that of La Vallée Poussin without taking into consideration corrections published in recent studies. However, Pandeya has not been able to copy correctly La Vallée Poussin's edition, and even omits whole passages. For instance, one finds in Pandeya's edition on p. 8.14 the following passage: *kiṃ kāraṇam yohi prāptiyartham kiṃ tarhi pratim prāptiyartham samudūtam ca pratīyaśabdam prāptāv eva varṇayati*. Pandeya omits an entire passage between *prāptiyartham* and *kiṃ tarhi: pratīyaśabdam vyācaṣṭe nāsau pratim vīpsārtham vyācaṣṭe / nāpy etim prāptiyartham*, cf. La Vallée Poussin's edition, p. 8.2—3.

The only usefulness of Pandeya's work is probably in making it clear that this is not the way to proceed. It is to be hoped that Indian scholars will give up the notion that it is possible to reconstruct from Tibetan translations the original Sanskrit text. This is impossible even for scholars who have a much better knowledge of Sanskrit and Tibetan than Pandeya. It is at most possible to suggest a Sanskrit original technical term when translating a Tibetan text. Tibetan texts can be translated into Sanskrit as well as into other languages as long as one does not pretend to reconstruct the lost original text.

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Florin Giripescu Sutton, *Existence and Enlightenment in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra. A Study in the Ontology and Epistemology of the Yogācāra School of Mahāyāna Buddhism*. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1991. xix, 371 pp. Paper \$19.95 ISBN 0-7914-0172-3—ISBN 0-7914-0173-1 (pbk.)

According to the author his work is "an attempt mainly to clarify and systematize the Laṅkāvatāra world of ideas, which, after half a century of virtual neglect following Suzuki's brilliant studies, now require reevaluation in the light of modern scholarship" (p. 35). Sutton remarks: "I selected only those essential concepts which define the distinct contribution of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra to the development of Yogācāra thought — concepts which Suzuki has either insufficiently treated (such as Tathāgatagarbha), or insufficiently understood (such as Citta-mātra, or Vijñapti-mātra, which he

mistakenly interprets as expressing the rejection of the external, objective world as an illusion produced by the mind: *lokaṃ vijñaptimātram*") (p. 20). In his preface the author writes that, in order to reach the core of Yogācāra thought, he has made use of the following methodological approaches, either individually, or in various combinations, as the topic required: the text-critical (philological), the Buddhist-hermeneutical (philosophical), the historical, the psychological, and the sociological methods (cf. p. xviii). One would hesitate to write a review of such a wide-ranging work if the author had not pointed out the primarily linguistic orientation of his investigation into Yogācāra thought (p. 24). According to him the role of the religious scholar is (or should be) strictly limited to the interpretation of the text in the light of his linguistic, historical and philosophical expertise (cf. p. 25).

The author translates many extracts from the Laṅkāvatārasūtra so that it is easy to form an opinion about his linguistic expertise. Let me just quote a few examples of his translations. P. 10: "Words are tied to discrimination [for imagination, *vikalpa*] and are the vehicle of transmigration. Moreover, Mahāmati, meaning is attained from the accumulation of much learning" (*ṛutam vikalpasambaddham saṃsārāvāhakam / arthaś ca mahāmate bahūśrutānām sakāśāl labhyate*). P. 44 "subject [grasping, *grāhya*] and object [grasped, *grāha*!"]". The text has *grāhaka* and not *grāha*! P. 157: "Mahāmati, the Tathāgata is neither permanent nor impermanent. Why? For this reason, namely because of the wrong attachment to either" (*na mahāmate tathāgato nityo nānityaḥ / tat kasya hetor yud utobhayadosaprasaṅgāt*). P. 55: "Clear primary substance (or fundamental form, *prakṛti*)" (*prakṛtiprabhāsvara*). P. 158: "The holding of the immature onto [the duality of] permanence and impermanence, Mahāmati, comes from the abiding in the mode of cognition based upon disjunctive alternatives (*vikalpabuddhi*), and not from the abiding in the understanding based on the views derived from solitary [meditation, *vivikta-buddhi*]" (*vikalpabuddhikṣayāt mahāmate nityānityagrāho nivāryate bālānām na tu viviktadr̥ṣṭibuddhikṣayāt* — Sutton reads — *kṣayāt!*). It is obvious that Sutton does not know the meanings of *āvāhaka*, *bahūśruta*, *grāhya*, *grāhaka*, *prakṛtiprabhāsvara* and *kṣaya*.

In places in which the text in Nanjio's edition is clearly wrong, Sutton's translation becomes even worse. In Nanjio's edition the text of verse 138 (pp. 76—77) is as follows: *ākāśam atha nirvāṇam nirodham dvayam eva ca / bālā kalpenty akṛtakān āryā nāstyastivarjītāḥ //* One must read *nirodhudvayam*. Cf. Tib.: *mya-nan-'das dan nam-mkha' dan / 'gog-pa gñis-po ñid kyan ni /*. Sutton translates this verse as follows: "Space, and likewise Nirvāṇa [i.e., the gradual extinction of pain], Nirodha [i.e., the sudden cessation], and even

the duality [i.e., of Parinirvāna and Saṃsāra, see above] — (these) the immature imagine as *not* being produced by causation, and *not* as being free from (both) being and non-being” (p. 161). It is interesting to compare Suzuki’s translation of this verse which is correct apart from his rendering of *akṛtaka*: “Space, Nirvana, and the two forms of cessation — thus the ignorant discriminate the things which are not effect-producing but the wise stand above being and non-being” (p. 68). Sutton does not seem to have paid enough attention to Suzuki’s translation. It is full of imperfections but Suzuki had the advantage of being able to read the Chinese translation and to know that there are two *nirodhas*, the *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* and the *aprasaṃkhyānirodha*.

The author is not only sadly lacking in knowledge of Sanskrit but he is also unable to present correctly the opinions of other scholars. On p. 15 he states that Takasaki seems to have changed his opinion about the date of the compilation of the *Laṅkāvatāra*. According to Sutton Takasaki affirmed on two different occasions that the *Sūtra* was compiled after Vasubandhu. However, Takasaki wrote in 1966: “That is why the *Laṅkāvatāra* is regarded by modern scholars as a work produced after Vasubandhu.” In 1982 he remarked: “the *Laṅkāvatāra* is sometimes regarded as of a date later than Vasubandhu.” Completely erroneous also is the information given on p. 2 where Sutton writes that the first translators of the text taught the *Tripiṭaka*, the southern (Theravāda / Hīnayāna) canon, because they had the title of Teacher of the *Tripiṭaka*. On p. 8 Sutton mentions a Sanskrit version of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* issued by the Buddhist Texts Publishing Society and refers to p. 9 of Nanjio’s edition where Nanjio mentions “a free rendition of the *Sutra*” by Shoshi Mitsui.

Sutton writes that the *Laṅkāvatāra* has been virtually neglected in the last fifty years. He seems to be completely unaware of the work done by Japanese scholars. In 1976 Kōsai Yasui published a new translation and in 1980 Takasaki published a detailed exegesis of many sections of the text in the well-known series *Butten kōza* under the title *Ryōgakyō*. In his bibliography (pp. 22–27) he lists a great number of articles written by Japanese scholars.

The *Laṅkāvatāra* is a difficult text and Nanjio’s edition is far from satisfactory. In 1981 Takasaki published a revised edition of the *Kṣaṇika-parivarta* based upon seventeen manuscripts, the three Chinese translations and the Tibetan translation. It is to be hoped that Takasaki will publish a revised edition of the entire text. In the meantime it is impossible to read the text without consulting at least the Tibetan translation which, in many places, makes it possible to arrive at better readings.

One wonders how it is possible that no competent scholar seems to have read the manuscript of Sutton’s book which ought never to have been published.

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Tadeusz Skorupski (ed.), *Buddhist Heritage* (Buddhica Britannica. Series continua 1). Tring, U.K., The Institute of Buddhist Studies, 1989. XIII, 276 pp. £20

According to the introduction the articles in this volume represent the papers, with a few exceptions, that were originally delivered at a symposium entitled *The Buddhist Heritage* which was convened in November 1985 at the School of Oriental and African Studies. Some papers were probably read only in part, as for instance, Dr. J. K. Locke’s long article on Newar Buddhism: The Unique Features of Newar Buddhism (pp. 71–116) which gives a detailed survey of contemporary Newar Buddhism and its history. This article ought to have been divided into different sections with separate headings as has been done by K. R. Norman in his article: The Pāli Language and Scriptures (pp. 29–53) which in a very lucid way deals with the following topics: The early councils; The bhānaka system; The early language(s) of the Theravādins; The influence of Sanskrit; The writing down of the canon; The language of the Theravādin canon; The later history of the canon in Ceylon; The Theravādin tradition in Southeast Asia; The influence of the grammarians; The later councils; The ‘Pāli’ language; The development of Western scholarship; Variations in the Theravādin tradition; Non-Theravādin traditions; Theravādin and Non-Theravādin traditions; Pāli studies in Europe.

It is difficult to single out articles, in this volume but one must certainly mention the following ones which will be read with profit by interested readers: H. Bechert, Aspects of Theravāda Buddhism in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia (pp. 19–27) which deals with the legitimization of political power by religious authority and the relation between the ‘great’ and ‘little’ traditions in Theravāda Buddhism; E. Zürcher, The Impact of Buddhism on Chinese culture in an Historical Perspective (pp. 117–128) and D. Seyfort Ruegg, The Buddhist Notion of an ‘Immanent Absolute’ (tathāgarbha) as a Problem in Hermeneutics (pp. 229–246). Seyfort Ruegg explains how the Buddhists have developed hermeneutical techniques with regard to the Buddha-nature or tathāgarbha teachings. The reader will find much interest-

ing information in the remaining articles of which we can only mention the titles: D. L. Snellgrove, Multiple Features of the Buddhist Heritage (p. 7—17); A. H. Christie, Buddhism in Southeast Asia: An Anecdotal Survey (pp. 55—69); R. Whitfield, Buddhist Monuments in China and Some Recent Finds (pp. 129—141); L. R. Lancaster, The Rock Cut Canon in China: New Findings at Fang-shan (pp. 143—156) [See also Li Jung-hsi, 'The Stone Scriptures of Fangshan', *The Eastern Buddhist*, N.S. vol. XII, 1 (1979), pp. 104—113]; Hee-Sung Keel, Word and Wordlessness: The Spirit of Korean Buddhism (pp. 179—191); T. Kubo, Contemporary Lay Buddhist Movements in Japan: A Comparison between the Reiyūkai and the Sōka Gakkō (pp. 193—218); A. Piatigorsky, Buddhism in Tuva: Preliminary Observations on Religious Syncretism (pp. 219—228); Russell Webb, Contemporary European Scholarship on Buddhism (pp. 247—276).

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Chapter XII of the *Catuhśataka* refutes heretical views (*dr̥ṣṭi*) and chapter XIII sense-organs and their objects (*indriyārtha*). Parts of the Sanskrit text of Candrakīrti's commentary have been preserved and the entire commentary was translated into Tibetan by Sūkṣmajñāna and Pa tshab Ni ma grags (1054—?). Dharmapāla's commentary exists only in a Chinese translation by Xuan zang. It deals only with the last eight chapters of the *Catuhśataka*.

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Tillemans also points to the use and value of indigenous Tibetan materials in interpreting the *Catuhśataka*, the *Catuhśatakavṛtti* and other Indian Buddhist texts. Tillemans makes some very useful remarks. It has become a tendency with some scholars to concentrate entirely on Tibetan materials to the neglect of Indian texts even when Sanskrit originals are available. Tillemans clearly points out the drawbacks and advantages of Tibetan commentaries and works. It is certainly useful to consult them carefully but only after having studied the Indian materials available both in the original Sanskrit and in Tibetan translation.

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literature for the study of Buddhism in Central Asia: "... diese Literatur in vieler Hinsicht durchaus eigenständige Wege geht und von ihren Vorbildern in nicht-türkischen buddhistischen Literatursprachen abweicht. Dazu kommt, dass gerade im Uigurischen Reste von Texten erhalten sind, die im sonstigen buddhistischen Bereich nicht überliefert oder verschollen sind ..."

Gerhard Ehlers edits and translates one leaf belonging to the introduction to the Altun Yarok which briefly mentions stories of bodhisattvas who have sacrificed themselves in order to obtain the summary of the doctrine in one śloka (*bir ślok nom*). The fourth story refers to the bodhisattva Sūryamānava, a name which has not yet been found elsewhere.

Jens Peter Laut and Peter Zieme publish the text of an original composition written in praise of the Bāg of Kočo and his spouse. The text comprises a number of alliterative verses in Old Turkish and Sanskrit. The Sanskrit verses are written in brāhmī script. The text relates how in the past King Reṇu and queen Prabhāvātī received the prediction of future Buddhahood for having regaled the Buddha Kṣemaṅkara together with the saṃgha and expresses the wish that in the future, when the Buddha Maitreya appears, the Bāg and his wife will receive likewise the prediction of future Buddhahood. In line 5 *janapadi* represents probably *janapati* not *janapadi*. In line 18 *janapadicāri* is explained as being skt. *janapadicārin*. More likely it is *janapaticari*, see Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary* s.v. *cārī*. Laut and Zieme explain that this text belongs to a group of texts dating from the 13th and 14th centuries which were found in the Dunhuang caves 181 and 182.

In his article on the foundation legend of Khotan Alexander L. Mayer studies the versions of this legend in Chinese and Tibetan sources and the history of the interpretation of this legend since Stanislas Julien's translation of Xuanzang's biography (Paris, 1853). Mayer shows that the translators of the biography have not seen that it quotes the *Xi-yu-ji* (T. 2087) although with omissions. This has given rise to the supposition that the biography contained a different version of the foundation legend. Mayer translates the corresponding passage of the Old Turkish version of the biography. The Old Turkish translator added supplementary information from the *Xi-yu-ji*. Mayer's article is an important contribution to the study of the interrelations of the different versions of the foundation legend of Khotan. Extremely useful is the detailed bibliographical information on the history of the interpretation of the legend. On p. 44, note 18 the reference to p. 1 has to be changed to p. 167. John Strong's *The Legend of King Aśoka* is not a translation of the *A-yu-wang-zhuan* but of the Sanskrit version of the Aśoka legend in the *Divyāvadāna* (cf. *IJ* 29, pp. 70–73). Mayer's trans-

lation of *sui zhi cheng-li* is incorrect: "Worauf er heranreifte und auf den Thron gesetzt wurde" (p. 58). The text says: "Thereupon he arrived at manhood", cf. Mizutani's translation which Mayer calls "die beste kommentierte Übersetzung": *yagate seijin-suru made ni natte* (p. 395) and Menšikov's translation: *i tak [on] vyros* (Tuguševa, p. 130). Mayer refers to Mizutani and other Japanese scholars by their first names (cf. p. 63).

Klaus Röhrborn examines the errors made in the Old Turkish translation of Xuanzang's biography and points out that previous translators of the Old Turkish version were too much influenced by the text of the Chinese original. According to Röhrborn Kumārajīva and other early translators greatly abridged the original texts. However, Kumārajīva's translations are much freer than later one by Xuanzang but certainly not greatly abridged. Röhrborn refers to Arlotto (p. 68, n. 7) without explaining that the reference is to A. T. Arlotto, *The Uighur Text of Hsüan Tsang's Biography* (unpublished dissertation Harvard University, 1966). On p. 72 he refers to the edition of Xuanzang's biography by Utsunomiya and Haneda which I have been unable to consult (cf. E. Denison Ross, *JRAS*, 1934, p. 422; *Bibliographie bouddhique* VI, nr. 79).

Peter Zieme's article also deals with Xuanzang's biography and, like Mayer, he points out that the translator of the Old Turkish version made use of the *Xi-yu-ji*. Zieme publishes a series of fragments of the third and second books of the biography. On p. 81 he discusses the original Sanskrit *ji-liang* which Li-Yung-hsi (Peking, 1959) reconstructed as *Samuccaya-pramāna*. It is of course Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* which is always rendered in Chinese by *ji-liang*, cf. *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, etc. by Ji-Tsing. Translated by J. Takakusu (Oxford, 1986, p. 187) where it is mentioned as the eighth work of Jina (i.e. Dignāga). According to Zieme Old-Turkish *viyakiyan* derives from *vyākhyāna* and not from *vyākaraṇa* (p. 82). The translator must have confounded *vyākaraṇa* and *vyākhyāna* because the Chinese text clearly mentions a *vyākaraṇaśāstra*.

It is to be hoped that all fragments of the Old Turkish version of the biography of Xuanzang will be published and translated accompanied by a new translation of the corresponding passages in the Chinese original. The existing translations by Stanislas Julien (1853), Samuel Beal (1888) and Li Yung-hsi (1959) are all incomplete and not free from errors.

All five articles in this volume are important not only for Old Turkish studies but also for the study of Buddhist literature in Central Asia. We must be grateful to Jens Peter Laut and Klaus Röhrborn for having carefully edited this interesting book.

Hans Roth in Zusammenarbeit mit Veronika Ronge, *Katalog der tibetischen und mongolischen Sachkultur in europäischen Museen und Privatsammlungen*. Lieferung 1. Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz, 1989. 76 Seiten, 24 Klapptafeln, 5 Trennblätter. DM 212,—.

The purpose of the catalogue is the description of the traditional material culture of the Tibetans and Mongolians in European museums and private collections. This first fascicle comprises an introduction and an explanation in German and in English of the structure and system of the catalogue. In the English version some chapters of the introduction are slightly abridged.

Since 1972 Hans Roth has visited more than 200 museums of which 80 contained relevant items. All items have been photographed. In the West German museums all the relevant objects were classified. On average 90% of the museum collections outside West Germany were catalogued. All the objects were re-measured and the entire data available in the inventory books, museum records, in correspondence and on museum files were transferred to punch cards.

Hans Roth has developed a special classification system which consists of twenty categories, which are subdivided into Types. The allocation of the objects to one of the twenty categories is based on one of the two following criteria: 1. Primary function or application; 2. Close relationship to another object or group of objects. As to the concept of type Hans Roth quotes as an example the Type Conch shell trumpet (12.20). It is allocated to the twelfth category, Musical Instruments. Hans Roth explains that for this type no ideal example can be given. Instead, what is described in the 'Type' Conch shell trumpet is a series of wind instruments which share the feature of having a conch as resonator or are shaped like a conch and made of metal or clay. If the same conches — without a special polished mouth-piece — and used as offering bowls, they are listed together with similar items in the 'Type' Offering Bowl with the Category 4 Receptacles.

The objects are described on foldouts. On the title page of the foldouts the category is given at the top, the type being in the middle. Within a category each foldout, i.e. each type, is numbered. If a type covers more than one foldout, Roman numerals are added to the number of the foldout. The description of the objects is divided into four sections: I. Description of the object; II. Explanation of the operation and application. How used and with which other items; III. Function and use; IV. Data available in the collections for the objects illustrated. Listing of similar items in other collections and which are not illustrated.

The first fascicle comprises 24 foldouts. To give a few examples: 2

category number) Geräte für Landwirtschaft and Tierhaltung, 6 (type number) Sichel; 4 Gefässe / Küchen- und Essgeräte/Nahrung, 6 Räucheropfer; 4 idem, 7 Räucherbecken I; 4 idem, 23 Bronzekann I; 4. idem, 26 Plattflasche I; 4 idem, 26 Plattflasche II. For all objects the names in Tibetan and Mongolian are listed as well as the corresponding English term. For instance, Sichel; T zor-ba; M quduyur; E sickle.

The scope of this work is truly amazing and one cannot but admire the energy and skill with which it has been planned and executed. According to a leaflet distributed by the publisher, about one fascicle will be published each year and the entire work will comprise five or six files, each containing probably three fascicles. Hans Roth expresses the hope that this catalogue will assist ethnologists, art historians and scholars of comparative religion, dealers and private collectors to gain greater access to the variety and richness of the material culture of the Tibetans and Mongolians. Without any doubt this splendid catalogue will be received with gratitude for the enormous amount of work accomplished by Hans Roth and Veronika Ronge.

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J. W. DE JONG

Padmanabh S. Jaini, *Gender & Salvation. Jaina debates on the Spiritual Liberation of Women*. Berkeley — Los Angeles — Oxford, University of California Press, 1991. xxix, 229 pp. ISBN 0-520-06820-3

It is noteworthy that in India only the Jains have been discussing the spiritual liberation of women. In 1974 Muni Jambūvijayajī published two texts by Śākatayana, the *Strīnirvānaprakaraṇa* and the *Kevalibhukti prakaraṇa*, together with their autocommentaries (*svopajñāvṛtti*). He also drew attention to a great number of works by other Śvetāmbara authors on this topic. In an appendix he published a portion of the work of an Digambara author, Prabhācandra, which contains the *pūrvapakṣa* outlining the Śvetāmbara position.

P. S. Jaini has selected six texts written by Yāpanīya, Śvetāmbara and Digambara authors. The oldest text translated by Jaini is an extract of six verses of the *Sūtraprābhṛta* by the Digambara Ācārya Kundakunda (c.A.D. 150). Kundakunda does not deny that women can be liberated but by stating that women can not obtain the ordination (*pravrajyā*) he implies their disqualification for obtaining *mokṣa*. The first detailed discussion is found in the *Strīnirvānaprakaraṇa* written by Śākatayana, a follower of the

Yāpanīya sect, in the ninth century. The Yāpanīya sect existed for about a thousand years in northern Karnataka and became extinct by the fifteenth century. The only extant texts of the sect are the Strīnirvāṇaprakaraṇa and the Kevalibhuktiprakaraṇa together with the commentaries. The opponent who denies mokṣa for women is a Digambara. The translation of the Strīnirvāṇaprakaraṇa together with Jaini's notes occupies sixty pages. It is not possible to summarize the arguments used by the author and his opponent. Jaini's instructive introduction explains clearly the terms of the debate between the Svetāmbaras (including the Yāpanīya Sākaṭayana) and the Digambaras in the course of centuries. The last text translated by Jaini is an extract of the Yuktīprabodha with the Svopajñāvṛtti of the Svetāmbara Upadhyaīya Meghavijaya (c.1653—1704).

In this preface Jaini writes that he had prepared romanized versions of the one Prakrit and five Sanskrit texts translated by him. However, only one text has been included, namely a passage from Prabhācandra's Nyāyakumudacandra. It would perhaps not have been necessary to include the Strīnirvāṇaprakaraṇa which has been published recently in a well-known series (the Atmānandagrānṭhamālā no. 93, Bhavnagar, 1974) but the other texts are not easily found. I have only been able to compare Jaini's translations of two texts with the originals: the Strīnirvāṇaprakaraṇa and the Nyāyakumudacandra. However, these two texts occupy the greater part of Jaini's book (pp. 41—138).

The texts translated by Jaini are written in the usual Indian terminology of philosophical debate. It is not only the style which makes it difficult to understand these texts but also the contents. One must be well versed in the Jaina scriptures to understand the matters referred to by the opponents in the debate. Jaini has provided a very detailed commentary which makes it possible to understand the full impact of the texts. Jaini has also rendered a great service by indicating the two sides of the debate. His translations follow the texts closely and all necessary complements are given between square brackets.

There are only very few passages where one would like to suggest a slightly different interpretation. In some places it is perhaps due to the fact that Jaini renders the text rather freely that it is not possible to understand the rendering he gives.

My first point concerns Jaini's rendering of the word *vaikalya*. On p. 49 he renders *nirvāṇakāraṇavaikalyam* as "insufficiency of the cause for nirvāṇa". In philosophical texts *vaikalya* almost always has the meaning "absence". This meaning is not given by Monier-Williams although it is found already in the Great Petersburg Dictionary (das Fehlen, Nichtdasein

this passage the discussion is about the presence or absence of the cause for nirvāṇa in women. Elsewhere Jaini renders *vaikalya* as "shortcomings" (p. 66), "deficiencies" (pp. 70 and 72) and "impairment" (p. 78).

On p. 77 Jaini renders *vṛddhavyavahāra* by "ancient linguistic convention". Śābarasvāmīn's *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya* I, 1, 5 explains that children learn the meaning of words from the usage of adults. Otto Strauss has "der Gebrauch der Erwachsenen" (*Die älteste Philosophie der Karma-Mīmāṃsā*, 1932, p. 516; *Kleine Schriften*, Wiesbaden, 1983, p. 516), Erich Frauwallner "der Sprachgebrauch der Erwachsenen" (*Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnistheorie der Karmamīmāṃsā*, Wien, 1968, p. 47) and Madeleine Biardeau "l'usage des adultes" (*Théorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole*, Paris — La Haye, 1964, pp. 161 and 406).

On p. 52 section 17 is rendered as follows: "You cannot definitely assert the absence of nirvāṇa just because in the absence of one thing that is neither cause, nor in inherence with it, nor indeterminate, there is the absence of the other thing. For example, you cannot say that he possesses cows just because he has no horses, or that he is an expounder [of dharma] because he has no attachments. Thus, there is no definite absence understood because of the absence of inherence" (*na hy akāraṇavyāpakasya tasmīn aniyatasya vinivṛtyā niyamena nivṛtir bhavati / na hi 'sa gomān anaśvatvāt, vaktā vā rāgādyabhāvāt' iti niyamena tathābhāvo gamyate, tathāpratibandhābhāvāt*. The editor reads *tathā pratibandha-*). My first problem is with Jaini's rendering of *tasmīn aniyatasya*. Does this not mean "not limited to it"? As to *na hi*, etc. I suggest the following rendering: "not necessarily is such a state (i.e. of being *gomān* or *vaktā*) indicated because there is not such a restriction (i.e. that the non-possession of horses entails the possession of cows)". For *pratibandha* in the meaning "restriction", "restricting rule", see Jaini's translation of *pratibandha* by "a rule restricting . . ." on p. 88 (section 132).

On p. 64 we find the following passage: ". . . at the time of death all attachments, beginning with the body, are renounced. When a nun who is desirous of mokṣa is living in complete seclusion and thereby has contact between her body and those clothes, how can the clothes be an obstacle to mokṣa for her? (*marāṇānte śarīram ādīm kṛtvā sarva eva saṃyogās tyajyante, tatra kuto vastraṃ pracchannapradeśugatāyā vastreṇāṅgasaṅge 'pi mokṣapratibandhini mokṣakāmāyāh*). I understand *tatra . . .* as meaning: "in that case how can the clothes [be an obstacle to mokṣa] for a nun living in a secluded place, when she is desirous of mokṣa, even though the contact between her body and those clothes is obstructing mokṣa?"

On p. 77 the text quotes the following rule: "Where both the primary and

secondary meanings are possible, the primary meaning should be accepted (*gauṇamukhyayor mukhye kāryasampratyaḥ*). This rule is found in Mahābhāṣya I, 1, 15 vt. 1; pbh. 15. Jaini does not translate *kārya*. Renou gives the following rendering: "(quand un mot possède une valeur secondaire et primaire, une opération le concernant est entendue (se référant à sa valeur) primaire" (*Terminologie grammaticale du sanskrit*, Paris, 1942, p. 141).

On p. 80 Jaini renders *saṅgrahāryā* as "a verse from an anthology" but on p. 99 he speaks of "collected verses". Is it not rather "summarizing verse"?

On p. 90 (section 138) Jaini translates: "Surely these statements are referring to humans (*manuṣya*) in general; what proof do you have that "human" in this passage should be construed specifically with reference to women? Although the word "human" is a general term, it has the specific meaning of "man", since the word "man" may include a male who experiences female sexuality also" (*nanu cedam sāmānyaviśayaṃ katham viśeṣe śriviśaye pramānam syāt, tadviśeṣaparihāreṇa viśeṣāntare bhāve'pi tasya sāvakāśatvād iti cet, tarhi puṃviśaye'pi mā bhūt, so'pi viśeṣa eva*). The meaning seems to me to be: "... what proof do you have that "human" in this passage should be construed specifically with reference to women because by rejecting that specific meaning (i.e. women) it can also refer to another specific meaning (i.e. "man") and therefore that (other specific meaning) is applicable. In this case, it ought not to apply to man also, because that is also a specific meaning." I believe that the opponent argues that the word *manuṣya* can neither mean "woman" nor "man" because it is a general term and cannot indicate a specific meaning.

On p. 91 Jaini translates: "The reason for this is that exceptions are removed from consideration when a general rule is enjoined; otherwise, no rule would ever have any applicability" (*utsargasya hi niyamanīṣedhenāpavā davidhirvinirmukto viśayo bhavati, anyathā niyamādyayogāt*). I understand this is as follows: "By negating a restrictive rule a general rule will not be affected by a particular rule; otherwise, no restrictive rule would ever apply." However, the exact meaning of *anyathā niyamādyogāt* escapes me.

On p. 129 Jaini translates that the *gaṇadharas* "do not have that status which is worthy of being reverentially greeted by the entire world, as do the Tīrthāṅkaras." However, the text has *tadvandyatvam* "the status which is worthy of being reverentially greeted by them (i.e. the Tīrthāṅkaras)."

I leave it to the experts to decide how far my suggestions are to be accepted or not. In any case, they do not diminish in the least the merit of this book which is a remarkable achievement and a great joy to read. We

must be very grateful to Jaini for having made these texts accessible with his splendid translation and commentary.

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Arion Roşu (éd.), *Travaux sur l'histoire de la médecine indienne*. Un demi-siècle de recherches āyurvédiques. Gustave Liétard et Palmyr Cordier. Documents réunis et présentés par Arion Roşu (publications de l'Institut de Civilisation indienne, Fasc. 56). Paris, De Boccard Edition-Diffusion, 1989. CXXI, 615 pp.

Ce gros volume consiste en deux parties, la première comprenant les travaux de Gustave Liétard publiés entre 1858 et 1903, et la seconde ceux de Palmyr Cordier publiés entre 1894 et 1912. Dans l'avant-propos M. Arion Roşu écrit que la découverte à Londres et à Paris de documents qui concernent Liétard et Cordier fut à l'origine du projet de réimpression de leurs travaux. Dans une longue introduction M. Roşu esquisse la place de ces deux savants dans l'historiographie de la médecine indienne. En 1858 Gustave Liétard (1833—1904) soutint sa thèse de doctorat, intitulée *Essai sur l'histoire de la médecine chez les Indous*. Selon M. Roşu cet opuscule de 57 pages est établi essentiellement d'après Suśruta dans la version latine de Hessler (Erlangen, 1844—1850). Par la suite, Liétard a acquis des connaissances du sanskrit, mais il ne semble pas en avoir appris assez pour pouvoir lire des textes indiens de médecine. En 1883 Liétard publia une monographie consacrée à Suśruta qui fut suivie par une série de travaux sur plusieurs aspects de la médecine indienne. M. Roşu fait remarquer qu'en ce qui concerne les relations entre l'Āyurveda et la médecine grecque, Liétard supposait la part grecque plus importante que les apports indiens.

Les travaux de Palmyr Cordier occupent plus de trois cent pages. Palmyr Cordier (1871—1914) que M. Roşu caractérise comme pionnier de la philologie des textes médicaux sanskrits et tibétains, apprit très jeune des langues orientales. Dans sa première lettre à Liétard (27.11.1893) il écrit que "depuis cinq [ans], je me suis livré dans la mesure du possible à l'étude des langues sanscrite, pâlie et zende." Malheureusement, M. Roşu ne donne pas d'autres détails sur les études de Cordier qui étudia la médecine à Toulon et à Bordeaux, probablement sans pouvoir profiter de l'enseignement d'orientalistes. M. Roşu discute en détail la vie et les travaux de Cordier (pp. LXVI—CVIII). C'est à cet excellent travail, une contribution de premier ordre à l'historiographie des études de la médecine indienne que

of Gling-tshang and Gon-gyo. During the reign of Ming Ch'eng-tsu (1402–1424) they were appointed as 'king of the dharma' (*fa-wang*) on April 20, 1407.

The section Philosophy and Textual History comprises the following articles: William L. Ames, A Translation of Chapter Sixteen, "Examination of Bondage and Liberation", from Tsong-kha-pa's *Rigs-pa'i rgya-mtsho* [a commentary of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikāh*], pp. 91–106; David P. Jackson, The Earliest Printings of Tsong-kha-pa's Works: The Old Dga'-ldan Editions [Jackson has located several old Dga'-ldan xylographs; the blocks of two were carved between 1419 and 1432], pp. 107–116; Per Kvaerne translates a description of the Bonpo deity Gtso-mchog in the *Khro-bo dbang-chen-gyi pho-nya'i le'u*: A Preliminary Study of the Bonpo Deity Khro-bo Gtso-mchog Mkha'-gying, pp. 117–125; Karen Christina Lang explains the importance of the translations of Candrakīrti's works by Spa-tshab Nyi-ma-grags (born 1055): Spa-tshab Nyi-ma-grags and the Introduction of Prāsāngika Madhyamaka into Tibet, pp. 127–141; the late János Szerb has contributed Two Notes on the Sources of the Chos-'byung of Bu-ston Rin-chen-grub [written in 1322], pp. 143–148; Mark Tatz asks which scholars were refuted by Tsong-kha-pa: Whom is Tsong-kha-pa Refuting in his *Basic Path to Awakening?*, pp. 149–163; he identifies as one of them Sa-skya Grags-pa rgyal-mtshan (1147–1216). The second Edict of Khri-srong-lde-btsan is preserved in the *Mkhas-pa'i dga'-ston* (written in 1545–1565 by Dpa'-bo Gtsug-lag-phreng-ba). The text has been edited by Tucci, Lokesh Chandra and Richardson and translated by Tucci and Richardson. W. South Coblin has collated these three editions and retranslated the text: A Reexamination of the Second Edict of Khri-srong-lde-btsan, pp. 165–185. Roy Andrew Miller discovers in the oldest Tibetan grammars "A treatment of Tibetan case-grammar in terms of the much-discussed, and enormously involved, Indic theory of the *kāraka*": Case-grammar in the First Two Tibetan Grammatical Treatises, pp. 187–204.

Ter Ellingson studies Tibetan Monastic Constitutions: the *bca'-yig*, pp. 205–229. He explains that *bca'-yig* is "the name for a document outlining the basic principles, institutions, roles, and rules governing the organization and operation of a Tibetan monastic community." Ellingson's article is based upon a survey of fifty-one *bca'-yig* dating from the early fifteenth to the early twentieth centuries. Melvyn C. Goldstein examines clashes between the government and monasteries in the first half of the twentieth century: Religious Conflict in the Traditional Tibetan State, pp. 231–247. Ngawang L. Normang was a monk enrolled in the monastery of Dwags-po Bshad-

gling. His article is entitled: Monastic Organization and Economy at Dwags-po Bshad-grub-gling, pp. 249–268.

The section on foreign scholars comprises three articles: Nancy Moore Gettelman, Karma-bstan-skyong and the Jesuits, pp. 269–277; Joseph M. Kitagawa, Kawaguchi Ekai: A Pious Adventurer and Tibet, pp. 279–294; Richard Sherburne, A Christian-Buddhist Dialog? Some Notes on Desideri's Tibetan Manuscripts, pp. 295–305. In 1627 two Portuguese Jesuits, João Cabral and Estavão Cacella had been dispatched to Gzhis-sha-rtse (Shigatse), Gtsang's capital, to open a mission. In a letter, dated June 17, 1628, Cabral related his travels to Bhutan, Central Tibet and Nepal and gave a description of the ruler of Dbus-Gtsang, Karma-bstan-skyong, and of Shigatse. Nancy Moore Gettelman explains the historical background in the light of Tibetan historical sources. Kawaguchi Ekai (1866–1945) travelled to Tibet in 1900–1902 (on p. 287 July 3, 1903 is a misprint for July 3, 1902) and in 1913–1915. Joseph M. Kitagawa describes his life and activities as told by his nephew. Recently Scott Berry has written a book on Kawaguchi: *A Stranger in Tibet: The Adventures of a Zen Monk* (Collins, 1990). Richard Sherburne describes five Tibetan manuscripts written by Ippolito Desideri (1684–1733), of which the fifth was discovered only in 1970.

The last section, Comparative Studies, comprises two articles: Christopher Beckwith, The Medieval Scholastic Method in Tibet and the West, pp. 307–313; Lawrence Epstein, A Comparative View of Tibetan and Western Near-death Experiences, pp. 315–328.

This volume covers many branches of Tibetan studies and gives clear testimony to the progress of Tibetan studies in the United States since 1960.

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J. W. DE JONG

Per K. Sorensen, *Divinity Secularized. An inquiry into the nature and form of the songs ascribed to the Sixth Dalai Lama* (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Heft 25). Wien, Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1990. 466pp. OS 480,—

The so-called Love Songs of the Sixth Dalai Lama were first published in 1915 by Sarat Chandra Das in his *An Introduction to the Grammar of the*

*Tibetan Language* (Appendix IX, pp. 33–35). Since 1915 many editions and translations have been published but they are now all superseded by Sorensen's exhaustive study. Tibetan songs have become known better only in recent years thanks to publications of songs in China and India. Sorensen's introduction sketches the types of Tibetan songs and studies the classification of Tibetan folksongs. As regards the songs of the Sixth Dalai Lama Sorensen draws attention to the research undertaken in the People's Republic of China where they have become a favorite topic of research. Sorensen analyses their form and content and points out that a number of poems seem to contain veiled allusions to the regent Sañs-rgyas rgya-mtsho (A.D. 1653–1705).

The songs are six-syllable quatrains. Sorensen's edition comprises 66 songs and is based upon eleven editions which are described in detail (pp. 33–39). The main part of his book is entitled *The Critical Edition of Tsañs-dbyañs rgya-mtsho'i mgul-glu* (pp. 43–281) but comprises not only a critical edition but also a translation and a very detailed commentary in which Sorensen explains the textual problems and the allusions found in the songs. How detailed the commentary is in some cases can be illustrated by Sorensen's explanations of song 20 (pp. 113–142) where he discusses and explains in detail the meaning of the following topics: *dag pa sel ri* (Pure Crystal Mountain), the herb *klu bdud rdo rje*, *phab[s] rgyun* and the association of the Ye ses mkha' 'gro ma with spirits. Song 30 mentions Prince Nor-bzañ (Sudhana), a Buddhist jātaka which has been developed in Tibet into a theatrical drama play. Sorensen lists carefully the sources of this story and the influence of the play on the songs. There is such a wealth of information in the commentary that one very much regrets the absence of indexes.

In an appendix Sorensen publishes the text of 459 songs found in a collection of songs which is partly ascribed to, partly dedicated to Tsañs-dbyañs rgya-mtsho. Sorensen gives explanatory notes for a number of the songs, probably reserving a complete translation and commentary for later.

The book ends with a detailed bibliography divided into Western sources, Tibetan sources and Chinese sources. On p. 454 correct Helffer, Mirielle to Helffer, Mireille and on p. 460 Tucci, Guiseppe to Tucci, Giuseppe.

Sorensen's book is important not only for the study of the songs of the Sixth Dalai Lama. It contains much information on Tibetan folksongs, on Tibetan vocabulary and on an enormous range of topics directly or indirectly mentioned in the songs. Sorensen has an encyclopedic knowledge of

all matters Tibetan and one cannot but admire his learning. His work will be indispensable for every Tibetologist.

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J. W. DE JONG

Marek Mejer, *Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa and the commentaries preserved in the Tanjur* (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 42). Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991. XX, 115 pp.

The Tibetan commentaries of the Abhidharmakośa occupy nine volumes in the Tanjur but apart from Yaśomitra's Sphuṭārthā which has been preserved in Sanskrit little attention has been paid to them by Western scholars. As Marek Mejer remarks in his preface a fully comprehensive treatment of them is not yet possible. However, a number of important problems have been studied by Mejer in his book.

In the introduction Mejer studies Vasubandhu and his works. He carefully enumerates the information found in the sources with full references to the scholarly literature. The first commentary studied by Mejer is the Sūtrānurūpā attributed to 'Dus-bzañ (Saṃghabhadra) or 'Dul-bzañ (Vinītabhadra). Mejer points out that the first chapter of Sthiramati's Tattvārtha contains five fragments ascribed to 'Dul-bzañ. A comparison of the opinions ascribed to 'Dul-bzañ in the two commentaries by Pūrnavardhana with the commentary of Yaśomitra shows that 'Dul-bzañ must be an error for 'Dus-bzañ, i.e., Saṃghabhadra. In conclusion Mejer remarks: "It seems possible that the Sūtrānurūpā-ṛṭti's author is Saṃghabhadra/'Dus-bzañ, the text itself, however, represents but a recast and abridgment of one of his treatises, perhaps the Samayapradīpika, and is presumably the work of the Tibetan translator(s)." This seems to contradict his remark on p. 32: "I could not find any link between it [i.e., the Sūtrānurūpā] and the words ascribed to 'Vinītabhadra" [i.e., Saṃghabhadra] in Sthiramati's Tattvārtha."

In his examination of Yaśomitra's Sphuṭārthā Mejer concentrates on the passages mentioning a *vrddhācārya*-Vasubandhu and a *Sthavira*-Vasubandhu. Mejer agrees with Frauwallner's hypothesis of the two Vasubandhus. However, he does not accept Frauwallner's arguments for the identification of the elder Vasubandhu with the brother of Aśaṅga and for his conversion from the Sarvāstivāda to Mahāyāna. As to the expression *pūrvācāryāḥ* according to Mejer this is equivalent to *yogācārāḥ*.

Mejer studies five fragments in which Yaśomitra quotes the opinions of

Guṇamati and his pupil Vasumitra. He remarks that Guṇamati and Vasumitra belonged to a school different from that of Vasubandhu and that their opinions were criticized by Yaśomitra, a Sautrāntika. He also states that they contradicted the opinions of the Ābhīdarmikas.

Mejor examines in discussing Śamathadeva's commentary his quotations of texts relating to the *pratīyasamutpāda*. Apart from Pūrṇavardhana's two commentaries and the commentaries by Dignāga and Sthiramati Mejor also examines briefly the Abhidharmāvatāraprakaraṇa and its commentary, the Sārasamuccaya, from which he quotes the passages dealing with the six *heus* and the term *saṃjñā*.

One finds much useful information in Mejor's book. However, one must regret the fact that Mejor has not consulted Chinese texts and especially Saṃghabhadra's two treatises. For instance, in discussing the five fragments ascribed to 'Dul-bzañ in Sthiramati's Tattvārthā Mejor ought to have tried to discover if these passages can be traced in Saṃghabhadra's Nyāyānusāra. This would immediately prove that 'Dul-bzañ is an error for 'Dus-bzañ. In fact, all five fragments occur in Saṃghabhadra's Nyāyānusāra (T. 1592): 329b17—25, 329c7—8, 334b8—16, 347b10—15 and 348a17—18. The texts do not agree word for word but this is perhaps due to the way Sthiramati's commentary has been transmitted in Tibet. Further study of both the Tibetan and Chinese texts is necessary.

Another disappointing point in Mejor's work is the fact that he takes little account of the work done by Japanese scholars. His bibliography mentions only two articles in Japanese by Honjō. Several problems which Mejor studies have been studied already by Japanese scholars. For instance the equivalence *pūrvācāryaḥ* — *yogācārāḥ* has been questioned by N. Hakamaya in his article on *pūrvācārya* (*Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 34, 2, 1986, pp. 866—859). He points out that in several cases Vasubandhu seems to use the expression *yogācāra* in a more general sense as 'practisers of yoga'. Hakamaya also answers Mejor's query about the different opinions of the commentators on the meaning of the word *pūrvācārya* which was mentioned by Frauwallner. He refers to a passage in P'u-kuang's commentary (T.1821, p. 162c18—19). Hakamaya's article lists the eleven passages of the Kośa which mention the *pūrvācārya*. He concludes that most of them can be traced in Yogācāra literature.

We mentioned that according to Mejor Saṃghabhadra's Sūtrānūrūpā is probably an abridgment of his Samayapradīpika. In an article published in 1975 H. Sakurabe wrote that this work has no relation at all with the Samayapradīpika, and is nothing more than a kind of abridgment of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (cf. *Kokuyaku issaikyō, sanzoshū* III, 1978, p. 99b

98) As concerns Sthiramati's commentary Mejor does not mention an important article by Y. Ejima (*Bukkyōgaku* 19, 1986, pp. 5—32). Ejima gives a complete translation of the colophon of which Mejor gives a summary (p. 14) without quoting the Tibetan text. Ejima also points out that in the first chapter of Sthiramati's commentary the opinions of Saṃghabhadra are quoted in 43 passages (already listed by Y. Matsunami, *Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 30, 2, 1982, pp. 866—868). Both Matsunami and Ejima remark that most of them can be traced in Saṃghabhadra's two treatises. Mejor mentions two articles by Honjō on Śamathadeva's commentary but many more have been published by him since 1979 (cf. III 28, 1985, pp. 61—62).

Mejor's translations are not free from problems. For instance, p. 31, n.128 *de ni ci la yan brten mi 'gyur* means "it is not based on anything at all". Mejor translates: "Why is it not based on [another element]?" In the same passage *nam mkhar gdags* means "is designated *ākāśa*", not "it is discerned." P. 54, fragment 2 Mejor translates *pratisaṃkhyānirodha*. However, both Wogihara's text and the Tibetan translation (*so sor brtags ma yin pas*) have *aprasaṃkhyānirodha*. P. 55, fragment 3, note 256: *astāv aniyatāḥ smṛtāḥ*, Tibetan: *brgyad ni nes pa yin par bsad?* In the Tibetan text Mejor changes *rna bar mi 'on' no* "come to my ear" to *rnam par mi 'on' no* which makes no sense. P. 80, fragment 3: Mejor does not translate *sems can 'gro ba gcig tu skyes pa rnams kyi*. The text seems to be incomplete. According to the Chinese text something is missing after *sogs pa'i*, cf. T. 1562, 400a19—20 "the cause for mutual similarity in body, etc." In the translation of fragment 8 Mejor has misunderstood '*gal-ba*, skt. *virodha* "contradiction", not "violation". The translation of *dag gi las kyi lam bu* "a path of pure action" is nonsensical. One must read *ñag gi . . .*, Skt. *vākkarmapatha*. In note 322 *saubhāgya* is a wrong reading. One must read with Wogihara *sābhāgya* or else *sabhāgatā*. *Anyonyābhirabhi-* has to be corrected to *anyonyābhirati-*, Tib. *phan ishun dga' bar*. Mejor does not translate *dga' bar*. P. 85: *sems can dmyal ba 'am sems can dmyal ba gan' yan' ba* is not "a hell or whatsoever is fit for a hell", but "one or another hell", for *gan' yan' ruñ ba* renders *anyatama* or *anyatara*. P. 87: *rnam par ses pa kun la yan' du ses yod de*. Mejor translates: "Consciousness everywhere", it is apprehension." The meaning is: "Consciousness is apprehension with regard to everything whatsoever." P. 104, n.17 Mejor has not understood the meaning of *ches* and *śin tu ches ñe ba* which render *bahutara* and *āsannatara*, cf. Abhidharmakośa (ed. Pradhan, 1967), p. 474.16; Vyākhyā (ed. Wogihara), p. 714.10. P. 105 "Because they are desired (*kāmyante*) and wished for (*prārthayante*) they are desires." Mejor trans-

lates: "[They are called] 'desires' because are desirable and are earnest exertions [to acquire an object]." Tib.: 'dod par bya žin // don du gñer bar bya bas na 'dod pa rnam te / .P. 107, n.447: *yasya pūrvābhyaśavāsanānirjātopapattilābhikā prajñā nāsti / sa bālah* "He is a fool who has no wisdom obtained at birth and deriving from impressions due to former exertions." Mejer translates: "A fool, i.e., one who has no wisdom leading to the acquisition of a [new] state of existence, originating from [evil] impressions of [his] former wons." Vasubandhu distinguishes two *prajñās*: *upapatti-pratīlambhikā* and *śrūtacintābhāvanāmāyī*, cf. Kośa (ed. Pradhan), p. 2. 7.

There are several places in which it is difficult to accept the translations given by Mejer, cf. p. 30, fragment 2: "Since it was said [by the Buddha]: 'Do rely on the Law (*dharma*), not on person (*pudgala*)', there is no need of [the author's] resolve upon [doing] this [treatise]." Tib. *chos la rton par bya'i gañ zag la ma yin no žes gsuñs pa'i phyir 'di btsal par bya ba ma yin no že na*. The Chinese text has: "Although one must not ask (for ?) the man who has said the abhidharma because the doctrine of the Buddha relies on the dharma and not on a person." Mejer remarks that these words seem to be a paraphrase of Kāśyapaparivarta: *śūnyatā Kāśyapa pratisaratha mā pudgalam*. Samghabhadra mentions the well-known second *pratisaraṇa*, cf. L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Kośa* IX, pp. 246—8; Lamotte, 'La critique d'interprétation dans le bouddhisme', *Annuaire de l'Institut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves* IX (1949), pp. 341—361. In the following fragment the text is probably corrupt because *sprul-pa'i rdul phra rab* refers to the sound made by a *nirmīta*, a person magically created, cf. Vyākhyā (ed. Wogihara), p. 26.26: *bāhyo 'pi hi nirmīto . . .*; Abhidharmāvatāra (tr. van Velthem), p. 5: "Parmi les sons suivants, ceux d'une voix magique" (Tib. *sprul-pa'i smra-ba'i sgra*). In these places it would be necessary to study the other commentaries.

Mejer is rather careless in his quotations. P. 35, note 146 the fourth pāda is missing: *bstan bcos chos mñon mdzod rab bśad par bya'o* and in the second pāda 'grob is an error for 'gro ba. In note 147 read *phra rgyas myed par* (cf. La Vallée Poussin, *Catalogue of the Tibetan Manuscripts . . .*, Oxford, 1962, p. 181). P. 8, n.25 the reference must be to p. 21, n.94. There are quite a number of misprints, but, as the reader will be able to correct them, I have not listed them.

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Shoun Hino, K. P. Jog (trs.), *Sureśvara's Vārtika on Aśva and Aśvamedha Brāhmaṇa*. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1990. xviii, 110 pp. Rs. 100 ISBN 81-208-0643-3.

Sureśvara's Brhadāranyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārtika is a metrical commentary in 11151 stanzas on Śaṅkara's Brhadāranyakopaniṣadbhāṣya. The introductory part, the Saṃbandhavārtika, was translated by T. M. P. Mahadevan (Madras, 1958). The text of Sureśvara's commentary together with Ānandagiri's Sāstraprakāśikā was published in three parts as volume 16 of the Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series (3 vols., Poona, 1892—1894). S. Subrahmanya Sastri contributed a summary of Sureśvara's commentary to Karl Potter's volume on *Advaita Vedānta up to Saṅkara and His Pupils* in the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* (Princeton, 1981, pp. 420—520).

According to the preface Hino and Jog plan to translate Sureśvara's entire work. The present volume contains a translation of the Aśvabrāhmaṇa (BUBV 1.1) and the Aśvamedhabrāhmaṇa (BUBV 1.2) comprising respectively 9 and 227 stanzas. Two sections of Sureśvara's work have been translated already by S. Hino (*Sureśvara's Vārtika On Yājñavalkya-Maitreyi Dialogue*, Delhi, 1982) and by K. P. Jog and S. Hino (*Sureśvara's Vārtika on Madhu Brāhmaṇa*, Delhi, 1988).

Hino and Jog have spared no efforts to explain the stanzas. The Sanskrit text of each stanza is reproduced, followed by translation and notes. The translators have made use not only of Ānandagiri's sub-commentary but also of that of Ānandapūrṇa, the Nyāyakalpalatikā, which is published by the Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyāpiṭha (Tirupati, 1971ff.). A select glossary lists the technical terms. The verse index contains an alphabetical list of the first pādas of the stanzas.

The complete translation of Sureśvara's work is an enormous undertaking, this volume comprises only about 2% of all the stanzas. Both the translation and the commentary are extremely useful and we can only hope that the translators will be able to continue their work in the same way.


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Mohan Wijayaratra, *Buddhist monastic life according to the texts of the Theravāda tradition*. Translated by Claude Grangier and Steven Collins. Cambridge University Press, 1990. xxiv, 190 pp. £27.50; paperback £8.95

Wijayaratra's book was first published in French under the title *Le moine*





ROY NORMAN

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JI XIANLIN ON THE ORIGINAL LANGUAGE  
OF BUDDHISM

Ji Xianlin has emerged since the Cultural Revolution as the doyen of Chinese Indologists: he is the author of a number of important studies on Indological or Sino-Indian themes, and the holder of several influential posts in Chinese academic life, including a vice-presidency of Peking University.<sup>1</sup> His credentials go back to a doctoral dissertation completed in 1941 under Ernst Waldschmidt at Göttingen on the *Mahāvastu*; this was followed by four years during which he was not able to leave Germany because of the war, during which he completed three further studies concerning Buddhist Sanskrit.<sup>2</sup> On returning to China, however, his career took a different turn, so that he became more generally occupied with linguistics and cultural history without being able to maintain his original specialization.<sup>3</sup> He did, none the less, publish in Chinese in 1957 an article on the original language of Buddhism, considering the well-known passage on this point in the *Cullavagga* in the light of earlier scholarship and the five parallel passages in the Chinese canon; an English version of this was published in Burma (as it then was) in 1959.<sup>4</sup> In 1958 he also published a trenchant review of Edgerton's *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*, defending his earlier work, though (as he now sees it in retrospect) without adding much new information, and with a distinctly anti-American tone.<sup>5</sup>

In 1980 he was able to return to Göttingen and meet the retired Professor Waldschmidt and his wife once again; he was also treated most hospitably by his successor, Professor Doctor H. Bechert, who presented him, *inter alia*, with the conference volume he had just edited, *The Language of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition*.<sup>6</sup> In 1985 Professor Ji (henceforward JXL) republished his two pieces from the 1950s together with a long essay reacting to the volume he had received in Göttingen and two shorter essays commenting on Bechert's use of his 1940s publications, in all a slim volume of 100 pages in Chinese. As he is aware, his views on Bechert and his colleagues are also somewhat trenchantly expressed, though (as he is at pains to stress) without malice.

Of all the contributors to Bechert's volume, K. R. Norman (henceforward KRN) is mentioned by far the most frequently, both in praise and blame. The following summary, therefore, concentrates particularly on JXL's

arguments as they impinge on those of KRN, but tries also to give some general view of his criticisms, based on the third piece in his volume, reviewing the Göttingen conference. Sections and subsections below follow those given by JXL.

1.0. *Was There an Urkanon? What Was Its Language? Is There a Problem of Translation?*

JXL traces this term back to Lüders, but notes also Lévi's use of the term 'précanonique', which he feels (whatever Lévi's own view) points to a related phenomenon. The 1976 conference tends to reject the notion of a single Urkanon; the views expressed may be divided under six headings.

1.1. *The Interdependence of the Question of Language with that of Literary form*

Professor Bechert sees the Buddhist scriptures emerging gradually out of scattered local traditions; Professor Colette Caillat refers to the 'langue primitive du bouddhisme' as a reconstruction; KRN agrees that the materials collected by Lüders only prove that portions of the Pāli canon were not originally in Pāli. These views (and especially Professor Bechert's emphasis on different strata in our materials) are directed towards undermining the evidence assembled by Lüders.

1.2. *The Language Policy of the Buddha*

The language policy of the Buddha was not to allow monks to use Sanskrit, but to allow them to use their own dialects: cf. Section 4, below.

Professor Bechert is correct in saying that this allows for linguistic pluralism, but would this have applied to the Buddha himself? KRN thinks that it seems clear that there was no single language or dialect used by the Buddha, and Étienne Lamotte also deemed such a conclusion 'naturel'; to JXL this is neither clear nor 'naturel'.<sup>7</sup>

He also notes Professor Bechert's observations that there was no Middle Indo-Aryan 'Hochsprache' at the earliest stage of Buddhism; that its dialects were also mutually intelligible over a wide area; and that the process of normalization in Middle Indo-Aryan languages was a long one: hence Bechert's conclusion that there cannot have been an Urkanon.

1.3. *Oral Transmission*

JXL quotes Professor Bechert's remarks on the 'transformation' from one dialect to another within oral tradition, and notes his use of the work of H. Berger, and his reference to the form *pure* in Pāli as evidence of oral

transmission in Ceylon (rather than of Māgadhism); he also notes KRN's caution on this point.

1.4. *The Lack of Any Surviving Document Reflecting the Buddha's Speech*

Professor Bechert's remarks on this are quoted without comment.

1.5. *The Need for New Approaches to the Problem*

JXL comments that elements in the new systematic approach advocated by Professor Caillat are far from new.

1.6. *Against the Use of the Term 'Translation'*

JXL notes Professor Bechert's preference for 'Übertragung' over 'Übersetzung' and for the English 'transposition' in talking of changes in early Buddhist materials, but observes that KRN does speak of 'translation'.<sup>8</sup>

2.0. *What Language Did the Buddha Preach in?*

JXL notes that his remarks on the traditional Theravāda understanding of this question are deferred to his appended essays, and treats the conference contributions under two headings.

2.1. *Did the Buddha Use One Language/Dialect, or Many?*

Here JXL quotes passages from KRN's contribution once more, and refers back to the views of Bechert and Lamotte, admitting that the general view that the Buddha used more than one is consistent with his understanding of the *Cullavagga* (see section 4). But on the question of the lack of a Hochsprache, he points out that Old Māgadhī (and especially Old Ardha-Māgadhī) was gradually becoming a Hochsprache, and had achieved 'Mandarin' status (see section 3) by Aśoka's time.

Apart from the *Cullavagga*, JXL does point to a passage in the Chinese version of the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* in which the Buddha has to resort to three different languages in order to explain the Four Noble Truths to the four (apparently monoglot) Heavenly Kings,<sup>9</sup> but adds that it would be somewhat naive to use this as evidence of the Buddha's actual abilities: there is no convincing proof that he used more than one language.

2.2. *If One Language/Dialect, then Which?*

Here JXL notes the research of Fr. Weller, cited in the conference volume by Gustav Roth,<sup>10</sup> arguing that the different Pāli accounts of the promulgation of the Four Noble Truths point to an underlying original version in Māgadhī; the notion that Māgadhī was the mother of all languages he illus-

trates by quoting the material used by KRN in his contribution.<sup>11</sup> As to whether the Buddha would have used Old Māgadhī itself or Old Ardha-Māgadhī, JXL is inclined to believe with Roth and KRN that he could have used both.

### 3.0. *Can the Aśokan Inscriptions Clarify Dialect Differences?*

In his survey of Aśoka's inscriptions JXL states that, apart from some of the Major Rock Edicts, all use the official eastern dialect of his day; both linguistically and epigraphically the Major Rock Edicts reflect regional differences; some stick close to a text in the eastern dialect, others do not; this eastern dialect is Old Māgadhī or Old Ardha-Māgadhī.

The Mauryan empire may not have been able, like the Qin dynasty of China's First Emperor, to impose a uniform script, but it must have had an official language, which must have been that of its metropolis, i.e. eastern. KRN accepts this, and that Māgadhī originals underly the (non-eastern dialect) inscriptions.<sup>12</sup> Yes, there are no inscriptions from the capital, Pāṭaliputra, but (says JXL) no matter: it is clear that Māgadhī was Aśoka's official language, and the language underlying his inscriptions.

Yet KRN states<sup>13</sup> that recent studies of the Aśokan inscriptions have tended to suggest that to a large extent Aśoka's scribes wrote either their own dialect or the dialect they thought was most appropriate to the locality, rather than the dialect actually spoken there! John Brough believed<sup>14</sup> that the inscriptions' distribution of -e/-o could not be used to distinguish eastern and western dialects! JXL cannot conceive that under the rule of a great emperor, in a matter as important as setting up an imperial inscription a copyist could have so much authority as to be able to change the text of an edict at will. And dialects *can* be distinguished: apart from -e/-o, the shift -am > -o, -u (examined in JXL's 1944 article) is western, just as distinctively as the use of Kharoṣṭhī for western dialect.

### 4.0. *Do the 'Cullavagga's Chinese Parallels Discuss Modes of Recitation or Dialect Differences?*

JXL introduces the much-discussed *Cullavagga* passage on permissible Buddhist language with its Chinese parallels, and points out that in the Chinese *Vinayamātrkā* there are actually two parallel passages, the second of which has not been noticed hitherto.<sup>15</sup>

#### 4.1. *Buddhavacanam*

All the Chinese sources agree that this must indicate the Buddha's teachings

of scriptures, though the Sarvāstivādins and Mūla-sarvāstivādins introduce the notion of recited scriptures. If the speech of the Buddha is what the Pāli means, it is worth pointing out that vacanam is singular, indicating a belief that only one language was involved.

#### 4.2. *Chandaso*

The Chinese translations do not support KRN's interpretation of this word as 'as desired'; JXL feels that it can only indicate Vedic or Sanskrit, but notes that I-ching's comments on the Mūla-sarvāstivāda parallel occurrence of the word make it refer to chanting.

#### 4.3. *Āropema, Āropetabbaṃ, Āropeyya*

KRN and John Brough are right to render these words 'translate'; the Chinese texts do not explicitly use an equivalent term, but the difference is simply in their mode of expression.

#### 4.4. *Nirutti*

KRN's attempt to interpret *nirutti* as indicating the use of glosses or synonyms will not work, either with regard to the original passage or Buddhaghosa's commentary on it: in the latter *sakā nirutti* is equated with *Māgadhiko-vohāro*; to translate as 'gloss' here will not do. There is another example in *Mahāvamsa* XXXVII, 244–5:

parivattesi sabbā pi Sīhalatṭhakathā tadā sabbesaṃ mūla-bhāsāya  
Māgadhāya niruttiyā,

where 'Māgadhī glosses' will not work.<sup>16</sup>

#### 4.5. *Language or Recitation?*

Though most of the Chinese parallels to the *Cullavagga* passage make it a discussion of language, the Sarvāstivāda and Mūla-sarvāstivāda versions appear to discuss the manner of reciting texts (cf. section 4.2). But these two schools used a canon which had been translated into Sanskrit, so they were obliged to obfuscate the point that the Buddha was opposed to the use of Sanskrit — a point insufficiently appreciated by Lévi in his work on recitation.

A similar phenomenon may be seen in the versions of the story of Koṭikarna, in *Mahāvagga* V.13.9:

paṭibhātu taṃ bhikkhu dhammo bhāsitaṃ

Of the one Pāli and five Chinese parallels,<sup>17</sup> three make this refer to

recital rather than language, but the Mahāsāṅghika version evidently means recitation as the repetition of texts, rather than a mode of chanting: the two remaining parallels are once more the Sarvāstivāda and Mūla-sarvāstivāda versions — the latter version even exists in the original Sanskrit from Gilgit.<sup>18</sup>

#### 5.0. JXL's Views

Evidence is lacking for the use of a variety of languages in early Buddhism; there is an even greater lack of evidence that Middle Indo-Aryan speakers found each other mutually intelligible because differences between them were dialectal — such a situation would have obviated the need to change speech according to locality. But dialect differences are not always mutually intelligible. In China today, in mountainous parts of Zhejiang and Fujian, dialect speakers separated by a single mountain have difficulty in communicating — surely ancient India cannot have been entirely unlike this? Out of Māgadhī and Ardha-Māgadhī, it is more likely that the Buddha spoke the latter: first, because his mother tongue was not Māgadhī, and secondly because Old Ardha-Māgadhī functioned in Magadha in a way similar to Mandarin in Imperial China, i.e. as a sort of Hochsprache or lingua franca.

As for the evolution of the Buddhist scriptures, Bechert's view that the *Vinaya* contains the earliest Buddhist material is impossible. The Confucian canon provides a parallel case, in which the *Analects* of Confucius represent the oldest and most authoritative part, including much material which may really originate from Confucius: it contains no *Vinaya* type material. Of course, Buddhism and Confucianism are different, but they surely have points in common. Sayings of the Buddha remembered by his disciples would form the core, the basis for the earliest scriptures: it is possible to point to surviving examples of such sayings, preserved in different variants.<sup>19</sup> When KRN speaks of collections of the Buddha's sermons undergoing different recensions, this makes sense, yet he contradicts himself by not allowing the existence of an Urkanon.

At first these scriptures were transmitted orally, and this was the situation at the time of the first two Councils; on the Indian mainland the texts were reduced to writing towards the end of the second century B.C. At this point, as Gustav Roth argues, western Prakrits and Sanskrit had eclipsed Ardha-Māgadhī and Māgadhī in importance.<sup>20</sup> Emperors and religious leaders at this period wanted to choose a language acceptable to people across a wide area: this was now Sanskrit. Similarly, the First Emperor of China promoted unification of the writing system and other measures to

help in the control of his empire. The appearance of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* marks the rise of Sanskrit.<sup>21</sup>

Five points should be made concerning the resultant Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit. First, the change to Sanskrit was piecemeal, not total. Secondly, it was gradual and never actually completed — hence, perhaps, Buston's 'intermediate dialect'. Thirdly, though Roth uses the term 'super-regional', some regional features (such as western *aṃ* > -o, -u) remained. Fourthly, though Edgerton's *Dictionary* proposes the unity of Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, successive versions of the *Lotus Sūtra* (for example) show successive stages of transformation: one cannot speak of a unity. Fifthly, the proposal by C. Regamy<sup>22</sup> that some texts were written from the start in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit is, in the light of the foregoing discussion, impossible.

There are six more points to be made concerning the Göttingen conference contributions.

#### 5.1. What Was the 'Urkanon'?

Some confusion has been caused by the fact that Lüders never defined this term; he occasionally spoke of 'Schriften', but never said that he intended an organized, Tripitaka-style canon. It is surely correct to say that such a canon cannot have existed before the Maurya period. John Brough's remarks on this point are apposite.<sup>23</sup>

#### 5.2. The Canon of the Jains

The experience of Jainism is well worth considering in conjunction with that of Buddhism. How is it that the Jains could have had an Urkanon (albeit compiled a little later) in a canonical language, and the Buddhists not?

#### 5.3. Māgadhism

The ending -e (Sanskrit -as) has long been recognized as a 'māgadhism'. In rejecting the notion of an Urkanon, the Göttingen conference participants seem at times to reject this idea also. Take two particular examples:

##### 5.3.1. Bhikkhave

Bechert's following Berger in explaining the conditions under which this form was preserved does nothing to alter the fact that it is a māgadhism.<sup>24</sup>

##### 5.3.2. Pure

As against Bechert, KRN allows that this may come from either Māgadhī,

Sinhalese or North-western Prakrit; John Brough pointed out that -e was a feature also of Gāndhārī.<sup>25</sup> But all ancient Indian grammarians do agree that -e is an eastern peculiarity, and Lüders did not build his case on this feature alone.

### 5.3.3. -o and -e

Finally, A. L. Basham has shown that -o material and -e material is derived from different sources; it cannot be that the latter is preserved for comic effect.<sup>26</sup>

### 5.4. *New Approaches (cf. 1.5)*

That the approaches advocated by C. Caillat include old approaches may be illustrated from Oldenberg's work.

### 5.5. 'Translation'

Nobody can deny that translation was involved in the formation of the Buddhist scriptures; the move to Sanskrit was a form of translation. Bechert's reservations on this point concerning the appropriate German term are due to his attitude towards the Urkanon and its eastern dialect.

### 5.6. *Materials in Chinese on the Buddhist Use of Language*

There are ten passages in *Vinaya* materials preserved in Chinese which bear upon this question, in that they make it clear that it was an offense to teach (or, it would seem, even to address) someone from outside the Madhyadeśa in the language used within that area, or vice versa.<sup>27</sup> This may be taken as evidence of the purely utilitarian Buddhist approach to language.

As mentioned above, JXL appends two essays to the preceding review. The first reconsiders the question of am > -o, -u. Part of it takes Lamotte's *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien* (Louvain, 1958) to task, but only as a result of understanding the date of the printing available to him (1976) as the date of publication. Most of the essay is directed against an observation by Bechert that JXL's earlier conclusions on this North-western regionalism are vitiated by the absence of -u endings in the Gilgit manuscripts.<sup>28</sup> This suggestion JXL combats by drawing on the *Gāndhārī Dharmapada*, the *Samādhirājasūtra* in the Gilgit manuscripts, a Gilgit *Lotus Sūtra* published in China and the *Prajñā-pāramitā-ratna-guṇa-samcaya-gāthā*.<sup>29</sup>

The second essay concerns Pāli and the Middle Indian aorist, again a topic he had raised in the early 1940s. His original aim had been to show that the aorist was a characteristic of Middle Indian eastern dialect, of Old

Ardha-Māgadhī, with a view to using this criterion to determine the date and origin of Buddhist materials. But how to understand Pāli? This lacks the traditionally recognized characteristics of Māgadhī, though W. Geiger did accept the Pāli tradition's view that its language was a form of Māgadhī. KRN's view, expressed in the conference paper, that Pāli could have been a dialect spoken somewhere in Magadha, and hence termed Māgadhī by the tradition with a certain degree of legitimacy, is most helpful. In JXL's earlier research he had observed a tendency for the aorist to appear much more frequently in old materials, where new materials replaced it with other past tenses. This pattern was consistent with the appearance in early materials of other forms which (on the basis of the Aśokan Inscriptions and other materials) could be taken as characteristic of an eastern dialect. Hence the aorist is an eastern feature.

But how could it be that it should appear with such frequency in Pāli, ostensibly a western dialect? This contradiction had always bothered him, but though his immediate reaction was to combat KRN's view, on closer consideration it struck him with the force of a revelation. Why not, with the tradition, recognize Pāli as a form of the speech of Magadha?

Thus though Professor Bechert in 1972 cited his research to suggest that it had put paid to the notion that western dialects lacked an aorist,<sup>30</sup> JXL now sounds a note of caution on this point.

Finally, three comments on JXL's views. First, it should be remembered that during the middle part of his career he was not able to keep in touch with Western-language Indological publications; his reactions therefore provide a valuable index of the degree to which opinions on some matters have shifted during that time.<sup>31</sup>

Secondly, the explicit analogies between China and India (which have, perhaps, been unduly highlighted in the foregoing summary) illustrate the degree to which reconstructions of the linguistic situation in Ancient India are guided by what is found conceivable in the light of analogous situations. Heinz Bechert does indeed draw explicit analogies between Middle Indo-Aryan and the emergence of written Romance vernaculars,<sup>32</sup> but it is at least possible that Western-language Indologists are influenced by unconscious analogies which are not actually appropriate to the Middle Indo-Aryan case.

Thirdly, JXL's vantage point of Chinese Indology may not provide the only independent position from which to view current Western-language scholarship. He notes that his own opinions are supported by Professor Minoru Hara of Tokyo.<sup>33</sup> Japanese scholarship on the language of the earliest Buddhist tradition has not hitherto been particularly conspicuous,<sup>34</sup>

but it may yet produce a further, independent critique of the current state of the field.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> See his biographical entry (with photograph) in W. Bartke, ed., *Who's Who in the People's Republic of China* (Second ed., München: K. G. Saur, 1987), p. 187, where his date of birth is given as 1911. Ji was known until 1949 in the West as Dschi Hiän-lin, and during the 1950s as Chi Hsien-lin.
- <sup>2</sup> This information is given on p. 1 of his preface to his *Yuanshi fojiao de yuyan wenti* (Peking: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1985), the work partially summarized below; hereafter *YFDYW*. These early studies were "Parallelversionen zur tocharischen Rezension des Punyavata-Jātaka", *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 97 (1943), pp. 284–324; "Die Umwandlung der Endung -am in -o und -u im Mittelindischen", *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen* (below *NAWG*) 1944.6, pp. 121–144; "Die Verwendung des Aorists als Kriterium für Alter Ursprung buddhistischer Texte", *NAWG* 1949, pp. 245–301.
- <sup>3</sup> Though in the late 1940s his published studies in Chinese frequently drew upon his Indological knowledge, after 1949 his publications in linguistics concentrated on Chinese script reform and such questions as translation in the light of Stalinist linguistics. He did in 1956 publish also an article on the discovery and value of Tocharian, but this treats its topic primarily from the viewpoint of Sino-Indian cultural relations. A collection of his Chinese articles on Sino-Indian relations, including this study and others from the 1940s and 1950s, was published by the Sanlian shudian, Peking, in 1982 as *Zhong-Yin wenhua guanxishi lunwenji*.
- <sup>4</sup> Original title "Yuanshi fojiao de yuyan wenti", *Beijing daxue xuebao* (*Renwen kexue*) 1957.1, pp. 65–70; I have found no trace of the Burmese publication, mentioned in *YFDYW*, p. 2.
- <sup>5</sup> Thus *YFDYW*, pp. 2–3. Originally published as "Zailun yuanshi fojiao de yuyan wenti", *Yuyan yanjiu* 1958. 1, pp. 87–105.
- <sup>6</sup> Heinz Bechert, ed., *Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung/The Language of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition*. Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Folge 3, Nr. 117. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980. Abbreviated to *LEBT* below.
- <sup>7</sup> E. Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien* (Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, 1958), p. 608, cited by Bechert, *LEBT*, p. 14.
- <sup>8</sup> *LEBT*, p. 75: the inverted commas are, however, original to KRN — THB.
- <sup>9</sup> *Taishō Canon* (henceforward *T.*), XXIII, p. 193a: this is the Chinese translation of the *Vinaya* in the Sarvāstivāda tradition, *T.* no. 1435.
- <sup>10</sup> *LEBT*, p. 91, n. 42, citing *OLZ* 43 (1940), col. 73–79.
- <sup>11</sup> *LEBT*, pp. 63, 66, 67.
- <sup>12</sup> Apparently on the basis of KRN's remarks in *LEBT*, pp. 75 and 65, but I am not sure that I follow JXL's meaning correctly — THB.
- <sup>13</sup> *LEBT*, p. 69.
- <sup>14</sup> J. Brough, ed., *The Gāndhārī Dharmapada*. London Oriental Series, VII (London, OUP, 1962), p. 115, n. 2: abbreviated *GD* below.
- <sup>15</sup> In *juan* 8, *T.* XXIV, p. 846c, *T.* no. 1463. The other passages are listed by John Brough in *LEBT*, p. 37, though in his 1957 article, as reprinted in *YFDYW*, p. 13, JXL adds to the standard Mahīśāsaka parallel a further similar passage, *T.* XXII, 39c (*T.* no. 1421), on the Buddha's acceptance of texts as recited in 'foreign states'.

This evidence seems a little late to bear upon KRN's point — THB.

*Uddāna*, V, 6; *T.* XXIII, p. 1052c (*T.* no. 1447, A: Mūla-sarvāstivāda); *T.* XXIII, p. 181b (no. 1435, 25); *T.* XXII, p. 144b (*T.* no. 1421, 21); *T.* XXII, p. 845c (*T.* no. 1428, 39: *Umaguptaka*); *T.* XXII, p. 416a (*T.* no. 1425, 23: *Mahāsāṅghika*)

*Gilgit Manuscripts*, Vol. III, Part IV, Calcutta, 1950, p. 188, according to JXL — not cited, THB.

JXL cites the Buddha's words on the completion of his mission from *T.* I, p. 17b (*T.* no. 1428, 38); *T.* XXIV, p. 389a (*T.* no. 1451, 36: Mūla-sarvāstivāda); and *T.* XXII, p. 144b (*T.* no. 1428, 38); the latter two are from the *Vinaya*, which does not seem quite to accord with his argument — THB.

*LEBT*, p. 79.

Cf. *LEBT*, p. 80.

Cited by Bechert, *LEBT*, p. 32.

Cf. *GD*, p. 33, which deserves quoting at length; JXL translates one sentence only: "For present, it would seem more prudent to interpret 'primitive canon' as meaning no more than an early body of potentially canonical (i.e. authoritative) prose and verse compositions, without allowing the use of the term to suggest any implications of the fixation or codification of texts".

Cf. *LEBT*, p. 29.

*GD*, p. 115.

A. L. Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ājivikas* (London: Luzac & Co., 1951), pp. 1–5. Basham in fact puts this as no more than a possibility — THB.

*Viz.* *T.* XXII, p. 4b (*T.* no. 1421, 1); *T.* XXII, p. 261c (*T.* no. 1425, 4); *T.* XXIII, pp. 223b, 290a (*T.* no. 1435, 4, 31, 40); *idem* 27a, 360a (4, 49); *idem* 392a–b (53); *T.* XXIII, p. 622c (*T.* no. 1441, 10: Sarvāstivāda); *T.* XXIII, p. 913b (*T.* no. 1443, 2: Mūla-sarvāstivāda) — all on *YFDYW*, pp. 83–4.

"Über die 'Marburger Fragmente' des Saddharmapūṇḍarīka", *NAWG*, Philologisch-Historische Klasse, 1972, 1, p. 79.

(Citing a) *GD*; b) Nalinaksha Dutt, ed., *Gilgit Manuscripts*, vol. II, Srinagar-Kashmir:

1941; c) Ji's own English-language preface to Jiang Zhongxin, *Miaofa lianhua jing*, Peking: Minzu wenhuagong tushuguan, c. 1980 ? — not seen, THB; d) Akira Yuyama, ed., *Prajñā-sūtramitā-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā* (*Sanskrit Recension A*), Cambridge: CUP, 1976 — also Yuyama's *Grammar* of the same, Canberra: ANU Press, 1973.

"Über die 'Marburger Fragmente'", p. 72.

Note, however, that Chinese-language readers could have become aware by 1979 that JXL's views were no longer accepted, as a result of the translation of de Jong's writings on the history of Buddhist studies into Chinese: see J. W. de Jong, tr. Huo Tao-hui (Fok Tou-hui), *Ou-Mei Fo-hsüeh yen-chiu hsiao-shih* (Hong Kong: Fo-chiao fa-chu hsüeh-hui, 1983), pp. 73–4 (and p. x for the first appearance of this translation).

*LEBT*, p. 15.

*YFDYW*, p. 5.

Though one may point to some exceptions, e.g. Maeda Egaku, *Genshi Bukkyō seiten no kenkyū*, Tokyo: Sankibō, 1964.

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BUDDHA-FIELD AND TRANSFER OF MERIT IN A  
THERAVĀDA SOURCE

Though Sri Lanka has been considered the homeland of the most orthodox and conservative form of Buddhism and has played an important part in the preservation and spread of Theravāda throughout history, Buddhism in Ceylon was not exempt from the general trend towards innovation, and there were periods when orthodoxy had a rather difficult time with the dynamics of Mahāyāna and Tantric forms of Buddhism. Both from the chronicles and from a considerable number of architectural and inscriptional remains we can imagine the impact of Mahāyāna on the mediaeval culture of Ceylon.<sup>1</sup> Influences from Mahāyāna were also absorbed in the popular religion of the Sinhalese.<sup>2</sup>

In Pāli literature, Mahāyāna is called Vetullavāda.<sup>3</sup> In the historical literature of Ceylon, the earliest reference to Vetullavāda is found in the *Mahāvamsa*. There it is said about King Vohārikatissa (215–237 A.D.) that, “suppressing the Vetulla doctrine and keeping heretics in check by his minister Kapila, he made the true doctrine to shine forth in glory” (*Mahāvamsa* 36.41). Since there is no information on the type of this Vetulla heresy in the commentary of the *Mahāvamsa* (*Vamsatthappakāsini*, ed. G. P. Malalasekera, p. 662), we depend for additional information on much later sources which seem to be of a rather suspicious nature. Thus we must confess that we do not have any reliable historical information on the exact nature of the Vetulla doctrines suppressed by this king, nor do we know how much earlier, from which part of India and by whom these doctrines were brought to the island, and which communities in Ceylon were subscribers to Vetulla, or Mahāyāna doctrines. More than 60 years later, King Goṭhābhaya again suppressed the Vetullavāda. In the passage recording this event (*Mahāvamsa* 36.111 f.) we also find the first explicit statement that the monks who had turned to the Vetulla doctrine belonged to the Abhayagirivāsins. This nikāya, or sect, which is also named the Dhammaruci (Dharmaruci) sect, had originated as a result of the first split of the Buddhist Sangha of Ceylon during the period of King Vattagāmani Abhaya (1st century B.C.).

It is widely believed “that the use of Sanskrit rather than Pāli by the monks of the Abhayagiri fixed yet another distinction between them and their rivals of the Mahāvihāra”, and this is reproduced even in some rather

recent publications on the subject.<sup>4</sup> However, we have ample evidence for the fact that the Abhayagirivāsins used the same collection of sacred scriptures in Pāli which has been handed down to us by the orthodox Theravāda tradition of the Mahāvihāravāsins and which formed the common heritage of all of the three nikāyas, or sects of Buddhism, in mediaeval Ceylon.

Another wide-spread misunderstanding is the belief that the monks of the Abhayagirivāsa and the Jetavanavāsa sects were mostly followers of Mahāyāna, whereas the monks of the Mahāvihāra sect are believed to have based their interpretation of the doctrine on the Theravāda tradition as introduced from India exclusively, without being much influenced by the further development of doctrine and literature in India. It has been long known, however, that late canonical and post-canonical Pāli literature was heavily influenced by Indian Buddhist literature and philosophy of other schools.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, the available evidence clearly gives proof that, though Mahāyānist tendencies were at times tolerated in the Abhayagiri and Jetavana communities, Mahāyāna was never made the official creed of these two nikāyas.

There is, unfortunately, still much confusion about the nature of Buddhist "sects" (nikāya) or "schools" (vāda) in spite of the enormous amount of writing that has been done on Buddhist sects. This confusion is caused by confounding different types of sect. We should differentiate three main types of sect: the so-called vinaya sects, the doctrinal sects, and the philosophical schools. A "vinaya sect", or nikāya is characterized as a community of monks who mutually acknowledge the validity of their ordination and make use of the same particular redaction of the vinaya texts, i.e. the texts of Buddhist ecclesiastical law.

The second type of "sect" came into existence during the period of doctrinal dissensions and controversies, when particular notions of the issues under discussion were accepted in the different nikāyas, which had only now turned into communities which were distinguished, not only as different "vinaya sects", but also as upholders of certain doctrines. Only very few of the sects mentioned in the context of the early doctrinal controversies succeeded, however, in developing a consistent system of philosophy which had an impact on the progress of philosophical thought in India. These were the philosophical schools. There should be no confusion of these philosophical schools with the earlier doctrinal and the early vinaya sects. A Sarvāstivādin, in the sense of a follower of the Sarvāstivāda philosophy, could well have been a member of a rather different vinaya sect, particularly of a sect which had no philosophical tradition of its own.

The formation of Mahāyāna Buddhism took place in a way which was

fundamentally dissimilar from that of the formation of Buddhist sects. Whereas the formation and growth of Buddhist nikāyas took place mainly on the basis of local communities, the rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism was a development which pervaded the whole sphere of Buddhism and many nikāyas. It was an event taking place not on the basis of the understanding of monastic discipline nor of doctrinal controversies of the traditional kind, but on a different level, viz. by a new definition of the goal of religious life. Instead of striving for personal liberation as a follower of the advice given by the Buddha, a Mahāyānist decided to go along the path leading himself to the status of a Buddha — the long and troublesome path of a Bodhisattva, a "Buddha-to-be". A follower of Mahāyāna Buddhism did, however, not at all cease to be a member of one of the nikāyas. Louis de La Vallée Poussin has clarified in his fundamental contribution *Opinions sur les relations des deux Véhicules au point de vue du Vinaya*<sup>6</sup> that there could exist two factions in each of the ancient Buddhist nikāyas, or sects: a Mahāyānist and a Hīnayānist faction. One could not be a Buddhist monk without being a member of one of the old sects and accepting the authority of one of the recensions of the *Vinaya-piṭaka* of the Hīnayānists. It follows, on the other hand, that members of any one of these sects could have accepted the religious "program" of Mahāyāna without leaving the community of their nikāya.

We know from the records of the Chinese pilgrims, from inscriptions and from other sources that there were monastic communities where followers of both Śrāvakayāna, or Hīnayāna, and Mahāyāna lived together peacefully; but there were other strictly Mahāyānist and strictly Hīnayānist Sanghas as well.

For those who accepted Mahāyāna, their allegiance to their nikāya was of quite a different nature from that of a Hīnayānist: it was the observance of a vinaya tradition which made them members of the Sangha, but it no longer necessarily included the acceptance of the specific doctrinal viewpoints of the particular nikāya. In the context of Mahāyāna, the traditional doctrinal controversies of the nikāyas had lost much of their importance and, thus, as a rule, one would not give up the allegiance to one's nikāya on account of becoming a follower of Mahāyānist doctrines originating with monks ordained in the tradition of another nikāya.

It is a well known fact that the evolution of the main doctrines of Mahāyāna were not a result of a sudden change in the ways of thinking of Buddhists. Several trends which were later developed in Mahāyāna doctrine are already found in the literature of Hīnayāna schools. These ideas were styled "semi-Mahāyānist" by Nalinaksha Dutt.<sup>7</sup>

The Mahāsaṅghika sect and the Lokottaravāda sect, one of the sub-sects



of the Mahāsāṅghikas, are particularly renowned as advocates of a considerable number of such "semi-Mahāyānistic" concepts. Many of these are also found in the literature of the Sarvāstivādins, whose original home was in the north-western parts of India.<sup>8</sup> The tradition of Pāli Buddhism too was influenced by this trend before the final redaction of the Tripiṭaka in Pāli. *Buddhavaṃsa* and *Cariyāpiṭaka* are the two canonical works where the impact of these innovations is most intensely felt, particularly in the doctrines concerning the career (*cariyā*) and the perfections (*pāramitā*) of a bodhisattva.

These statements, however, do not yet provide us with conclusive evidence for direct Mahāyāna influence on early Ceylonese Theravāda nor, more specifically, do they help in the understanding of the historical sources which I have quoted above, because the concepts found in these works were not yet specifically Mahāyānistic. They represent a widespread trend to raise and answer questions which were not considered important in the earliest Buddhist community, but had become important in the stage of development of philosophical and doctrinal thinking reached shortly before the final redaction of the Pāli scriptures. I may quote as an example the problem of explaining why some beings become Samyaksambuddhas, i.e. Buddhas who have reached supreme enlightenment by their own efforts without help from others and who announce the doctrine for the benefit of others, whereas other beings attain nirvāṇa as Arhats, i.e. as pupils of a Buddha following his instructions.

The tradition that Gautama, when he was Sumedha in one of his former existences, had delivered a vow (*praṇidhi*) before the Buddha Dīpankara to become a Buddha himself, was accepted as a sufficient explanation in the early period of Buddhism. By force of this vow, which was confirmed by the prophecy (*vyākaraṇa*) of the former Buddha, Sumedha became a Bodhisattva. The vow and the prophecy were subsequently to be renewed whenever the Bodhisattva met other former Buddhas. It was only after innumerable reincarnations and after accomplishing innumerable meritorious deeds that the Bodhisattva was finally born as Siddhārtha Gautama and attained full enlightenment as a Buddha. The main problem raised here relates to the conformity of this concept with the law of karma, for it is a consequence of the teaching of a Buddha that numerous beings attain nirvāṇa as pupils of the Buddha, so that they benefit from the fact that the Bodhisattva has gone the long and difficult path leading to full enlightenment and has not accepted the easier way to attain nirvāṇa as a disciple of a Buddha or as a Pratyekabuddha. This seems to be contradictory to the so-called law of karma, the doctrine that every being can only earn the fruits of his own deeds; for it is the actions of the Bodhisattva, in the form

of the announcement of the doctrine, which bring benefit to other beings.

This tension between the karma doctrine and the bodhisattva concept can be resolved by the assumption that parts of a Buddha's karmic results of his previous efforts as a Bodhisattva pass over to his audience by way of his teaching. His own lengthened way to nirvāṇa shortens the way of his hearers. Though it is not formulated in the ancient texts, it is evident that this observation implies that a transference of religious merit may be supposed.

However, the notion of transfer of merit has been fully developed only in Mahāyāna Buddhism with its generalization of the request to make the Bodhisattva's vow. As a consequence, there was a treasure of merit available to the faithful, which finds a close parallel in the notion of the "treasure of the church" in Roman Catholic dogma since the 13th century.<sup>9</sup>

It is surprising to observe that the concept of a "transference of merit" is an important religious practice in Theravāda Buddhism as well. In 1967, Dr. G. P. Malalasekera gave the following description of this practice as current in contemporary Theravāda Buddhism.<sup>10</sup>

The method of such transference . . . is quite simple. The doer of the good deeds has merely to wish that the merit he had thereby gained should accrue to someone in particular, if he so wishes, or to 'all beings'. The wish may be purely mental or it may be accompanied by an expression in words. This could be done with or without the particular beneficiary being aware of it. Also the fact of 'transference' does not in the slightest degree mean that the 'transferor' is deprived of the merit he had originally acquired by his good deed. On the contrary, the very act of 'transference' is a good deed in itself and, therefore, enhances the merit already earned. The act of 'sharing' one's good fortune is a deed of compassion and friendliness and, as such, very praiseworthy and 'meritorious'.

Where the beneficiary is aware of the transference, another very important element comes in. This is called in Pāli *anumodanā* which means 'rejoicing in, the 'joy of rapport'. Here, the recipient of the transfer becomes a participant of the original deed by associating himself with the deed done. Thus, this identification of himself with both the deed and the doer can sometimes result in the beneficiary getting even greater merit than the original doer, either because his elation is greater or because his appreciation of the value of the deed done is more intellectual and, therefore, more 'meritorious'.

The terms used for this practice are *patti* (skt. *prāpti*) which literally means "acquisition", and *anumodanā*, literally "consent". These two terms are often combined into *pattānumodanā*. This terminology is not found in the canonical scriptures in Pāli, but there are a few canonical references to the offering of merit, though not in the developed form described by Malalasekera. These passages refer only to the gift of merit to pretas, or departed spirits, and to gods. In the *Milindapañha* and in the classical Pāli commentaries written by Buddhaghosa, Dhammapāla, and others in the

period between the 5th and 7th centuries A.D., the doctrine of *pattānumodanā* is, however, found in its fully developed form. These notions have been referred to by various authors.<sup>11</sup>

The origination of these notions is explained by Richard Gombrich, in a study of this problem published in 1971, as a reinterpretation of the *mataka dāna*, i.e. the ritual of almsgiving with the intention to transfer merit to dead relatives, a practice which replaced the brahmanical *śrāddha* (ceremonies for the benefit of dead relatives) in Buddhism. Gombrich characterizes the “transference of merit” as a practice “which affords some psychological relief from the oppressive doctrine of man’s total responsibility for his own fate”. He argues that the practice of *pattānumodanā* has been rationalized in a way to conform to the canonical doctrine by changing the meaning of *anumodanā* from “thinking” about the gift to “rejoicing” at the merit. Gombrich does not accept any Mahāyānistic influence on the development of the *anumodanā* doctrine.

There is an important source for the doctrinal controversy involved, viz. the *Kathāvatthu*, the well-known “Points of Controversy”, the doctrinal compendium of the Theravāda school which forms part of its *Abhidhamma-Piṭaka*, and consequently is considered a canonical scripture. Here, the view that “one being could help the consciousness of another one” is explicitly repudiated on the ground that everyone has to get on with his karma alone. Subsequently, the theory is repudiated that one being can procure happiness for another being which does not result from his karma. This is based on the argument that it is also impossible for one being to inflict pain upon another which does not result from his karma. In another section of this work it is explained that the result of the gift dedicated to a preta arises not from the gift itself, but only from the approval (*anumodanā*) of the gift, because no person is the agent for the consequences of another’s actions.<sup>12</sup>

If the doctrinal compendium of the Theravādins was so explicit in its negation of the possibility of transference of merit, how could this theory then become so prominent in Theravāda? How should we explain that in the *Samkhajātaka*, where the Bodhisattva gives away merit of his good deed and thereby saves his attendant, we find a concept of the Bodhisattva’s merit which could be rightly described by Gombrich as “very close to the idea of a fund of merit, like a bank account, to be drawn at will”. Must there not have been a period when even the main tradition of Theravāda was more open-minded towards innovation, including concepts of “Mahāyāna in the making”?

It is evident that a conclusive answer to this question can be found only if we succeed in tracing additional evidence for the influence of clearly

Mahāyānistic concepts in the formative period of Theravāda doctrine. Fortunately, there is a piece of evidence to help us answer this question, viz. the *Buddhāpadāna*. This text is the first part of the *Apadāna* book of the Pāli canon, a text which was accepted as part of the scriptures of the Mahāvihāra tradition. The main parts of the *Apadāna* consist of stories of former existences of Theras and Therīs who attained arhatship as disciples of the Buddha. Most of these stories follow more or less the same pattern: In a former existence the particular monk or nun earned merit by a donation to a former Buddha, to his Sangha, by veneration of a Buddha, a Stūpa, etc. As a result, he or she was reborn as a god, as a cakravartin, etc., and finally, in his or her last existence, met Gautama Buddha and attained sainthood. The text was not carefully handed down, and there is evidence that it had been enlarged several times and that at least three different versions of the *Apadāna* had existed.<sup>13</sup> The *Buddhāpadāna* forms the first part of the book.

Judging from its title *Buddhāpadāna*, we expect to find a text here which relates some former “great deed” of the Buddha, the fruit of which has contributed to his enlightenment. What we read in this text, however, deals with a rather different and unusual theme. The text begins as follows:

1. *atha Buddhāpadānāni sunātha suddhamānasā  
timsapāramisampunṇā dhammarājā asaṅkhiyā.*
2. *sambodhim Buddhaseṭṭhānaṃ sasaṅghe lokanāyake  
dasāṅgulī namassitvā sirasā abhivādayim.*
3. *yāvata Buddhakkhettesu ratanā vijjanti ’saṅkhiyā  
ākāsaṭṭhā ca bhūmaṭṭhā manasā sabbam āhare.*
4. *tattha rūpiabhūmiyaṃ pāsādaṃ māpaye ahaṃ  
'neka bhūmiṃ ratanamayaṃ ubbidham nabham uggataṃ.*

1. Now, with a pure mind, hear the (relation of the) great deeds of the Buddhas, the innumerable kings of the Dharma who have fulfilled the thirty perfections.
2. Paying homage with ten fingers (i.e. both hands) to the leaders of the world with their Sanghas, I respectfully saluted with my head the perfect enlightenment of the excellent Buddhas.
3. I brought together in full all the innumerable jewels which are found in the Buddha-fields in the sky and on the earth.
4. There I built a jewelled palace with a floor of silver with several stories raised high to the sky.

A lengthy description of a *Buddhakṣetra* or “Buddha-field” follows, and

we learn that the Bodhisattva created all the Buddhas of the past, brought them into the palace and offered robes, food, etc. to them. The Buddhas lay down in a lion's posture on costly beds, and, in a state of mindfulness, were committed to the delight of meditation. They preached the true doctrines, played with their miraculous facilities, indulged in supernatural knowledge, mastered all forms of supernatural knowledge, and assumed hundreds of thousands of miraculous transformations. These and similar relations are followed by a poetic description of the "Buddha-field", and a connection is then established with the world of men and other beings by offering them the merit which the Bodhisattva has earned.

Thus, in the *Buddhāpadāna* we find not only the concept of transfer of merit, which — however difficult — can be justified within the limits of Theravāda orthodoxy, but also the concept of a Buddha-field, which is described as a paradise where many Buddhas exist at the same time — a concept which diametrically opposes the tenets of Theravāda orthodoxy. The text is, however, not quite clear as to the question of whether these Buddhas really exist or if they are only creations of the meditative power of the Bodhisattva. The latter alternative is suggested by at least two stanzas of the text, but there is no clear-cut borderline between these alternatives, a differentiation which we could expect in a Theravāda text. We are reminded of what É. Lamotte says on the origination of the central concepts of Mahāyāna Buddhism in his study *Der Verfasser des Upadeśa und seine Quellen*,<sup>14</sup> viz. that these concepts essentially originate in the meditative sphere and thus, for the meditating monk, they are of a higher order of reality than anything from the so-called real world could be.

The *Buddhāpadāna* provides us with sufficient evidence for the conclusion that it is a full-fledged Mahāyāna text, and thereby is quite different from all other works in the Pāli Tripiṭaka. The concept of a "Buddha-field" had to be included in the later doctrinal system of the Theravādins because the *Buddhāpadāna* was included in the collection of their scriptures, but Buddhaghosa's writing on the subject, as found in the *Visuddhimagga*, carefully avoids all the non-orthodox connotations as found in our text. In *Visuddhimagga* XIII. 30f. (ed. H. C. Warren and Dh. Kosambi, p. 349), Buddhaghosa distinguishes three kinds of "Buddha fields": *jātikkhetta* ("birth field"), i.e. the realm which quakes on the occasion of the birth of a future Buddha; *ānākkhetta* ("field of authority"), i.e. the realm where the recitation of parittas is effective; and *visayakkhetta* ("field of objects"), i.e. the realm in which the respective Buddha potentially knows whatever he desires to know.<sup>15</sup> These explanations harmonize with the orthodox notion

that there exists only one Buddha at a time. However, this interpretation makes no sense in the context of the *Buddhāpadāna* passage.

In spite of the disregard of basic tenets of Theravāda orthodoxy, there can be no doubt that the *Buddhāpadāna* is a Theravāda text indeed, and not borrowed from the tradition of any other nikāya. This becomes evident from the fact that it mentions thirty perfections, or pāramitās, of the Bodhisattva, subdividing the ten pāramitās of earlier Theravāda tradition into three each, a notion which is already found in the *Buddhavamsa* and in several other works of the Pāli school, but not in the tradition of any other nikāya. Language and style, as well as the particular use of many well-known stock phrases from earlier Pāli texts, provide additional evidence. The fact that the *Buddhāpadāna* is clearly within the tradition of Theravāda also explains the curious fact that the only modern scholar who has dealt with this text so far, Dwijendralal Barua, has completely overlooked its Mahāyānistic character and restricted his comments to the romanticism of its poetic descriptions.<sup>16</sup>

There can be no doubt that the *Buddhāpadāna* is the work of monks who either formed a Mahāyānistic faction in the Mahāvihāra or who were ready to accept at least some very essential elements of Mahāyāna. Being in the tradition of Theravāda and using Pāli as their sacred language, it was quite obvious that they would compose in Pāli a text embodying the new concepts. Since the *Apadāna* book was a compilation whose final redaction took place at a comparatively late period, it was a place where a *dhammapariyāya* of this kind could easily be added to the scriptural literature. We can now conclude that the acceptance of the generalized doctrine of *pattānumodanā*, or transference of merit, into Theravāda Buddhism was also due to this influence of Mahāyānistic trends in the same early period of Ceylonese Buddhism.

At least in a very tentative way, the period of this development can be determined by the following considerations: The author of the *Kathāvatthu* clearly delimitates Theravāda orthodoxy against tendencies which, though they were not yet developed into explicitly Mahāyānistic tenets, were representative of the trends which preceded the formation of Mahāyāna. Whether or not the *Kathāvatthu* was composed at the Council of Pāṭaliputra, held at the time of Aśoka, it was a work of Indian origin and it represented the views of a section of the Sangha which strongly rejected the then current trends towards rather far-reaching innovations. We have seen that the theory of the transference of merit was not acceptable to its author. On the other hand, the passage from the *Mahāvamsa* on the suppression of the Mahāyānists

in Ceylon during Vohārikatissa's reign, which does not mention at all which communities were infiltrated by the Vetulla doctrines, makes it clear that there was no tolerance of such trends from this time on. The evidence of the chronicles is definite: The Mahāvihāra did not allow a Mahāyānist faction in its framework to exist after that, and whenever they existed in the Sangha of Ceylon later on, it was within communities which did not belong to the Mahāvihāra faction.

Thus, we may conclude that the infiltration of Mahāyāna ideas into the Mahāvihāra tradition took place, on the one hand, after a relaxation of the strict orthodoxy represented by the Kathāvattu and after the antagonism of the sects had become less severe, i.e. not before the end of the 2nd century B.C., and, on the other hand, it must have taken place before the suppression of Mahāyānist tendencies in the first half of the 3rd century A.D. In a quite different context, I proposed a date not long before the middle of the 1st century B.C. for the earliest version of the *Apadāna* book which did not yet include the *Buddhāpadāna*. It, therefore, seems that the *Buddhāpadāna* was composed roughly at the same time as the *Sukhāvāṭṭyūha*, the most important Mahāyāna text elaborating the concept of the "Buddha-field", i.e. in the 1st century or in the beginning of the 2nd century A.D.

The questions raised in the preceding paragraphs have been recently discussed by Gregory Schopen<sup>17</sup> and Lambert Schmithausen.<sup>18</sup> Schopen argued that the early Buddhists held the view that "somebody could be expected to obtain Nirvāṇa as the result of an act of pūjā undertaken on his behalf by another".<sup>19</sup> This view is presented by him as the leading monastic idea of the early period, and for this hypothesis Schopen mainly relies on inscriptional evidence. From early Indian and Ceylonese inscriptions he derives the conclusion that the inscriptional references to the transfer of merit have no connexion with Mahāyānist tendencies, and in this context he criticizes G. Fussman's statement that the references to the doctrine of the transference of merit in early Buddhist inscriptions prove "l'existence de courants mahāyānistes dans l'Inde du Nord-Ouest, à la fin du premier siècle de n.e."<sup>20</sup> Schopen argues that the relevant formula referring to an act of transfer of merit to one's deceased parents "in at least five instances . . . appears in conjunction with a specifically named school and that in every instance that school is a Hīnayāna school", viz. the Mahāsāṅghika, Aparāśaila and Bhādrāyaṇīya schools, but never in association with the name Mahāyāna.<sup>21</sup> The transfer of merit to "the welfare and happiness of all beings" is also found in conjunction with specifically named schools, with the Mahāsāṅghika, Sarvāstivāda, Dharmaguptaka, Bhādrāyaṇīya, Mahīśāsaka and Vibhajyavāda schools.<sup>22</sup> Schopen further concludes that "this, coupled

with the fact that in at least some cases the donors were monks — presumably belonging to the same schools — would seem to indicate that we can legitimately conclude that all these schools, the Mahāsāṅghikas, Sarvāstivādins, Bhādrāyaṇīyas, etc., had and held a doctrine of the 'Transference of Merit'.<sup>23</sup> This transference of merit was not consistently oriented towards one specific goal, but to the granting of health, to conferring of long life on some specified individual, etc., and, on occasion to the attainment of Nirvāṇa. In those inscriptions, however, which were classified as Mahāyāna inscriptions by Schopen, "the act or gift recorded is always undertaken first of all for 'all beings' — even if . . . we shall see, certain individuals within the category 'all beings' are in many cases particularly singled out." The purpose of the transfer of merit in the Mahāyāna inscriptions "is always said to be intended specifically for the attainment of *anuttarajñāna* [supreme knowledge] by all beings".<sup>24</sup> None of those inscriptions which are termed Mahāyāna inscriptions by Schopen are earlier than the 4th century A.D., but the "Hīnayāna" inscriptions in question predate them by one or more centuries.<sup>25</sup> Several early inscriptions found in Ceylon (dated ca. 210 and 200 B.C. by S. Paranavithana) record the transfer to merit "for the benefit of mother and father" and "for the welfare and happiness of beings in the boundless universe".<sup>26</sup>

In commenting on my paper on "Buddha-Feld und Verdienstübertragung: Mahāyāna-Ideen im Theravāda Buddhismus Ceylons",<sup>27</sup> Schopen criticizes me for ignoring the presence of the doctrine of the transference of merit in Hīnayāna inscriptions, and for implying that "there is a single, unified, and unchanging conception of this idea in Mahāyāna texts".<sup>28</sup>

It seems, however, that Schopen has misunderstood my arguments, for I did not deny the presence of the concept of the transfer of merit in inscriptions and texts of the pre-Mahāyāna period, nor did I postulate a single and unchanging concept of this notion in Mahāyāna literature. On the contrary, I argue that this concept may be understood as an inherent consequence of certain doctrines of early Buddhism.<sup>29</sup> However, it is evident that the doctrine of the transfer of merit was not present in the earliest strata of Buddhism, but originated in the course of development of Buddhist tenets, though in a comparatively early period.

In this context, I may refer to the analysis of the relevant passages in the four Nikāyas of the Tipitaka by Lambert Schmithausen.<sup>30</sup> He observes that "there does not seem to exist, in the four Nikāyas, any unambiguous evidence for merit transference to the deceased", but that the situation in this respect has changed already in the tales of the *Petavatthu*.<sup>31</sup> Thus, it becomes clear that Schopen's insistence that the doctrine of the transfer of

merit must be considered an essential part of the earliest Buddhist doctrine cannot be correct, because it presupposes that the inscriptions reflect an earlier stage of the development of Buddhism than that documented by the early canonical texts — a presupposition which can be shown to be erroneous.<sup>32</sup>

The inscriptional evidence adduced by Schopen reflects a transitional state in the development of Buddhist doctrine, during which the theories concerning the career and the perfections of the Bodhisattva were formulated, and, at the same time, new concepts like the transfer of merit emerged. This transitional state has been termed "semi-Mahāyāna" by modern scholars, although in the period in question the terms Hinayāna and Mahāyāna were not yet used. The concept of the transfer of merit seems to have originated in the context of the practice of donating gifts for one's deceased parents and relatives as a lay Buddhist ritual, which in turn was used to replace the early brahminic rituals for the deceased, as has already been suggested by R. Gombrich and others. In this particular form, it was accepted as orthodox within Theravāda doctrine as delimited by the compiler of the *Kathāvattu*, but it was explained in this text that the benefit depends on the *anumodanā* (approval) of the benefitted person, as we have seen above (p. 100). However, this orthodox explanation soon lost its importance for religious practice, and the transfer of merit was generally used for various purposes. It was, however, only with the new religious program of Mahāyāna that all devotees were expected to take the Bodhisattva's vow, and thus work for the attainment of supreme knowledge by all beings. Thus, the followers of Mahāyāna devoted the benefit of their good karma for this purpose. It is only in this context that I postulate a general concept of Mahāyānists, and I consider this the essential character of Mahāyāna. However, we cannot conclude, as Schopen does, from the presence of the names of schools or nikāyas alone whether a text or inscription of the transitional period represents pure Hinayānistic or early Mahāyānistic thought, because — as should be known at least since Vallée Poussin's above-quoted statement (p. 97) — the followers of Mahāyāna did not cease to be members of the nikāyas from which their tradition of ordination originated. Schopen seems to have overlooked this fundamental fact.

As far as Schmithausen's remarks on my earlier papers<sup>33</sup> are concerned, I should clarify that I never presupposed or expressed the opinion that liberation is exclusively or mainly due to good karma in early Nikāyic Buddhism. I agree with Schmithausen in describing the doctrinal background of the developments in question as belonging to a later period which is represented by late canonical texts of a semi-Mahāyānistic charac-

ter. I do not deny the possibility that these concepts emerged under the influence of "Hinduism", though I hesitate to use this term for the period in question. However, as with several other new concepts to be observed in the context of the developments in this period, the influence of these non-Buddhistic religious movements seems to have been an indirect one, mainly consisting of the adaption of means to serve the needs of the growing number of followers of Buddhism when it was transformed from a way to personal liberation practised by a spiritual élite into a religion of the broad masses of the population.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> For a history of Mahāyāna in Sri Lanka, see Nandasena Mudiyanse, *Mahayana Monuments in Ceylon*, Colombo, 1967. The first detailed study of this topic was S. Paranavitana, "Mahayanism in Ceylon", *The Ceylon Journal of Science, Section G*, Vol. 2 (1928—1933), pp. 35—72.

<sup>2</sup> See H. Bechert, "Die Mythologie der singhalesischen Volksreligion", *Wörterbuch der Mythologie*, ed. H. W. Haussig, vol. V, s.v. Bōsat, Kataragama, Nātha, Saman and Upulvan.

<sup>3</sup> See Étienne Lamotte, *Histoire du bouddhisme indien*, Louvain, 1958, pp. 502, 590.

<sup>4</sup> Diran K. Dohaniyan, "Mahāyāna Cult in Ancient Ceylon", *India's Contribution to World Thought and Culture, Vivekananda Commemoration Volume*, Madras, 1970, p. 425.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. H. Bechert, "Zur Geschichte der buddhistischen Sekten in Indien und Ceylon", *La Nouvelle Clio* 7—9 (1955—57), pp. 351—357.

<sup>6</sup> "Notes bouddhiques XVIII", *Académie royale de Belgique, Bulletins de la Classe des Lettres et Sciences politiques*, 5e série, vol. 16 (1930), pp. 20—39. See also "Note additionnelle", *Bulletins*, vol. 15 (1929), pp. 233f.

<sup>7</sup> Nalinaksha Dutt, *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and Its Relation to Hinayāna*, London, 1930, pp. 36f.

<sup>8</sup> See Étienne Lamotte, "Sur la formation du Mahāyāna", *Asiatica, Festschrift Friedrich Weller*, Leipzig, 1954, pp. 377—396.

<sup>9</sup> See H. Bechert, *Bruchstücke buddhistischer Versammlungen*, vol. I, Berlin, 1961, pp. 32—42; ib., "Notes on the Formation of Buddhist Sects and the Origins of Mahāyāna", *German Scholars on India, Contributions to Indian Studies*, vol. I, Varanasi, 1973, pp. 14ff. See also Har Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature*, London, 1932, pp. 188—193.

<sup>10</sup> G. P. Malalasekera, "Transference of Merit in Ceylonese Buddhism", *Philosophy East and West* 17 (1967), pp. 85f.

<sup>11</sup> J. F. Dickson, "Notes Illustrative of Buddhism as the Daily Religion of the Buddhists of Ceylon", *Journal of the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. 8 no. 29 (1884), pp. 203—236 (see particularly pp. 203ff.); E. Washburn Hopkins, "More about the Modifications of Karma Doctrine", *JRAS* 1907, pp. 669f.; H. Kern, "Opmerkingen over eenige Pāliwoorden", *Verslagen en Mededeelingen der Kon. Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkunde*, 4, XII, 1913, pp. 234—236; repr. in: H. Kern, *Verspreide Geschriften*, vol. 3, 's-Gravenhage, 1915, pp. 165—167; F. L. Woodward, "The Buddhist Doctrine of Reversible Merit", *The Buddhist Review*, vol. 6 (1914), pp. 38—50; Wilhelm Geiger, *Culture of Ceylon in Mediaeval Times*, Wiesbaden, 1960, p. 182; I. B. Horner, "Translator's Introduction", in: *Milinda's Questions*, vol. 1, London, 1963, pp. XLII f.; H. Bechert, "Zur Frühgeschichte des Mahāyāna-Buddhismus", *ZDMG*, vol. 113 (1964), pp. 530—535; G. P. Malalasekera,

"Transference of Merit in Ceylonese Buddhism", *Philosophy East and West*, vol. 17 (1967), pp. 85–90; Gananath Obeyesekere, "Theodicy, Sin and Salvation in a Sociology of Buddhism", *Dialectic of Practical Religion*, ed. E. R. Leach, Cambridge, 1968, pp. 25ff.; Richard Gombrich, "Merit Transference in Sinhalese Buddhism: A Case Study of the Interaction between Doctrine and Practice", *History of Religions*, vol. 11 (1971), pp. 203–219; id. *Precept and Practice, Traditional Buddhism in the Rural Highlands of Ceylon*, Oxford, 1971, pp. 226–241; Peter Schalk, *Der Paritta-Dienst in Ceylon*, Dissertation, Lund, 1972, pp. 216–217; James P. McDermott, "Sādhina Jātaka: A Case against the Transfer of Merit", *JAOS* 94 (1974), pp. 385–387; J.-M. Agasse, "Le transfert de mérite dans le bouddhisme pâli classique", *Journal asiatique* 1978, pp. 311–332; J. Filliozat, "Sur le domaine sémantique de *punya*", *Indianisme et bouddhisme, Mélanges E. Lamotte*, Louvain-La-Neuve, 1980, pp. 101–116; O. Oguibénine, "La daksinā dans le Rgveda et le transfert de mérite dans le bouddhisme", *Indological and Buddhist Studies* (Festschrift J. W. de Jong), Canberra, 1982, pp. 393–414; M. Hara, "A Note on the Sādhina Jātaka", *ZDMG, Supplement VII: XXII. Deutscher Orientalistentag*, Stuttgart, 1985, pp. 308–314. See also *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, vol. 1, fasc. 4, Colombo, 1965, pp. 747–750.

<sup>12</sup> For the references see H. Bechert, "Notes on the Formation", pp. 16f.

<sup>13</sup> See H. Bechert, "Über das Apadānabuch", *WZKS* 2 (1958), pp. 1–21.

<sup>14</sup> NAWG 1973, pp. 46–49.

<sup>15</sup> This understanding of *buddhakkhetta* is reproduced in later Theravāda literature. See, e.g. the passage translated in R. Spence Hardy, *A Manual of Buddhism*, London, 1853, p. 2.

<sup>16</sup> Dwijendralal Barua, "Buddhakkhetta in the Apadāna", *B.C. Law Volume*, ed. by D. R. Bhandarkar et al., Part 2, Poona, 1946, pp. 183–190.

<sup>17</sup> G. Schopen, "Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism", *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 10 (1984), pp. 9–47.

<sup>18</sup> Lambert Schmithausen, "Critical Response", *Karma and Rebirth: Post Classical Developments*, ed. R. W. Neufeldt, Albany, N.Y., 1986, pp. 203–230; cf. particularly pp. 210–216.

<sup>19</sup> Schopen, op. cit., p. 32.

<sup>20</sup> G. Fussman, "Documents épigraphiques kouchans", *BEFEO* 61 (1974), p. 56.

<sup>21</sup> Schopen, op. cit., p. 34.

<sup>22</sup> Schopen, op. cit., pp. 35f.

<sup>23</sup> Schopen, op. cit., p. 36.

<sup>24</sup> Schopen, op. cit., pp. 38f.

<sup>25</sup> Schopen, op. cit., pp. 43f. and ib., "Mahāyāna in Indian Inscriptions", *Indo-Iranian Journal* 21 (1979), pp. 13f.

<sup>26</sup> Schopen, op. cit., p. 45 referring to S. Paranavithana, *Inscriptions of Ceylon*, vol. 1, Colombo, 1970, nos. 34 and 338–341.

<sup>27</sup> *Académie Royale de Belgique, Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, 5e sér., 62 (1976), pp. 27–51.

<sup>28</sup> Schopen, op. cit., p. 47.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. H. Bechert, "Notes on the Formation of Buddhist Sects and the Origins of Mahāyāna", *German Scholars on India*, vol. 1, Varanasi, 1973, pp. 17f.

<sup>30</sup> Schmithausen, op. cit., pp. 210–212.

<sup>31</sup> Schmithausen, op. cit., p. 212.

<sup>32</sup> See H. Bechert, "The Beginnings of Buddhist Literature: An Examination of a Recent Theory", *Let ex Litterae, Essays on Ancient Indian Law and Literature in Honour of Oscar Botto, Indologica Taurinensia* (forthcoming).

<sup>33</sup> Schmithausen, op. cit., p. 213.

## CONNECTIONS BETWEEN ASOKAN (SHAHBAZGARHI) AND NIYA PRAKRIT?\*

Asokan studies have more than once benefitted by Mr. K. R. Norman's patient and unprejudiced labour, thanks to which it has often been possible, in particular, to recognize the correct readings and the original wording or purport of the emperor's proclamations. As a tribute to this untiring and friendly scholar, I may be permitted to submit a short list of grammatical features which, as far as Asoka's inscriptions are concerned, appear as characteristic of the Sh epigraphs, and which, on the other hand, specifically agree with the usage of the later Niya Kharoṣṭhī documents. The present paper, therefore, will only consider some details in as much as they are significant in this connection. Though many have been mentioned in previous studies, it seems that more and firmer conclusions can be reached nowadays.<sup>1</sup>

As far as the general characteristics of the N-W Prakrits are concerned they are well known<sup>2</sup> and need not be repeated here. As for the main features common to Niya and both the Sh and Ma edicts, they have been listed by T. Burrow. Nevertheless some refinements can be added to the data collected in his 1936 survey of BSOS and his valuable book *The Language of the Kharoṣṭhī documents*.<sup>3</sup>

In particular, there can be little doubt that similarities are more numerous between Ni and Sh than between Ni and Ma. In itself this is not surprising, as it is clear that the language of the Ma edicts shows unequivocal Eastern influences.<sup>4</sup> But there is more to it: it can be shown that various idiosyncracies of Sh, far from being haphazard or erratic, are genuine Gdh forms. Hence the description and history of this variety of MIA could gain in accuracy and consistency.

1. Concerning phonology, only a few remarks will be added to T. Burrow's and K. R. Norman's lists.

1.1. For the development of the vowel Sk (*r*) into *ri* or *ru* in Niya, Burrow quotes the possible spellings *krita* . . . ~ *kṛta*, etc. (BSOS 419 f.; LKhD 5; compare, for Sh Ma, CII p. LXXXIV; XCVII). J. Bloch notes that the interpretation of the Sh-Ma reflex is not easy (§6). Though, in such matters, statistical results cannot be taken at their face value, nevertheless it can be

"Transference of Merit in Ceylonese Buddhism", *Philosophy East and West*, vol. 17 (1967), pp. 85–90; Gananath Obeyesekere, "Theodicy, Sin and Salvation in a Sociology of Buddhism", *Dialectic of Practical Religion*, ed. E. R. Leach, Cambridge, 1968, pp. 25ff.; Richard Gombrich, "Merit Transference in Sinhalese Buddhism: A Case Study of the Interaction between Doctrine and Practice", *History of Religions*, vol. 11 (1971), pp. 203–219; id. *Precept and Practice, Traditional Buddhism in the Rural Highlands of Ceylon*, Oxford, 1971, pp. 226–241; Peter Schalk, *Der Paritta-Dienst in Ceylon*, Dissertation, Lund, 1972, pp. 216–217; James P. McDermott, "Sādhina Jātaka: A Case against the Transfer of Merit", *JAOS* 94 (1974), pp. 385–387; J.-M. Agasse, "Le transfert de mérite dans le bouddhisme pâli classique", *Journal asiatique* 1978, pp. 311–332; J. Filiozat, "Sur le domaine sémantique de *punya*", *Indianisme et bouddhisme, Mélanges E. Lamotte*, Louvain-La-Neuve, 1980, pp. 101–116; O. Oguibénine, "La daksinā dans le Rgveda et le transfert de mérite dans le bouddhisme", *Indological and Buddhist Studies* (Festschrift J. W. de Jong), Canberra, 1982, pp. 393–414; M. Hara, "A Note on the Sādhina Jātaka", *ZDMG, Supplement VII: XXII. Deutscher Orientalistentag*, Stuttgart, 1985, pp. 308–314. See also *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, vol. 1, fasc. 4, Colombo, 1965, pp. 747–750.

<sup>12</sup> For the references see H. Bechert, "Notes on the Formation", pp. 16f.

<sup>13</sup> See H. Bechert, "Über das Apadānabuch", *WZKSJ* 2 (1958), pp. 1–21.

<sup>14</sup> NAWG 1973, pp. 46–49.

<sup>15</sup> This understanding of *buddhakkhetta* is reproduced in later Theravāda literature. See, e.g. the passage translated in R. Spence Hardy, *A Manual of Buddhism*, London, 1853, p. 2.

<sup>16</sup> Dwijendralal Barua, "Buddhakkhetta in the Apadāna", *B.C. Law Volume*, ed. by D. R. Bhandarkar et al., Part 2, Poona, 1946, pp. 183–190.

<sup>17</sup> G. Schopen, "Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism", *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 10 (1984), pp. 9–47.

<sup>18</sup> Lambert Schmithausen, "Critical Response", *Karma and Rebirth: Post Classical Developments*, ed. R. W. Neufeldt, Albany, N.Y., 1986, pp. 203–230; cf. particularly pp. 210–216.

<sup>19</sup> Schopen, op. cit., p. 32.

<sup>20</sup> G. Fussman, "Documents épigraphiques kouchans", *BEFEO* 61 (1974), p. 56.

<sup>21</sup> Schopen, op. cit., p. 34.

<sup>22</sup> Schopen, op. cit., pp. 35f.

<sup>23</sup> Schopen, op. cit., p. 36.

<sup>24</sup> Schopen, op. cit., pp. 38f.

<sup>25</sup> Schopen, op. cit., pp. 43f. and ib., "Mahāyāna in Indian Inscriptions", *Indo-Iranian Journal* 21 (1979), pp. 13f.

<sup>26</sup> Schopen, op. cit., p. 45 referring to S. Paranavitana, *Inscriptions of Ceylon*, vol. 1, Colombo, 1970, nos. 34 and 338–341.

<sup>27</sup> *Académie Royale de Belgique, Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morale et Politiques*, 5e sér., 62 (1976), pp. 27–51.

<sup>28</sup> Schopen, op. cit., p. 47.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. H. Bechert, "Notes on the Formation of Buddhist Sects and the Origins of Mahāyāna", *German Scholars on India*, vol. 1, Varanasi, 1973, pp. 17f.

<sup>30</sup> Schmithausen, op. cit., pp. 210–212.

<sup>31</sup> Schmithausen, op. cit., p. 212.

<sup>32</sup> See H. Bechert, "The Beginnings of Buddhist Literature: An Examination of a Recent Theory", *Let ex Litterae, Essays on Ancient Indian Law and Literature in Honour of Oscar Boto*, *Indologica Taurinensia* (forthcoming).

<sup>33</sup> Schmithausen, op. cit., p. 213.

## CONNECTIONS BETWEEN ASOKAN (SHAHBAZGARHI) AND NIYA PRAKRIT?\*

Asokan studies have more than once benefitted by Mr. K. R. Norman's patient and unprejudiced labour, thanks to which it has often been possible, in particular, to recognize the correct readings and the original wording or purport of the emperor's proclamations. As a tribute to this untiring and friendly scholar, I may be permitted to submit a short list of grammatical features which, as far as Asoka's inscriptions are concerned, appear as characteristic of the Sh epigraphs, and which, on the other hand, specifically agree with the usage of the later Niya Kharoṣṭhi documents. The present paper, therefore, will only consider some details in as much as they are significant in this connection. Though many have been mentioned in previous studies, it seems that more and firmer conclusions can be reached nowadays.<sup>1</sup>

As far as the general characteristics of the N-W Prakrits are concerned they are well known<sup>2</sup> and need not be repeated here. As for the main features common to Niya and both the Sh and Ma edicts, they have been listed by T. Burrow. Nevertheless some refinements can be added to the data collected in his 1936 survey of BSOS and his valuable book *The Language of the Kharoṣṭhi documents*.<sup>3</sup>

In particular, there can be little doubt that similarities are more numerous between Ni and Sh than between Ni and Ma. In itself this is not surprising, as it is clear that the language of the Ma edicts shows unequivocal Eastern influences.<sup>4</sup> But there is more to it: it can be shown that various idiosyncracies of Sh, far from being haphazard or erratic, are genuine Gdh forms. Hence the description and history of this variety of MIA could gain in accuracy and consistency.

1. Concerning phonology, only a few remarks will be added to T. Burrow's and K. R. Norman's lists.

1.1. For the development of the vowel Sk (*r*) into *ri* or *ru* in Niya, Burrow quotes the possible spellings *kriṭa* . . . ~ *krīṭa*, etc. (BSOS 419 f.; LKhD 5; compare, for Sh Ma, CII p. LXXXIV; XCVII). J. Bloch notes that the interpretation of the Sh-Ma reflex is not easy (§6). Though, in such matters, statistical results cannot be taken at their face value, nevertheless it can be

observed that, while Ma more than once writes *kaṭ(a)*,<sup>5</sup> Sh mostly has *kiṭ(a)*,<sup>6</sup> as well as the typical *kiṭr(a)*, whether the a.v. is used freely (V (D) Sh *kiṭram* ~ Ma *kate*), or at the beginning of the compound *kiṭraṇāta* (VII (F), in which, in fact, *-i-* seems widespread (Ma Er *kiṭanata*)). Elsewhere Sh writes *kri-* (II (A), on which CII p. LXXXV n. 1, ubi alia), compare *vistriṭena* (XIV (A), Ma is damaged). On the whole, therefore, the Sh development (with prevailing *-i-*) seems more in tune with the usual Gdh trend (cf. LKhD 5).

1.2. As for consonants, several developments (not found in Ma) are common to Ni and Sh. Burrow mentions (*ñj*) > *ñ*, (*ny*) > *ñ* (BSOS 420), to which can be added (*jñ*) > *ñ*: Sk (*rājñ-*) Sh *raño*, *raña* (~ Ma *rajino*, *rajina*) (LKhD 44).

After a long vowel, there are examples of *-j-* becoming *-y-* in Ni (LKhD 17; cf. GDhp §32); the same process takes place in Sh, *Kamboya*, *raya*, *samaya* (*samāja*) being frequently quoted (BSOS 420; J. Bloch §11). K. R. Norman<sup>7</sup> observes the same phenomenon after a short vowel, in Sh I (B): *prayuhotave* (~ Ma *prajohi-*), for which some counterparts exist also in Ni (LKhD 17). This gerundive is curious as it seems to have been influenced by a dialect foreign to Sh (*jive* // *prayuhotave*: with the nom.-acc. ending *-e*, cf. GDhp §22a).

In various contexts, the typical Sh developments are grouped together, e.g. in I (D-E). In the Sh version, apart from the characteristic Gdh *draṣi-* (common to Sh and Ma [Sk *darśi-*]), not only is *-y-* written for OIA intervocalic *-j-* (supra), but OIA *-y-* has disappeared (cf. GDhp §37); moreover the ending *-ā* could have been palatalized in *samaye* (nom. pl. according to Franke).<sup>8</sup> In turn *samaye* could have prompted *sasumate*. Thus Sh and Ma are clearly contrasted: (Sh) *bahuka hi doṣa samayaspi devanapriye priadraṣi-* (~ Ma: *priya-*) *raya* (~ Ma: *raja*) *dakhati. asti pi cu ekati.* (~ Ma: *ekatiya*) *samaye* (~ Ma: *samaja*; Er Ka DhJg Gi: *samājā*) *sasumate* (~ Ma: *sadhūmata*) *devanapiasa* (~ Ma: *priyasa*) *priadraṣisa* (~ Ma: *priya-*) *raño* (~ Ma: *rajine*). Considering the phonological context, it will seem not improbable that *sasu-* (*sādhu-*)<sup>9</sup> does "indicate the development of the intervocalic stop to a [z]", a change sporadically observed in the Ni documents as well as in the Gdhp (LKhD §50; GDhp §43; ubi alia).

2. A systematic investigation of the palatalization of vowels including the Asoka material, has been conducted by K. R. Norman himself, and there would be no point in re-examining the data here.<sup>10</sup>

2.1. As for labialisation, though it has also been scrutinised by the same scholar,<sup>11</sup> the Sh material lends itself to further analysis, especially because, more than once, morphological phenomena are involved.

As examples of labialisation of vowels, K. R. Norman, in his 1976 paper, quotes and sometimes comments: §2.6 "After *m*: Aś. *dhramo* < Skt. *dharmam* (this could be before *-m*"); §3.7 "Before *m*: Aś. *anudivaso* = Aś. *anudivasam*; Aś. *iyō* = Aś. *iyam*; Aś. *śako* = Aś. *saka(m)*"; and, §2.11, "After (*v*)*v* developed from *v* + consonant: Aś. *-tavo* < Skt. *-tavyam* (this could be before *m*)". K. R. Norman also remarks that all the *-tavo* occurrences are from Sh, and he compares the Niya usage (p. 48 n. 51).

As a matter of fact, not only *-tavo*, but *all* the above examples, as well as several others (infra), occur precisely in Sh. It would thus appear that they probably represent specific Gdh trends — all the more so as most of the other MIA examples in K. R. Norman's lists are taken from the GDhp or from the Niya documents. On the other hand, the Ma counterparts of the Sh occurrences are generally written *-a(m)*, or *-e*. Thus, XII (I) Sh *dhramo* *ṣruneyu*, "they should listen to the Law" (~ Ma *dhramam*; compare GDhp 3 *dharmo vi'ane'a* ~ Dhp 392 *dhammam vijāneyya*); I (F) Sh *anudivaso* (~ Ma *-divasa*); XII (D) Sh *iyō mula* (~ Ma *iyam mule*); XIII (L) Sh *śako* *ch'amanaye* (Ma is missing).

2.2. Some more examples can be added, which would suggest further remarks.

Other pronominal *-o* forms occur in Sh, especially the anaphoric, nom.-acc. nt. sg., so: IX (H) Sh *so vatavo pituna* (~ Ma *se vataviye* ~ Gi *ta*; compare XI (D) *etaṃ vatavo pituna*, "therefore a father . . . ought to say", CII). In particular, it is used as a particle (Sk. *tad*) to introduce a sentence (~ Ma *se* ~ Gi *ta*): IV (B) Sh *so aja devanam priyasa . . .* (~ Ma *se aja* ~ Gi *ta aja*), "but now . . ." (CII); V (D) Sh *kalanam dukaram* // *so maya bahu kal(an)am kiṭram* (~ Ma *tam* ~ Gi *ta*), "now, by me many virtuous deeds have been performed" (CII); XIII (K) Sh *so, yamatro jano* // *hato* (~ Gi *yāvatako . . .*), "now, as many as were slain . . ."; XIV (E) Sh *so siya va atra kice . . .* (~ Ma *se . . .* ~ Gi *tatra ekadā* // *asa*), "but some of this may have been . . ." (CII). This *so* is clearly an equivalent of *tam*, used similarly: VI (C) Sh *tam maya evam kiṭam* (~ Ma *ta* ~ Gi *ta*), "but I have made the following (arrangement)" (CII).<sup>12</sup>

2.3. In a favourable context, Sh is also seen to use the relative (indefinite) *yo* (*pi*): X (A) Sh *añatra yo pi yaśo* // *ichati* (~ Ma *yam pi yaśo*), "whatever



glory // he desires // that . . ." (CII). Similarly, the GDhp uses *yo* (acc.) corresponding to Pa *yam* (231; 241; cf. GDhp index).

Thus definite grammatical categories appear to have favoured the equivalence Sh *-o* ~ Ma *-a(m)* or *-e*. This observation matches the Niya morphology, where the nom.-acc. sg. of various pronouns seems to be fixed and shows an *-o* ending; e.g. *iyo* (LKhD 82; cf. Sh supra); or "yo for all genders" (ib. 85).<sup>13</sup> In this respect also Sh and Niya appear to have affinities which Ma lacks.

It could be assumed that in the above syntagma *añatra yo pi*, the relative is used in an adverbial function<sup>14</sup> exactly as *anudivaso* (supra), which is a fixed adverbial form. On the other hand, in Niya, *yo* is seen to introduce subordinate clauses (LKhD 127; E. J. Rapson and P. S. Noble, *Kharoṣṭhi Inscriptions* III (Oxford 1929), index s.v. *yo = yad*).

2.4. There could thus have been some general Gdh tendency to use *-o* as a sort of invariant marker (cf. MIA *kho = khalu*). Consequently, the above pronominal particles could have attracted the emphatic *yo* (~ *ca yo*), to which K. R. Norman has drawn attention,<sup>15</sup> as well as *vo*. The gerundive form *sako* (as well as *-tavo*) would not contradict such an assumption (infra). As for *yo*, K. R. Norman, following CII, lists altogether 4 (perhaps 5) occurrences, of which 3 (4?) are from Sh, but only 1 from Ma. Similarly *vo* occurs 8 times in Sh, only twice in Ma.

2.5. The ending of the nom. sg. of the *-a-* stems will be left out of the present survey: the distinction between the Sh and Ma usage, which has often been considered as comparatively clear cut (BSOS 420 f.; J. Bloch §17), is in fact relatively complex (cf. CII p. XC), and the Gdh usage will have to be examined further (cf. GDhp §§75 f.).

3. As far as the verb is concerned, Burrow (BSOS 420) notes the following common features between the "Niya Prakrit" and the "Kharoṣṭhi versions of Aśoka":

- (6) The primary endings are appended to the optative.
- (7) Indeclinable participles in *-ti*.
- (8) Infinitives in *-anaye*".

3.1. The case of the absolutive in *-ti* is comparatively simple. Though it is not particularly frequent in any text, it appears as typical of (spoken?) Gdh; for it is attested not only in the Asokan Sh Ma inscriptions, but also in the

Niya Documents and the GDhp (Gdhp §80, ubi alia). Burrow quotes "Aśoka *tīḥiti, draṣeti, vijinīti, aloceṭi*" (BSOS 420; cf. LKhD 102).

But one point should be emphasised: whereas, among these, *one* item is from Ma, IV (B) Ma *draṣeti* (~ Sh *draṣayitu* ~ Ka Dh *dasayitu*), "having shown", the three others are all from Sh:

IV (F) Sh *tīḥiti* (~ Ma Er Ka Dh *cīḥitu*), "having abided by"; XIII (D) *vijinīti* (~ Er Ka *vijinītu*, Ma Gi are damaged), "having conquered"; XIV (E) Sh *aloceti* (~ Er Ka *ālocayitu*, Ma is damaged), "having considered".

Once more, the proportion (Sh 3 ~ Ma 1) points to stronger links between Sh and Niya, and the Gdh Prakrits.

3.2. As for the infinitive in *-anaye* (Niya *-amnae*, LKhD §103), Asoka has *one* example, and that precisely in Sh, where it modifies *śako* (*śakyam*, supra). It is therefore used in a clear Gdh context, XIII (L) Sh *yam śako ch'amanaye* (~ Gi *ya saka chamitave*, Ma is damaged), "what can be forgiven is to be forgiven" (CII). Once more a specific Gdh feature is shared by Sh and Niya.

3.3. Another verbal form common to both Niya and Sh is the 3rd sg. *ahati*, corresponding to Sk *āha* (CII p. XCVI; LKhD 96). In Niya there is no other form for this verb. In Sh it occurs 5 times. Once, in III (A), it is preceded by *raja*. Elsewhere the royal subject is clad in Gdh phonetics, viz. *raya* (supra 1.2). This *ahati* is consistently used in the recurring opening emphatic formula which, in Ma, generally reads *raja evam aha*. But Sh writes: IX (A) *raya evam ahati*; V (A) = XI (A) *raya evam hahati*; VI (A) has the graphic (?) variant *raya eva ahati*. Exceptionally Sh III (A) writes *raja ahati* (~ Ma *raja eva aha*), that is more or less the counterpart of V (A) IX (A) Ka *lājā āhā*.

CII observes that this verb is usually preceded by *eva(m)*, "consequently *ti* cannot have the meaning 'thus'" (p. 52 n. 11). In fact, the redundant use of the particle should probably not be ruled out; at the same time, this form being used with a present meaning, the analogical adjunction of the 3rd. person common *-ti* marker is but natural.<sup>16</sup>

3.4. Whereas most scholars appear to accept *ahati* as a unitary form,<sup>17</sup> the interpretation of the Sh optative ending *-eya(-)ti* gives rise to some controversy.

According to Burrow, in both the Sh edicts and the Niya documents, "the primary endings are appended to the optative; Aśoka: *paṭipajeyati*,

*apakareyati, nivatēyati*" (BSOS 420; cf. LKhD 100). Why he does not mention *siyati* (~ *siya*) is not said.<sup>18</sup> In fact, from his discussion it would appear that the Gdh development of *-eyati* cannot really be examined apart from the common MIA evolution. Further it will be seen that, even in the time of Asoka, the sequence *-eyā(-)ti, siyā(-)ti* occurs also outside the Gdh area. The Asokan data is reviewed below.

XIII (L) Sh *yo pi ca apakareyati* (CII, U.S., but *-eya ti* J. B. ~ Er *apakaleya*; Ma, etc. are damaged), "whoever should wrong him",<sup>19</sup>

IX (J) Sh *siya vo // nivatēyati* (CII, but *-eya ti* J.B., U.S. ~ Ma *nivatēya* ~ Ka *nivatēyā* ~ Er *nivatayeyā*), "one may attain" (CII);<sup>20</sup>

XIV (D) Sh *yena jana tatha paṭipajeyati* (CII, J.B., U.S. ~ Ma *paṭipajeyati* CII, J.B. U.S. ~ DhJg *paṭipajeyāti* CII p. 91 n. 2, J.B., but *-eyā ti* CII ed. p. 91 l.3, U.S. ~ Ka Er *paṭipajeyā* ~ Gi *paṭipajetha*).<sup>21</sup>

X (C) DhJg write *huveyā ti* (CII, J.B. U.S.), where all the other edicts (except Gi) have *siyā(-)ti*.

Thus it seems that on the one hand the ending *-eya(-)ti* ~ *-eyā(-)ti* is not confined to the NW; on the other hand, it is more frequent, perhaps more "regular", in Sh than elsewhere (Sh 3 ~ DhJg 2 ~ Ma 1).

The interpretation of *siyā(-)ti* is still more problematic. CII (index) quotes two examples from Sh, one from Ma. But the adjunction of *ti* after *siyā* could be more widespread. The occurrences are respectively Sh 2 ~ Ka 2 ~ Er 1 (~ DhJg *huveyā ti*, supra). Thus, apparently a form *siyā(-)ti* is neither restricted to Sh (Ma) nor to a particular position in the sentence (though it probably tends to occur towards the end of the syntagma). In the same phrase, the same edict is seen to oscillate between *siya* and *siyati*:

XII (L) Sh *kiti salu-vadhī siyati savra-praśadanaṃ* (CII, J.B., U.S. ~ Ma Er *siyā* ~ Ka *siyā s. ti* ~ Gi *asa*), "that all sects should progress"; but

XII (B) Sh *kiti salu-vadhī siya savra-praśamḍanaṃ* (~ Ka *siyāti ś.*, CII, J.B., U.S.) ~ Ma *siya savra-praśadana ti* ~ Er *siyā s.* ~ Gi *asa s.*

In X (C), at the end of the sentence, all the edicts (except Gi) write *ti* after *siyā*: Sh *kiti sakale // siyati* (CII, J.B., but *siya ti*, U.S. ~ DhJg *huveyā ti*, CII, J.B., U.S.), "in order that all may be" (CII). In this phrase, Ma Er Ka even duplicate *ti*: Ma *kiti s. siyati ti*, CII, J.B. ~ Ka *siyāti ti*, CII, J.B.; but Ma *siya ti ti* ~ Er *siyā ti ti*, U.S.).<sup>22</sup>

In X, it could be argued that while the last *ti* marks the end of the sentence, the first closes the "quotation" initiated by *ki(m)ti*. In fact, it seems that the adjunction of *ti* rather contributes to the emphasis of the predicate. For when the emphasis is expressed by some other means, e.g. the repetition of parallel phrases in parallel sentences (XII (D) Sh *kiti // no siya // lahuka va siya . . .*), or when the verb enters an adverbial phrase, Sh

appears to use not *siyati* but *siya*, e.g., IX (J) *siya vo // nivatēyati*, "maybe one could attain . . .", or XIV (E) Sh *so siya va atra kice // likhitaṃ*, "but maybe some of this has been written".

To sum up: in the Asokan epigraphs generally there is a marked tendency for the 3rd. sg. opt. *-eyā* and for *siyā* to be followed by an element *(-)ti*. Whether this accretion etymologically represents the particle *ti* (*iti*) or the verbal primary ending *-ti* — or perhaps one or the other according to the dialectal area, is an open question.<sup>23</sup> However that may be there is no doubt that *-eyāti* has spread consistently in Sh, more than in Ma or elsewhere: in this respect Sh appears as anticipating the Niya paradigm. To that extent, it can be maintained that *-eyati* is, in Sh, the normal Gdh opt. ending.<sup>24</sup>

4. The Sh reflex of the Sk (*-tavya*) gerundive lends itself remarkably well to a comparison with the Niya usage (LKhD 53; 116), a fact which has more or less escaped attention. In Niya, forms in *-tavya* (*-davya*) are seen to alternate with *-tavo* (*-davo*). Further the agent is normally in the genitive, as in "345: *taha sarva śramana Anamḍasenaṣa viyoṣidavo huda* 'And so everything was to be paid by the monk Anandasena'" (LKhD 119). Both features characterise the Sh gerundive syntagma. The following forms occur.

4.1. Forms in *-tavi(y)a* (3): 1 occurs iic., XIII (L) *ch'āmitaviya-* (~ Er *khamataviya-*), "is to be forgiven"; 1 acc. sg., XIII (X) *navam vijayam ma vijetavia mañiṣu* (~ Ma Er *-taviyam* ~ Gi *-tavyam*), "they should not think a fresh conquest to be made"; 1 nom. pl., XII (E) *pujetaviya va cu parapraśamḍa* (Er Ka Gi *-pasamḍā*), "other sects ought to be duly honoured" (CII).

4.2. Forms in *-tava* (2): 1 nom., I (C) *no pi ca samaja-kaṭava* (~ Ma *samaje kaṭaviye* ~ Gi *samājo katavyo*), "no festival meetings must be held" (CII); 1 nom. sg., I (B) *no kici jive // prayuhotave* (~ Ma *prajohitaviye*), "no living being must be // sacrificed" (CII).

4.3. Forms in *-tavo*, either without or with an agent expressed (respectively 4, from 2 verbs; 3, from 1 verb):

(i) VI (F) *yam pi ca kici // paṭivedetavo me* (~ Ma DhJg *-vedetaviye* ~ Gi *-tavyam*), "whatever // it must be reported to me";

(ii) *kaṭavo* occurs three times, in almost the same sentence: IX (D) *so kaṭavo ca va kho maṃgala* (~ Ma *kaṭaviye*), "now, ceremonies should

certainly be practised" (CII); (H) *imaṃ sadhu imaṃ kaṭavo maṃgalaṃ* (~ Ma *-ṭaviye*); XI (D) *imaṃ sadhu imaṃ kaṭavo* (~ Ma *-ṭaviye*).

(iii) In IX (H) and XI (D), *kaṭavo* is announced by *vatavo*, "it should be said", in a phrase which recurs, with a variant, in XII (K). Thus, IX (H) *so vatavo pituna* ... (~ Ma Ka Er Dh *se vataviye* ~ Gi *ta vatavyam*); XI (D) *etaṃ vatavo pituna* ... (~ Ma *eṣe vataviye pituna* ... ~ Gi *eta vatavyam pitā*); in XII (K) the agent is a pronoun, *ye ca // teṣaṃ vatavo* (~ Ma Er Ka *tehi vataviye* ~ Gi *tehi vatavyam*). As emphasised by U. Schneider,<sup>25</sup> the message is evidently the same in the three phrases: "by their father ... (/ by them) it should be said: 'this is to be done'", or, better: "their father ... (/ they) should tell them" (IX, XI/XII). The construction in XII tallies exactly with the Niya syntax (supra 4).

4.4. Several remarks can be made: (1) the *-tavo* endings are specific of Sh and Niya. (2) They are not prompted solely by the phonetic environment (< *-tavyam*): neither by the nasal (*-m* ~ *-ṃ*: contrast the acc. *vijetavia* in X), nor by the rhythm (*katavo* = *vatavo* [---] but (*paṭi*)*vedetavo* [----]). (3) This form appears to always replace a nt. (nom.-acc.) sg.: in fact, it recalls the other Niya invariant *-o* forms (compare *śako* (*śakyam*), supra 2.4), and could be viewed as an equivalent of an impersonal imperative (compare LKhD 98). (4) Taking into account the above similarities between Niya and Sh on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the parallelism between the recommendations expressed in IX (H) XI (D) and XII (K), the probability is that the gen. construction in XII corresponds to the instrumental agents of IX = XI: an assumption evidently reinforced by the fact that, in Niya, the genitive construction with the gerundive is the normal one (supra). Therefore, despite the hesitations shown, since Antiquity, by translators, there can now be little doubt that XII (K) means "The sympathisers should say".<sup>26</sup>

4.5. This is not the only passage where Sh uses the gen. of the agent where the other RE have an instrumental. In I (A), Sh *alone* writes *aya dhramadipi* (sic) *devanapriasa* (sic) *raṇo likhapitu*, which contrasts with the instr. in Ma and elsewhere: *devanaṃpriyena priyadraśina rajina likhapita* (~ Er *lajina* ~ DhJg *lājina* ~ Gi *rāñā*). Thus this syntax obtains whether the agent is expressed by a pronoun or a noun. Though the type '*mana* (*mama*) *krtaṃ*' is well established in Indo-Iranian,<sup>27</sup> nevertheless the gen. in Sh I (A) is all the more remarkable as it is associated with the a.v. of a causative base — it thus occurs in a syntagma where the instrumental is well accredited.

The precise concordances which have just been described are specific and recurrent: they cannot be fortuitous but point to a comparatively close relationship (in certain areas) between Sh and Niya.

Taking all the above evidence together, there can be little doubt that, if examined closely, the Sh edicts show more than superficial or casual points of affinity with the Niya Prakrit. Several specific morphological and morphosyntactic features are exactly similar in both and are distinct from the common MIA usage — with which on the whole Ma generally complies. This is all the more remarkable considering the difference in country, epoch and style which separate Niya and Shahbazgarhi. The above specific trends, clearly recognizable as they are in Sh, have naturally developed considerably more in Niya; and it is thanks to the fact that they do occur abundantly in the Kharoṣṭhi documents from Niya that it is possible to identify and interpret them in the Sh Asokan epigraphs. Therefore, to conclude, this Shahbazgarhi administrative language appears as an important, authentic reflex of the III cent. B. C. Gandhari Prakrit.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Some have been mentioned casually in my papers 'Sur l'authenticité linguistique des édits d'Asoka', in Caillat, C. ed.: 1989, *Dialectes dans les littératures indo-aryennes* (Institut de Civilisation Indienne 55, Paris), pp. 413—432 (p. 426 n. 69, 70, with an add. p. 432); 'Notes grammaticales sur les documents kharoṣṭhi de Niya', in Haneda, A. ed.: 1990, *Documents et archives provenant de l'Asie Centrale* (Association Franco-Japonaise des Etudes Orientales, Kyoto), pp. 9—24 (p. 24 n. 37).

<sup>2</sup> E.g. preservation of the distinction between the three orders of sibilants; of consonant clusters with R; weakness of the aspiration, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Burrow, T.: 1936, 'The dialectical position of the Niya Prakrit', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies* 8, pp. 419—435. — Id.: 1937, *The language of the Kharoṣṭhi documents from Chinese Turkestan* (Cambridge at the University Press).

<sup>4</sup> To this extent the contrast between the Sh and Ma varieties of Gdh is clear. The present paper should accessorially show that other distinctive features can be tracked (on this point, doubts have been expressed by G. Fussman, 'Gāndhārī écrite, gāndhārī parlée', in *Dialectes* (pp. 433—501), p. 440 n. 18.

<sup>5</sup> II (A) ~ Er Ka *kaṭā*; V (D) *kaṭe* (also in Er Ka Dh ~ Gi *katam*); V (I) *kaṭa* (Ka Dh *katā* ~ Gi *katā*).

<sup>6</sup> V (I); VI (C) *kūṭam* (also in Ma); V (L) *kūṭabhikaro* for which Ma has the hybrid (?) *katra-* (~ Ka Dh *kaṭā*).

<sup>7</sup> Norman, K. R.: 1970, 'Some aspects of the phonology of the Prakrit underlying the Asokan inscriptions', *BSOAS* 33, p. 137 (= CP I p. 100).

<sup>8</sup> Quoted in Woolner Gl. s.v.; cf. GDhp §22a.

<sup>9</sup> In I (E), the "inflectional" ending of Sh *samaye* seems to have attracted but little attention. Woolner I p. XXVII lists Sh "*ekatīe samaye*" among the nom. sg. of *-a-* stems, thus as a "Magadhism" — but (ib. n.) refers to his Glossary, s.v., where he quotes Franke's analysis of the form as a plural: the latter would, in effect, agree with all the other versions

(Er Ka Jg: *ekatiyā samājā* ~ Gi: *ekacā samājā*). In Sh, Bühler had read the pronoun as *ekatie* (CII p. 51 n. 4; also see J. Bloch p. 92, n. 13, referring to Pa n. pl. *ekacce*).

Could these *-e* endings (*ekatie* (?), *samaye*) have some affinity with the Niya "plural in *-e*" which is regularly employed in the case of the suffix *-i*" as well as in various other words, e.g. in *avaśithe*, "remaining", etc. (LKhD 60)? In any case *samaye* could be seen as one more example of "palatalization of vowels in Middle Indo-Aryan", which has been studied by K. R. Norman in his 'Middle Indo-Aryan studies XIII' and 'XVI', *Journal of the Oriental Institute* (Baroda) 25, 1976, pp. 328–342 = CP I pp. 220–237; 32, 1983, pp. 276–278.

Of course, one should keep in mind J. Brough's remark: "in many places it would seem that we have little more than faith to guide us if we attempt to decide whether a given instance of *-e/-i* is a 'Māgadhan' survival, or a Gāndhārī palatalization", GDhp §77.

As for III (B), IV (K), Sh *badaya-vasa* (~ Ma: *duvadaśa-*), "12 years", which contrast with V (I) *todaśa*, "13", VIII (C) *daśa*, "ten", perhaps it should be remembered that in the Ni documents, "there is some difficulty in deciding between *y* and *ś*" (LKhD 17).

<sup>9</sup> The reading *sasu* (which Prof. H. Nakatani kindly checked for me) is certain, cf. *Dialectes*, p. 426 n. 70.

CII views *sasu* as an error ("read *sadhu*", p. 51 n. 5); so does, it seems, G. Fussman, *Dialectes*, p. 464 n. 42.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. n. 8.

<sup>11</sup> Norman, K. R.: 1976, 'The labialisation of vowels in Middle Indo-Aryan', *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 2, pp. 41–58 (= CP I pp. 247–261); also in 'Middle Indo-Aryan studies XVI' (cf. supra n. 8), pp. 278 f.

<sup>12</sup> On the connecting particles in the edicts, J. Bloch §50.

<sup>13</sup> Compare the personal pronouns, 1. sg. GDhp *aho*, *ahu* (GDhp index), Niya *ahu* (LKhD 78); 2. sg. *uo* (LKhD 79).

<sup>14</sup> Cf., in OIA prose, A. Debrunner-J. Wackernagel, *Altindische Grammatik* 3, p. 555 f.

<sup>15</sup> Norman, K. R.: 1967, 'Notes on the Aśokan Rock Edicts', '2. *yo*, *ye* = *eva*', *Indo-Iranian Journal* 10, pp. 161–163 (= CP I pp. 48–50), referring to CII. The latter recalls that, according to Michelson, *yo* is a form of the relative pronoun (CII p. LXXXV).

<sup>16</sup> Cf. J. Bloch, p. 95 n. 1.

<sup>17</sup> But Woolner, in his edition, steadily prints *aha ti* (two words). Cf. Bühler, quoted in CII p. XCVI and 52 n. 11. K. L. Janert also refers to Bühler, and suggests that, in the Kharoṣṭhī script, *ti* could have been the substitute of the vowel lengthening used elsewhere to indicate a quotation, Janert, K. L.: 1972, *Abstände und Schlussvokalverzeichnungen in Aśoka-Inschriften* (Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, Wiesbaden, Verzeichnis der Orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, Supplementband 10), p. 91 §39 H).

<sup>18</sup> These 4 are quoted in CII p. XCVI, where it is stated that they "have the termination of the indicative"; compare J. Bloch, p. 119, n. 7.

Woolner, in his 'Outline of Asokan grammar' (§51), does not mention these endings, and, in his edition, systematically writes *-eya ti*; cf. J. Bloch §41, and infra n. 19, 20. Also note the hesitations in the transcriptions (passim, cf. infra n. 21).

Janert, l.c., p. 91 §39 (G) (H), examines the comparable double *ti* after an imperative in the Tōpra Pillar Edict 2 (G): *hotū = ti = ti*, cf. his edition p. 129 (~ *hotūti* in the other versions). P. 91, he suggests "das erste *ti* // als Rezitierungskennzeichnung und das zweite *ti* // als Zitierungskennzeichnung". On this passage, CII p. 121, n. 1, ubi alia.

<sup>19</sup> "Ce *ti* embarrassé; on attend un indicatif", J. Bloch, p. 129 n. 14.

<sup>20</sup> "Sh. *ti* étonne... un indicatif réel serait possible", J. Bloch, p. 116 n. 11. U. Schneider, n. 82 p. 101, accepts Bloch's hypothesis that *ti* could have been misplaced.

<sup>21</sup> With CII p. 91 n. 2, compare ib., p. 71 n. 14; p. 40 n. 1.

<sup>22</sup> Niklas, U.: 1990, *Die Editionen der Aśoka-Inschriften von Erragudi* (VGH Wissenschaftsverlag, Bonn), p. 96f., reads (on the ESI plate): = (śi)(yā)(ti) = (ti).

<sup>23</sup> The details of the evolution in consequence of which *-eyā* (etc.) gave way to *-eyāti* escape us. Undoubtedly though, it was made easier by the fact that the opt. often is used to express a general present. Further, the analogy of the rest of the paradigm favours the spreading of *-eyāti*, cf. the parallel phrases, one in the opt., the other in the future, Sep II, Dh (M) *ena // yujisamti* ~ Jg (N) *yujeyū*.

<sup>24</sup> The generalization of the 3rd. sg. marker *-ti* in Niya gives rise to such forms as *huati*, probably based on the a.v. *hua* (*huda*, Sk *bhūta*), cf. Balbir, N.: 1990, 'A propos du verbe "être" à Niya', in Haneda, A. ed.: 1990. *Documents* (reference supra, n. 1), pp. 25–34 (32). P. 115; 139 (quoted in my 'Notes grammaticales' [supra n. 1], ubi alia).

<sup>25</sup> Cf. U. Schneider, ib., also Christol, A.: 1983, 'Les édits grecs d'Aśoka', *Journal Asiatique* 271, pp. 25–42 (p. 28f.).

<sup>27</sup> Cardona, G.: 1970, 'The Indo-Iranian construction *mana* (*mama*) *krtam*', *Language* 46, pp. 1–12, quoted in Haudry, J.: 1977, *L'emploi des cas en védique* (Ed. L'Hermès, Lyon), pp. 407 ff. (ubia alia). Also Christol, l.c., p. 29 n. 7.

#### \* ABBREVIATIONS

##### Languages:

Gdh = Gāndhārī; MIA = Middle Indo-Aryan; Ni = Niya (Gdh) Pk; OIA = Old Indo-aryan; Pa = Pāli; Pk = Prakrit; Sk = Sanskrit.

##### Asoka R(ock) E(dicts):

As = Asoka; DhJg = Dhāuli and Jaugada; Er = Erragudi; Gi = Girnār; Ka = Kālsī; Ma = Mānsehrā; Sep = DhJg Separate edicts; Sh = Shāhbāzgarhī.

##### Books and articles:

J.B., J. Bloch = Bloch, J.: 1950, *Les inscriptions d'Asoka* (Paris, Les Belles Lettres, Collection Emile Senart) [indications of §§ refer to the paragraphs in the Introduction linguistique, pp. 43–88].

BSOS = Burrow, T.: 1936, 'The dialectical position of the Niya Prakrit', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies* 8, pp. 419–435.

CII = Hultzsch, E.: 1925, *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum I, Inscriptions of Asoka* (Clarendon Press, Oxford).

*Dialectes* = Caillat, C. ed.: 1989, *Dialectes dans les littératures indo-aryennes* (Institut de Civilisation Indienne 55, Paris).

*Documents* = Haneda, A. ed.: 1990, *Documents et Archives provenant de l'Asie Centrale* (Association Franco-Japonaise des Etudes Orientales, Kyoto).

GDhp = Brough, J.: 1962, *The Gāndhārī Dharmapada* (Oxford University Press, School of Oriental and African Languages, University of London, London Oriental Series 7).

LKhD = Burrow, T.: 1937, *The Language of the Kharoṣṭhī Documents from Chinese Turkestan* (Cambridge at the University Press) [the references are to the paragraphs].

(Norman) CP = Norman, K. R.: 1990, *Collected Papers, Volume I* (Oxford, The Pali Text Society).

U.S., U. Schneider = Schneider, U.: 1978, *Die grossen Felsen-Edikte Aśokas. Kritische Ausgabe, Uebersetzung und Analyse der Texte* (Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, Freiburger Beiträge zur Indologie 11).

Woolner = Woolner, A. C.: 1924, *Asoka Text and Glossary. Part I, Introduction, Text; Part II, Glossary* (Oxford University Press, London, etc.).

NOTES ON SOME ORAL ASPECTS OF PALI  
LITERATURE<sup>1</sup>

Knowledge in books [is like] money in  
someone else's hands: when you need it, it's  
not there.<sup>2</sup>

Anthropologists and historians of religion have shown in recent years that there is never a simple, once-and-for-all transition from oral to written modes of tradition. For historical purposes, the category of 'the written' should be sub-divided into manuscript (chirographic) and printed texts. Most of the socio-cultural changes which had previously been associated with the advent of writing — such as the allegedly wider availability and verifiability of knowledge in written texts, and the greater extent of literacy skills — are now seen to be more characteristic of the relatively recent change from chirographic to printed literature. In consequence, more attention has come to be paid to the complex interaction between oral and chirographic modes when both coexist, as they have done throughout most of history (and continue to do in many contexts).<sup>3</sup> This paper will deal with some aspects of this issue in the case of the Theravāda Buddhist tradition.

Opinions differ on the evidence for knowledge of writing in India before the time of Aśoka (3rd. century B.C.),<sup>4</sup> but there is universal scholarly consensus that the earliest phase of the Buddhist textual tradition was oral.<sup>5</sup> Common sense might suggest that the new medium, once introduced, would have been used for Buddhist texts at first piecemeal and gradually, but we have no knowledge of any large-scale writing of texts before the statement in the early chronicles (Dīp XX 20—1,<sup>6</sup> Mhv XXXIII 100—1) that both the *tipiṭaka* and its commentary were written down during the reign of Vattagāmaṇi Abhaya in the first century B.C.<sup>7</sup> The aim of this paper is to show how, despite the existence of written texts, the Buddhist tradition remained in various ways also an oral/aural one.<sup>8</sup>

This can be seen already in the edicts of Aśoka:<sup>9</sup> it is unlikely that they were intended to be 'read' by all and sundry, in the modern sense, if only because literacy would not have been extensive at that time. In SepE I and II it is said that they should be 'listened to' (*sotaviyā*) on certain days, chosen astrologically, and also by individuals at other times (Bloch pp. 139, 143): this suggests public recitation. RE 12 (p. 123) wants all sects to be 'learned', 'having heard much'. *bahusrutā*; in PE 7 (p. 169) Aśoka says

that he will arrange for people to hear the Dhamma (*dhammasāvanāni sāvāpayāmi*). The Bairāt/Bhābrā edict recommends seven texts (*dhammapaliyāyāni*) by name, and records Aśoka's wish that monks, nuns, laymen and women should listen (to them) and preserve them (in memory) (*suneyuca; upadhālayeyuca*; pp. 154–5); K. R. Norman has suggested<sup>10</sup> that the term *visvaṃsayitave* in the 'Schism Edict' (p. 153) means 'listen to all (of the inscription)'; and it may be that the reference in RE 14 to 'sweetness' or 'charm' (*mādhuratā*; p. 134) is to the sweet-sounding voices of those who recite his Dhamma-writings (*dhammalipi*) (see below on the 'sweet voice' praised in recitation). There is inscriptional evidence for such public recitations of Pāli texts;<sup>11</sup> and this would seem to be indicated by the verbs used ubiquitously in texts, from all periods, where the audience is asked to listen to what is said, and verbs of speaking are used in relation to the author(s)/reciters:<sup>12</sup> 'I shall expound the commentary to the Jātaka. May the virtuous retain it well in mind while I speak' (*Jātakass' atthavaṇṇanam . . . bhāsissam. bhāsato tam me sādhu gaṇhantu sādhuvo*, Ja I 1;<sup>13</sup> cp. Mil 1 v.5, Dip I 1, 5, IX 1, XVII 4, Mhv I 4, Lp 1 v.6, Cha-k 6, Att 1 v.2, Jinak 1 v.5, Jināl v.2, Thūp v.5, Samantak vv. 4–6, Pañca-g vv. 4, 112, Bu-up 37 vv. 2–4). This is true even of the (probably 17th. c.) *Gandhavaṃsa* (p. 55, v.2), the 'Chronicle of Texts', which details at length the advantages accruing to those who write books or provide the wherewithal to have them written. In some texts one finds passive forms of the verb *anu-suṇāti*, used in the sense 'to be heard or reported (traditionally)' (CPD., s.v.) (Mil 1, Ja V 416); the phrase *evam anusuyyate* introduces most of the stories in the medieval collection *Sihalavathu*, which Ver Eecke (80) translates as 'ainsi est-il rapporté'.

*Vāceti*, the causative from *vac*, to speak, can be used to mean 'teach' (by making the pupil recite after the teacher<sup>14</sup>), but it is also the standard verb for 'read' (in the earlier texts, used of letters at Mhv VIII 7–8, X 48–9, Ja I 452, II 173, VI 403; of gold-plate at Ja II 35, IV 335; of an inscription on a wall at Ja I 8); the double causative *vācāpeti* is used, as when someone has books read (Sv 519, Mp II 214, IV 11), or a verse written on gold leaf (Ja IV 257, Cp-a 147). Among the means recommended at Ps II 91 by which a monk might regain his concentration if unwelcome thoughts arise during meditation are: (i) to recite loudly a text he has learnt (*uggahito dhammakathāpabandho . . . mahāsaddena sajjhāyitabbo*, and (ii) to take from his bag a 'handbook' (*mutthipotthaka*) in which praises of the Buddha and the Dhamma are written, and read it (aloud, *vācentena*). At Mhv XXXVIII 16–8 a novice, by himself under a tree, recites (*sajjhāyati*) from a book (presumably as a means of learning the text by heart). In another story a brahmin reads out some verses from a book of legal judgements: the

text at Ja V 483 has *potthakam olokento āha*, 'looking at the book, he read', where the corresponding passage at Cp-a 252–3 has *potthakam vācento gāthā abhāsi*, 'reading the book (aloud), he recited the verses'. Such oral reading/recitation of books continues even in the nineteenth century *Sāsanaṃsa*, where monks who are directly said to 'write' books (using the verb *likhati* of their activity, a very rare phenomenon in earlier texts<sup>15</sup>) nonetheless read them, or have them read, to audiences who listen (e.g. *bhikkhusaṃghassa majjhe vācāpetvā sunāpesi*, 97; *so ca thero tattha sotārāṇam pariyattim vācervā*, 98–9).

In secondary sources one often reads of monks (and nuns?) who undertook 'book-duty' (*gantha-dhura*) and/or 'meditation-duty' (*vipassanā- or vāsa-dhura*). Many such writers follow Rāhula (56: 159ff.), who speaks here of 'books'; but in chapter XVII of the same work, 'Education', he rightly stresses the predominance of oral/aural learning. Perhaps because of the analogy with the scribal work of European monasticism, *gantha-dhura* may seem to refer to the preservation of written documents: but the word *gantha* must be taken to mean 'text' in general, just as English refers to oral and written 'texts' (cf. D III 94 with Sv 870). In a well-known story, the canonical text of the *Mahāniddeśa* (cited as a *gantha*) is said to have been preserved for posterity when it was learned from the last monk who knew it by heart (Sp 695). In the *Visuddhimagga* (95–7 = III 51–6<sup>16</sup>) a list of hindrances to meditation includes *gantha*; but this is explained as being busy with recitation (*sajjhāya*), etc., and the stories given in explanation all refer to the learning by heart and recitation of texts.<sup>17</sup> Pj II 194–5 records that even a monk who goes to the forest to practice *vāsa-dhura* must have lived with his teacher for five years and learnt by heart the *pātimokkha* and two or three recitation sections of the Suttas. The Buddha told Upāli — who was to become the most learned expert in *Vinaya* — that in the forest one can only fulfil *vāsa-dhura*, whereas living in the monastic community (*saṃghamajjhe* Mp V 69, *aṃhākam . . . santike* Mp I 312, Thag-a I 101) one can do both: he then taught him the *Vinaya* (*uggaṇhāpesi*: see p. 124 and note 23 below on this verb), and Upāli attained Arahatsip through meditation. This story, and others like it (cp. Vism 90–1 = III 31–4) show that the crucial variable here is the necessary presence of others (both monks and laity, as teachers and/or audience) for the recitation of texts in *gantha-dhura*.

As Rāhula says, in traditional education 'the pupil had to listen to and commit to memory the instruction imparted orally by the teacher'.<sup>18</sup> The aim was to make texts *paṇa* and *vācuggata*. The first of these terms, from Sanskrit *praguna*, 'straight (lit. and fig.), right, correct, . . . being in a good

state or condition' (MW), is used in various ways in Pāli, both of texts and those who know them.<sup>19</sup> The English 'familiar' has a comparable double usage, but it is not as strong as *paguṇa*, which means to (be) know(n) perfectly, by heart. When used of texts, it is predicated of them either directly, with the person in the dative or genitive case, or used with the verb *kr*: e.g. *ekass'eva bhikkhuno Mahāniddeso paguṇo ahoṣi* (Sp 695, cp. Ja II 243, Vism 95, III 51, 242, VIII 49), and *pāṭimokkham paguṇam katvā* (Spk III 35, cp. Ja IV 130, Mil 12, Sp 614, Spk I 85, Vism 90 = III 31, 312 = IX 67). At Dip IV. 45, *paguṇako thero* seems to mean 'fluent (in the texts)' (see Gombrich, forthcoming). *Vācuggata* often appears with *paguṇa* (e.g. Sp 234, 788, 790, 792), and is used in the same constructions (with dative/genitive or *kr*). The contexts in which it is used make it clear that it refers to memorising texts, but with the corollary that doing so will enable the learner to recite them (e.g. Mil 10, Sp 983, 990, 1060, Ps III 78, Spk I 262, Vbh-a 389, Bu-up 42, 45, Saddhamm-s 82).<sup>20</sup>

The teaching and learning process is referred to by a number of verbs, and related substantives: the teacher *vāceti*, 'makes (the pupil) recite', *uddisati*, 'teaches/recites';<sup>21</sup> the pupil *suṇāti*, 'listens', *uggaṇhati*, 'grasps (in memory)',<sup>22</sup> *adhīyati* and *pariyāpuṇāti*, 'learns (by reciting)', *sajjhāyati*, 'recites', and *dhāreti*, 'retains (what he has learnt in memory)'. (*Uddisāpeti* can be used of the pupil's requesting and receiving instruction, and corresponding causative forms of the pupil's verbs can be used to refer to the teacher's activity).<sup>23</sup> The words for learning are often cited as synonyms, but on occasion distinctions are drawn. At M III 200 the Buddha instructs a monk: *uggaṇhāhi . . . pariyāpuṇāhi . . . dhārehi* (a *sutta*): the commentary gives the sense of the words, respectively, as 'listening to in silence', 'making a verbal recitation', and 'teaching others' (*tunhībhūto suṇanto; vācāya sajjhāyaṃ karonto; aññesaṃ vācento*, Ps V 8).<sup>24</sup> The *Cūlavamsa* (Mhv XC 80–4) describes king Parakkamabāhu IV (fourteenth century) as having learnt (*uggaṇhivā . . . dhāretvā*) the Jātakas by listening to his teacher; he then translated them into Sinhala, recited them (or had someone do so: he 'had them heard', *sāvetvā*) in an assembly of monks who knew the Canon (*piṭakattayadhārinam*). Only then, after correcting his text (*parisodhiya*) by this means, did he have it written and distributed around the island.

Canonical texts are divided, in manuscripts and in descriptive accounts (e.g. Ps I 2, As 6ff.), into 'recitation sections' (*bhānavāra*); and there was a division of labour between 'reciters' (*bhānaka*-s) of different parts of the Canonical corpus.<sup>25</sup> Although it is likely that such 'reciters' originally memorised the texts for the purpose of accurate oral transmission, this was no longer an absolute necessity after the use of writing; indeed, Sp 788–9,

presenting a three-fold classification of those who are learned (*bahussuta*), says that reciters of different sections of the Canon were only required to learn specific parts of their texts. The rationale for this classification has nothing to do with textual transmission, but with different degrees of freedom within the monastic regulations, the highest grade (who had, it is true, to learn the three *piṭaka*-s and some if not all commentaries) having the right to be advisors to nuns.<sup>26</sup> The different *bhānaka*-s at this time, I think, represent a division of labour not so much in textual transmission as among specialists in public recitation.

Such recitation would no doubt have been done on many different occasions, but one is worth remarking on. This involved a three- and sometimes four-stage sequence, lasting all night: these were (i) a sermon (probably a narrative such as a *Jātaka* story: cf. Spk III 36) by the 'day-preacher' (*divākathika*); (ii) a recitation by a monk called either *padabhānaka* or *sarabhānaka*;<sup>27</sup> (iii) a commentary on or sermon deriving from some text — perhaps that recited by the *pada/sarabhānaka*, as Adikaram (53: 131) suggests — by the night preacher (*rattikathika*) (cf. Mp I 39, Dh-p-a II 95); and (iv) another sermon by the 'dawn-preacher' (*paccūsa-kathika*), which may have been another *Jātaka* (Spk III 36). The manner in which the *sarabhānaka* made his recitation is not entirely clear; a common translation is that he 'intoned' the text. *Sara* is the equivalent of Sanskrit *svara*, which (according to MW<sup>28</sup>) can mean tone in recitation, accent, and musical note. The *Jinakālamālī* (93) states that monks went from Thailand to Ceylon in the 15th. century, and *Laṅkādiṭṭhe akkharapaveniṇi ca tadanurūpam padabhāṇaṇi ca sarabhāṇaṇi ca uggahetvā*, which Jayawickrama (68: 130) translates as 'learned the orthographic system in vogue in the Island of Laṅkā as well as the manner of recital of texts and the vocal intonation in conformity with it'.<sup>29</sup> In the *Vinaya* the Buddha forbids singing *dhamma* 'in a drawn-out singing voice' (*āyatakena gūṭassarena*), but allows *sarabhāṇa* (Vin II 108; cp. A III 251).<sup>30</sup> The monk Sona recites part of what is now the *Sutta Nipāta*, (Vin I 196 *sarena abhāsi; abhāṇi* at Ud 59; cf. Mp I 241), and his recital is called *sarabhāṇa* (cf. also Vin II 300). As 73 describes someone remembering the sound either of a monk preaching with a sweet voice or of a *sarabhānaka* 'intoning'.<sup>31</sup> Whatever the precise style in question, it would seem that *sarabhāṇa* recitation involves something like a chant or recitative instead of ordinary speech.<sup>32</sup>

The sound of recitation could have various effects. One of the qualities required of a monk allowed to teach nuns (*bhikkhunovādaka*) was that he should have a pleasant voice (*kalyāṇavākkaraṇa*, Vin IV 51, glossed as *madhurassaro*, 'sweet-voiced' at Sp 790), because, it seems, women like that

kind of thing (*mātugāmo hi sara-sampattirato*, *ibid.*). It would perhaps be rather impious to suggest that monks might serenade their womenfolk: but one story, obviously well-known,<sup>33</sup> suggests that the effect of recitation could be to induce a mood other than religiously sublime. Some young monks were learning recitation (*sajjhāyaṃ gaṇhanti*) while young nuns sat behind them listening (*dhammaṃ suṇanti*). One monk stretched out his arm and touched a nun: with admirable brevity the text concludes 'and because of that he became a layman' (*ten'eva kāraṇena giḥi jāto*) (Ps I 264, Spk III 193, Vbh-a 358).<sup>34</sup> A number of stories tell of the beneficial effect of recitation on animals, despite their not understanding the meaning of what was being recited: some are recounted in the *Saddhammasaṅgaha*, a text from the 14th. century which is very revealing for my present purpose. Classed by CPD (Epileg. to vol. I, p. 53\*) as a text of 'bibliography', it contains accounts of the Councils, the writing down of the Canon, and the composition of commentaries and sub-commentaries; it ends with two chapters, one on the advantages of writing books or sponsoring their being written, and one (by far the longest) on the advantages of listening to (the preaching of) *Dhamma*. Like the other texts cited earlier, it presupposes that it will be recited aloud: 'listen, all you good people who are present here in order to hear' (*suṇātha sādhave sabbe sotukāmā idhālayā*, p. 23 v. 4). In one story in the final chapter, Sāriputta learns the *Abhidhamma-piṭaka* by heart and recites it at the entrance to a cave. Five hundred bats in the cave, despite perceiving only the sound of his voice (*sare saddamattam eva gahervā*, p. 81)<sup>35</sup> are entranced and take no thought for food; they die and are reborn in heaven (cf. As 17). Similar tales are told of a frog, a deer, a fish and a snake.<sup>36</sup>

The oral/aural dimension of Buddhist texts is not only a matter of learning and public performance: it plays a role in meditation also. The word *paṇa* is used for 'familiarity' with or 'mastery' of various kinds and *jhāna*-levels of meditation (Sp 430, Ps IV 201, Spk II 81, 233, 236, It-a I 92, As 184, cp. Vism 87—8 = III 20, speaking of *samādhi*, Vbh-a 378, 462, 463, 522). Given that the *jhāna*-s above the first are said not to be characterised by discursive thought, one might take *paṇa* simply as 'familiarity' or 'mastery' in a non-verbal sense.<sup>37</sup> But other texts show that discursive, oral texts are relevant in this connexion. At D III 241—2, A III 21 (repeated and summarised at Patis-a.69—70), five 'occasions for release' are given, at each of which joy, delight, etc. arise in someone, leading to concentration of the mind: when listening to *dhamma*, when teaching *dhamma* oneself according to what one has heard (*yathāsutam*), when reciting (*sajjhāyaṃ karoti*) what one has heard, when mentally reflecting on what one has

heard, and when concentrating the mind on an object of meditation. The transition here, obviously, is from aural/oral to mental, from public (verbal) discourse to private (verbal and non-verbal) consciousness. In such a passage, it might seem that the last 'occasion for release' is of a different (non-textual) kind from the first four, and simply juxtaposed with them.<sup>38</sup> But elsewhere the internalisation of a recited text is clearly apparent.

This can be seen in the accounts of the meditations on the body given at Pj I 39ff., Vbh-a 224—6, 249ff. and Vism 241—2 = VIII 48—57. A monk wanting to practice them must first seek out a teacher who knows both the text of the practice and has experience in its attainment (*āgamādhigama-samannāgato*);<sup>39</sup> 'when he has learnt (the text of) the meditation subject'<sup>40</sup> (*kammaṭṭhānaṃ uggahervā*, Pj I 40, cp. Vbh-a 249, 257, 258), he may go to live elsewhere and practise it. This practice involves, first, 'recitation by parts' (*koṭṭhāsavasena sajjhāya*, Vbh-a 250: that is, the thirty-two parts of the body, in groups of five or six, in forward and backward order), which is to be done aloud (*vacasā sajjhāyo katabbo*, Vbh-a 224—5, Vism 241—2 = VIII 49) for some months. This must be done 'even by one who is a master of the Tipiṭaka', since it is in this way that the subject becomes clear (*ibid.*). He must 'hammer it in verbally during the recitation period' (*sajjhāyakāle vacasā pothervā pothervā*, Vbh-a 249),<sup>41</sup> so that each section is learnt by heart (*paṇibhūta*, Pj I 41); as many as a hundred thousand repetitions may be necessary before the text is learnt (*sajjhāyena hi kammaṭṭhānatanti paṇā hoti*, Vbh-a 225, Vism 242 = VII 56). Verbal recitation is done so that the text is familiar (*pālipaṇibhāvattam*, Pj I 41); such familiarity with the text (*pālipaṇatā*, *ibid.*) is a condition for the mental recitation which then follows; mental recitation (*manasā sajjhāya*, Vbh-a 225, Vism 243 = VIII 56—7)<sup>42</sup> is necessary for full understanding.<sup>43</sup>

I shall end these remarks by considering two similes which illustrate the close parallels and connexions between the oral and written preservation of texts. It is true that *scripta manent*, what is written endures. But in traditional South Asia, as is well-known, the staying power of most materials for writing, whether bark, wood, palm-leaf, or whatever (see Losty (82)), was limited. The Dambulla Rock-inscription of king Nissanka Malla of Ceylon (twelfth century) (EZ I 121—35, translation from 133) tells us that

he also made it a rule that when perpetual grants of land were given to those who had done loyal services, such benefactions should not be made evanescent, like lines drawn on water, by being written on palm leaves liable to be destroyed by mice and white ants; but that they should be engraved on plates of copper so as to endure long unto their respective posterity.

The longevity of writing was certainly a common theme. The earliest



references to the writing down of the texts, in Dīp and Mhv (see p. 2 above) state that this was done *ciraṭṭhitattham*, 'for the sake of longevity'; Aśoka likewise states that he had his edicts written in the hope that that they, and no doubt also his reputation, would endure (e.g. *iyam dhammalipi likhāpiṭā . . . cilamūhitikā ca hotu*, PE 2; cf. RE 5, 6, PE 7). A recurring motif in both rock inscriptions and metal plates is that engraving the order or proclamation is intended to ensure that what was written should last 'as long as the sun and moon' (e.g. EZ II 255, III 240, 325, IV 8).<sup>44</sup> (No doubt palaeologists would wish that this had been true!)

The two similes are found, first, in the colophon to manuscripts: the scribe hopes that 'like lion's oil kept in a golden bowl, or writing on stone, may everything I have heard (remain) permanently (and) not perish'.<sup>45</sup> As K. R. Norman says (90: 153), the comparisons are 'very appropriate to the work of authors and scribes, who hope that their work will not disappear, just as something inscribed on stone, or valuable oil kept in a safe, permanent, leak-proof container is not lost, but remains unchanged'. For my present purposes it is very revealing that the two similes are used also of learning and memorising texts orally (Ja V 149, Mhv-t 6, Ps II 336); and they are given in commentarial exegeses of the word *sutasannicaya*, '(being) a treasury of what has been heard' (Ps II 252, Mp III 28; cf. Sp 788). This term refers to a monk who 'stores what has been heard in the treasury (or, perhaps inelegantly, the manuscript-chest) of his heart' (*yassa hi sutam hadaya-mañjūsāya sannicitam*).<sup>46</sup> Both oral and written preservation of texts are useful, if fragile, means of confronting the destructive power of time.

The scribes who used the similes wrote that they hoped that what they had heard, or 'what has been heard' (*sutam*) would not be destroyed. There may be no particular significance in the choice of this word, but it may point to another close relation between oral and written transmission: perhaps the texts were dictated to the scribe (either from a manuscript or by someone who knew it by heart), who then wrote down 'what was heard'. In the case of Aśoka's inscriptions, it seems certain that at some stage in the transmission of them, dictation was involved. K. R. Norman states that

oral recitation took place at some stage of the transmission, but I think it was probably when Aśoka was dictating to his scribes. Thereafter I think that (part, at least, of) the transmission was in a written form, because some of the errors which occur in the edicts are only likely in written form.<sup>47</sup>

Evidence for the written transmission of the edicts can also be found in the 'covering letter' which he postulates accompanied the text of the inscriptions, parts of which were on occasion inscribed mistakenly along with the

inscription itself (see Norman (84), (87)). Others, however, think that there is evidence for oral transmission after Aśoka's original dictation.<sup>48</sup> Of the three cases in question here, only the *Jātaka* might be thought to go back, in something like its present form, to the time when all texts were oral. It is true that the *Mahābodhivaṃsa* is dependent on previous *vaṃsa* material, some of which almost certainly began as oral tradition; and the author of the *Haṭṭhavanagalla-vihāravāṃsa* states that his account is dependent on 'traditional (oral) accounts'<sup>49</sup> and earlier writings' (*itihānugatam kathaṅ ca niṣṣāya pubbalikhitaṅ c'idha vāyamāmi*, Att 1 v. 3). But both of these texts are composed in a highly ornate style (see Norman, 83: 141, 143), which would suggest that they were originally 'literary' compositions in all senses of the word.<sup>50</sup>

The introduction to a Sinhalese version of the *Haṭṭhavanagallavihāravāṃsa*, composed in the 15th. century by Vidāgama Maitreya, gives a reasonably clear indication of the actual circumstances of its transmission:

being, as said before, a collection of dharma-stories narrated by the venerable lord Śrī Maitreya, and having been written by us who have attained the condition of being well-disciplined students of that noble saṅgharāja, it should be listened to by good people who have acquired good qualities, with an undivided and attentive mind which has love as its distinguishing trait.<sup>51</sup>

According to Charles Hallisey (who has kindly provided me with the text and translation of this passage) the word 'as said before' refers to an earlier sentence which stated that the text was composed (*viracita*)<sup>52</sup> in Pali, but that since not everyone understood that language a Sinhala version was being presented (in which the verses of the Pali text were followed by a Sinhala translation and elaboration). So what is described here is a situation in which Śrī Maitreya was reading from a manuscript in Pali (since such a text is unlikely to have been learnt by heart) and providing an oral gloss in Sinhala, which his student(s)<sup>53</sup> then wrote down, in order that it might later be read (aloud) to an audience. That is to say, there is a three-part process: oral dictation (probably from a written text) to written text to oral recitation.

Although the Buddhist tradition, unlike the Brahmanical, came fairly soon to welcome the medium of writing as an important means of self-preservation, the distrust expressed in the *nīti* verse cited at the beginning of this paper should alert us to the continuing importance of the oral/aural aspects of Pali literature, both as a means of preservation and as a facet of the lived experience, the 'sensual dimension', of Buddhist 'scriptures'.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> My title refers to K. R. Norman's now standard survey of *Pali Literature* (83). I am grateful to Professor Norman for help with a number of points in this paper, and for comments on an earlier draft. Everyone working in Pali and Buddhist studies is indebted to his publications; I have never been his pupil formally, but his tireless generosity, both in person and in correspondence, has made it possible for me also to learn from him directly for more than a decade. I am honoured to be able to contribute this small footnote to *Pali Literature* as a token of my respect and gratitude.

Abbreviations used in this paper are those used in the *Critical Pali Dictionary*: texts are cited from the Pali Text Society editions, unless otherwise stated.

<sup>2</sup> *pothakesu ca yam sippam parahatthesu yam dhanam/yathā kicce samuppanne na tam sippam na tam dhanam* (Dhn 364 = Lkn 13), freely translated. The Sanskrit parallels given in Bechert and Braun (81) ad loc. have *vidyā* for *sippam*; pada c is a conjectural emendation by the editors of *yadā icche samuppanne* found in the mss.

<sup>3</sup> See Graham (87). Goody, e.g. (77) (86), (87), has been influential in the study of orality and literacy, but he is a very unreliable guide to Indian and Buddhist history. See Parry (85) and Falk (90).

<sup>4</sup> See von Hinüber (90: esp. p. 54).

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, Cousins (83) and Gombrich (90); for an overview of the state of knowledge on these matters see Norman (89).

<sup>6</sup> References to *Dīp* are to Oldenberg's (1879) edition.

<sup>7</sup> I have tried to set this event in historical context in Collins (90).

<sup>8</sup> I follow other scholars in using this rather ungainly locution to refer to the fact that written as well as oral texts were recited and listened to; in Buddhism as in pre-modern Europe silent reading was the exception, rather than the rule. In what Graham (87) has called 'the sensual dimension' of religion, therefore, Buddhist texts were more often experienced through the voice and ears than the hands and eyes.

<sup>9</sup> For the most recent survey, see Allchin and Norman (85). I have used the text as given in Bloch (50).

<sup>10</sup> (87) pp. 101–99 (14–16).

<sup>11</sup> E.g. the *Thūpavamsa*, discussed by Jayawickrama (71: xiv), and 'the *Ariyavamsa* festival' in Rahula (56: 268–73).

<sup>12</sup> It is true, of course, that these usages may not always be literal, as in modern English an author may be termed as 'saying' something in a book, or when one says that one 'sees' the point of an argument. But the systematic nature of the Pali usage would seem to suggest that the literal sense is usually the one intended.

<sup>13</sup> Translated by Jayawickrama (90). I have changed the order of words slightly.

<sup>14</sup> For uses of this in *Dīp* see Gombrich (forthcoming).

<sup>15</sup> As I hope to show elsewhere, scribes in the earlier texts and inscriptions seem normally to have been laymen.

<sup>16</sup> References to the *Visuddhimagga* are given first by PTS page number, then by the Warren and Kosambi (50) chapter and section.

<sup>17</sup> For further elucidations of *gantha-dhura* and *-yutta* as oral/aural learning and recitation, see Mp I 30, 37ff., Dhpa I 7–8, 154, Vbh-a 297. In the *Katikāvata* promulgated by Parakkamabāhu I in the twelfth century one of the duties of monks is 'the study of books and documents' (MPK 12, translated Ratnapala (71: 132); cf. DK 7, KRK I 7, 104–5); in the thirteenth century Dambadeni *Katikāvata* (DK 12, 13) one task of candidates for admission to the Saṅgha is to learn to read and write (DK 12, 13, 18); and in the first *Katikāvata* of Kīrti Śrī Rājasimha (eighteenth century; KRK I 111–2) monks and novices are described as 'writing books'. But although the *gantha*- and *vidarśanā-dhura*-s are very frequently mentioned throughout these texts, the 'vocation of (learning and teaching) books', as

Ratnapala translates the former term (p. 188, 5.2), is never associated with writing or reading: rather, it is very clearly associated with learning texts by heart, and being able to recite them when necessary (e.g. PBK 6–8, 13, DK 19, 22–4, 26, 29, 38–9, 97, 105). (56: 288); see also de Silva (18).

<sup>18</sup> At Vin I 275 a monk with a digestive disorder is said to have faeces and urine *na paguno*; Dhps 15 (# 48–9) and 51 (# 328–9) refer to *pāguññāta* of body and mind, explained at As 131, 151 and Vism 466 = XIV 146 as 'healthiness' (*agelaññabhāva*, etc.); the term can be predicated of persons, as at D III 170, Vin I 359, Jā V 399, where 'fluent' or 'skilled' seem appropriate translations; and the term is predicated of *dhamma* in contexts where translators have rendered it 'sublime' or 'well-expounded' (this in view of commentarial glosses as *su(pa)vatiṭṭa*, etc.): Vin I 7/Sp 963, D II 39/Sv 471, M I 169/Ps II 181, S I 138/Spk I 203 (cp. also Sp 234, 790 ad Vin I 65 and IV 51), Vv 53 v. 2/Vv-a 232, cited at Ps I 131, Mp II 108, It-a II 44). The term is also found in the compound forms *paṇḍita-bhāva* at Jā III 537, *paṇḍita-dhamma* at It-a II 25, *Saddhamm-s 71*, and *paṇḍita-sajjhāya* at *Saddhamm-s 85*. See text below for uses in relation to meditation.

<sup>19</sup> PED s.v., citing Mil 10, gives 'with well-intoned speech', which is inaccurate. It occurs there after *hadayaṅgata*, and seems to differ from it in that the texts are not only 'learnt by heart', but also 'able to be recited'. Opinions differ on how the word is to be derived. CPD, citing Spk I 262, gives it under *uggata*, from *uggacchati* (cf. Vmv I 125 ad Sp 234 (cited by Norman (90: 148): *vācāya uggatam*). The idea may be that texts 'have risen up to/in speech' or 'come out by speech', in the sense that the person can recite them. (One of the meanings of *uggacchati* given in CPD is 'issue (from mouth: be brought up and vomited)'). K. R. Norman suggests (ibid. 149) that *uggata* is a form of *oggata* = *ogata* (< *avagata*) with the sense of "learnt, understood", which is not usual in Pāli, although *avagata* sometimes occurs with the meaning "understood". The compound would then mean something like "learnt orally", referring to the recitation procedure'. He also cites Gv 77, where the word is used of people, meaning 'those who have learnt texts orally'; this parallels the use of *paṇḍita* for both texts and people.

<sup>20</sup> Both *deseṭi* and *katheti* can also mean to teach, but they tend more commonly to be used of discursive elaborations and explanations of texts and doctrines (to both monastic and lay audiences), rather than this oral inculcation of texts.

<sup>21</sup> This word can also refer to learning non-verbal skills or forms of knowledge: e.g. Vin II 217, Ja IV 177, Ps II 94, III 248, Vbh-a 410–1.

<sup>22</sup> References can be found in the relevant entries in PED, PTC; CPD; some useful texts are: Vin IV 203–4 compared with Jā III 28, Vin IV 14–5/Sp 741–4, S I 202–3/Spk I 296–7, Sp 802 compared with Dhpa I 244, IV 180, Vism 388 = XII 60–2 (the story of Cūlapanthaka), Mp III 28–9 = Ps II 252–3.

<sup>23</sup> The gloss on *dhārehi* as 'teach' is probably taking up the causative form of the verb, since (less commonly) the simple *dharati* can also be used to mean 'remember'. The first two verbs are found at S II 75, and Spk II 75 glosses them similarly; both in silence and by recitation a monk *paṇḍitaṃ karonto . . . dhāreṭi*. At Ps III 193, 426, *dhāreṭi* is glossed *paṇḍitaṃ karvā dhāreṭi*. R. F. Gombrich suggests (personal communication), that one should translate *sajjhāyam karonto* and *aññesaṃ vācento* here as 'reciting aloud to oneself' and 'reciting for others', in order 'to bring out the reflexivity of *svādhyāya*'. This is certainly relevant here, although on other occasions the reflexive prefix seems to add little to the sense: e.g. Pj II 456 *vede sajjhāyantehi pathamaṃ ajjhetabbato Sāvitti chandaso mukhan ti vuttā*.

<sup>24</sup> See Adikaram (53) pp. 24–32. Epigraphical references to different *bhāṅka*-s exist from the second century B.C.: Paranavitana (70) nos. 330, 407, 666.

<sup>25</sup> The text is discussed by Rāhula (56: 294–6), Gunawardana (79: 140), and von Hinüber (90: 68–70).

<sup>26</sup> The terms are given as alternative readings at Jā II 66, Ps II 377, Mp I 39, II 249;

compare Dh-p-a III 345, IV 18 with Spk I 305. See also Jinak 93, cited in the text below.

<sup>28</sup> See also Lévi (15: 426–40, 445–7), and Demiéville (29–30), (80). Lévi argues that these references show that the earliest Buddhist texts go back to a time when accents were still in use; that is, the time of Pāṇini and the latest Vedic texts.

<sup>29</sup> Such matters have been shown to be of unexpectedly great importance for the history of Theravāda in Southeast Asia by Bizot (89). See also von Hinüber (87).

<sup>30</sup> Sp 1202 here refers to 32 styles (*vattāni*) of *sarabhañña*, and cites three: *taraṅga*, *dohaka*, and *galita*, like a wave, (milk into a) milk-pail (?), and trickling (water) (cf. MW s.v. *galita*). This is obscure, but elsewhere *sarabhañña* is compared to pouring water into a pot (Spk III 36) and to someone's bringing the celestial Ganges down to earth (Spk I 306, cp. Jā I 95–6 on the Buddha's 'divine voice', *brahmassara*; and As 15); perhaps the idea is that good recitation 'flows' in various ways. Lévi (15: 435–6) cites this passage, from a sub-commentary to Sp, and translates 'rhythme du galop', 'rhythme clair (*dhota*-), 'rhythme avalé'.

<sup>31</sup> *Madhurena pana sarena dhammikathikassa vā dhammaṃ kathentassa sarabhānakassa vā sarena bhañantassa saddaṃ sutvā aparabhāge yatha kathaci nisidirivā āvajjānāssa dhammakathā vā sarabhaññaṃ vā sotadvāre āpātham āgatam viya hoti*. For a similar distinction between *dhammakathā* and *sarabhañña* see Spk I 41, Dh-p-a I 154, Cp-a 307, As 78–9; cf. Pp-a 174 (taking the v. l. cited in n. 9). Other references to *sarabhañña* can be found at Jā II 109, Sp 1058, 1060, 1312, Spk II 124.

<sup>32</sup> Tambiah (68: 100), without giving any source for his information, states that 'sarabhanna' is one of the 'three musical rhythms employed in chanting' (along with Magadha and Samyoka). It 'employs a higher pitch of voice and also lengthens the speed of chanting, . . . breaking the chant into phrases; the Sanghaha [*sic*] is a similar mode of 'lengthened' chanting; Sarabhanna chanting is essentially employed on *avamangala* (inauspicious) occasions, such as immediately after death, when its slow and mournful grandeur suites the occasion'.

<sup>33</sup> Mp I 27 refers to it briefly, as a familiar tale.

<sup>34</sup> Ps II 145 makes it the nun's fault: she took his hand and put it on her breast.

<sup>35</sup> On p. 82 the same event is described in the words *sara-bhañjanamattam eva sutvā*, which may be an error for *sara-bhañña-mattam*, although K. R. Norman suggests (personal communication) that it might have 'the same meaning as Pkt. *bhañgi* = "modulation (of voice)"'.

<sup>36</sup> All five stories are parallel. In the story of the frog reborn as a deva through listening to the Buddha's preaching, I would interpret the phrase *sare nimittam aggahesi* to mean that the frog simply perceived 'a (special) quality in the Buddha's voice' (Saddhamm-s 80; cp. Sp 121, Vism 208 = VII 51, and Vv-a 217 in Masefield (89: 339, 343 n. 16)). The same phrase is used in the prose section of the story of the deer (83), and the corresponding verse specifies that it was only the sound: *saddamatte nimittam*. Similar phrases are used in the other stories. Mil 350 cites the frog, however, as an example of *dhammābhisamayo*, 'penetration of Dhamma', which would normally mean full understanding.

<sup>37</sup> Cp Sp 430, *vasipatta*; and the sub-commentary to As 184, cited by CPD s.v. *appaguna*, *avasikata*.

<sup>38</sup> The commentaries here (Sv 1032–3, Mp III 230–1), however, interpret *dhamma* and *atha*, used in all five cases, as 'the text' and 'its meaning', and refer in the last case to 'learning' (*uggaṇḥati*) a meditation subject, and to the text of it (*kammaṭṭhāna-pāli*).

<sup>39</sup> Nānamoli's rendering of this as 'scripture and scribing' (60: 39, cp. 110–1 n. 23) is, from the present perspective, wholly inappropriate.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. p. 40.

<sup>41</sup> Translated by Nānamoli (87: 309).

<sup>42</sup> Pj I 41 has *vacasā . . . manasā ca bhāvanā*. In both places these are two items in a sevenfold 'skill in learning' (*uggaha-kosalla*). The word 'recitation' in English, like *sajjhāya*,

usually refers to saying something out loud (cf., for example, Vin I 133, *sajjhāyasaddam*, Vin II 193–4, *mahāsaddā sajjhāyam karontā*), and so 'mental recitation' is perhaps an unusual locution. Although *sajjhāya* can often mean simply 'study', it would seem clear that in such contexts as these study involves the act of 'running through' a text which is being or has been learnt, both verbally and in silence to oneself.

<sup>43</sup> This is the standard tripartite division of Buddhism: *pariyatti*, 'learning', *patipatti*, 'practice', and *pativedha*, 'penetration' (the term is used at Vism 243 = VIII 57) *in nuce*.

<sup>44</sup> The theme is common: see, for example, the inscription from Sānchi cited in Marshall and Foucher (40) pp. 390–1.

<sup>45</sup> *vasā sihassa pakkhittā yathā kañcanapātīyā / silālekhe 'va me niccam sutam sabbam na nāsaye* (Att 34 v. 6; cp. Ja VI 595.3–4, Mbhv preface p. v.). For the first comparison, which is frequently found by itself, see Norman (90: 152–4). According to Charles Hallisey (personal communication) lion's oil is common in the Sinhala tradition as an example of something valuable but elusive.

<sup>46</sup> Written materials were often kept in such chests: cf. Ja II 36, IV 335, Mhv XXVII 5, Sp 453.

<sup>47</sup> Personal communication.

<sup>48</sup> See Janert (67–8) and (72: 20): 'each scribe was reproducing with amazing accuracy the speech patterns characterising the formal delivery or recitation before him of the edicts'; and von Hinüber (90: 60 n. 136).

<sup>49</sup> See CPD and Childers s.v. *uihā*.

<sup>50</sup> K. R. Norman (personal communication) says that he 'cannot believe that Att was not written down from the start'.

<sup>51</sup> *Śrī Maitreya mahā svāmipādāyan vahanse visin kathika dharmā-kathā prabandhaya yathokta vū ē saṅgharājottamayānan vahanse gē suvinūta śīsyabhāvōpagaṭa apa visin liyānū lada, sādhu guṇōpte sādhu janayan visin sāvadhāna vā avikṣipta cūṭayan upalākṣita vā sādharayen āsiyā yutu* (*Elu Attanagalu Vamśaya*, in Tennekōn (80: 170).

<sup>52</sup> According to Hallisey, this word 'has connotations of being written (according to Sorata [Sinhala dictionary], and interestingly a derivative is defined as *śāstrīya lipi* — śāstric writings)'.  
<sup>53</sup> The use of *apa* may simply be a polite way for an individual to refer to himself, or it may indicate that more than one scribe was taking down the dictation: that would certainly be a more efficient way to produce multiple manuscript copies of a text.

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## VITAKKA/VITARKA AND VICĀRA

*Stages of samādhi in Buddhism and Yoga*

The two terms *vitakka/vitarka* and *vicāra* are crucial to the understanding of the stages of *samādhi* in both the Buddhist tradition and in the influential *yoga* tradition attributed to Patañjali. However, at present interpretation is often dominated by notions derived from later commentarial sources. Such notions, although in themselves of great interest, create an artificial appearance of difference between the two traditions which is probably unjustified. It suffices to note the marked difference in English renderings of these two words in translations from Sanskrit and from Pali.

This is exacerbated by the, no doubt inevitable, tendency to treat the Buddhist and Brahmanical traditions as if they operated in complete isolation from one another. In fact it is clear that each has both influenced and been influenced by the other in numerous ways. Buddhist origins are obviously from a milieu in which both orthodox and heterodox Brahmanical ideas and practices were ubiquitous. Not surprisingly influences from and reactions to Vedic traditions pervade the early Buddhist texts. Subsequently, after Buddhism's rapid growth and early creative period, influences are for a while mainly, but not exclusively, from Buddhism to Brahmanism. After the formation of classical Hinduism and during the gradual decline in importance of Buddhism and Jainism which took place from the Gupta period onwards, it is clear that Buddhism borrows much more than it contributes. No doubt this is what one would expect, but it seems surprisingly little recognised.

The present issue is a case in point. Influences from Buddhist sources (to my mind, very frequent) on the *Yoga-sūtra* are often minimized or ignored.<sup>1</sup> In the particular example with which we are concerned here the *Yoga-sūtra* is often seen as having a distinctive analysis of the stages of *samādhi*. I think this is a mistake, partly due to focussing on later Buddhist literature rather than on the canonical account. The reason for this is possibly the fact that the canonical material often needs to be approached through the early *abhidhamma* literature which is less studied than the *sutta* material.

The most important source for this purpose is the first book of the *Abhidhamma-piṭaka*, the *Dhammasaṅgani*. This gives mnemonic registers for both *vitakka* and for *vicāra*. For the nature and function of these registers I refer the reader to my article: "Pali Oral Literature".<sup>2</sup> It is

sufficient to note that these registers give us a clear picture as to what these terms were understood to mean at this time once the *suttanta* contexts to which they refer have been examined.

#### VITAKKA IN THE DHAMMASAṄGANI

The *dhammuddesa* for *vitakka* in the *Dhammasaṅgani* is as follows:

1. *takka*
2. *vitakka*
3. *saṅkappa*
4. *appanā*
5. *vyappanā*
6. *cetaso abhiniropanā*
7. *sammā-saṅkappa*

Unusually for the *Dhammasaṅgani* the complete register for *vitakka* is already to be found in a single location in the *nikāyas*, namely in the *Mahācattārīsaka-sutta*.<sup>3</sup> This discourse is an *abhidhamma*-style analysis of the Eightfold Path. In fact the *sutta* reads suspiciously as if it were itself based on the *Dhammasaṅgani*, but if so it is difficult to explain why no additional sources can be found for some of the terms. We must then assume that this *sutta* is the source of this *Dhammasaṅgani* register and presumably of much of the methodology of the *Dhammasaṅgani*, but it is surprising that no additions have been made. Perhaps the list was already too established in the tradition to allow of amendment. It would be interesting to know if the corresponding *sutta* preserved in Chinese contains the same passage.

Taking the terms of the register in order:

##### 1. *Takka*

This occurs in a number of contexts in the earlier literature, but can always be rendered by 'speculation'. The more specific later meaning of (systematic) logic would be anachronistic, while the translation sometimes given of 'doubt' is incorrect for the *nikāyas*. The context which the *Dhammasaṅgani* or its source probably has in mind is one which occurs in the *Brahmajāla-sutta*:<sup>4</sup>

... some mendicant or brāhmaṇa is speculative (*takkin*) and inclined to investigation (*vimamsin*). He says that which is beaten out by speculation, that which is attended by investigation . . . .

In the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* we find the statement that one should not believe anything by reason of speculation (*takka-hetu*).<sup>5</sup> Another important *sutta* formula also occurs in the *Brahmajāla-sutta*:<sup>6</sup>

There are, monks, still further truths (*dhamma*) — deep, hard to see, hard to comprehend,

peaceful, excellent, outside the sphere of speculation (*atakkāvacara*), subtle, (only) to be known by the wise — which the Tathāgata makes known after having himself comprehended them by his higher knowledge and after having directly experienced them.

Similar passages occur in several contexts concerned with the truth assessment of views or wisdom.<sup>7</sup> Finally in the canonical accounts of the request of Brahmā Sahampati the same set of epithets is applied to the *dhamma* which the Buddha has reached.<sup>8</sup>

To go by the position of right view as last in the list it would seem that an ascending order is intended. If so, the implication is probably meant to be that speculation is a rather weak and inferior form of thinking. Certainly the commentaries have little difficulty in interpreting these contexts in terms of their understanding of *vitakka* as the fixing of the mind on an object of thought or sense.<sup>9</sup> For them speculation is merely a form of weak *vitakka* whose object is constantly changing. So the term *takka-pariyāhata* recalls the commentarial definition of the function (*rasa*) of *vitakka* as *āhanana-pariyāhanana*: "for by means of this the *yogāvacara* makes the object struck by *vitakka*, struck around by *vitakka*".<sup>10</sup> In the present context it would be easy to interpret *takka-pariyāhata* as meaning that the speculative complex of ideas which arises in weak mentality requires application of the mind from many different angles.

##### 2. *Vitakka*

The word *vitakka* occurs frequently in definitions and explanations of *samādhi* or *jhāna*, but is not explained in that context. Apart from this I have collected about forty other passages from the four *nikāyas*; there are probably some more. It is clear that it can always be rendered as 'thinking' or 'thought', although it is unlikely that this would have the same significance as the concept does for us today. Of course this is even more unlikely among a community containing many contemplatives. It may therefore be the case that thought was already pictured as essentially the activity of bringing different objects into firm focus before the mind's eye — be those objects thoughts or mental pictures. Such a view of the matter would after all be very natural to people with a very highly developed eidetic faculty.

Apart from the above-mentioned accounts of *jhāna* and the like, *vitakka* occurs most frequently in passages referring to the three skilful thoughts or the three unskilful thoughts or all six together i.e. thought connected with desire or with desirelessness, with aversion or with non-aversion and with cruelty or non-cruelty.<sup>11</sup> Less commonly it is found as part of a series.<sup>12</sup> (There are of course many similar sequences which do not include *vitakka*

at all.) In a number of places it means simply thought or thinking in a fairly general sense.<sup>13</sup> A few less usual contexts connected with *samādhi* can be added.<sup>14</sup> Also we are told that *vitakka* and *vicāra* are the activities which fashion speech: "when one has thought and examined (*vicāretvā*), afterward one utters speech."<sup>15</sup> There is also one discourse which applies the genre of riddle and answer to the subject of *saṅkappa-vitakkā*.<sup>16</sup> It is clear from this and one other passage that *saṅkappa* and *vitakka* are not always identical in meaning.<sup>17</sup>

### 3. *Saṅkappa*

This should perhaps mean thought formation rather than thought, but not surprisingly it does not in practice seem greatly differentiated in its use from *vitakka*. For example, in a number of contexts the same division into three unskilful and three skilful types is found.<sup>18</sup> In a general sense of 'thinking' we find 'remembering thoughts' (*sara-saṅkappa*) used a number of times in ways obviously related to the usage of the three unskilful thoughts.<sup>19</sup> Several times we have expressions like 'due to that' (e.g. fame and gain) 'he is happy and his purpose is fulfilled (*paripunṇa-saṅkappa*)'.<sup>20</sup> This appears to be the only context where the translation 'purpose' is required, although it is a possible alternative in some cases, and may perhaps be appropriate in some passages where *saṅkappa* and *vitakka* are juxtaposed or differentiated.

Finally the use of *saṅkappa* as part of a series needs to be mentioned.<sup>21</sup> This is closely parallel to similar uses of *vitakka*. It is especially frequent to juxtapose *saññā* with either *vitakka* or *saṅkappa*. It is emphasized that *saññā* arises dependent upon the sense objects and corresponding *saṅkappa* arises dependent upon *saññā*, but the converse is not the case. This seems to mean that only if there is say a visual stimulus (*rūpa-dhātu*) can there be recognition of the visual object (i.e. *rūpa-saññā*); only if a visual object has been recognised can there be thoughts about what has been seen (*rūpa-saṅkappa*). The precise degree of introspective acuteness envisaged is unclear.

### 4. *Appanā*

This occurs only in the one *nikāya* context previously mentioned. In commentarial usage it signifies the absorption accompanying strong concentration. The word may already occur in this sense in a doubtful passage in the *Peṭakopadesa*, a treatise which may not be long after the early *abhidhamma* works in date.<sup>22</sup> In the *nikāyas* verbal forms of *appeti* occur only in the sense of 'to flow into (e.g. the sea)' < *apyeti*.<sup>23</sup> There are, however, a

number of *Vinaya* passages where it appears to mean 'to fix' < *arpayati*.<sup>24</sup> The same derivation is implied in *Vibhaṅga* passages which use it in the sense of 'made to go away' i.e. 'removed'.<sup>25</sup> This is the standard etymology in the later tradition, both in Pali and in Buddhist Sanskrit, no doubt rightly.<sup>26</sup> It is perhaps just possible that the meaning of *appanā* in the *Dhammasaṅgani* register is influenced by the sense of 'flowing into' but on the whole it seems adequate to take it as meaning 'fixing'.

### 5. *Vyappanā*

This also appears only in the *Mahācattārisaka-sutta* as far as the *nikāyas* are concerned, but *vyappita* is found in the same *Vibhaṅga* context mentioned above in the sense of 'completely gone'. The commentary is no doubt right to interpret this as either augmentation with a prefix for stylistic adornment or an intensified form of *appanā*.<sup>27</sup> So it should probably be translated as 'firm fixing'.

### 6. *Cetaso abhiniropanā*

This too does not appear elsewhere in the *nikāyas*. It is usually taken as deriving from *abhi* + *ni* + causative of RUH — literally, 'transferring the mind onto (an object)'. This is probably correct, but it is worth noting that BHSD gives a form *abhinirūpayati*, which suggests an alternative derivation from RŪP. It is this which must be intended by the *Netti-pakarana* (*abhiniropeti*) and the *Peṭakopadesa* (*niropayitabba*) in their explanation of *nirutti*.<sup>28</sup> In the latter case it can be translated: 'should be given this form'. This would offer an alternative rendering for the *Dhammasaṅgani* register of 'mental forming' or 'mental defining'. However, *abhiniropanā* occurs in the *Paṭisambhidā-magga* as the standard epithet for *sammā-saṅkappa* and also for *vitakka*.<sup>29</sup> It is also found in one passage in which it defines the activity of resultant mind element; here it must refer to the fixing of a sense object in the mind.<sup>30</sup> Although the date of the *Paṭisambhidā-magga* is not known, it must be earlier than the latest of the canonical *abhidhamma* works.

### 7. *Sammā-saṅkappa*

As the second link in the Eightfold Path this has an important place. The *nikāyas* define it in exactly the same way as the three skilful *vitakkas* or *saṅkappas*.<sup>31</sup> Likewise *micchā-saṅkappa* is defined in exactly the same way as the corresponding types of skilful thought. So a translation by 'purpose' can be ruled out — *vitakka* cannot mean purpose. Moreover there are contexts in which such a meaning is hardly possible:

But although there really is another world, he has the view that there is no other world — that is his wrong view; but although there really is another world, he forms the thought (*sāṅkappeti*) that there is no other world — that is his wrong thought (*micchā-sāṅkappa*); but although there really is another world, he utters speech to the effect that there is no other world — that is his wrong speech.<sup>32</sup>

Here the sequence is clear. If one's way of seeing is flawed, then the way in which one's thought will take form in the understanding will be flawed and likewise the way in which one expresses that understanding in speech.

#### VICĀRA IN THE DHAMMASAṅGAṆI

The *dharmuddesa* for *vicāra* in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* is as follows:

- |                     |                                  |                         |
|---------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. <i>cāra</i>      | 2. <i>vicāra</i>                 | 3. <i>anuvicāra</i>     |
| 4. <i>upavicāra</i> | 5. <i>cittassa anusandhanatā</i> | 6. <i>anupekkhanatā</i> |

Again taking them in order:

##### 1. *Cāra*

This occurs in a few passages in opposition to *vihāra* — 'wandering' as opposed to 'abiding in one place', but such general uses do not seem very relevant to the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*.<sup>33</sup> It is possible that some usage which I have not been able to identify is referred to here — perhaps *cāra* as the second member of some compound. More probably it is used here simply to indicate a mobile aspect of thought — its 'wandering'; this would be appropriate in opposition to 'fixing' as the chief feature of *vitakka*.

##### 2. *Vicāra*

Literally interpreted, this might mean either 'constant wandering' or 'that which causes the (mind) to wander in different directions'. In practice it almost always occurs in conjunction with *vitakka*, while in the *nikāyas* *vicāreti* is usually found with *vitakketi*. This is nearly always in contexts associated with *jhāna* or *samādhi*. At least once, however, it is part of a list.<sup>34</sup>

##### 3. *Anuvicāra*

Although the noun does not occur in the *nikāyas*, the verb *anuvicāreti* is found in a few passages, always preceded by *anuvitakketi*. This would of course literally mean 'causing to explore', but it is clear from the *Majjhima-nikāya* passages that the use of these two verbs together is intended merely to indicate the repeated application of *vitakka* and *vicāra*; *anu* is here

simply a prefix indicating repetition.<sup>35</sup> The *Anguttara-nikāya* usage is similar, although it almost always occurs there in the phrase: . . . *dhammam cetasā anuvitakketi anuvicāreti manasānupekkhati* ' . . . applies *vitakka* and *vicāra* with the mind to the *dhamma*, mentally examines the *dhamma*.'<sup>36</sup>

##### 4. *Upavicāra*

The verb *upavicarati* (used in close conjunction with the noun) means 'to frequent'. The noun means that which the mind frequents and hence a sphere of activity or range of interest.<sup>37</sup> Its inclusion in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* register is obviously based upon the formula sometimes referred to as the eighteen *manopavicāra*:<sup>38</sup> "After seeing a visible object with the eye one frequents a visible object which is the basis for pleasant feeling" — the number eighteen is reached by utilizing three types of feeling in conjunction with six senses. This list is found in contexts concerned with the same kind of process that we find described in stages five to eight of the dependent origination formula. So it is closely related to the use of *vitakka* and *vicāra* as part of a series.

##### 5. *Cittassa anusandhanatā*

This may mean either 'explorativeness of mind' or 'a state of constant uniting of the mind'. The former seems the most likely of the various senses of the Sanskrit verb, while the latter is the interpretation of the commentary: "it is a state of constant uniting of the mind because it constantly unites the mind to the object and holds it, just as one joins an arrow to the bowstring and holds it there."<sup>39</sup> This is not impossible, but in view of the sixth item of the register, investigation or exploration seems more likely. Only a verbal form occurs in the *nikāyas* and only in one doubtful context.<sup>40</sup>

##### 6. *Anupekkhanatā*

This means 'careful examination' or 'constant examination'. *Anupekkhati* occurs in the *nikāyas* in two formulae. One was cited above under *upavicāra*. The other, which is much the more frequent, may be translated: "dhammas are heard much, remembered, practised aloud, mentally examined (*manasānupekkhita*), well penetrated with insight."<sup>41</sup>



## THE TWO REGISTERS

The two registers may then be translated as follows:

*vitakka*:

1. speculation
2. thought
3. thought formation
4. fixing
5. firm fixing
6. applying the mind
7. right thought formation.

*vicāra*:

1. wandering
2. wandering about
3. repeated wandering about
4. frequenting
5. explorativeness of mind
6. constant examination.

In the first case the complete register is derived from a single *Majjhima-nikāya* passage and three items occur only there. The others are used fairly widely. For *vicāra* convincing *nikāya* contexts exist for at least items 3, 4 and 6 of the register.

## THE LATER PALI TRADITION

*Vitakka* and *vicāra* occur in a number of passages in the later canonical literature, but these do not add significantly to our understanding of their meaning.<sup>42</sup> Important information is however to be found in several paracanonical works and in the commentarial literature. These can be taken in approximate chronological order:

1. *Petakopadesa*

This is probably the oldest Pali work we have outside the Canon itself. It shows relatively little influence from the *abhidhamma*, presumably because it is in effect a general commentary on *suttanta*. *Vitakka* is defined as the first alighting (of the mind on an object), while *vicāra* is the exploration (*vicarana*) of what has been understood (by *vitakka*).<sup>43</sup> It goes on to explain in terms of the initial perception of someone coming in the distance. *Vitakka* understands that it is a man or a woman and recognizes colour and shape. Those thinking (*vitakkayanto*) further investigate (*uttari upaparikkhanti*) as to whether the person is virtuous or otherwise, rich or poor — this is *vicāra*. The next sentence is corrupt, but appears to associate *vitakka* with fixing (*appeti*<sup>44</sup>) and *vicāra* with exploring and conforming (or following).

There follows a simile in which *vitakka* is compared to the striving of a bird (on taking flight) while *vicāra* is compared to the subsequent stretching out of the wings (in flight) which does not involve so much effort. The intention appears to be to indicate both the subsequent nature of *vicāra* and

its greater subtlety. Later commentaries specify the difference as between the trembling of the mind at the time of first arising and a subsequent calmer mode.<sup>45</sup>

Several subsequent passages are corrupt, but some further points are clear. Another simile is given which contrasts silent recitation with (subsequent) contemplation. In view of what follows the reference is probably to contemplation of the thirty two parts of the body. The two terms are related to the four discriminations (*paṭisambhidā*) and to the stages in the development of insight knowledge.<sup>46</sup> In the latter case at least *vicāra* is compared to the higher stages. "For one established in the two, bodily and mental suffering does not arise; bodily and mental happiness does arise. Mental happiness produced by *vitakka* in this way is joy (*pīṇi*); bodily happiness is simply bodily."<sup>47</sup>

2. *Milindapañha*

Some additional points and similes are given in the *Milindapañha*.<sup>48</sup> These must be quite early as this portion of that work is cited by Buddhaghosa and others with specific mention of Nāgasena. *Vitakka* is given the characteristic (*lakkhana*) of fixing (*appanā*) and this is explained as similar to a carpenter fixing a thoroughly prepared piece of wood in a joint. *Vicāra* has the characteristic of pondering over and over (*anumajjana* — literally repeated rubbing or threshing). It too is illustrated by a simile. "Just as, O king, a bronze gong, which has been struck, afterwards sounds repeatedly and echoes on.<sup>49</sup> *Vitakka*, O king, should be seen as like the striking; *vicāra* should be seen as like the sounding repeatedly."

3. *Vimuttimagga*

This work is now extant only in Chinese, but is clearly an important source of the *Visuddhimagga*. Its account contains most of the material in the *Petakopadesa* passage with the addition of a version of one of the similes from the *Milindapañha* and an analysis of *vitakka* and *vicāra* in terms of their characteristic, *rasa*, *paccupatṭhāna* and *padatṭhāna*.<sup>50</sup> This last is a standard method of analysing *dhammas* in the commentarial literature and, as Nāṇamoli has suggested,<sup>51</sup> is probably in part derived from the sixteen *hāras* of the *Petakopadesa*.

4. *The Works of Buddhaghosa*

A detailed treatment of these two terms is found in three of the works attributed to Buddhaghosa.<sup>52</sup> All three are plainly based on a simplification and tidying up of the *Vimuttimagga*. It is unlikely that Buddhaghosa had

direct access to the *Petakopadesa*; material in his writings derived from that source is clearly secondhand. In fact even the simile from the *Milindapañha* is normally cited as a bell, just as in the *Vimuttimagga*, whereas in the *Milinda* itself it is a gong.<sup>53</sup> The *Dhammasaṅgani commentary* gives the bell, but also cites the *Milinda* directly, either from memory or from a different version, as there are some variations from the text we have — most notably the gong is cited as a drum.

Of the three commentaries the *Vinaya commentary* is fairly close to the *Vimuttimagga* version with relatively little additional information but omitting some of the less comprehensible ideas from the *Petakopadesa*. Probably the most important addition is the new simile of the bee — *vitakka* is compared to a bee with its mind following a scent that drops straight onto a lotus while *vicāra* is compared to the bee's wandering over the lotus after it has alighted.

The fullest account is given in the *Dhammasaṅgani commentary*. The *Visuddhimagga* gives a rewritten and simplified version of this. Both give a series of new similes. If someone is firmly gripping a dirty metal vessel with one hand and rubbing on (*anumajjana*) powder or oil with a cloth, then *vitakka* is like the hand which grips firmly and *vicāra* is like the hand which rubs. If a potter who is making a vessel has spun the wheel with the blow of a stick, then *vitakka* is like the hand which presses down (to hold the clay) and *vicāra* is like the hand which moves about here and there (to shape the clay). Similarly *vitakka* applies (the mind) (*abhiniropana*) just like a fixed pin which has been fastened in the middle when someone is drawing a circle. *Vicāra* ponders over (*anumajjana*) (the object) just like the pin which circumscribes the circle.

Elsewhere *abhiniropana* and *anumajjana* are given as the respective characteristics of *vitakka* and *vicāra*. This must come from an old commentarial passage (giving exegesis of the word *Tathāgata*) which describes the characteristics of various *dharmas*.<sup>54</sup> Closely related to this is a rewritten version of the *Petaka's* simile of the bird. *Vitakka*, which "occurs by way of applying the mind to its object", is compared to the movement of a large bird flying in the sky which takes the air with both wings and then holds its wings steady; for *vitakka* becomes one-pointed and then enters absorption (*appeti*). *Vicāra* which "occurs by way of pondering over the object", is compared to the movement of the bird when it swiftly moves its wings in order to take the air; for *vicāra* ponders over the object. The *Dhammasaṅgani commentary* specifically attributes this simile to the [old] *atthakathā*.<sup>55</sup> The same work is the only one to give another simile — just as one goes up

into (*ārohati*) a royal palace depending upon a friend or relative who is a courtier, so the mind takes up (*ārohati*) an object in dependence upon *vitakka*.

#### NORTH INDIAN BUDDHIST TEXTS

The *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*<sup>56</sup> defines *vitarka* as *cittaūdarikatā* 'grossness of mind' and *vicāra* as *cittasūkṣmatā* 'subtlety of mind'. The *Abhidharmāvātāra* gives a similar definition<sup>57</sup> which must be fairly old, since it appears also in the *Jñānaprasthāna*<sup>58</sup> — one of the latest of the Sarvāstivādin canonical texts — and in the *Abhidharmahrdaya*.<sup>59</sup> This application of the distinction between gross and subtle does not appear in the Pali tradition before the *Vimuttimagga* and is therefore probably of Sarvāstivādin origin. Noticeably, whereas the *Vimuttimagga* probably gave it in the form 'grossness of mind, etc.', Buddhaghosa refers simply to grossness, etc. This is significant in the light of the discussion in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, where Vasubandhu criticizes the above definition. As he points out, grossness and subtlety are relational terms (in *abhidharma*) and should extend as far as the highest level of existence (i.e. the *bhavāgra*). In other words each *dhyāna* or attainment is subtle in relation to the one below and gross in relation to the one above — a process extending to the fourth formless *jhāna*. The intended implication is that this is incompatible with the canonical account where neither *vitarka* nor *vicāra* are present in the higher *dhyānas*. The Pali tradition avoids this problem by making *vitakka* and *vicāra* gross and subtle in relation to one another rather than the causes of the mind's grossness and subtlety in general.<sup>60</sup>

The *Abhidharmāvātāra*<sup>61</sup> and the *Abhidharmadīpa*<sup>62</sup> declare that *vitarka* is the cause of the activity of the five (sensory) consciousnesses which are gross, while *vicāra* is favourable to the activity of mind consciousness (*manovijñāna*). They also describe *vitarka* as differentiating the type of sensory feature (*viṣayanimittaprakāravikalpin*) involved and as having its activity stirred up by the wind of labelling (*saṃjñā*) i.e. it is stimulated by the constant flow of labelled sensations. Yogācārin authors give definitions which are slightly more reminiscent of the Pali *Abhidhammapiṭaka* and the *Petakopadesa*. It suffices to quote the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*:

What is *vitarka*? It is a mental murmuring which searches about (for the object) in dependence either upon volition (*cetanā*) or upon understanding (*prajñā*). But that is grossness of mind. What is *vicāra*? It is a mental murmuring which investigates (the object) in dependence either upon volition or upon understanding. But that is subtlety of mind.<sup>63</sup>

## STAGES OF SAMĀDHI IN THE YOGA-SŪTRA

The parallelism between the description of *saṃprajñāta-samādhi* in the *Yoga-sūtra* and the traditional descriptions of the *rūpa-jhānas* in Buddhist sources has long been noted.<sup>64</sup> Careful examination of the text of the *Yoga-sūtra* (Yogas) and its *bhāṣya* suggests that the resemblance is even closer than has always been appreciated. Two passages are relevant for this purpose. The first of these (Yogas i 17) reads:

*vitarka-vicārānandāsmītā-rūpānugamāt saṃprajñātaḥ |*

It is called [the cessation<sup>65</sup>] which clearly comprehends [its object] as a result of being accompanied by forms<sup>66</sup> of *vitarka*, *vicāra*, bliss and a sense of I.

The commentators are agreed that this indicates four distinct stages, which may be tabulated, after the *bhāṣya*, as follows:

TABLE I

1. <i>sa-vitarka</i>	}	<i>vitarka</i>
		<i>vicāra</i> bliss sense of I
2. <i>sa-vicāra</i>	}	<i>vicāra</i>
		bliss sense of I
3. <i>sānanda</i>	}	bliss
		sense of I
4. <i>asmītā-mātra</i>	}	sense of I

Such a series poses no problems and is, as we shall see, in good agreement with the Buddhist sources.

The *bhāṣya* to this passage defines *vitarka* as: *cittasyāḷambane sthūla ābhogaḥ* "gross directing of the mind to an object." *Vicāra* is correspondingly subtle. This is quite close to some of the Buddhist definitions we have seen and strikingly different to the more typical definition of the later commentaries which sees grossness and subtlety in terms of the object of the mind rather than as a feature of the mind itself. However this should

not be overstated. It is certainly a fundamental assumption of both *abhidharma* and Sāṃkhya-yoga that higher states of consciousness are both themselves more subtle and possess subtler objects. The point is rather that in adapting material of ultimately Buddhist origin the Yoga tradition tends to shift it from the rather psychological bias of *abhidharma* towards a more cosmological orientation.

In fact this definition in terms of the subtlety of the object is in part derived from a passage later in the same chapter of the *Yoga-sūtra* to which we must now turn:

*śabdārtha-jñāna-vikalpaiḥ saṃkīrṇā sa-vitarkā samāpattiḥ* [42]

*smṛti-pariśuddhau sva-rūpa-sūnyevārtha-mātra-nirbhāsā nirvitarkā* [43]

*etayaiva sa-vicārā nirvicārā ca sūkṣma-ṣayā vyākhyatā* [44]

*sūkṣma-ṣayatvaṃ cāliṅga-paryavasānam* [45]

42. The attainment with *vitarka* is associated with concepts arising from knowledge of the meanings of words.<sup>67</sup>
43. When mindfulness (*smṛti*) is pure [the attainment] without *vitarka* reveals only the object and is as if empty of its own nature.
44. By this has been explained [the attainment] with *vicāra*, whereas [the attainment] without *vicāra* may be explained as having subtle objects.<sup>68</sup>
45. Moreover the sphere of subtle objects ends with that which has no distinguishing marks [i.e. *prakṛti*].

The commentators are a little misleading here. Their discussion is in terms of the *savitarka/nirvitarka*, *savicāra/nirvicāra* terminology, creating a new set of four *samāpattis*. If this is taken literally, it creates problems in reconciling the new set with the version from the *bhāṣya* set out in Table I. In the light of the Buddhist information that interpretation is almost certainly correct.<sup>69</sup> Yet there is no place for a *nirvitarka-samādhi* distinct from *savicāra-samādhi*.

According to the commentaries to i 44 *savicāra*- and *nirvicāra*- (*samāpatti*) are *sūkṣma-ṣayā*; *savitarka*- and *nirvitarka*- are *sthūla-ṣayā*. This can be interpreted as a single pair — these last are gross and all higher stages of *saḥaja-samādhi* are subtle. However, on further investigation an alternative solution appears possible. The redactor of the *Yoga-sūtra* may rather have been thinking in terms of a series of stages. A is gross in

relation to the subtlety of B, which is itself gross in relation to the subtlety of C, yet again gross in relation to D, and so on.

In the light of the general nature of this type of yogic practice, this second explanation seems much more plausible. Some examples of this kind of usage are cited in the *Visuddhimagga* from traditional sources.<sup>70</sup> Here the first *jhāna* is gross (*oḷārika*) where the second is subtle (*sukhuma*), but the second is gross where the third is subtle and the third is gross where the fourth is subtle. Many other examples could be cited from abhidhammic contexts.

If we understand the *Yoga-sūtra* in this way, we can derive the following table:

TABLE II

1. <i>sa-vitarka</i>	gross ‡	<i>vitarka</i> <i>vicāra</i> bliss sense of I
2. <i>nirvitarka</i> = <i>sa-vicāra</i>	subtle gross ‡	<i>vicāra</i> bliss sense of I
3. <i>nirvicāra</i> = <i>sānanda</i>	subtle gross ‡	bliss sense of I
4. * <i>nirānanda</i> = <i>asmitā-māra</i>	subtle gross ‡	sense of I

This interpretation makes more plausible the translation adopted for *Yogasūtra* i 44 (see note 68). Obviously the terms *nirvitarka* and *nirvicāra* can also be taken as referring to all higher levels of *samādhi* beyond the first (or second) in the table as these too lack *vitarka* and *vicāra*. Equally all higher levels and mental objects can be described as subtle, not only the one immediately above. Correspondingly even the lowest level can be described as possessing *vicāra*.<sup>71</sup>

It should also be mentioned that the influence of the Buddhist account of

the four *dhyanas* is already evident in one passage of the *Mahābhārata*, as pointed out by V. M. Bedekar.<sup>72</sup>

## BUDDHIST SOURCES

It is clear that at the time of the formation of many of the classical *abhidhamma* schools in the second and third centuries B.C., several different lists of factors of *samādhi* were extant in different *suttas*. By far the most important of these was the list contained in the standard formula for the four *jhānas*:

1. First *jhāna* — *savitakkaṃ, savicāraṃ, vivekaṃ, pīṭisukhaṃ*;
2. Second *jhāna* — *ajjhataṃ sampasādanaṃ,<sup>73</sup> cetaso ekodibhāvaṃ, samādhijaṃ, pīṭisukhaṃ*;
3. Third *jhāna* — *upekkhako viharati, sato ca sampajāno sukhañ ca kāyena paṭisaṃvedeti, upekkhako, satimā, sukhavihāri*;
4. Fourth *jhāna* — *adukkhaṃ, asukhaṃ, upekkhāsatipārisuddhi*.

The *Vibhaṅga*, an early canonical *abhidhamma* work, formulates (in its *Suttantabhājanīya*) the factors which make up each *jhāna* as follows:<sup>74</sup>

TABLE III

First <i>jhāna</i>	<i>vitakka</i> <i>vicāra</i> joy and happiness one-pointedness of mind <sup>75</sup>
Second <i>jhāna</i>	<i>sampasādana</i> joy and happiness one-pointedness of mind
Third <i>jhāna</i>	equipoise ( <i>upekṣā</i> ) mindfulness ( <i>sati</i> ) clear comprehension happiness one-pointedness of mind
Fourth <i>jhāna</i>	equipoise mindfulness one-pointedness of mind

The list given in the *Abhidhammakosa* differs only for the fourth *dhyaṇa*, where it has: 1. neutral feeling; 2. *upekṣāparisuddhi*; 3. *smṛtiparisuddhi*; 4. *samādhi*.<sup>76</sup>

Also in early sources was a division of *samādhi* into three kinds:<sup>77</sup>

1. With *vitakka* and *vicāra*;
2. Without *vitakka* but with *vicāra*;
3. With neither *vitakka* nor *vicāra*.

The list posed problems for systematic analysis, as the second kind cannot be precisely equated with any one of the four *jhānas*. Early schools resolved the problem in one of two different ways. The Sarvāstivādins and others introduced an intermediate stage or *dhyānāntara* between the first and second *dhyānas*. The Vibhajjavādins/Theravādins preferred to adopt an alternative list of five *jhānas* for purposes of *abhidhamma* analysis and distributed the factors as follows:<sup>78</sup>

TABLE IV

First <i>jhāna</i>	<i>vitakka</i> <i>vicāra</i> joy happiness one-pointedness of mind
Second <i>jhāna</i>	<i>vicāra</i> joy happiness one-pointedness of mind
Third <i>jhāna</i>	joy happiness one-pointedness of mind
Fourth <i>jhāna</i>	happiness one-pointedness of mind
Fifth <i>jhāna</i>	equipoise one-pointedness of mind

Another ancient list divided similar material into three sections:<sup>79</sup>

1. *Samādhi* with *vitakka* and *vicāra*, with only *vicāra*, with neither;
2. *Samādhi* with and without joy;
3. *Samādhi* with *sāta* or with equipoise.

It seems clear that two distinct stages are to be found in the sources. In the early material we find a less standardized situation with the experience of

*samādhi* at the centre of the stage and the classification into types more varied and perhaps more experiential in nature. Only later arises the attempt to harmonize this material into a single list, as is done in the Sarvāstivādin tradition. In this respect the Theravādin device of an alternate set of five *jhānas* preserves more faithfully an earlier variety.<sup>80</sup>

## IN CONCLUSION

For the canonical *abhidhamma*, *vitakka* at its weakest results in a tendency to speculate and fix upon ideas. More strongly developed it is the ability to apply the mind to something and to fix it upon a (meditative) object. *Vicāra* at its weakest is simply the tendency of the mind to wander. More highly developed it is the ability to explore and examine an object. In one way we can say that *vitakka* is 'thinking of' something, whereas *vicāra* is 'thinking about' that same thing, but in fact the latter is probably intended to refer more to what we would now describe as the mind's associative faculty.<sup>81</sup>

A *samādhi* with *vicāra* but without *vitakka* is a state of mind in which the mind freely associates about a meditative object without *deliberately* thinking of anything specific. It must obviously be preceded by one with *vitakka*. If it were not, then the mind would simply wander to any kind of object and soon lose (or never acquire) the kind of focus and unification required for *samādhi*. The situation is different once a *samādhi* with *vitakka* is sufficiently strongly developed. Then *vitakka* can drop away because that focus is well enough established not to need further reinforcement.<sup>82</sup>

The later texts do not depart radically from this understanding. Such differences as we do find are simply due to the need to conform to the requirements of theory. For the Vaibhāṣikas and Buddhaghosa this means conformity to strict momentariness and precise definition as distinct *dharmas*. For the *Yoga-sūtra*, and even more for its commentaries, the stages of *samādhi* need to be related to the levels of Sāṃkhya evolution.

## NOTES

Abbreviations of names of texts are those used in the Critical Pali Dictionary unless otherwise indicated.

<sup>77</sup> A useful presentation of part of the case for such influences in: Johannes Bronkhorst, *The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India*, Stuttgart, 1986, chapter six.

<sup>78</sup> In Philip Denwood and Alexander Piatigorsky, *Buddhist Studies — Ancient and Modern*, London, 1983, pp. 1–11. Some of the material in the first part of this article was included in a draft version of that paper.

- <sup>3</sup> M III 73.  
<sup>4</sup> D I 16; 21; 23; 29; a similar formula at M I 68, etc.; 520.  
<sup>5</sup> A I 89, etc.; 193 ff.; II 191 f.  
<sup>6</sup> D I 12 etc.  
<sup>7</sup> M I 487; II 172 f.; A II 189 f.; Sn 885 f.  
<sup>8</sup> D II 36 f.; M I 167; S I 136; Vin I 4.  
<sup>9</sup> Sv-pt I 188 ff.; Sv I 106 f.  
<sup>10</sup> E.g. Dhs-a 114.  
<sup>11</sup> M I 114 ff.; M III 114; 125; S I 203; II 151 ff.; III 93; A I 148; 254; 275; II 16; 76; 117; 252; III 390; 428 f.; 446; cf. also M I 118; 133; III 129 ff.; and *gehasita-vitakka* at M I 124; S I 186.  
<sup>12</sup> D II 277; M III 124; S II 151 ff.; 153 f.; A IV 147; *saññā* and *vitakka* are juxtaposed at M I 133; A III 428; cf. also M III 129.  
<sup>13</sup> The eight thoughts of a great man D III 287, A IV 229; not thinking a thought connected with the body while dwelling in contemplation of the body M III 136; thinking whatever thought one desires to think, etc. A II 36 f.; the monk who is full of thought and spends his day in thoughts about *dhmma* A III 87; mindfulness of in and out breathing should be developed in order to cut off thought A IV 353; subtle defilements are thoughts connected with clan, country or reputation — after these go, *dhmma* thoughts remain A I 254; thought is the world's *vicāraṇā* S I 39 f. Some of these could be interpreted in more technical senses. Evil unskilful thoughts at A I 280 probably refers to the three kinds of unskilful thought.  
<sup>14</sup> Thought reading D III 104, A I 171, cf. D I 213; where *vitakka* and *vicāra* cease and who dwells constantly making them cease A IV 411; a place is oppressive in which they have not ceased A IV 550; *saññāmanasikāra* associated with *vitakka* are an illness for someone dwelling in the second *jhāna* A IV 415; the *jhāyin* without *vitakka* S I 186; *vitakka* and *vicāra* have ceased, are tranquilized and calmed in the second *jhāna* S IV 217, cf. A IV 409; they are movement in (the peace of) the first *jhāna* M I 454, cf. D I 37; also in lists of types of *samādhi*, see notes 77 and 79 below.  
<sup>15</sup> M I 301; S IV 293.  
<sup>16</sup> A IV 385.  
<sup>17</sup> A II 36 f.  
<sup>18</sup> D III 215; M II 24 ff.; A V 31; *kāma-saṅkappa* alone at A III 259, 145—6. The three unskilful *saṅkappas* are probably intended at Sn 818 and A I 281 — in the last case *saṅkappa* in verse corresponds to *vitakka* in prose.  
<sup>19</sup> Due to lack of mindfulness M I 453 f., S IV 190; due to not guarding the senses S IV 76 f., 136 f.; similar at M III 132 and 136 (*gehasita*).  
<sup>20</sup> D III 42—6; M I 192 ff.; III 276 f. (here the meaning 'purpose' is required); A V 92; 94; 97; 99; 104.  
<sup>21</sup> S II 143 f.; 144 ff.; 146 f.; 147 ff.; cf. also M II 27 f.  
<sup>22</sup> Peṭ 168.  
<sup>23</sup> A IV 199; 202; also Vin II 238 f.; Ud 53; 55; S II 184; Ap 23.  
<sup>24</sup> Vin II 136 f.; III 217; 257 f.  
<sup>25</sup> Vibh 195; 197; 202; 254; 259. Probably *appanā* as the name for the concluding phrases in Dhs should be understood in the same way.  
<sup>26</sup> Dhs-a 142; Ps IV 132 f.  
<sup>27</sup> Dhs-a 142 f.  
<sup>28</sup> Nett 33; Peṭ 92.  
<sup>29</sup> Paṭis I 16; 17; etc.  
<sup>30</sup> Paṭis I 79.  
<sup>31</sup> M III 251; D II 312; S V 9; etc.

- M I 402.  
 S IV 189 f.; Paṭis II 19.  
 A IV 147; cf. Vibh 103 f.  
 E.g. M I 115 f.: there is an inclination of the mind towards whatever one frequently applies *vitakka* and *vicāra* to; cf. also M I 116: if I apply *vitakka* and *vicāra* for too long, my body would become tired; M I 144: ... applies *vitakka* and *vicāra* by night to the affairs of the day; M II 253 f.: ... applies *vitakka* and *vicāra* in accordance with that teaching.  
 A III 87 f.; 177 f.; 361 f.; 382 f.; IV 86; A III 21 ff. — D III 242 (i.e. the *Saṅgītipariyāya*); the exception is A I 264.  
 Cf. BHSD s.v. *upavicāra* and A III 363 f.  
 D III 244 f.; M III 216 f.; S IV 232; A I 176; cf. Vibh 381.  
 Dhs-a 143.  
 A IV 47—51; E<sup>a</sup> and C<sup>a</sup> 1970 read *anusandati*; the latter cites a reading *anusanthāti* cf. Skt *anusamsthā* 'to follow'.  
 PTC lists twenty seven occurrences s.v. *dhata*.  
 See for example: It 72; Nidd I 386; 493; 501; Paṭis I 17; 36; 136; 178 f.; Vibh 86 f.; 103 f.; 362; Kvu 412 ff. For *takka*: It 37; Nidd I 293 f.; 360; 400; 482; 498; 501; II 29; 185.  
 Peṭ 142.  
 Nānamoli (Peṭ Trsl. 190) so emends *apeti*.  
 Sv I 144; Dhs-a 115; Vism 142.  
 This paragraph must be compared to Nett 19—20 where there are a number of parallels. Probably the comparison in Peṭ of *vitakka* with *aparīṇā* and of *vicāra* with *parīṇā* should read *abhiṇṇā* and *parīṇā* (or *vice versa*).  
 So correct Nānamoli's translation.  
 Mil 62 f.  
 E<sup>a</sup> reads *anusandahati*. S<sup>a</sup> (cited CPD) reads *anusandati*. Dhs-a has *anusaddāyati* which I follow in the translation. There may be, or have been thought to be, some connection with the *anusandhanatā* of the *Dhammasaṅgani* register but it is difficult to make sense of this. Possibly both were taken to mean 'continuing in sequence' cf. BHSD s.v. *anusamdhi*.  
 Vim Trsl. 86 ff.  
 Nett Trsl. liv.  
 Sp I 144; Dhs-a 114 f.; Vism 142 f. See also the Chinese version of Sp (trsl. P. V. Bapat and A. Hirakawa, 1970) p. 104 and Paṭis-a I 181 f.; Nidd-a I 127 f.; Moh 12.  
 For the bell simile, see also N. Aiyaswami Sastri, *Satyasiddhiśāstra of Harivarman*, Baroda, 1975 and 1978, I 165 and 216; II pp. 134 and 186.  
 Sv I 63; Ps I 48; Mp I 106; cf. Sv I 121 f.; Ps II 348; Mil 62 and note the earlier pair at Paṭis I 17.  
 The *Visuddhimagga* (also Paṭis-a I 182 and Nidd-a I 128) cites instead the *Dukanipātaṅghakathā*, but this too must be the old Sinhala commentary as it is not in Mp.  
 Abhidh-k-bh II 33.  
 Marcel Van Velthem, *Le Traité de la Descente dans la Profonde Loi de l'Arhat Skandhila*, Louvain, 1977, p. 16. Further material cited in SWTF s.v. *audārika-pañca-vijñāna-hetu-dharman* (kindly sent to me by Dr. Siglinde Dietz).  
 Śānti Bhikṣu Sāstrī, *Jñānaprasthāna-śāstra of Kātyāyaniputra retranslated into Sanskrit from the Chinese version of Hiuan Tsang*, Śāntiniketan, 1955, p. 53.  
 Charles Willemen, *The Essence of Metaphysics*, Brussels, 1975, p. 27. Also p. 106 where *vitakka* is explained as "when, at the moment of engaging in concentration, one begins to produce wholesome qualities, one first reflects with coarse thoughts," while for *vicāra* we have: "when one connects and links the thoughts with subtlety."  
 It must be noted, however, that the Vaibhāsikas probably did not intend to go so far. This is simply the implication claimed by Vasubandhu in their use of the simile of ghee in

water to defend the simultaneous presence of both *dharmas*. Note that Vasubandhu, but not the Sautrāntikas, denies the possibility of such a simultaneous occurrence since for him they are two degrees of a single *dharma*.

<sup>61</sup> Van Velthem, op. cit., p. 16.

<sup>62</sup> P. S. Jaini, *Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣaprabhāvṛtti*, Second Edition, Patna, 1977, p. 81. Jaini's footnotes give a number of relevant source passages. See also the general discussion of *vitarka* and *vicāra* in the Introduction pp. 83–88. Further comments and references in: Stefan Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, Delhi, 1984, p. 77 f.

<sup>63</sup> Cited Jaini, op. cit., p. 81 f. Some similar passages also in the *Satyasiddhiśāstra* — Aiyaswami Sastri, op. cit., Vol II p. 185 f. cf. pp. 134 f.; 173; 246 f.; 367 ff.; 385 ff.

<sup>64</sup> Bronkhorst, op. cit.

<sup>65</sup> Supplying the noun *nirodhaḥ* from Yogas i 2 and i 12. Alternatively *samprajñātaḥ* (sc. *samādhiḥ*) cf. Yogas-bh and Bhoja.

<sup>66</sup> Just possibly *rūpa* here refers to the object of *samādhi*, as in some Buddhist sources. See L. S. Cousins, "Buddhist *jhāna*. Its nature and attainment according to Pali sources," *Religion* III (1973) p. 119. We would then translate: "... as a result of following a [mental] object with *vitarka* ..."

<sup>67</sup> Following Shlomo Pines and Tuvia Gelblum, "Al-bīrūnī's Arabic Version of Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*: A translation of his first chapter and a comparison with related Sanskrit texts," BSOAS XXIX (1966) p. 325 n. 234. This is a translation of the text in isolation. If one prefers to take account of the use of these terms elsewhere in Yogas (i 9 and iii 17), then the following would be preferable:

42. The attainment with *vitarka* is mixed with [erroneous] identification of the sound of the word with the object [to which it refers] and the general concept [implied by the word].

<sup>68</sup> Following the alternative translation given in Pines and Gelblum, op. cit., p. 325 n. 234. See Table II. The more usual translation is:

44. [The attainments] with and without *vicāra*, which have subtle objects, are explained in just the same way.

<sup>69</sup> The four factors given by the *Yoga-sūtra* are simply a modification of the various Buddhist lists of factors. *Ānanda* is in any case a synonym for *prīti* and *asmīdā* is substituted for *upekṣā/taramajjhataṭā* with an eye to Sāṃkhya theory (*buddhi*) — even at the price of some inconsistency with Yogas ii 3.

<sup>70</sup> Vism 275.

<sup>71</sup> As with Yogas i 17 above.

<sup>72</sup> "The Dhyānayoga in the Mahābhārata (XII 188)," *Bhāratīya Vidyā* 20–21 (1960–61) 116–25. Further discussed in Bronkhorst, op. cit., p. 65 ff.

<sup>73</sup> Compare the *adhyātma-prasāda* of Yogas i 47.

<sup>74</sup> Vibh 257, line 30; etc.

<sup>75</sup> The addition of *cinekkagatā* ≠ *samādhi* to the list is explicit in such contexts as M I 294 f.; III 25.

<sup>76</sup> Abhidh-k-bh VIII 8; the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (p. 68) is similar; cf. Peṭ 139; M III 25 f.; cp. also D I 196.

<sup>77</sup> DN III 219 = 274 ≠ SN IV 360 ≠ 362 f.

<sup>78</sup> Dhs 33 ff.

<sup>79</sup> M III 162 = A IV 300.

<sup>80</sup> A different view: Walpola Rahula, "A Comparative Study of Dhyānas according to Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda and Mahāyāna," *The Maha Bodhi*, June 1962, pp. 190–99.

It is not as such 'sustained application of mind' nor is it 'holding the mind' on an object — these are results of *vicāra*, not its nature.

<sup>81</sup> The *Dhs-m* (Ce 1938) 166 (to Dhs-a 115) describes *vitakka* in access or absorption (*samādhi* as unwavering (*niccalo hutvā*) and as having entered into the object (*anupavissitvā pavattati*). The *Anuṭṭikā* explains that when it is active continuously on a single object it does not vibrate as it does with a new object.

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## THE BUDDHA'S BOOK OF GENESIS?

Relativism is all the rage these days. In some university departments, especially in the United States, and in many other places as well, the view prevails that the meaning of a text is that ascribed to it by each reader or each generation of readers; that it has no objective or inherent meaning, and the grounds for preferring one interpretation to another, if any, are thus political or matters of personal preference. It is hard to believe that anyone who has studied the oeuvre of Roy Norman could continue to maintain this view. For many centuries Asoka's inscriptions lay unread and unrecognised, till in 1837 James Prinsep deciphered the Brāhmī script and revealed to the world the humane policies of a great emperor who was remarkable for the extent to which he tried to avoid using violence. Yet one edict seemed to show, according to the interpretation of the experts, that Asoka did not go so far as to abolish the death penalty. Then in 1975 Norman published an article entitled: "Aśoka and Capital Punishment: notes on a portion of Aśoka's fourth pillar edict, with an appendix on the accusative absolute construction".<sup>1</sup> He showed that the experts had been wrong: the edict refers not to execution but to flogging. Aśoka did abolish the death penalty.

The criminals being punished by Aśoka's officials can have been in no doubt that the text of his edict had an objective meaning: for those accused the emperor's meaning was absolute. Joking apart, however, it is not enough to say that Norman provided a new interpretation of the text: he *discovered* its meaning.

That is not an authoritarian claim to truth. As Karl Popper has shown,<sup>2</sup> all discoveries are hypothetical and liable to revision: Newton's discovery of the laws of physics is a case in point. In general, the validity of Prinsep's decipherment of Asokan Brāhmī has successfully met so many tests that the chance of its being quite wrong is negligible, but there is still room for plenty of disagreement about particular characters. To say that Norman discovered the meaning of the fourth pillar edict is not to say that his view is bound to stand for eternity, but I think it probably will.

The full title of the article announcing this discovery reads almost like a philologist's self-parody, as if a grammatical construction were being considered in the same breath as a matter of life and death. But it makes the point that philological exactitude is indispensable to correct interpretation.



As it happens, this particular discovery did not hang on the accusative absolute or hinge on expertise in the historical development of Middle Indo-Aryan languages, the field Norman has made his own. It hinged on the word *vadha*: hitherto it had been interpreted as "killing", a meaning it often bears, but Norman could adduce parallel texts to show that in juridical contexts it normally meant "beating" in the sense of flogging.

Norman's studies of words in Middle Indo-Aryan texts have produced a host of discoveries, the largest number of them concerning the meaning of passages in the Pali Canon. Discovering the meaning of texts which some people hold sacred can have its problems. To show that an edict by Asoka has a certain meaning offends no vested interests and is unlikely to upset anyone but the few scholars who have got it wrong and may be more concerned with their *amour propre* than with the search for truth. A religious text, on the other hand, is embedded in a history of interpretation.

This can be a source of confusion. An important part of the history of a religion is of course how it interprets its own tradition, including its textual tradition. But that does not alter the fact that texts had specific meanings to their original authors, and moreover, since we can assume that those authors were competent communicators, to their original audiences. To uncover those original meanings is not only a legitimate task for the historian, it is of the greatest historical interest. If the original meaning turns out to be very different from that ascribed by later generations, it may upset people; but we should learn from the Buddha that in no area of life is reality inherently pleasant.

For the most part, the interpretation of the Pali canon which has been accepted by the Theravādin tradition has been that embodied in the Pali commentaries. When these were written down, which traditionally is said to have happened late in the first century BCE<sup>3</sup> and is unlikely to have been earlier, they certainly represented an oral tradition of exegesis which in some sense must stretch back to the time of, or immediately after, the Buddha himself. As soon as the texts themselves had been definitively formulated, additional material must have been classified as commentary. Unlike the sacrosanct texts, however, the commentaries were not memorised word for word; they represented a tradition of a far more fluid kind. If we date the death of the Buddha and the initial fixation of the texts of his sermons to the late fifth century BCE and the relative fixation of the commentaries to four centuries later, we are unlikely to be far wrong in deducing the period of oral transmission to have lasted about four centuries.

If we try to discover the original meaning of the Buddha's sermons, we

need to know what cultural knowledge and presuppositions he shared with his audience. We must admit, I fear, that we cannot know very much about the Buddha's interlocutors or about what his audiences were thinking or taking for granted, and to that extent some of what he meant may be lost to us. We may however be slightly better off in this respect than were the authors of the Pali commentaries. Even if we know little of the Buddha's cultural milieu, in some cases our knowledge of historical linguistics and of parallel (mainly brahminical) texts allows us to know things the commentators did not — as Norman's work has amply demonstrated. Though no doubt *in nuce* the commentarial tradition goes back to the first generations of Buddhists in northern India, Trautmann has shown<sup>4</sup> that such important parts of them as those concerning the Buddha's own family relations must have been composed in areas where Dravidian marriage patterns prevailed, i.e., in the southern half of India or Sri Lanka. The composition of the *athakathā* was thus, to a large extent, separated from that of the *suttas* not only in time but also in space.

Naturally I am not saying that we can ignore the commentarial tradition. I maintain the opposite: that we can both learn from the commentators and learn from their mistakes. What they have recorded for posterity is available to us, but we should not share their assumption that the Buddha's meanings resonate autonomously in timelessness. There is no *a priori* reason to think that an attempt to supplement, or even correct, the information they contain will be fruitless or misguided.

I append some remarks on what T. W. Rhys Davids, the first person to translate the text into English (or into any European language), called "A Book of Genesis".<sup>5</sup> That title well illustrates my overarching theme: that to communicate with an audience one needs to speak in their idiom. Rhys Davids attracted the attention and interest of English-speakers by suggesting an ancient parallel to the Bible in quite another tradition. The title also reflects my narrower theme. Buddhists — not merely Theravādins, but all Buddhists — have indeed hitherto taken the text as being a more or less straight-faced account of how the universe, and in particular society, originated. I contend, on the other hand, that the Buddha never intended to give such an account; that the original intention of the text is satirical. Like Roy Norman, in whose footsteps I am attempting to follow,<sup>6</sup> I shall use as my evidence the adduction of parallel texts and even, with some trepidation, a dash of historical linguistics.

The "Book of Genesis" is the *Aggañña Sutta* (AS).<sup>7</sup> It is ascribed to the Buddha. I accept that ascription, but my argument does not depend on it, being concerned with the text itself, and for the purposes of this paper "the

Buddha" simply means the author of AS. Nor does my argument assume that we have before us the text in the exact form in which it was originally recited (at the First Council?).

My argument is that we cannot understand the original meaning of the AS (to its first speaker and audience) unless we realise that it makes several allusions, at crucial points, to brahminical scriptures. Finding allusions to brahminical literature in the early Buddhist texts is a long and difficult business. Were it not so, great scholars like Louis de La Vallée Poussin would not have written that there are no allusions in the Pali texts to the Upaniṣads.<sup>8</sup> Even if all the relevant texts are put on computer, the search may not be much facilitated. Precise accuracy in quotation was not aimed at or valued in ancient times. Greek and Roman authors are often inaccurate in their quotations, even though they had books and libraries. When the Buddha alluded to a brahminical text, he could only have heard it, and since he was not himself a brahmin it is improbable that he was ever taught such a text or that anyone ever checked his accuracy. Besides, he may have heard a text in a form other than that which was written down many centuries later and has been transmitted to us; in other words, he might be quoting accurately but we could never know it. It is important to bear these conditions in mind when reading the rest of this paper.

Both anthropologists and textual scholars have been discussing the AS in recent years. The anthropologists have been discussing<sup>9</sup> how the Theravādin tradition has used the text as a charter for the institution of kingship and the organization of society into *varṇa*: according to the AS, those social arrangements are man-made rather than divinely ordained, but of primeval antiquity, so that the Buddha talked of them as things settled long ago, early in our eon — and by implication early in every eon, since the pattern of history repeats itself. Like every reader, the Theravādin tradition has seen that the Buddha denies religious significance to those socio-political arrangements. But the tradition lacks historical awareness and credits the Buddha with omniscience, so it detects no irony in the text, let alone the parodistic character which I see in it.

The bulk of the philological work on the AS in recent years has been published by Professor Ulrich Schneider<sup>10</sup> and his pupil Dr. Konrad Meisig. Dr. Meisig has put me very much in his debt by sending me free copies of his monograph on the AS<sup>11</sup> and his other major publications. Like all his publications, the monograph is extremely learned. Unfortunately, however, I am not able to agree with any of the conclusions that Schneider and Meisig argue for. The present article intends to make a positive contribution to our understanding of the AS, and polemics would be out of place in it; the one

point at which I cannot avoid taking issue with Meisig is in my discussion of the text's title below.

In my interpretation, I am essentially combining two unoriginal claims. The first is that the Buddha used humour;<sup>12</sup> the second that he turned the brahmins' claims and terms<sup>13</sup> against them, saying that they had forgotten the true purport of their own traditions. That his criticism of the brahmins used humour is not, I think, hard to accept if one considers an etymology the Buddha gives late in the AS (para. 23): he explains the word *ajjhāyaka*, "reciter of the Veda" (from Skt. *adhyāyaka*), as *a-jhāyaka*, "non-meditator". Incidentally, the pun does not depend on Pali; it would work in Sanskrit and presumably equally well in whatever form of Middle Indo-Aryan the Buddha spoke.

That the Buddha is setting out both to deny the brahmin view of the origin of society and to make fun of it becomes clear at the outset of the AS. Two brahmin converts tell the Buddha that other brahmins are roundly abusing them for having left the brahmin estate and gone over to join the ascetics, whose status is that of *sūdras*. The full meaning of this passage, as of much that follows, depends on the ambiguity of the word *varṇa*. As is well known, *varṇa*, like Sanskrit *varṇa*, refers to the four estates<sup>14</sup> of society (brahmin, *kṣatriya*, *vaiśya*, *sūdra*), while its primary meaning is "colour", and by extension it means "complexion" or "good looks". The four estates were assigned the symbolic colours of white, red, yellow and black respectively. (Though I know of no allusion to this in a Sanskrit text earlier than the *Mahābhārata*, I believe there is a reference to it in the *Tiṭṭaka* at AN, I, 162.) It is also possible that the typical brahmin was fairer than the typical *sūdra* or at least perceived to be so. Thus the brahmins are said to claim that their *varṇa* is white and the other is black.<sup>15</sup> We may assume that the brahmins considered those who had joined the Sangha to have *sūdra* status because the Sangha kept no caste rules of purity, had people from all castes live together and accept food from anyone; we can further assume that they were blacker because they rapidly became sunburnt like *sūdra* labourers.

At the same time the brahmins are reported as saying (para. 3): "The brahmins are pure, non-brahmins are impure. The brahmins are Brahmā's own children, born of his mouth, born of Brahmā, created by Brahmā, heirs of Brahmā." They describe the Sangha as "shaven-headed little ascetics, menial, black, born of the feet of the kinsman." The kinsman (*bandhu*) in question is the brahmins' kinsman, Brahmā.

The commentary on this passage<sup>16</sup> is very terse and does not reveal which allusions the commentator has caught, except that he does say that the feet at the end are Brahmā's feet. (Both commentary and sub-commen-

tary misunderstand *bandhu*; they take it as “allies of Māra”. But that is not significant because they are apparently reading *bandhū*, accusative plural.) The author of the sub-commentary, however, makes it clear that he understands the allusion to the *Puruṣa-sūkta* (*Rg-veda* X, 90). He says<sup>17</sup> that the brahmin tradition (*laddhi*) has it that the brahmins were born from Brahmā’s mouth, the *kṣatriyas* from his chest, the *vaiśyas* from his thighs and the *śūdras* from his feet. He also reports, no less accurately, that the brahmins are born from Brahmā’s mouth because they are born from the words of the Veda (*veda-vacanato*)<sup>18</sup> and that they are Brahmā’s heirs because they are worthy of the Vedas and Vedāṅgas.

The first words of the Buddha’s reply (para. 4) are that in these insulting remarks the brahmins have forgotten their own traditions. This is the same criticism as he makes of brahmins elsewhere, e.g., in the *Brāhmaṇa-dhammika Sutta*.<sup>19</sup> He claims time and again that the brahmins have forgotten that the true brahmin is a virtuous person, not someone born into a particular social group. The Buddha then consoles his brahmin disciples with a joke: how can brahmins say they are born of Brahmā’s mouth, when we can all see that they are born from the wombs of their womenfolk, who have periods, become pregnant, give birth and give suck? The Buddha does not have to spell out that this means that the brahmins have the same impurities from birth as other human beings.

The Buddha then points out that it is enlightened beings who enjoy the highest worldly prestige, and that they may come from any social background. People from any of the four estates may be wicked (para. 5) or virtuous (para. 6). When talking of vice and virtue the Buddha uses the words for black and white which were used to describe the *varṇa* just above. He then (para. 7) refutes what the brahmins have said by remarking that all four estates have good and bad people in them, but whoever is enlightened is rightly considered top. That righteousness is held to be the best he shows by referring to King Pasenadi (para. 8): the other Sakyas have to behave deferentially to King Pasenadi, but the king shows to the Buddha the same deference that the other Sakyas show to him.

This last argument seems typical of the Buddha. For instance, when he sets out to detail the benefits of becoming an ascetic, the very first that he talks of is the change in circumstance of a slave who always had to wait on his master, but after becoming an ascetic receives deference and material help from his former master.<sup>20</sup>

The Buddha then goes a step further (para. 9). “You,” he says, “are of various births, names, clans and families, and have left home for homelessness.” (Though the “you” is literally addressed to the two brahmin disciples,

the Buddha is looking beyond them to the whole Sangha.) “If you are asked who you are, state that you are ascetics, sons of the Sakyān.” But those who have firm faith will properly reply: “I am the Blessed One’s own child, born of his mouth, born of the Dhamma, created by the Dhamma, heir of the Dhamma.” For the Buddha is designated “Dhamma-bodied, Brahma-bodied, become Dhamma, become Brahma”. This echoes word for word the brahminical formula quoted above, substituting for Brahmā first the Buddha and then the Dhamma, his Teaching. The Buddha is making a serious point, but in language which to his followers must have sounded at least playful and to brahmins scandalous. At first he sounds as if he is equating himself with Brahmā, the creator god, but after a few words he makes clear that the real equation he is making is not of persons but of teachings: his teaching is, for his followers, the true Veda. In the final sentence of the paragraph he hammers home the point that what counts about him is not his individuality but his teaching; he makes the same point elsewhere, in the formula, “He who sees me sees the Dhamma and he who sees the Dhamma sees me.”<sup>21</sup> In the formulation he gives here, the language leaves open a further implication, because in the compounds *Brahma-kāyo* and *Brahma-bhūto*, *brahma-* could be masculine (as suggested by the equation in the previous sentence: the Sangha are the Buddha’s sons just as the brahmins are Brahmā’s) or neuter (equating the Buddha’s Dhamma with *brahman* in the sense of Veda/ultimate truth).

Here (para. 10) the Buddha embarks on the aetiological myth which occupies well over half the text and gives it its name — or names. Eager to support his teacher’s intuition that this part of the text originally had no connection with what precedes it, but was later cobbled on, Meisig maintains<sup>22</sup> that the earliest versions of the text we can reconstruct cannot have been called *Aggañña Sutta*. I do not know Chinese and so cannot go into details, but according to what Meisig himself reports,<sup>23</sup> of the three Chinese parallels one is called “The small *sūtra* of origins” or “The *sūtra* of the four *varṇa*”, the second “The Bhāradvāja hall *sūtra*”, and the third “The *sūtra* of origins to the two brahmins Vāsiṣṭha and Bhāradvāja”. The word *aggañña* will be discussed below, but the Pali tradition interprets it too as “origins”. It is only in this part of the text that the four estates are separately discussed; earlier, as we have seen, only the brahmin and *śūdra* estates are the theme, and the four are merely listed (in paras. 5–7) in a mechanical way. Thus I fail to see that the facts which Meisig painstakingly assembles support his conclusion.

The myth purports to explain the origins of kingship, of the four estates, and of many major features of the universe along the way. Since it is the

only ancient Buddhist text to offer any account of the origins of all these important things, it is not at all surprising that Buddhist tradition has taken it literally. I shall however try to show that the purported "myth" is primarily satirical and parodistic in intent.

The very fact that the text is unique in its subject matter has significance. The Buddha several times stated that he was not concerned to preach anything that was not directly relevant to the four noble truths and conducive to salvation. What he preached was as small in extent compared to what he could have talked about as a handful of leaves is to a whole forest.<sup>24</sup> He refused to give any answer to a set of fourteen questions, which included the questions whether the world was eternal in time and infinite in space, by comparing those who troubled with them to a man who, wounded by an arrow, refused treatment of his wound till he had answers to such irrelevant questions as the name of the man who shot the arrow.<sup>25</sup>

The story begins with the world in a phase when it contains only beings who consist of mind, feed on joy, are luminous and live in the air. We soon gather (in the next para.) that they are otherwise undifferentiated, and so are called just "beings" (*sattā*). It may occur to us to wonder in passing why such rarefied creatures merit no grander title. Be that as it may, the beings pass from the sphere of radiance and are reborn in our world (*itthattam āgacchanti*).<sup>26</sup> The world at that time is nothing but water and is completely dark, without heavenly bodies (in the astronomical sense) and without time divisions.

What does this remind us of? Vedic cosmogonies. *Rg-veda* X, 129, the most famous Vedic text to explore the mystery of the origin of the universe, begins: *nāsad āsīn no sad āsīt tadānim*: "There was neither non-existence nor existence then." The second verse says that there was then nothing to distinguish day from night. The third verse begins: "Darkness was hidden in darkness in the beginning; without distinction this all was water." Compare the first words of AS para. 11: *Ekodakī-bhūtam kho pana Vāsettha tena samayena hoti andhakāro andhakāra-timisā. Na candima-suriyā paññāyanti . . . na rattin-divā paññāyanti . . .*

The semantic similarity is striking. I also catch verbal assonances. The Vedic hymn begins by asserting that initially there was neither *sat* nor *asat*; for the Buddha this would have been nonsense, and also very hard to express in Pali. It is easy to see, however, how in turning it into a parodistic narrative he would have called the first beings just plain "beings". There may be another verbal echo too. The first line of the hymn's fourth verse is: *kāmas tad agre samavartatādhi*: "Desire in the beginning came upon that." The semantic parallel to this will occur soon below. Here I tentatively

observe that the verb *samavartata* may have been in the Buddha's mind and so account for the rather obscure expression (at the beginning of para. 10) *ayam loko samvattati*. Taken alone, this argument would be weak, but once one has seen the other affinities between the two texts it may have some force.

So far from seeing a chasm between paras. 9 and 10,<sup>27</sup> I see them as closely related. At the end of para. 9, in my view, the Buddha has been parodying *Rg-veda* X, 90. In the next sentences he moves on to a parody of another Vedic hymn, *Rg-veda* X, 129. In doing so, incidentally, he starts to fulfil the promise made in the first sentence of his reply to his disciples (beginning of para. 4; see above). On a larger scale, both parodies serve to make a serious point. The message of the cosmogonic one is that while human beings now are hierarchically ranked by birth, this is a human convention and basically we are all the same under the skin — just living beings, equally capable of good and evil.

We have seen above that after setting the scene of watery darkness the Vedic hymn introduces desire as the motive force. Its entrance is unexplained and unoccasioned but somehow *kāma* gets things moving. Desire plays a similar role at the same point in the AS. For Buddhists, however, desire can only be bad, as stated in the second noble truth. In accordance with that truth, the word for desire here is *taṇhā*. It arrives early in para. 12. Unlike the Vedic *kāma*, however, this desire has an object. A sweet earth (*rasa-paṭhavi*) has spread (*samatāni*) on the water, like the skin on hot milk as it cools; it looks like ghee or cream<sup>28</sup> and tastes as sweet as honey.

This is a skit on *Bṛhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad* (BAU) I, 2. The BAU contains at least three cosmogonies; we are dealing here with the first. It begins with Death, from whom water is born — so again water is the first material element. The text continues: *Tad yad apām śara āsīt, tat samahanyata, sā pṛthivy abhavat*: "Then the milk-skin of the waters congealed and became earth." Monier-Williams gives as a meaning of *śaras* "film on boiled milk". A parallel Pāli form (*saro*?) does not seem to be attested; if it was a rare word it could well have been garbled with the *rasa-paṭhavi* and so lost. The next words in the BAU are: *Tasyām aśrāmyat. Tasya śrāntasya taptasya tejoraso niravartatāgniḥ*: "On it [the earth] he [Death] laboured. Of him, labouring and heated, the essence of heat emerged: fire." That the word *rasa* occurs here may be a coincidence, but I doubt that it is mere coincidence that we have *taptasya* here and *tattassa* in the Pāli. However, even those sceptical about verbal assonances will not deny the affinity of the content.

In the BAU, Death now proceeds to divide himself up to create the universe. The Buddha's story takes quite a different course, since it has a different goal. The beings dip their fingers into the tasty film (like greedy children) and like it so much that they cannot stop eating it. At this their luminescence disappears — whereupon the sun and moon appear, now that they are needed. This leads to day and night and other time divisions up to the year. Though BAU I, 2 is quite different, there too, a few sentences beyond the point of convergence, Death gets round to creating the year. He then creates all living creatures (*prajāḥ paśūn*) and begins to eat them, as well as other things like the Vedas. Eating thus plays a part in that story too; but it is then diverted into word-plays which purport to explain how the horse sacrifice came into being. For the esoteric meaning of the horse sacrifice is the principal topic of this section of the BAU.

The principal concern of this section of the AS, on the other hand, is to explain the diversity of *vaṇṇa*. This is first explicitly mentioned in the next para., para. 13. As the beings go on eating, there is discerned among them what one might translate a “discoloration”: *vaṇṇa-vevaṇṇatā*. Literally this just means a diversity of *vaṇṇa*. All the meanings of *vaṇṇa* as colour, complexion and good looks are in play here, with its social meaning looming large in the background. When all the creatures have been guzzling the sweet earth for a long time, some keep their *vaṇṇa* (good looks) while others get bad *vaṇṇa* (grow ugly). Then the beings who still have their looks despise the uglier ones (just as the brahmins at the beginning of the text were despising people of low *vaṇṇa*). If this myth were meant to be taken seriously as a cosmogony, the failure to explain why the same behaviour should affect some but not others would be a logical flaw; but such criticism is hardly appropriate to a parody. On the other hand, the story suggests to me that, while it is certainly nicer to be handsome than ugly, what the Buddha is pinpointing as the real tragedy is the differentiation itself.

It is this differentiation that leads to the vice of contempt, and it is as a result of this arrogance about *vaṇṇa* (*vaṇṇātīmāna*) that the sweet earth disappears. At this the beings got together “and lamented, ‘Oh the taste, Oh the taste!’ So even nowadays when people get something sweet-tasting they say the same thing; they repeat that same primaeval expression but do not understand its point.”

The expression *aho rasam*, which I have translated “Oh the taste!”, may express a variety of emotions. The text is saying that what is now an expression of appreciation (“How delicious!”) originated as a lament (“Alas for the taste!”).

Again the text here seems illogical, even silly, if one takes it literally. But

it is simply a parody of the etymologies (*nirukti*) in which the Brāhmanas and Upaniṣads abound. These etymologies are not botched attempts at history or linguistics by people who did not know any better (and produced *vyākaraṇa*!) but attempts to discover some eternal inner significance in the Sanskrit language, which they conceived of as a blueprint for reality.<sup>29</sup> The Buddha did not accept that view of Sanskrit, and is making fun of it and the resultant etymologising. There is a parallel passage a little later in the text, at the end of para. 15, where the expression he pretends to explain is *ahu vata no, ahāyi vata no*. This must be a pair of idioms close to English “We’ve had it, it’s given out on us”. I have not yet found a very close Vedic parallel to these expressions, but that hardly matters: to see what the Buddha had in mind one need look no further than the beginning of the next cosmogony in the BAU, at I, 4, 1: *ātmaivedam agra ūsit puruṣavidhah. So ’nuviksya nānyad ātmano ’paśyat. So ’ham asmity agre vyāharat. Tuto śhamnāmābhavat. Tasmād apy etarhy āmantritaḥ: aham ayam ity evāgra ūktvā, athānyan nāma prabrūte yad asya bhavati*. “In the beginning this was just the self in human form. He looked round and saw nothing other than himself. His first utterance was ‘I am’. Thence came the term ‘I’. So even nowadays when one is addressed one first says just ‘I am here’ and then any other name one has.”

Incidentally, I have already pointed out that there are satirical references to this cosmogony elsewhere in the Pāli *suttas*.<sup>30</sup>

It is here that first occurs in the text the word *aggañña* which gives it its title. The commentary *ad loc.*<sup>31</sup> glosses: *aggaññam akkharan ti lok-uppattiyamsa-katham*: “story of the lineage of/from the origin of the world” — evidently a rather impressionistic rendering. Modern lexicographers (CPD and PED) have conjectured *aggañña* to be a collateral form of *aggaññu*, derived from Skt. *agra-jña*, “origin-knowing”. Even if that meaning would suit the title, it makes no sense where the word occurs within the text. It occurs five times, always immediately following *porāṇa*, with which it thus appears to be virtually synonymous. So it should mean “primaeval” or “original”. Where later in the text the word occurs in the instrumental, the commentator glosses:<sup>32</sup> *aggaññenā ti aggan ti nātena agge vā nātena*: “known as top or known as in the beginning (i.e., original)”. He seems to be interpreting *-ñña* as derived from *-jña* but passive in meaning, which surely will not do.

The *Abhidhānappadīpikā*<sup>33</sup> gives *aggañña* as a synonym of *para* and *uttama*, both words for “supreme”; it thus assigns no detectable meaning to the *-ñña*.

According to the CPD s.v., Helmer Smith posited a relation with Sanskrit

*agra-nī*, “leading in front”. The Sanskrit accusative singular *agranyam* is parallel to Pāli *aggaññam*. But we also find the instrumental singular *aggaññena* (cited above) and the nominative plural masculine *aggaññā*.<sup>34</sup> The latter occurs at the beginning of the *Ariyavaṃsa Sutta* (AN II, 27), where the commentator’s gloss<sup>35</sup> is *aggā ti jānitabbā*: “to be known as top” — evidently another attempt to derive the *-ñña* from *-jña*.

One could certainly take *aggaññena* and *aggaññā* as analogical formations within Pali: from the accusative singular *aggaññam* an ordinary thematic stem *aggañña* is deduced and inflected. However, I would prefer to posit an adjectival suffix *-ñña* formed on the analogy of *brahmañña*. In the *Ariyavaṃsa Sutta* is the series of four words in the nominative plural masculine: *aggaññā rattaññā vaṃsaññā porāṇā*. The commentarial tradition explains both *rattañña* and the much commoner *rattaññu* as deriving from *-jña*, but in his study of the word<sup>36</sup> Roy Norman has shown this to be unlikely. And what about *vaṃsañña*? The commentator again tries to gloss it with *jānitabba*, but that will not do. I do not see *-jña* here either; I posit another analogical formation with a mere adjectival suffix, so that *vaṃsañña* would mean “of (true) lineage”. In any case, whether one prefers Helmer Smith’s interpretation or mine (and I must admit that on past form a sensible punter would back Smith), *aggañña* means something like “primaeval” and has nothing to do with “knowing”.

The *Ariyavaṃsa Sutta* merits a short digression, because it offers further parallels with the AS. It was so popular in traditional Sinhala Buddhism that there was a special festival for its preaching.<sup>37</sup> At first sight this seems odd, in that the short text does not look particularly interesting. Its main message is that there are four kinds of persons who are said to be noble: one who is satisfied with any stuff to wear as a robe; ditto with any alms food; ditto with any lodging; and one who delights in meditation and renunciation. Obviously these four figures are all Buddhist monks and may in fact be the same person or persons. So why is the message expressed in the apparently roundabout way and why are the four figures called *ariyavaṃsa*, “of noble lineage”?<sup>38</sup>

The point is that the sermon has the same message as the AS, and likewise works by reinterpreting brahminical terminology. It begins: *Cattāro me bhikkhave ariyavaṃsā aggaññā rattaññā vaṃsaññā porāṇā asaṃkiṇṇā asaṃkiṇṇapubbā na saṃkiyanti na saṃkiyissanti appatikuṭṭhā samaṇehi brāhmaṇehi viññūhi*. “O monks, these four are of noble lineage, original, experienced, of true lineage, ancient, unmixed: they have never been mixed, they are not mixed and they will not be mixed; they are not criticised by ascetics or brahmins of understanding.” The main allusion seems to be to

the brahmin concept of *varṇa-saṃkara*, “mixture of estates”, the miscegenation which they regarded as the road to ruin. Just as in the AS the Buddha answers brahmins who accuse his disciples of being low-caste and plays around punningly with the concept of *varṇa*, here too he must be answering a similar allegation that by accepting people of any social status the Sangha causes *varṇa-saṃkara*. Since the estates are hereditary, they could be referred to as lineages. I am slightly puzzled only by the fact that in the brahmin view the top three estates alone are “noble”, the *śūdra* definitely not: could this somehow be reflected in the way that the fourth person of noble lineage in the Buddha’s formulation is not really parallel to the other three? This sermon has been transmitted to us without the introduction which would make the context explicit, and also has a puzzling little final section which seems not to fit (and is very corrupt), so the tradition is clearly defective in any case. Nevertheless, the parallel to the AS is instructive.

I return to the “etymologies” in the AS. The word or words being “explained” are referred to as *akkhara*, from Sanskrit *akṣara*. This means “imperishable” and in Sanskrit is used to refer to a word or syllable, in accordance with the theory that Sanskrit was eternal. Not accepting that theory, the Buddha seems to have used the word more flexibly, if the text is to be trusted. The third time it occurs, at the end of para. 16, it refers to a custom at weddings which is not verbal. It could be just that the custom is characterised as unvarying; but I incline to think that by the levelling process typical of oral transmission the word *akkharam* has mistakenly been added (ousting another word?) after *porāṇam aggaññam*.

Later, each of the eight words etymologised in paras. 21–25 is said to be an *akkhara*, which is natural; but then they are said to be evolved *porāṇena aggaññena akkharena*, “by the ancient, original expression”. The sub-commentary here (on para. 21) glosses *akkhara* as *nirutti*, which certainly catches the drift, but for *akkhara* to mean “etymology” is odd, and I wonder whether the text did not originally read that our terms thus evolved from the ancient, original expressions.

When the sweet earth has disappeared and the beings have lamented its loss, there appears a kind of mushroom or fungus of similar properties. The whole cycle is then repeated, for no apparent reason, till that too disappears. Then in its place comes a similarly delicious and attractive creeper, and the cycle, with further differentiation of *vaṇṇa*, is gone through a third time.

Why are there three cycles? True, the Buddhist texts tend to say things three times, but that does not explain the three different kinds of food

which lead to downfall. The question may be pointless, or at least unanswerable. But the particular sequence of foods does seem as if it must have meant something. The first we have found in the BAU, but the mushroom and the creeper we have not yet located in the Vedic literature. Or have we?

It is commonly accepted that from late Vedic times until the present day brahmins have used in their *soma* sacrifices various plants which they know and say to be substitutes for the original *soma*, and that by preference they use a creeper. For example, Sāyaṇa says: "If they cannot obtain the *soma* whose characteristics are described in the sacred text, then they may use the species of creeper (*latā*) which is known as *putika*."<sup>39</sup>

The original *soma* plant is described in the *Rg-veda* with so much figurative and hyperbolic language that its identity is obscure, and perhaps no subject in Indology has been so much contested by scholars. In 1968 R. Gordon Wasson caused a brief stir with his theory that *soma* was a mushroom, the *amanita muscaria*.<sup>40</sup> That theory is no longer popular and I doubt it myself, but I do not regard it as definitively refuted. It is possible that at the time of the Buddha the brahmins had some oral tradition about the original identity of *soma* and that the Buddha is alluding to that and making fun of the brahmins' liking for *soma*, its subsequent disappearance from their world, and its replacement by a creeper.<sup>41</sup> I freely admit that this is a bold hypothesis; I shall be glad to withdraw it as soon as someone produces a more plausible explanation for the three types of mythical food in the AS.

I have found one more allusion to brahminical literature in the AS. This one is not to a Vedic text but to the *Baudhāyana Dharmasūtras*. The text prescribes the way of life of a brahmin ascetic who has renounced the householder's life. The striking words which AS echoes are at 2,11,22, but it is necessary to give the whole passage from 2,11,16 on.

2,11,16: *parivrājakaḥ parityajya bandhūn aparigrahaḥ pravrajed yathāvidhi*  
17: *aranyam garvā* 18: *sikhāmuṇḍaḥ* 19: *kaupīnācchādanaḥ* 20: *varṣāsv*  
*ekasthaḥ* 21: *kāśāyavāsāḥ* 22: *sannamusale vyaṅgāre nivrtaśarāvasampāte*  
*bhikṣeta*<sup>42</sup>

16: "A wandering renunciate should leave his family and go forth without possessions according to the rule. (17:) Going to the forest (18:) with his head shaven except for a topknot, (19:) wearing a loincloth, (20:) staying in one place during the rains, (21:) with a yellow-stained outer garment, (22:) he should beg food when the pestle has been laid down, there are no live embers, and the collecting of the plates is over."

As against this, we get in AS para. 22 the picture of the original good brahmins: *araññāyatane paṇṇakuṭīyo karitvā paṇṇakuṭīsu jhāyanti, vyaṅgārā vīadhūmā paṇṇamusalā sāyam sāyamāsāya pāto pātārāsāya gāma-nigama-rājadhāniyo osaranti ghāsam esanā*. "In the forest they make leaf huts and meditate in them, and with no live embers or smoke, pestles laid down, they go round villages, towns and capital cities to seek food, in the evening for their evening meal, in the morning for their morning meal." I have no hesitation in reading *sannamusalā*, the *paṇṇa*- evidently being a corruption caused by the occurrence of that word twice in the preceding few words.<sup>43</sup>

There are so many points of interest in the Baudhāyana passage that it would deserve an article to itself; he goes on to say in *sūtra* 26 that the ascetics he is describing reject Vedic rites and say that they are adhering to the middle path, delimited to both sides (*ubhayataḥ paricchinnā madhyamam padam samśliṣyāmaha iti vadantaḥ*), which sounds like an allusion to the Buddhists, even if the passage as a whole may be giving a more composite picture. (There are also variant readings to consider.)<sup>44</sup> Here I must restrict myself to the point of closest similarity, the laying aside of the pestle and the dying out of the fire. The relationship between the two texts is intriguing. Baudhāyana is saying that the wandering ascetic, who can of course have no fire of his own, should beg food at a time when the household has not only finished cooking but also eating their meal — the plates have been collected. In this way he will be sure to get nothing but the true leftovers. This makes perfect sense for an ascetic. In the AS the brahmins described are not wanderers, but live in leaf huts, where however they do no cooking. The two striking adjectives which the two texts have in common, *sannamusala* and *vyaṅgāra*, apply to the ascetic brahmins, not to the people from whom they are begging.

The wording of the *Manusmṛti* carries the same message as Baudhāyana but has an extra echo of the AS:

*vidhūme sannamusale vyaṅgāre bhuktavajjane*  
*vṛte śarāvasampāte bhikṣam nityam yatiś caret* (6.56)

"A renunciate should always go begging when the pestle has been laid down, there is no smoke or live embers, people have finished eating and the plates have been collected." The Pāli *vīadhūma* and the Sanskrit *vidhūma* obviously correspond.

I doubt that it is possible to settle the exact chronological relation between the AS and the brahminical phraseology. The *Baudhāyana Dharmasūtras* are in a sense quite undatable, as they are a compilation of oral material; any date could refer only to the final redaction. The *Manusmṛti* dates from the

early centuries of the common era and here evidently draws on the older *sūtras*. Though Baudhāyana seems to refer to the Buddhists, it is most unlikely that he (or Manu) would quote the AS; besides, we have seen that the terms the texts have in common fit the brahminical better than the Buddhist context.

I doubt that the AS passage is intended to describe a real historical phenomenon. The Buddha in para. 22 is describing ideal brahmin hermits who did meditate (they were *jhāyaka*) in order to contrast them in para. 23 with others who were incompetent at meditating and composed (Vedic) mantras, so that they were dubbed “non-meditators” (*ajjhāyaka* — in fact, reciters of the Veda). Para. 22 is needed to set up the joke. The Buddha is talking about brahmīns, and has apparently borrowed a piece of their phraseology, but twisted it to suit his purpose — as he has done with their other texts.

The AS raises many issues which I cannot here pursue. But I need to say a few more words about the “etymologies”. I regard it as pointless to devise ingenious theories to give phonetic perfection to the puns which in paras. 21–25 provide “etymologies” for terms of social status. We have to look no further than the last Upaniṣadic passage cited above to see that the brahminical *nirukti* were phonetically quite imprecise. I have quoted the beginning of BAU I, 4, 1; its next sentence reads; *sa yat pūrvo 'smāt sarva-smāt sarvān pāpmana auṣat tasmāt puruṣah*. “He [the self] is called *puruṣa* [man: another term for the self] because being prior (*PŪRva*) to all this [universe] he burnt up (*UṢ*) all evils.” If the Buddha were following the style of such a passage seriously, he might perhaps try to improve on it, but if he is doing so in a spirit of parody, the wilder the phonetics the better the joke. I am not aware that any of the eight etymologies in the AS is based on a specific brahminical etymology. It may however be of interest to note in passing that the etymology of *rājā* in para. 21, *dhammena pare rañjeti*, which seems to mean “he pleases others by righteousness” (surely yet another joke), has brahminical links. I know of no brahminical attempt earlier than the *Mahābhārata*<sup>45</sup> to connect *rājan* with the meaning “to please”. But in the *Atharva-veda*, which may well be older than the AS, there is a similar etymology from the root *raj*: *so 'rajyata tato rājanyo jāyata*.<sup>46</sup> This is the first line of a hymn and there is little context to aid an interpretation, but the subject seems to be the creator Prajāpati and the line means something like “He was excited/delighted and thence/from him the royal was born.”

Like Steven Collins,<sup>47</sup> I am sure that Mahāsammata, which was taken by later Buddhist tradition to be the proper name of the first king, is in

the AS intended not as a proper name but as a description. *Prima facie*, *mahāsammata* simply means “agreed to be great”, “agreed on as great”; the construction is the same as in *hīnasammata* and *setthasammata* (“agreed to be inferior” and “. . . best”) in para. 23. At the beginning of para. 21, it is given another “etymology”: *mahājana-sammato*, “agreed on by the public”. This does not exclude the first interpretation; on the contrary, it is characteristic of this style of “etymologising” that as many “derivations” are squeezed out of a word as possible.<sup>48</sup> Collins has other interesting associations of the term to suggest.

To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that I am not maintaining that the Buddha never did etymologising in the *nirukti* style except as a joke, any more than I am saying that all his sermons are satirical. Roy Norman has, for instance, brilliantly emended the text of the *Sabhiya-sutta* to make coherent a poem in which the Buddha uses such punning to show how he thinks various moral and religious terms should be used.<sup>49</sup> The Buddha (and later Buddhists) used this as a didactic device, without claiming that language was grounded in reality. Thus in their spirit I can say that Norman is so called because he is “norm-man”, the man from whom we draw our norms; this is a serious remark about Norman but not a serious piece of linguistics.

Finally: what can we deduce (*pace* Meisig) about the history of the text? The Pali commentaries, being unaware of the allusions, were naturally therefore also unaware of the text's ironic character. The same holds, one might say *a fortiori*, for the other Buddhist traditions. The *Mahāvastu* wishes to trace the Buddha's royal lineage from its very beginning, which by then must mean from the first king of all, Mahāsammata; and in that context it virtually quotes the AS, containing a passage<sup>50</sup> closely parallel to AS paras. 10–21. (The rest of the text is not there because it is obviously irrelevant to the *Mahāvastu*'s purpose at that point.) Comparing the two versions is instructive, though it would take me beyond my theme to go into detail. The *Mahāvastu* rounds off irregularities and irons out difficulties. Everything essential to my purpose can be gleaned by comparing para. 11 of the AS with the parallel passage in the *Mahāvastu*. The *Mahāvastu* omits the first sentence of the Pali paragraph, quoted above: *Ekodakī-bhūtam . . . andhakāra-timisā*. This was the passage which alerted us to the parallel with the cosmogonic hymn *Rg-veda* X, 129. Likewise, a few lines on, the *Mahāvastu* has missed out — or rather, garbled — the allusion to “the milk-skin of the waters” from BAU I, 2. Where the Pali has the sweet earth spread out on the waters, the *Mahāvastu* reads: *ayam api mahāprthivi udakahradam viya samudāgacchet*.<sup>51</sup> “And this great earth arose all together



like a lake of water." Yet the *Mahāvastu* has not lost all trace of what the passage originally said. A few words later this "great earth" is said to look like *ksīra-saṃtānam* or *sarpi-saṃtānam*, "a spread of milk or a spread of ghee". This not only recalls the meaning of the AS; it also recalls the verb *samatāni*, which describes the "spreading" of the sweet earth on the water. It is even possible, though I would not wish to press the point, that in the Pali phrase at this point *sampannam vā sappi sampannam vā navanūtam* the word *sampannam* has come in from the previous line and we should emend to *sappi-saṃtānam* etc.

Let me summarise what I think this shows. If we had only the *Mahāvastu* and not the Pali AS, the allusions to brahminical texts, of which the author/editor was not aware, would be lost to us. When we are aware of what was there, we can catch both the similarity in content and even the verbal echoes — the reader will not have failed to notice the similarity between how the *Mahāvastu* recalls the AS and how I showed earlier that the AS recalls the BAU. The *Mahāvastu* may not be entirely useless for a critical history of the text: the *sarpi-saṃtānam* gives us an idea for a possible emendation to the Pali. This fact is however dwarfed by the massive fact that the *Mahāvastu* has forgotten the original meaning of the passage.<sup>52</sup> However many versions in however many languages agreed with the *Mahāvastu* in saying that at this point the great earth arose like a lake of water, their testimony would count for nothing against the single Pali version which is so obviously meaningful.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1975, 1, pp. 16–24.
- <sup>2</sup> Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, London 1959.
- <sup>3</sup> *Mahāvamsa* XXXIII, 100. The commentaries were at that stage probably in the spoken language; the Pali version which has come down to us is due to Buddhaghosa and other later authors.
- <sup>4</sup> Thomas R. Trautmann, *Dravidian Kinship*, Cambridge 1981, pp. 316–330.
- <sup>5</sup> *Dialogues of the Buddha, Part III*, London 1921, pp. 77–94.
- <sup>6</sup> I am grateful for his comments on an earlier version of this article, as indeed for guiding a great deal of my work since he first taught me in 1974. I owe him too much to be able to claim any profound originality.
- <sup>7</sup> *Digha Nikāya suttā* xxvii. For convenience I shall use the Pali Text Society edition and refer to its paragraph numbers.
- <sup>8</sup> L. de La Vallée Poussin, *La morale bouddhique*, Paris 1927, p. 12.
- <sup>9</sup> See especially M. B. Carrithers, "Review Article: *World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background* by S. J. Tambiah", *Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford* 8, 1987, pp. 95–105, which alludes to some of the points made below in this article; also the same author's "Buddhists without History", *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 21, 1987, pp. 165–8.

- <sup>10</sup> "Acht Etymologien aus dem Aggañña-Suttanta", pp. 575–583 in *Asiatica: Festschrift Friedrich Weller*, Leipzig 1954; "Ein Beitrag zur Textgeschichte des Aggañña-Suttanta", *Indo-Iranian Journal* 1, 1957, pp. 253–285.
- <sup>11</sup> *Das Sūtra von den vier Ständen*, Wiesbaden 1988.
- <sup>12</sup> Walpola Rahula, "Humour in Pali Literature", *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 9, 1981, pp. 156–173.
- <sup>13</sup> K. R. Norman, "Theravāda Buddhism and Brahmanical Hinduism: Brahmanical Terms in a Buddhist Guise", paper delivered at the Buddhist Forum, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 9 May 1990.
- <sup>14</sup> Anthropologists have alerted us to the need to reserve the word "caste" to translate *jāti*.
- <sup>15</sup> Here and throughout the paper I am abbreviating the text; only words in quotation marks are intended as literal renditions. I thus pass over many points of detail. But perhaps I should mention here, as it is relevant to my main theme, that the reported criticism by the brahmins begins with the words: "The brahmin is the best *vaṇṇa*, the other *vaṇṇa* is inferior. The brahmin is the white *vaṇṇa*, the other *vaṇṇa* is black." A variant, but clearly inferior, reading puts the other *vaṇṇas* in the plural. In the first sentence the commentator, reasonably, takes "the other *vaṇṇa*" as a collective singular and glosses: "the other three *vaṇṇa*". It is of course ambiguous, as this is not a legal treatise but a piece of polemical rhetoric. But it is only the *śūdra* who are black and born of Brahmā's feet; the focus is on them, not on the intermediate *vaṇṇa*.
- <sup>16</sup> *Sumaṅgala-vilāsini*, P.T.S. ed., III, 861–2.
- <sup>17</sup> *Dighanikāyathakathāṭṭhikā Linathavannanā*, P.T.S. ed., III, 47.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 46. Perhaps *veda-vacanato* should be translated "in respect of the words of the Veda".
- <sup>19</sup> *Sutta-nipāta* vv. 284–315.
- <sup>20</sup> *Sāmaññaphala Sutta*, DN I, 60–61.
- <sup>21</sup> SN III, 120.
- <sup>22</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 8.
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 8–10.
- <sup>24</sup> SN V, 437–8.
- <sup>25</sup> *Culla Mālunkyaputta Sutta*, MN suttā lxiii.
- <sup>26</sup> Commentary: they are reborn as humans. The text seems to leave no room for the evolution of living beings other than humans. That again fits the loose logic of a parody but would beg questions if it were seriously intended as an account of how all the types of living beings in the Buddhist cosmos (the five or six *gati*) came into existence.
- <sup>27</sup> This is the point at which Schneider and Meisig claim that two originally separate texts have been cobbled together.
- <sup>28</sup> My wife Dr. Sanjukta Gupta, who is both a Sanskritist and an Indian with practical experience of the matter, assures me that though the dictionaries translate *navanūta* "fresh butter", it is the cream which rises to the top as one begins to churn or stir milk.
- <sup>29</sup> This has been admirably explained, with special reference to Yāska's *Nirukta*, by Eivind Kahrs: "Yāska's use of *kasmār*", *Indo-Iranian Journal* 25, 1983, pp. 231–7.
- <sup>30</sup> "Recovering the Buddha's Message", pp. 5–20 in Tadeusz Skorupski (ed.), *The Buddhist Forum*, vol. 1, London 1990, p. 13.
- <sup>31</sup> *Sumaṅgala-vilāsini*, p. 868.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 870.
- <sup>33</sup> Cited CPD s.v.
- <sup>34</sup> Though on balance, for reasons given in the text, I incline not to accept Helmer Smith's derivation, there is a piece of evidence which just *might* support him. In the parallel passage in the *Mahāvastu* (of which more in the text below), the word here is printed by Senart, on all four occurrences, as *agniyam* (I, 340, 17; 341, 10; 342, 6; 342, 16). There are no parallels to the passages where the Pali has the instrumental. Radhagovinda Basak, who claims to have reprinted

Senart's text, has by accident or design printed *agrinyam* each time (*Mahāvastu Avadāna* I, Calcutta 1963). Allowing for the fluctuations in spelling hybrid Sanskrit, this might be the *aluk samāsa agre-nyam* "leading in the beginning", therefore "foremost" or "original". One would need to re-examine the *Mahāvastu* mss.

<sup>35</sup> *Manoratha-pūraṇi* III, 45.

<sup>36</sup> K. R. Norman, "Eleven Pāli Etymologies", *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 11, 1987, pp. 33–49 (*rattaññūva* on pp. 40–41). He derives the word from \**rātnya*, which he translates "possessing jewels". Despite the evidence he presents, I would prefer to take it as "connected with jewel(s)" and see the jewel in question as the Sangha itself; but this merits separate discussion.

<sup>37</sup> Walpola Rahula, *History of Buddhism in Ceylon: the Anuradhapura Period*, Colombo 1956, pp. 268–273.

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<sup>39</sup> Commentary on the *Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa* 9, 5, 3. I have taken the citation (in translation) from Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, "Part Two: The Post-Vedic History of the Soma Plant", in R. Gordon Wasson, *Soma: Divine Mushroom of Immortality*, New York and The Hague, 1968, pp. 96–7.

<sup>40</sup> See previous note.

<sup>41</sup> The most sensible suggestion seems to a non-specialist like myself to be that of Harry Falk, that *soma* was ephedra. ("Soma I and II", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* LII, part 1, 1989, pp. 77–90). Wasson certainly made mistakes, but on the other hand I have not been convinced by Brough's polemics (cited by Falk). If Falk is right in arguing that *soma* was the ephedra creeper all along, my hypothesis could only be right if the brahmins *thought* that it was a substitute.

<sup>42</sup> Ed. E. Hultsch, *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* VIII, 4, Leipzig 1884, p. 65.

<sup>43</sup> The commentator apparently read *panna-* and took it as the past passive participle of the root *par* "fall". The Nalanda edition (accordingly?) also reads *panna-*.

<sup>44</sup> See especially Hultsch, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

<sup>45</sup> Minoru Hara, "A note on the Epic Folk-etymology of *rājan*", *Journal of the Ganganath Jha Research Institute*, XXV, pp. 489–99.

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<sup>50</sup> *Le Mahāvastu* I, ed. É. Senart, Paris 1882, p. 338 line 13 to p. 348 line 6.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 339 line 7.

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## A NOTE ON DHAMMAPADA 97

To the volume dedicated to L. Sternbach (*Indologica Taurinensia* 7, 1980), K. R. Norman contributed an article, entitled 'Dhammapada 97: a misunderstood paradox.' In this article he examined carefully all the adjectives which occur in this *Dhammapada* verse, and brought to light a punning skill (*śleṣa*) involved there. Though it is true that some scholars prior to him were aware of the puns used there<sup>1</sup> as Norman himself says in the aforementioned article, and as a matter of fact, the poetical device called *virodhābhāsa* intended there by the author was noted by W. Rau already in 1963,<sup>2</sup> Norman is the first who advocated this new interpretation clearly, and rectified the misinterpretation of the verse in the past. The originality of this interpretation, thus, consists in attributing two opposite meanings to these adjectives, and explaining the skill of the poet. To the best of his knowledge, the present writer can not think of any scholar in Japan, who ever questioned the nature of this enigmatical verse and brought the problem involved there to light, despite the presence of eminent scholars who have worked on, and translated into Japanese, the *Dhammapada*, such as U. Wogihara, N. Tsuji, S. Watanabe, H. Nakamura, K. Mizuno, E. Mayeda and others.<sup>3</sup>

Yet, to our surprise, we find that verse 97 of the *Dhammapada* was once discussed among the authors of Abhidharma literature, and interpreted by them in almost the same way as Norman did. To be more precise, what Norman proposed in the above mentioned article is, in fact, verified by some passages in the *Abhidharma-samuccaya-bhāṣya* and its Chinese translation. The aim of the present paper, then, is to demonstrate what the Bhāṣya-kāra says about the verse in question, and to ascertain how Norman's proposition is supported by the exegesis among Abhidharma scholars. However, prior to entering upon the discussion, it is necessary to introduce the *Dhammapada* verse in question with its usual translation, and to give an outline of Norman's interpretation.

*Dhammapada* 97 reads as follows,

*assaddho akataññū ca sandhicchedo ca yo naro  
hatāvakāso vantaṣo sa ve uttamaporiso*<sup>4</sup>

The usual translation of *Dhammapada* 97, which is here represented by S. Radhakrishnan's version, runs as follows,

Senart's text, has by accident or design printed *agrinyam* each time (*Mahāvastu Avadāna I*, Calcutta 1963). Allowing for the fluctuations in spelling hybrid Sanskrit, this might be the *aluk samāsa agre-nyam* "leading in the beginning", therefore "foremost" or "original". One would need to re-examine the *Mahāvastu* mss.

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The usual translation of *Dhammapada* 97, which is here represented by S. Radhakrishnan's version, runs as follows,

The man who is free from credulity, who knows the uncreated, who has severed all ties, who has put an end to all occasions (for the performance of good or bad actions), who has renounced all desires, he, indeed, is exalted among men.<sup>5</sup>

In addition to this usual interpretation, Norman proposed a new one, differentiating the meaning of the five adjectives in the verse, *assaddha*, *akataññu*, *sandhiccheda*, *hatāvakāsa*, and *vantāsa* into two opposite meanings, bad and good.

Thus, taken in the first, that is, in the bad sense, *assaddha* means "without faith," *akataññu* "ungrateful," *sandhiccheda* "housebreaker,"<sup>7</sup> *hatāvakāsa* "one who has destroyed his opportunity," and finally *vantāsa* "eating what has been abandoned by someone else."

Next, in the second, that is, in its opposite good meaning, *assaddha* means "without desire,"<sup>8</sup> *akataññu* "knowing the uncreated (i.e., knowing *nibbāna*), *sandhiccheda* "cutting off, destroying rebirth," *hatāvakāsa* "one who has got rid of occasions (for quarrels, or rebirth)," and finally *vantāsa* "one who has abandoned desire."

Next, let us see how the author of the *Abhidharma-samuccaya-bhāṣya*<sup>9</sup> interprets the verse in question. By way of introducing the points of discussion, the text (p. 155, lines 23 ff.) reads as follows,

*āsraddhaś cākṛtajñāś cety asyām gāthāyām hinārthābhīdhāyīny akṣarāny uttamārthe paridīpitāni*

In this verse, the syllables (which compose the words) *āsraddha*<sup>10</sup> and *akṛtajñā*, which are (prima facie) indicative of bad sense (*hinārtha*), are transformed into (*paridīpita*) a good sense (*uttamārtha*).

Here we notice that, as is the case with Norman, the Bhāṣyakāra was aware of a double meaning implied in our verse. We shall, then, proceed to see in detail how he understood the verse in a bad sense (*hinārtha*), as well as in a good sense (*uttamārtha*).

## I-1

First, let us investigate how the Bhāṣyakāra interprets our verse in the bad sense.

After introducing *Dhammapada* 97, the text continues to read as follows,

*hīno loke catur-vidhaḥ — manas-karma-hīnaḥ, kāya-karma-hīno, vāk-karma-hīna, upabhoga-hīnaś ca/manas-karma-hīnaḥ punar dvi-vidhaḥ, kuśala-pravṛtti-vailomyena cāsraddhaḥ, paralokādy-asampratyayena dānādīṣv aprayogāt/akuśala-pravṛty-ānukūlyena cākṛtajñāḥ, yatropakārānapekṣitvena matṛ-vadhādi-*

*duścariṇe nirmāyādatvāt/kāya-karma-hīnaś cauraḥ sandhicchedakah, ariyatham garhita-jīvitvatvāt/vāk-karma-hīno mṛṣāvādādi-pradhānaḥ, tad-rūpasya sabhādiṣu praveśābhāvāt/upabhoga-hīnaḥ śvā kākāḥ preto very evam-ādikah, chardita-bhakṣanād iti / (p. 155, lines 24—30).*

Here, the five adjectives of the *Dhammapada* 97, *assaddha*, *akataññu*, *sandhiccheda*, *hatāvakāsa* and *vantāsa* are explained one after another, although the last two adjectives (*hatāvakāsa* and *vantāsa*) are not specifically mentioned here. Furthermore, we note that these five are allotted to the following four different categories, viz., *manas-karma*, *kāya-karma*, *vāk-karma* and *upabhoga*, the first being further subdivided into two, thus making the whole once again composed of five. The text, then, is to be translated as follows,

In this world the wretched (*hīna*) are of four kinds, viz. the wretched with regard to mental action (*manas-karma-hīna*), with regard to bodily action (*kāya-karma-hīna*), with regard to verbal action (*vāk-karma-hīna*), and finally with regard to (the act of) eating (*upabhoga-hīna*). (Of these, the first, that is,) the wretched with regard to mental action (*manas-karma-hīna*) is further subdivided into (the following) two categories: (Of these, the first is) the man without faith (*āsraddha*), because of his turning away from the practice of good action. Since he has no confidence (*asampratyaya*) in (the existence of) the next world, there is no motivation for him to perform (meritorious) action such as giving (*dāna*). (The second is) the ungrateful person (*akṛtajñā*), because of his inclination to the practice of evil action. Since he has no regard to the beneficial action (done for him by somebody else), he is limitless with regard to evil action such as matricide. (The third, that is,) the wretched with regard to bodily action (*kāya-karma-hīna*) is the man who makes breaches (in a wall) (*sandhicchedaka*), the thief. He leads the most disgraceful way of life. (The fourth, that is,) the wretched with regard to verbal action (*vāk-karma-hīna*) is (one who has lost his opportunity [*hatāvakāsa*]). The man being apt to tell a lie, for such a type of person is excluded from the assembly (*sabhā*) and so forth. (The fifth, that is,) the wretched with regard to (the act of) eating (*upabhoga-hīna*) is (one who eats what is vomited [*vantāsa*]<sup>11</sup> like) a dog, crow, and hungry ghost, for he takes what is vomited (by somebody else).

In the above, first we discern the well-known triple division of action (*manas-*, *vāk-*, *kāya-karma*) basically in function. While differentiating the *manas-karma* into two, and adding as the fifth the act of eating (*upabhoga*), the author makes up the number of five, which corresponds to the number of the adjectives of our verse.

## I-2

Next, we shall proceed to see what the Abhidharma scholar says about the

second, opposite meaning of the adjectives, that is the good meaning. The text continues as follows,

*katham punar etāny akṣarāny utamārthe parināmyante/āsraddhādi-vacanānām arhati parināmanāu/atrāsraddho vimukti-jñāna-darśana-yogena svapratyayavāḥ/akṛtajña 'saṃskṛta-nirmāṇa-jñānāu/saṃdhi-chettā punarbhava-pratisaṃdhi-hetu-kleśa-prahānāu/hatāvakāśa āyatyaṃ sarva-gatiṣu duḥkhābhinirvartanāu vāntāśo drṣṭe dharme upakarana-balena kāyam saṃdhārayato 'pi bhoga-jivūtāsābhāvād iti (p. 156, lines 1—5).*

We translate the above as follows,

How, then, are these (same) syllables transformed into the (second,) superior meaning? Because it is possible for these words, *āsraddha* and others, to transform themselves (*parināmana*)<sup>12</sup> in the case of a Buddhist *arhat*. Of these, the word *āsraddha* (is transformed into the good meaning of an incredulous person), because of his self-dependence (*sva-pratyayarva*) with regard to knowledge of, and insight into, final emancipation. (Next, the second,) the word *akṛtajña* (ungrateful, is transformed into the good meaning of a knower of the unconditioned), because he has the supernatural knowledge of the unformulated (that is, *nirvāṇa*).<sup>13</sup> (Then, the third,) *saṃdhi-cchett* (wall-breaker, is transformed into the good meaning of eliminator of the linkage), because he has abandoned (all) the defilements, which cause the linkage with rebirth. (Then, the fourth,) *hatāvakāśa* (one who has lost his opportunity, is transformed into the good meaning of a destroyer of the occasions), because there exists no possibility of suffering in all the conditions of his future existence. (The last, that is,) *vāntāśa* (eating of the vomited, is transformed into the good meaning of a person who has abandoned desire), because he has no desire for secular enjoyment nor for life, even though he still keeps his body by the force of paraphernalia (*upakarana*) in this present life (*drṣṭa-dharma*).<sup>14</sup>

We see here that our Abhidharma scholar has an insight into a second meaning in *Dhammapada* 97. Then, it is an interesting task for us to compare the interpretation of the Abhidharma writer with that of the eminent Prakrit scholar of our day.

I-3

Comparing Norman's interpretation with that of the *Abhidharma-samuccaya-bhāṣya*, the following points will be worthy of special note.

As regards the first adjective *āsraddha*, when taken in a good meaning, it is evident that the Bhāṣyakāra here takes *āsraddha* in the sense of "free from credulity," because of the presence of the explanatory word of *sva-pratyayavāḥ*. We note that the meaning assigned by the Bhāṣyakāra is the same as that given by the Pali commentator of the *Dhammapada*.<sup>15</sup> However, apparently the meaning of "without desire" is preferable in view of the nature of the verse, which is originally not imbued with any Buddhist tinge,

but simply conveys a general purport.<sup>16</sup> We shall see later even one of the Chinese versions of *Dhammapada* preserves this meaning of "without desire." It is also possible to translate it in the sense of "not performing the ancestral rite (*śrāddha*)," as W. Rau takes it.

For the second adjective *akṛtajña*, there is no need for a further examination, because the meanings, good as well as bad, attributed to it ("ungrateful" and "the knower of the uncreated") here present no problem.

The third adjective *saṃdhi-chedika* is clear enough both in good and bad meanings. It is also possible to take *saṃdhi* in the sense of "promise, or treaty," that is found in the treatises of ancient Indian politics<sup>17</sup> as W. Rau takes it. However, the presence of the last member of the compound, *cheda*, suggests to us to take it preferably in the sense of "breaker (of a wall)."<sup>18</sup>

The fourth adjective *hatāvakāśa* demands our special attention, taken in a bad sense as well as in a good meaning.

First, we shall discuss the bad meaning. Although we have no specific mention of *hatāvakāśa* in the text, the compound is to be taken in the sense of "one who has destroyed, lost, missed his opportunity" as Norman takes it. But, one may wonder what sort of opportunity (*avakāśa*) is here meant. According to the Bhāṣyakāra, the person who is here styled as *hatāvakāśa* is *vāk-karma-hina* (the wretched with regard to the verbal action), which is further paraphrased as *mṛṣāvādādi-pradhāna*. The Bhāṣyakāra proceeds to say that, as the result of his bad habit in speech (*vāk-karma-hina*), that is, speaking lies (*mṛṣāvāda*), he loses his opportunity, that is, the right to enter (*praveśa*) into the assembly (*sabhā*). Here the assembly (*sabhā*) means the court of justice, and thus, the whole meaning is that the liar is not entitled to go into the court in the capacity of a witness (*sākṣin*).

Second, *hatāvakāśa* taken in a good sense. We are confronted with the problem of what exactly the word *avakāśa* here means. Since the compound as a whole conveys the good meaning, we should expect *avakāśa* to be used here in a bad sense. Then, what sort of bad meaning should one attribute here to the word *avakāśa*? Norman, following the explanation given in CPD., takes it in the meaning of "occasion (for quarrels)." But one may take it in a sense somewhat like "inventing a pretext for quarrels with a malignant intention to harm others."

The last adjective *vāntāśa* presents no problem, although it is not easy to translate precisely the phrase *drṣṭe dharme upakarana-balena*. My translation of *drṣṭa dharme* is based upon BHSD, and of *upakarana* upon CPD.

## II

At this point, it is interesting to see how the Chinese translators rendered *Dhammapada* 97 into Chinese. Since such poetical devices as alliteration (*yamaka*, *anuprāsa*) and puns (*śleṣa*) are peculiar to Sanskrit, it is hardly to be expected that Chinese translations of our verse would preserve the subtle nuance of the original. The poetical beauty of a particular language is apt to refuse to be translated into a foreign language. This is particularly the case, when the two languages, the original and that of the translation, have no historical relation with each other. Sanskrit and Chinese are languages of this sort. In such circumstances, we cannot expect that the two sets of meanings implied in *Dhammapada* 97, bad and good as we have seen above, should be reflected in the Chinese translation. As a matter of fact, the compound *uttama-puruṣa* is often equated by Chinese translators with Buddhist *arhat* (阿羅漢), and this equation consequently makes the whole sentence inclined to the good meaning only. Despite all these disadvantages, it is still worthwhile to see how each adjective of our verse is translated in all the existent Chinese versions.

Thanks to the careful comparative studies done by K. Mizuno<sup>19</sup> and Ch. Willemen,<sup>20</sup> we are now in a position to check at a glance all the Chinese translations of *Dhammapada* 97. Three of them are even furnished with an explanatory commentary. Though each and every translation in Chinese presents many problems to be solved, due to the limitation of space, we shall deal here only with some points of philological interest.

Broadly speaking, we can classify all these Chinese versions into four categories, according to the different wordings and versifications. We shall present here these four Chinese versions, and their tentative translation in English.

(1) Chronologically, first comes the Chinese version of the *Dhammapada*, which is said to have been translated in 244 AD. The text reads as follows,

棄欲無著，缺三界障

望意已絕，是謂上人 (Taisho No. 210, vol. 1, p. 564b lines 11–12)<sup>21</sup>

He who abandons desire and has no attachment (a), without hindrance throughout the three worlds (b), having no hope in mind (c), is called the highest person (d).

Here four adjectives are translated instead of five and all are taken in a good sense. It is remarkable that here *aśradḍha* is rendered “without desire” instead of “without faith” which is found in all the other Chinese versions. We have here the same interpretation of the word as that of Norman.

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(2) Next comes a Chinese translation of the *Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra* (阿毘曇八健度論). The original Sanskrit text is not preserved, but the date of translation is indicated by the translator, Saṅghadeva, in 383 AD. The relevant portion reads as follows,

不信不往知 若那羅斷際

香姪捨離姪 彼是無上士 (Taisho No. 1543, vol. 26, p. 916a lines 15–16)

The man, who is without faith, without knowing what is gone (a), cuts the extremes like Nara (b), with his desire destroyed and with his desire abandoned (c), is the highest person (d).

The versification is different from the previous verse, having five characters in each pada instead of four. All the five adjectives are translated here, and the text is further furnished with a commentary. Though this translation contains many problems, the reading 不往知 (without knowing what is gone) deserves special attention, for this Chinese rendering evidently presupposes the Sanskrit reading of *agata-jñā* in place of *akata-jñā*. In pada c, the single Chinese word 姪 represents both *avakāśa* and *āsā*.

(3) The third version is found in the so-called Chinese *Udāna-varga*, of which the date of translation is 399 AD. The text reads as follows,

無信無反復 穿牆而盜竊

斷彼希望意 是名為勇士 (Taisho No. 212, vol. 1, p. 750c lines 4–5)<sup>22</sup>

He who is without faith and without repetition (a), breaks through walls and steals secretly (b), having no hope in mind (c) is called a valiant man (d).

We are puzzled why the second adjective *akṛtajñā* is here rendered into “without repetition.” Only four adjectives are translated into Chinese and they are understood in a bad sense.

(4) Last, we shall deal with the Chinese translation of the *Abhidharma-samuccaya-bhāṣya*, the Sanskrit original of which we discussed above. This Chinese version runs parallel with the original, each and every word, so exactly that one has the impression that the editor of the Sanskrit text may have had recourse to the Chinese translation in reconstructing the Sanskrit original. The translation was made by the famous Huang Tsuang in the seventh century. *Dhammapada* 97 as quoted there reads as follows,

不信不知恩 斷密無容處

恆食人所吐 是最上丈夫 (Taisho No. 1606, vol. 31, p. 773, lines 12–13)<sup>23</sup>

Without faith, ungrateful (a), breaking the secret (place), losing his opportunity (b), eating what has been vomited by someone else (c). He is the highest person (d).

As is evident from the above translation, the five adjectives in our verse are

taken in a bad sense. The verse itself is furnished with a lengthy commentary of some eighteen lines, which explains in detail the puns (*śleṣa*) used in the Sanskrit text. But, since the Chinese commentary goes in exactly the same way as the original Sanskrit, and we have discussed this in the previous chapter, we need not dwell on this translation in detail.

## III

Lastly, a mention must be made of the semantic field of Sanskrit *puruṣa* and *pauruṣa*. In addition to the ordinary meaning of "man" or "person", the word *puruṣa* conveys the meaning of "male" and "hero." Consequently, its derivative *pauruṣa* has a connotation of "manliness" "heroism" "courage" and the like. Viewed from a different angle, this word *pauruṣa* is a counter-concept of *daiva*, which etymologically means "derived from *deva*, the god" and often denotes "destiny." The contrast between the two, human effort (*pauruṣa*) and destiny (*daiva*), will be best illustrated by the following examples.

*tad vyaktam nanu daivam eva śaraṇam dhig dhig vr̥thā pauruṣam* (IS.3815d)  
*adya mat-pauruṣa-hatam daivam drakṣyanti vai janāḥ* (R.2.20.14ab, cf. also 15cd)

In contrast to the *daiva*-praising context (*daivam eva param manye pauruṣam tu nirarthakam* IS.2974), the *pauruṣa*-praising one is often imbued with a tinge of aggressiveness and audacity (*daivam nihatya kuru pauruṣam ātma-śaktyā* IS.1255c). It seems that the semantic domain of *pauruṣa* is overflowing with "fighting spirit," "challenging boldness" and sometimes even with "reckless violence."<sup>24</sup> In order to illustrate this we shall quote a few examples.

*chittvā ca bhittvā ca yānti tāni sva-pauruṣāc caiva suhr̥d-balāc ca jñānāc ca raukṣyāc ca vinā vimoktum na śakyate sneha-mayas tu pāśaḥ* (Saundarananda 7.15)

Those (ties of the ordinary sort) can be cut or broken by one's own prowess and strength of friends, but the snare of love cannot be loosed except by true knowledge and hard-heartedness.

*abhimānavato manasvinaḥ priyam uccaiḥ padam āruksataḥ vinipāta-nivartana-kṣamam matam ālambanam ātma-pauruṣam* (Kirātārjunīya 2.13)

For the high-minded and insightful man, who is ever eager to attain the high position which is dear to him, his own prowess is considered to be the foundation, which is able to drive away misfortune.

We read also in the utterance of the reckless Avimāraka, who entered the sleeping chamber of the princess Kuraṅgī secretly at midnight.

*śrutvā tu rājño gr̥ha-samvidhānam praviṣtam ātmānam avaiti buddhiḥ na pauruṣam vā para-dūṣaṇīyam na ced visamvādam upaiti daivam* (Avimāraka 2.8)<sup>25</sup>

Now that I have heard how the king's palace is planned, my mind is certain of my entry (inside). Anyway, my reckless act will not be rebuked by my opponents unless destiny is set on disappointment.<sup>26</sup>

An example is quoted from the stories in Māhārāṣṭrī, where *porisa* and *porusa* are translated by H. Jacobi as *Mut*.

*nirāhuḥ sampayam, tā na porisassā'vasaro tti cintiya bhaniyam* (Jacobi, p. 60, line 4)

Since I have no weapon with me now, it is not an occasion for a manly deed (= using violence, resorting to force)." Thus, he (Mūladeva) thought and said . . .<sup>27</sup>

In the above, the expression *chittvā bhittvā* (Saundarananda 7.15), and the context of trespassing into the royal palace (Avimāraka) remind us of our verse of *Dhammapada* 97 (*akataññu, samdhi-ccheda*, etc.). Occasionally, *pauruṣa* (recklessness) is contrasted to *buddhi* (considered judgement: KSS.33.132, 158), where intelligence (*buddhi* or *jñāna*) is superior to reckless, physical strength (*pauruṣa* or *parākrama*).<sup>28</sup>

Now, if we read the last portion of *Dhammapada* 97 (*uttama-poriso*)<sup>29</sup> in the context of this semantic field of *pauruṣa* as a neuter abstract noun, the preceding adjectives seem to go well with it. The extravagance or audacity against common sense-behaviour, which is implied in such concepts as "without faith," "ungrateful," "house-breaker," and others, seems to be well matched with *pauruṣa* (*porisa*) in this sense. If we take Pali *uttama-porisa* as equivalent to Sanskrit *uttama-pauruṣa*, and if we understand this Pali compound as a Bahuvrīhi (possessive compound), this "man of extreme audacity" (*uttama-porisa* = *uttama-pauruṣa*) stands in perfect harmony with the concepts implied by the preceding adjectives taken in a bad sense. That is to say, the two meanings, both good and bad, implied in the preceding five adjectives of *Dhammapada* 97, as Norman himself detected, are also discernable in the last word *uttama-poriso*, that is, "the highest person" (*uttama-puruṣa*) in the good sense, as well as "the man of extreme audacity" (*uttama-pauruṣa*) in the bad sense.

## NOTES

Abbreviations and texts used in this article are as follows:

- Āgamaḍambara: V. Raghavan and A. Thakur ed. (Darbhanga 1964)  
 Avimārika: *Bhāsa-nāṭaka-cakram* (Poona 1951)  
 BHSD: F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary* (New Haven 1953)  
 Cārudatta: *Bhāsa-nāṭaka-cakram* (Poona 1951)  
 CPD: V. Trenckner and others, *A Critical Pali Dictionary* (Copenhagen 1948 ...)  
 Daśakumāracarita: NSP. 1951  
 IS: O. Böhtlingk, *Indische Sprüche* (St. Petersburg 1870—73)  
 Kautilya: *Kauṭilya Artha-sāstra*, ed., by R. P. Kangle (Bombay 1960)  
 Kirātārjuniya: NSP. 1954.  
 KSS: *Kathāsaritsāgara of Somadevabhāṭṭa*, NSP. 1930  
 MS: *Manusmṛti*, NSP. 1946  
 MBh.: *The Mahābhārata* (Poona Critical Edition)  
 Mṛcchakatika: NSP. 1950  
 Mudrārāksasa: A. Hillebrandt ed. (Breslau 1912)  
 NSP: *The Nirṇaya Sagar Press* (Bombay)  
 PTS: *The Pali Text Society* (London)  
 R.: *The Vālmiki Rāmāyaṇa* (Baroda Critical Edition)  
 Raghuvamśa: NSP. 1948  
 Saundarananda: E. H. Johnston ed. (Rinsen Reprint, Kyoto 1971)  
 Veniśamhāra: NSP. 1940

- <sup>1</sup> S. Radhakrishnan, *The Dhammapada* (Oxford 1950), p. 92.  
 J. Brough, *The Gāndhārī Dharmapada* (Oxford 1962), p. 182.  
<sup>2</sup> W. Rau, "Bemerkungen und nicht-buddhistische Sanskrit-parallelen zum Pali dhammapada," *Jñānamuktāvalī, Commemoration Volume in Honour of Johannes Nobel* (New Delhi 1963), pp. 164—5, who translated the verse in question as follows,  
 "Ein Mann, der ungläubig ist (keine Manenopfer mehr darbringt), und der undankbar ist (das Ungeschaffene kennt), und der seine Übereinkünfte nicht hält (die Fesseln bricht [welche ihn an die Welt binden]), der die Gelegenheit (zum Lebensgenuss) mordet und die Hoffnung (auf Lust) ausspeit, der ist wahrlich der vornehmste Mann. — Ein virodhābhāsa."  
<sup>3</sup> The only exception is K. Fujita, who mentions this article of K. R. Norman in his note, although he follows the usual translation in the main portion. *Buddha no Shi I* [Poems of Buddha], Tokyo 1986, pp. 22 and 385.  
<sup>4</sup> From the text-historical point of view, the following three versions are worthy of special attention.

*āśraddho akatamñū ca samdhi-cchedo ca yo naro  
 hatāvakaśo vāniāso sa ve utima-porūso*  
 (Margaret Cone, "Patna Dharmapada, Part I: Text," *Journal of PTS*, XIII, 1989 p. 191 [333]).

*āśraddhaś cākrājñāś ca samdhicchettā ca yo narah  
 hatāvakaśo vāniāśah sa vai tūtamapūrusah* (Udānavarga 29.23)  
 (F. Bernhard, *Udānavarga*, Göttingen 1965, p. 377.)

*sampūrṇa-dharma-samjñāya sarvābhijñāya tāyine  
 kṛtajñāyākrājñāya sarvajñāya namo 'stu te* (49)  
*hata-sarvāvakaśāya cchinna-pāśāya sarvaśah*

*kṛta-prajñāvakaśāya vāntāśāya namo 'stu te* (Varṇārhavarnastotra 2.50)  
 (Jens-Uwe Hartmann, *Das Varṇārhavarnastotra des Mārceta*, Göttingen 1987, pp. 118—119). Cf. also my review in *OLZ*. 86 (1991), p. 316.

- <sup>5</sup> S. Radhakrishnan, *loc. cit.*  
<sup>6</sup> Cf. W. Rau's translation "keine Manenopfer mehr darbringt," which apparently takes *aśraddho* in the sense of *aśraddha*.  
<sup>7</sup> Cf. W. Rau's translation "der seine Übereinkünfte nicht hält," which evidently takes *samdhi* as the technical term of the ancient Indian political treatises. See below, note 17.  
<sup>8</sup> This translation is based upon the interpretation of the word by H.-W. Köhler, *Śrad-dhā in der vedischen und altbuddhistischen Literatur* (Wiesbaden 1973).  
<sup>9</sup> Text edited by Nathmal Tatia in the *Tibetan Sanskrit Work Series* No. 17, published from the Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1976. I owe this reference and others to my pupil, Mr. Sh. Okada.  
<sup>10</sup> I read *āśraddha* despite the emendation to *āśraddha* by N. Tatia (p. 155, note 4).  
<sup>11</sup> Cf. L. Alsdorf, "vāntam āpātum," *S. K. Chatterji Jubilee Volume* (Poona 1955), pp. 21—28 = *Kleine Schriften*, pp. 178—185.  
<sup>12</sup> Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, "Allusiveness and Obliqueness in Buddhist Texts: *samdha*, *samdhi*, *samdhya* and *abhisamdhi*," *Dialectes dans les littératures indo aryennes*, ed., par Colette Caillat (Paris, 1989), pp. 303 ff. (*pariṇāmanābhīsamdhi*).  
<sup>13</sup> One may emend the text here (*nirmāna* to *nirvāna*).  
<sup>14</sup> Cf. also, W. Rahula, *Le compendium de la super-doctrine (philosophie) (Abhidharma-samuccaya) d'Asaṅga* (Paris 1971), pp. 185—186.  
<sup>15</sup> Cf. *The Commentary on the Dhammapada*, ed., by H. C. Norman PTS. text vol. 2 (reprinted in 1970), pp. 186—187.  
<sup>16</sup> Cf. K. R. Norman, *op. cit.*, p. 330 (5.1) and W. Rau, *op. cit.*, p. 175.  
<sup>17</sup> Cf. MS.7.160,

*samdhiṃ ca vighrahaṃ caiva yānam āsanam eva ca  
 dvaidhībhāvaṃ samśrayaṃ ca saṅgunāms cintayet sadā*

Cf. also Kautilya Arthasāstra 7.1.2ff., 7.1.1ff.

<sup>18</sup> Below we list all passages of *samdhi-ccheda* and the like, so far collected from Classical Sanskrit literature.

*samdhiṃ chitvā tu ye cauryaṃ rātrau kurvanti taskarāḥ  
 teṣāṃ chitvā nṛpo hastau tikṣṇe śūle niveśayet* (MS. 9.276)  
*dvārasya samdhinā bhijena vā vedham ...* (Kautilya Arthasāstra 4.6.16)  
*pati-guru-prajā-gṛhāṅkām agni-viśadāṃ samdhi-cchedikāṃ vā gobhiḥ pātayet*  
 (Kautilya-Arthasāstra 4.11.19)

The well-known passages of the thief's monologue and the related passages from Act three of Cārudatta and Mṛcchakatika read as follows,

*bhoḥ, vrkṣa-vātikā-pakṣa-dvāre samdhiṃ chitvā pravisto 'smi* (3.5.1)  
*bhūtīnāṃ kva nu darśitāntara-sukhaḥ samdhiḥ karālo bhavet* (3.8b)  
*kīdrśa idānim samdhi-cchedaḥ kartavyaḥ syāt* (3.8.3)  
*samdhi-cchedaḥ pūhikā vā gajāsyam asmat-pakṣyā vismitās te katham syuh*  
 (3.9cd)  
 Vidūsakah — *coro samdhiṃ chindadī via pekkhāmi* (3.9.6—7)  
 ceṭī — (sākrandam) *ayya-mettea, amhānam rukkha-vāḍiā-pakkha-duvāle  
 samdhiṃ chindia corao pavūttho* (3.14.6—7)  
 ceṭī — *bhatidāraa, amhānam rukkha-vāḍiā-pakkha-duvāre samdhiṃ chindia  
 coro pavūttho* (3.14.26—27)



vidūsakah — coram chindia sandhī pavitho (3.14.11)  
 cetī — hadāsa, sgmdhim chindia coro pavitho (3.14.12) (Cārudatta)  
 vrkṣa-vāṭikā-parisare samdhim kṛtvā praviṣṭo 'smi madhyamakam (3.10.1)  
 tat kasminn uddese samdhim utpādayāmi (3.11.1)  
 bhittinām ca na darśanāntara-gatah samdhih karālo bhavet (3.12b)  
 atra karma-prārambhe kīdrśam idānim samdhim utpādayāmiha khalu  
 bhagavatā kanakaśaktinā catur-vidhah samdhy-upāyo darśitah (3.12.3—5)  
 eka-loṣṭāvaśeṣo 'yam samdhih (3.16.1—2)  
 samāpto 'yam samdhih/bhavatu, praviṣāmi (3.17.1) (Mṛcchakatika)

One example is also quoted from the Daśakumāracarita,

garvā kasya cil lubdheśvarasya grhe samdhim chitvā . . . (p. 99, lines 1 ff.)

All these passages suggest that we should take the compound *samdhī-cheda* in the sense of "wall-breaker" instead of "breach of promise, denouncement of a treaty." The counter-part of *satya-samdha* (true to promise) is rather indicated by such compounds as *samdhī-dūṣāna*, *samaya-bheda*, or *samaya-vyabhicāra*.

<sup>19</sup> K. Mizuno, *Hokkukyo no Kenkyu* (Studies on the Dhammapada) (Tokyo 1979), pp. 122—123.

<sup>20</sup> Ch. Willemen, *Dharmapada, A Concordance to Udānavarga, Dhammapada, and the Chinese Dharmapada Literature* (Brussels 1974), p. 39.

<sup>21</sup> Exactly the same reading is repeated in 法句譬喻經 (Taisho 211, vol. 1, p. 588c lines 20—21).

<sup>22</sup> We have almost the same reading in 法集要頌經 (Taisho 213, vol. 1, p. 793b lines 16—17, which has 思 for 意 in pada c. Cf. also Ch. Willemen, *The Chinese Udānavarga* (Bruxelles 1978), pp. 132 and 137.

<sup>23</sup> The same version is found in 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (Taisho 1605, vol. 31, p. 694a lines 24—25), and almost the same reading is given in 阿毘達磨發智論, another translation (657—660 AD) of the lost *Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra* by Hsuang Tsuang. This version is furnished with a commentary. A variation is in pada c, which reads 恆希望奕吐 (Taisho 1544, vol. 26, p. 1030b line 23). Furthermore, this translation is quoted in a truncated form in Kumārajīva's translation of *Sarva-siddhi-śāstra* (成實論, 411—412 AD) (Taisho 1646, vol. 32, p. 288a lines 11—12).

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *Kāmasūtra* 2.7.22,

*pāruṣyam rabhasatvam ca pauruṣam teja ucyate*  
*aśaktir ātir vyāvṛtir abalatvam ca yoṣitah*

<sup>25</sup> Cf. also Avimāraka 6.14cd (*pūrvam pauruṣam āśritya . . .*) and 6.14.36 (*pareṇa pauruṣeṇa saṅgamyā . . .*).

<sup>26</sup> *anigūdhārthi-vibhavam nigūdhā-jñāna-pauruṣam* (Saundarananda 1.52)  
*etad vicintya balam āmani pauruṣam ca* (Venīsamhāra 5.42c)  
*daivāyattam kule janma mad-āyattam tu pauruṣam* (Venīsamhāra 3.37cd)  
*kiṃ tu vaḥ pauruṣa-pratighāto 'smābhir anālocita-pūrva ity . . .* (Venīsamhāra 2.4.1—2)  
*are re vrthā-prakhyāpīṭika-pauruṣābhīmānin!* (Venīsamhāra 6.6.30—31)

A Jain monk utters in fear of Saṃkarṣaṇa as follows,

*ayam asau snātukah saṃkarṣaṇah saugatān abhibhūya sāmpratam asmān*  
*paribubhūsur ihāsuah tad apasaranam evātra śreyah/durvisaham asya*  
*pauruṣam/apūrvā vakti-śaktih prajñā ca* (Āgamadāmbara 2.6.5—7, p. 33, lines 6—8).

<sup>27</sup> Other occurrences of the word in H. Jacobi's *Ausgewählte Erzählungen im Māhārāshtri* are as follows,

*uttama-puriso koi esa āgaie ceva najjai* (p. 60, lines 5—6)  
*kāūna poruṣam annahā vi n'atthi mokkho tti kaliūna . . .* (p. 17, lines 35—36)

Another example of its synonym *puruṣakāra* is also met in,

*kettiyam kālam mukka-purisayārehim acchiyavvam?* (p. 16, lines 12—13)

*buddhir nāma ca sarvatra mukhyaṃ mitram na pauruṣam* (KSS.33.132ab)  
*tad evaṃ sarvadā buddheh prādhānyam jita-ppauruṣam*  
*idṛṣeṣu ca kāryeṣu kiṃ vidadhāt parākramah* (KSS.33.158)

Cf. also Raghuvamśa 8.28c (*agrya-pauruṣam Mallinātha: mahā-parākramam utkrṣṭa-bhoga-śaktim ca*).

<sup>29</sup> For this Pali compound as a descendant of the Upanishadic *uttama-pūruṣa*, cf. H. Berger, "Pāli porisa, Mensch" *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens* 1 (1956), p. 78.

ĀKĀRAVATTĀRASUTTA:  
AN 'APOCRYPHAL' SUTTA FROM THAILAND

## INTRODUCTION

With the recent publication of the *Paññāsa-Jātaka*,<sup>1</sup> the term "apocryphal" may have become acceptable when applied to extra-canonical Buddhist narratives claiming the canonical status of *The Jātaka*.<sup>2</sup> This term, however, has never before been used for any piece of Pali literature that can be classified as a "sutta".<sup>3</sup> It is, therefore, an extraordinary find when a Pali manuscript is discovered which purports to contain a hitherto unknown "sermon" of the Buddha and which, moreover, claims to be a part of the *Samyutta-Nikāya*. I allude here to a text entitled *Ākāravattārasutta*, found among the Pali manuscripts preserved at the Siam Society, Bangkok. A catalogue of this collection, prepared by Dr. Oskar v. Hinüber, was published in the *Journal of the Siam Society* in 1987.<sup>4</sup> I am grateful to the authorities of the Siam Society for a microfilm which gives me an opportunity to publish this unique manuscript in honor of Professor K. R. Norman.

The catalogue describes this manuscript as "[No.] 47. *Ākāravaṭṭārasutta* (*Vaṇṇanā*) Khmer script; 5 lines 5, 2 × 29,0 cm; gilt edged. Folios: *ka-kaḥ, kha, khā*." The manuscript contains no information on the date or the place of its copying, but the colophon (front cover) gives the name of its donors as [Mr.] Kon Jambhu and [Mrs.] Kev and states that this sutta exists in the *Samyutta-Nikāya*: "*khā. nāy k'on 'jam 'bhu nān keev mī saddhā 'srān vai nai bra buddha sāss'hnā. bra ākāravattasūtra. mī nai samyuttanikāy*".<sup>5</sup> After consulting all available bibliographical sources, Dr. v. Hinüber has rightly concluded that "this sutta cannot be traced in [the] S[am]yutta-[N]ikāya or elsewhere in the Tipitaka."<sup>6</sup>

The title *Ākāravattāra* (with or without the word *sutta*) occurs thirteen times in the body of the text (see # 7, # 8, # 11, # 29, # 35, # 36 twice, # 38 five times, # 44) and once (see # 32) in its shortened form, *Ākāra-sutta*. Strange as it may seem, there is also another title, viz., *Ākāravattāra-suttavaṇṇanā*, which appears only once, almost at the end of the manuscript (see # 48). This suggests the possibility of there being two works here, the "Sutta" and its "Vaṇṇanā" (commentary). The end of the "Sutta" portion is probably indicated by the words "sambuddhena pakāsitaṃ . . . sattara-savaggehi paṭimaṇḍitaṃ" (see # 35).

These concluding words are followed by two rather corrupt verses [Nos. 18—19] of obscure meaning. The first verse says: "This sutta has been revealed by me (mayā pakāsītā) and it should be copied (likhitabbā) by a person with faith (saddhāharā)." Is it possible that the agent of this sentence is not the Buddha but the composer of the sutta? The second verse seems to allow such a meaning: "By me are tied together (mayā ganthitā) in this sutta the virtues of the Buddha like clusters of the best flowers." This accords well with the earlier admission that "the *Ākāravattārasutta* was revealed by the Omniscient One after putting together (sammasitvā) the Suttanta, Vinaya, and Abhidhamma" (see verse No. 16). A work "derived" from the three Pitakas can hardly be called a "sutta", but it might be designated a "vaṇṇanā" (commentary). Even this is high honor indeed for this composition, an honor once accorded to the *Visuddhimagga* of Buddhaghosa: "Briefly summing up the three Pitakas together with the commentary, he wrote the work called *Visuddhimagga*." (*The Cūlavamsa*, I, ch. 37, verse 236).<sup>7</sup>

The remainder of the manuscript (# 36—# 46) consists of a motley collection of some 37 verses. The sole function of these repetitious verses is to describe an assortment of fruits that result from the recitation of the *Ākāravattārasutta*. This portion can therefore be termed "vaṇṇanā", forming a sort of appendix to the "sutta", if indeed such a division was intended by the author. The familiar closing formula of a sutta, e.g. "idaṃ avoca bhagava . . . bhagavato bhāsitaṃ abhinandī ti," which should have appeared at the end of the "sutta" proper (i.e. at # 35), is belatedly introduced at the end of this "vaṇṇanā". In the absence of another manuscript of this work, it is not possible to determine if the stray appearance of the name *Ākāravattārasuttavaṇṇanā* here is the result of a scribal error or if it truly forms the title of a commentary on the *Ākāravattārasutta*.

The conclusion of the vaṇṇanā (nitthitā, see # 48) is followed by what is probably the most intriguing sentence in the entire work: [# 49] "Without a doubt, this sutta has been spoken by the Blessed One, in the *Samyutta-Nikāya*." Startling as this is, one would expect this reference — the significance of which will be examined below — to occur within the vaṇṇanā and not outside of it. It is not unlikely that this reference to the *Samyutta-Nikāya* was appended at a later time by the copyist, the writer of the final words of dedication: [see # 50] iminā puññalikhitena . . . nibbānapaccayo hotu." But it is also possible that the expression "iminā puññalikhitena" might point not to a copyist but to the writer himself, the author of the entire work who, having designated his own composition as a "sutta", must perforce remain nameless. Judging by the language as well as the subject

matter of the text (i.e. the consequences of committing pārājika acts and so forth) and the audacity with which this work was put in the mouth of the Buddha, one must conclude that the author was a learned monk of the Theravāda sect of Thailand where the manuscript was found. The work might well have been composed at the request of the donors mentioned above.

One would expect the vaṇṇanā to explain the meaning of the rather strange title like *Ākāravattārasutta*. The word *ākāra* is well known in the sense of manner, condition, state, and so forth, while *vattāra* can mean "a speaker" (cf. evaṃ vattāro honti, *Jātaka*, I, p. 134), but the compound *ākāravattāra* is not attested elsewhere. The two words together can yield the meaning "The sutta which expounds the manner [of]," without however specifying the object of the sermon. A brief look at the contents of the text will show that the meaning of the title is completed if we read it as "A sermon which expounds the manner of [averting rebirth in hells]."

The sutta opens with the appropriate words: [# 1] "Thus have I heard . . . when the Blessed One was residing in Sāvattī at Vultures' Peak." It then introduces the Venerable Sāriputta entertaining the following thought: "These foolish beings may commit all sorts of evil deeds . . . the householders, (gahattā) performing such acts as matricide and so forth, might commit a pārājika offense against the Teaching [# 2] and even those who are mendicants (pabbajitā), having cut their roots [of good] might commit pārājika offenses. They, having committed evil deeds, would be reborn in the Avīci hell. Is there any "dhamma," profound and subtle, capable of preventing their suffering?"

Thinking thus he addressed the Buddha: [# 3] "A person guilty of a pārājika offense . . . suffers for . . . aeons in the Avīci hell; . . . of a saṃghādisesa . . . in the Mahātāpa hell; . . . of a thullaccaya . . . in the Tāpāna hell; . . . of a pācittiya . . . in the Lokantara hell; . . . of a pāṭideśaniya . . . in the Bherava hell; . . . of a dukkaṭa . . . in the Kālasutta hell; of a dubbhāsita . . . in the Sañjīva hell. [# 4] Just as there is cool [water] for extinguishing a hot fire, . . . there must be a "dhamma" which could pacify [the effects of] the pārājika and so forth . . . [# 5] May the Blessed One preach that "dhamma" which is free from (i.e. saves one from) the evil states of rebirth (apāya)."

The Blessed One then spoke: [# 6] "O Sāriputta, unabandoned (avijantam) by as many Buddhas as there are grains of sand in the river Ganges . . . there is the *Ākāravattārasutta*, capable of preventing beings from suffering [# 7] in the eight great and sixteen minor hells. . . . [# 8] Whosoever listens to this sutta and learns it, worships it and remembers it, . . .

such a person, [ # 10] even if he has committed evil deeds (dussanakam-mam) against his parents, will not be reborn in evil states for ninety thousand aeons . . . .”

“And which is this *Ākāravattārasutta* of the Tathāgata?” In answer to his own question the Blessed One then uttered the famous formula in praise of the Buddha, known by its beginning words [ # 11] “iti pi so bhagavā arahā sammāsambuddho” and ending with the words “parisuddhaṃ brahmacariyam pakāseti”.

It is at this juncture that the author of the *Ākāravattārasutta* expands the canonical formula through seventeen sections of varying length called the vaggas. They all begin with the first four words of the original formula: “iti pi so bhagavā.” The word immediately following these four words, which is different for each section, is used as a marker for a new vagga. Thus, for example, the word *araham* (see # 12) appears at the beginning of the first vagga. It is followed by a string of nine adjectives (e.g. sugato, lokavidū) each again preceded by the words “iti pi so bhagavā.” The end of the section is marked by “ti” and it is then named as “arahādiguṇavagga.” This naming pattern continues through the remaining sixteen vaggas. It is possible to surmise that the author was naming the vaggas in imitation of a canonical text like the *Dhammapada*, in which each vagga derives its name from a word occurring in its first verse (e.g. Appamādvagga, Cittavagga). The total number of vaggas, seventeen, is probably without any significance.

This first, the Arahāvagga, has ten entries, a number that corresponds to the number of adjectives found in the original formula. The subsequent vaggas also conform, by and large, to this arrangement as no less than ten out of the remaining sixteen vaggas have ten entries each of “iti pi so bhagavā.”

In the case of the first vagga, the ten words (araham, and so forth) are directly taken from the canonical litany. In the subsequent vaggas, however, one becomes aware of a major deviation from the canonical text. This consists of the novel practice of repeating the word *pāramisampanno*, each time preceded by the name of the particular pāramī, and the words *iti pi so bhagavā*, to describe the Buddha. The main body of the *Ākāravattārasutta* thus consists of the phrase “iti pi so bhagavā” repeated one hundred seventy-four times and the word “pāramisampanno” only ten less than that number!

The concept of pāramī is, of course, conspicuously absent in the canonical formula of “iti pi so bhagavā.” Assuming that the word “sammāsambuddho” in the formula might point to the attainment of the pāramīs, the number of perfections should still not exceed the canonical ten (as in the

*pāramīvagga*, see # 17). New pāramīs must, therefore, be invented to make up the bulk of the sutta. This is accomplished initially by designating some of the chief events in the career of a Bodhisatta, viz., the abhinīhāra (resolve to become a buddha), the gabbhavuttāhāna (emerging from the womb in a purified manner), and abhisambodhi (Supreme Awakening), as pāramīs. Beyond this point the author feels free to draw upon the canonical clusters of “dhammas” (khandha [consisting of sila, samādhi, paññā], vijjā, pariññā, ñāna, bodhipakkhiya, bala, cariyā, samāpatti, lakkhaṇa, and so forth), to serve as pāramīs. The Blessed One is then described as endowed with these manifold perfections, e.g. “iti pi so bhagavā cattāro satipatthānapāramīsampanno” [ # 21], “iti pi so bhagavā thāmalapāramīsampanno” [ # 24].

There is nothing unusual in the idea that the recitation of the “iti pi so bhagavā” formula can ward off evil. Indeed, in the *Lokaneyyappakarāṇa*, also an apocryphal text originating in Thailand, not only the entire chant but just the first four syllables “i-ti pi so” together with “bha-ga-vā” are shown to have magic powers.<sup>8</sup> In this text the Bodhisatta narrates the story of a layman called Soṇa to ā yakkhā. Soṇa once had climbed a tree in a forest and was bitten by a deadly snake. Foreseeing his imminent death, Soṇa surrendered himself to the protection of the Buddha and, remembering his virtues through the recitation of the “iti pi so bhagavā” formula, was saved. The yakkha, having listened to this story, begged the Bodhisatta to reveal to him the function of the “seven syllables” (sattakkharānam kiccāma) — a usage reminiscent of the Brahmanical ṣaḍakṣara (e.g. om namaḥ śivāya) or the aṣṭākṣara (e.g. om namo Vāsudevāya) mantras. The Bodhisatta then composed an acrostic using each syllable of the formula. Several of the items (notably iddhi, vijjā, ñāna, and bala) encountered in the elaboration of the “iti pi so bhagavā” formula in the *Ākāravattārasutta* are also found in these seven verses.<sup>9</sup> Whether the *Lokaneyyappakarāṇa* in any way influenced the composition of the *Ākāravattāra* or not is a moot question; but one must note that the former was not presented as a “sutta” but only as a pakaraṇa or a treatise.

Given the prominent place it accords to the canonical formula of “iti pi so bhagavā,” the *Ākāravattāra* may be permitted to call itself a “sutta,” however the presumption of authority to speak on issues of Vinaya displayed here is quite unprecedented. No extant *Vinaya* text, *Aṭṭhakathā*, or oral tradition of the Theravāda countries is ever on record for punishing Vinaya transgressions with retributions in hells. Sure enough, the five ānantarika kammās (matricide and so forth) — evil acts that find retribution without delay — must immediately lead the perpetrator to the Avīci hell. Equally, those who indulge in evil actions are reborn in various states of

loss and woe (apāya). But the ingenious manner in which the author of the *Ākāravattārasutta* has arranged retribution for the seven Vinaya offenses (pārājika, saṃghādisesa, thullaccaya, pācittiya, pāṭidesaniya, dukkaṭa, and dubbhāsita) in the seven great hells (Avīci, Mahātāpa, Tāpana, Lokantara, Bherava, Kālasutta, and Sañjiva respectively), is not in keeping with the Vinaya texts of the Theravāda (and probably of any other Buddhist) tradition or even with the law of karmic retribution.

The original source for this innovation can possibly be traced to the *Jātakatthakathā*, particularly to the Nimijātaka (*Jātaka*, VI, pp. 105–115 [No. 541]). King Nimi is taken to the hellish abodes (nirayas) to witness the retribution for such evil acts as cheating, forgery, hurting the virtuous brahmins and samaṇas, plucking the feathers of birds and killing them, adulteration of food, theft (presented in that order,) and finally the most heinous acts of killing one's mother or father, or an arahanta (varieties of the ānantarika kamma). It is to be noted in this connection that this Jātaka verse uses the Vinaya term "pārājika" to describe the [lay] perpetrators of the last category: "ye mātaram vā pitaram va loke, pārājikā arahante hananti" (verse 475). The commentator seems to be aware of the rather unusual manner in which the Vinaya term pārājika is used here and adds: "pārājikā ti jarājīṇṇe mātāpitāro ghātetvā gihbhāve yeva pārājikam pattā." Thus it would appear that there was a precedence for the use of this technical term in a less rigid manner, applicable even to those householders who were not qualified to join the Order an account of their evil deeds. The statement in the *Ākāravattārasutta* that the "householders . . . would be guilty of pārājika (tattha gahatthā mātuḡhātādīkammaṃ katvā sāsanato pārājikam āpajjeyyum [ # 2])" thus establishes a direct link between the Nimijātaka and our sutta. It seems likely that the use of the term pārājikā in this jātaka (coupled with the description of the ussaniraya) might have given our author the idea to develop this link for the remaining Vinaya offenses as well and to further correlate them with the appropriate hells. Although initially used for householders, this karmic retribution plan, elaborated with precise details of duration, was then simply extended to mendicants (pabbajitā) also. This would not be seen as highly objectionable by traditional Buddhists since the "sutta" only helped to demonstrate the ability of the "iti pi so bhagavā" formula to destroy the consequences of even ānantarika acts.

Moreover, the assertion that the sutta forms a part of the "caturāsīti dhammakhandhasahassa" [ # 6], that it was spoken by all of the twenty-eight Buddhas headed by Dīpaṅkara [ # 31], and also that the "fruit of remembering the Sutta, Vinaya, and Abhidhamma is obtained by reciting

this sutta" [see verse 54], removes any doubt concerning its affiliation with the Theravāda tradition. In view of this, a few stray statements like "as many Buddhas as grains of sand on the river Ganges" ( # 6: anekāya Gaṅgāya vālokupamehi Buddhēhi), or the promise that "one will obtain living together with the Tathāgata" ( # 33: "Tathāgatena so saddhim samvāsam patilabhati"), should not be seen as reflecting an unorthodox influence. Indeed, the concluding verse of the sutta "One who sees the Good Law sees me; one who does not see the Good Law, even if he sees me, does not see" (see # 45) seems to reaffirm the true nature of the Theravāda faith in the Buddha.

This brings us to the intriguing final sentence (appearing just before the verse of benediction) of the text, claiming that "without a doubt, this (i.e. the *Ākāravattāra*) sutta is spoken by the lord in the *Samyutta-Nikāya* (*"Samyuttanikāye idaṃ suttaṃ bhagavatā bhāsitaṃ nisamsayaṃ,"* # 49). This is manifestly incorrect as this sutta cannot be traced to the extant edition of the *Samyutta-Nikāya* or to any other parts of the Pali canon. A possible explanation is to take the words "idaṃ suttaṃ" to refer not to the *Ākāravattārasutta* itself, but to the "iti pi so bhagavā" formula, the central focus of that sutta. This formula is found in the *Samyutta-Nikāya* (e.g. v, p. 343) which might indeed have served as the main source for the author of our sutta.<sup>10</sup> What then is the significance of the assuring words "nisamsayaṃ"? Surely, no one would have questioned the canonical source of so well known a formula as the "iti pi so bhagavā"?

A more convincing way of solving this mystery is to take the words "idaṃ suttaṃ" to refer not to the entire *Ākāravattārasutta*, but to a single verse in it, namely, verse No. 55: "yo passati saddhammaṃ so maṃ passati paṇḍito, apassamāno saddhammaṃ maṃ passanto pi na passati." This is a versified rendering of the following words uttered by the Buddha to the dying monk Vakkali: "yo kho, Vakkali, dhammaṃ passati so maṃ passati; yo maṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati. dhammaṃ hi, Vakkali, passanto maṃ passati; maṃ passanto dhammaṃ passati." Unlike the "iti pi so bhagavā" formula, these words are not of common occurrence. The *Itivuttaka* has a variation: (dhammaṃ so bhikkhave na passati, dhammaṃ apassanto na maṃ passati);<sup>11</sup> but the *Ākāravattārasutta* rendition in its entirety is attested only in the *Samyutta-Nikāya*.<sup>12</sup> The fact that this verse reads like a quotation, and that it appears at the very end of the work, lends support to the suggestion that the author of the *Ākāravattārasutta* (or of its *Vannanā*, or the copyist) wanted to reassure the reader about the authenticity of these solemn but less known words of the canon.

In addition to its interest in fostering the salvific power of the "iti pi so

bhagavā" formula, the *Ākāravattārasutta* shares the linguistic peculiarity of irregular geminate consonants with the fourteenth century apocryphal work mentioned above, namely, the *Lokaneyyappakarāṇa*, and hence can be assigned to the same period.

A roman transcription of the Pali text and a Summary/Translation is offered below. The following signs have been used:

[\*] indicates folio No. of MS.

(?) indicates doubtful reading or meaning.

◊ indicates irregular geminate consonant.

Additions in [ ]

Emendations in ( )

[\*1-a] ĀKĀRAVATTĀRASUTTA

[# 1] [\*1-b] namatthu. evaṃ me sutam[.] ekam samayaṃ bhagavā Rājagahe viharati Gijjhakūṭe pabbate[.] atha kho āyasmā Sāriputto yena bhagavā ten' upasaṅkami[.] upasaṅkamitvā bhagavantam abhivādetvā ekamantam nisīdi[.] ekamantam nisinnassa kho āyasmato Sāriputtassa parisam oloketassa evam parivittakko udapādi [—] ime kho sattā chinnamūlā attitasikkhā ye catūsu apāyesu dhuvam paccanti tesu paccamāne te nivāraṇe samatthehi buddhakaradhammehi bhavitabbaṃ.<sup>13</sup> na h' ete ettakā yeva buddhadhammā bhavissanti[.] aññesaṃ vicinissāmi ye dhammā bodhikarā vijjam(n)[t]' eva buddhassetthena gambhīraṃ tipitakattayaṃ pubbake mahesibhi āsevitān ti.<sup>13</sup>

[# 2] ye keci dupaṇṇā puggalā attano bālatāya buddhakaradhamme pi ajāni[tvā] anekakoṭisahasasamkhyam sabbapāpakammaṃ kareyyum. tesu manussaghāṭ(t)am [\*2 = Ka] kareyyum rājānam vā amaccam vā pa[u]rohitam vā bālam vā koci goṇam vā mahisaṃ vā assam vā ghāṭ(t)eyya. tattha gahatthā mātughāṭ(t)ādikammaṃ katvā sāsanaṭo pārājikam āpajjeyy[.] yam[.] pabbajitā pi tesu buddhavacanesu chinnamūlā pārājikam āpajjeyy[.] te pāpakammaṃ katvā kāyassa bhedā parammaraṇā Avi(t)cimhi upa[pa]jjeyy[.] tattha paccamāne satte nivāraṇe samattho koci dhammo gambhīro nipuṇo atthi nu kho bhante ti vatvā imā gāthāyo abhāsi.

[# 3] katham careyyam dhammesu katham nu saraṇam siyā, dasavassasahassāni timsasahassakoṭiyo pārājikam samāpanno Avi(t)cimhi upa[pa]jjati. [1] cattāri satasahassāni timsakoṭisatam pi ca samghādisesasamāpanno Mahātāpe upa[pa]jjati. [2] saṭṭhivassasahassāni satavassān ca koṭiyo thullaccayam samāpanno Tāpane upapajjati. [3]

cattāri satasahassāni cuddasavassakoṭiyo pācitta(i)yaṃ samāpanno Mahantare (Lokantare) vipacc[t]i. [4] saṭṭhivassasahassāni ekavassān(-vīsaṇ) ca koṭiyo pāṭidesaniyaṃ patvā Bherave up◊p◊apajjati. [5] duṃ(k)kaṭāpattisamāpanno Kāl(l)asutte upa[pa]jjati navut◊isatasahassāni mahādukkham anubhavi. [6] dub[b]hāsitaṃ samāpanno Sañjīve up◊p◊apajjati navut◊ivassasahassāni dukkham anubhavati so [ 7] katham dhamme care macco katham apāya(ā) muccate katham careyya dhammesu katham dhammena rakkhati [ . 8]

[# 4] yathā ca loke dukkhassa paṭipakkhabhūtam sukham nāma atthi evaṃ ca pārājikakamme sati tappaṭipakkhabhūtena gambhīrena nipuṇena bhavitabbaṃ[.] yathā ca uṇho sig(kh)i tassa vupasamanabhūtam si(t)talam pi atthi evaṃ pārājikakammādīni vūpasamena nibbānena pi bhavitabbaṃ[.] yathāpi lāmakakammaṃ paṭipakkhabhūto anavajjadharmo atthi evaṃ pāpikāya jātiyā sabbesaṃ paṇ(p)ānam khepanato ariyadhammo(a)samkhātena [\*3-Kā] nibbānena bhavitabbaṃ evā ti vatvā gāthāyo abhāsi.

[# 5]<sup>14</sup> yathā pi dukkhe vijjante sukham nāma kalyāṇo pi yathā pi uṇhe vijjante si(t)talam vijjati tathā pāpe vijjante vattati pārājikam samāpanno katham dhammena rakkhati. [9] yathā gūthagato poso taṭ(ḷ)ākam disvāna purisaṃ(pūritam?) udaken' eva dhovitā parisuddho malā siyā. [10] yathā pi byādhito poso vijjamāno(e) patikicchako(e) tikicchāpeti tam byādhiṃ arogo sukhito siyā. [11] yathā kuṇapam puriso kanṭhe bandham jigūñchiyaṃ mocayitvāna gaccheyya sukhaseri sayamvasi(t). [12] yathā pi kaṇhavisena ḍamsito puriso thito osadhamantatejena mutto maraṇato siyā. [13] yathā uccāraṇaṭṭhānasmim kā(a)ri(t)sam ū(o?)nac(?naran?)āriyo chaḍḍa(?)yitvāna gaccheyya anapekkho anattiko<sup>15</sup> [ . 14] tathāvidham pāpakammaṃ katham dhammena rakkhati apāyamutto yo dhammo desetu amatam padan ti. [15]

[# 6] atha sabbadhammesu appaṭiḥaṭ(t)añāṇo sammāsambuddho buddho bhagavā paṇham visajjento Sāriputta anekāya Gaṅgāya vālukup◊amehi buddhehi avij◊ahitam caturāsītiddhammakhandhasahassesu chinnamūlānam pāpasamāpannānam paṭṭhānam paṭiṭṭhānabhūtam gambhīraṃ nipuṇam dhammajātam atthi ti vatvā kappasatasahassādhikānam catunnam

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> *Paññāsa-Jātaka or Zimme Pannāsa* (in the Burmese Recension), 2 volumes, ed. P. S. Jaini, Pali Text Society, London, 1981–83. Translated (by I. B. Horner and P. S. Jaini) as *Apocryphal Birth Stories*, 2 volumes, Pali Text Society, London, 1985–86. For a study of the indigenous Chinese Buddhist scriptures, see *Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha*, ed. Robert E. Buswell, Jr., University of Hawaii Press, 1990.

<sup>2</sup> *The Jātaka (Jātakathavaṇṇanā)*, 6 volumes, ed. V. Fausbøll, Pali Text Society (2nd ed.), London, 1964.

<sup>3</sup> A possible exception would be the Buddhāpadāna, the first book of the *Apadāna* (Part I, ed. Mary F. Lilley, Pali Text Society, London, 1925, pp. 1–6) of the Khuddaka-Nikāya. According to Professor Bechert, this section was composed in Sri Lanka by Mahāyāna-sthāviras and was included in the Pali canon in the first century or in the beginning of the 2nd century A.D. See Heinz Bechert, "Mahāyāna Literature in Sri Lanka: The Early Phase," in *Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems: Studies in Honor of Edward Conze*, ed. Lancaster and Gomez, Berkeley Buddhist Series, I, 1977.

<sup>4</sup> Oskar v. Hinüber, "The Pāli Manuscripts Kept at the Siam Society, Bangkok: A Short Catalogue," *Journal of the Siam Society*, volume 75, pp. 9–74, 1987.

<sup>5</sup> Tr.: Mr. Kon Jambhu and Mrs. Keev, having faith, created (i.e. got made) this manuscript of the *Ākāravattasūtra* in the Buddha's Teaching. It exists in the *Samyutta-Nikaya*.

<sup>6</sup> von Hinüber, op. cit., p. 44.

<sup>7</sup> *Cūlavamsa: Being the more recent part of the Mahāvamsa*, Part I., tr. Wilhelm Geiger (and from German into English by C. Mabel Rickmers), Pali Text Society, London, 1929.

<sup>8</sup> *Lokaneyyappakaranam*, ed. P. S. Jaini, Pali Text Society, London, 1986.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, verses 278–84. The following verse, beginning with the second syllable "ti" can be cited as a good example:

tikāro eva tibhavahitakaro tikam oghapāram,  
tisso vijjānupatto tibhavabhayaharo tikkañānāsīyutto;  
tiṭṭhanto aggamaggam paramasukhadado tiṇṇamohandhakāro,  
tiṇṇam lokānam aggo tibhasasukhadado tinnalokam namāmi. [279]

<sup>10</sup> It should be noted, however, that the formula found in our text is not identical with any of its versions attested in the canon. Two parts of this sutta, namely, "so bhagavā cakkhubhūto . . . dhammarājā", and the last line, "sādhu kho pana . . . dassanam hoti" are, for example, missing in the *Anguttara-Nikāya* (ed. Richard Morris, Pali Text Society, London, 1885, Part II) version (p. 208), which is identical with the *Digha-Nikāya* (ed. J. Charpentier, Pali Text Society, London, 1917, Part I), p. 62. The *Samyutta-Nikāya* (ed. Leon Feer, Pali Text Society, London, 1888, Part V) version (p. 343), is shorter than both.

<sup>11</sup> *Iivuttaka*, section 92 (ed. E. Windisch, Pali Text Society, London, 1890).

<sup>12</sup> *Samyutta-Nikāya*, Part III, p. 120.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. na h' ete ettakā yeva Buddhadhammā bhavissare,  
aññe pi viciniṣṣāmi ye dhammā bodhipācanā.  
vicinanto tadā dakkhiṃ dutiyaṃ sīlapāramiṃ,  
pubbakehi Mahesihi āsevitānisevitam. *The Jātaka*, I, p. 20.

<sup>14–15</sup> Cf. *The Jātaka*, I, pp. 4–5 (Nidānakathā, verses 21–32) and *Buddhavamsa*, ch. II verses 10–21 (*Buddhavamsa and Cariyāpīṭaka*, ed. N. A. Jayawickrama, Pali Text Society, London, 1974).

<sup>16</sup> See note 10. The line "cakkhubhūto . . . dhammasāmi" appears in the *Anguttara-Nikāya* (Pali Text Society, London, 1900, Part III, p. 226), but not as a part of the "iti pi so bhagavā" formula.

<sup>17</sup> On the tradition of the twenty-eight Buddhas, see *The Jātaka*, I, pp. 43–45 (Nidānakathā, verses 246–51).

<sup>18</sup> See note 7.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *The Jātaka*, I (Nidānakathā) verse 189.

<sup>20</sup> See note 7.

<sup>21</sup> See *Samyutta-Nikāya*, Part III, p. 120.

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ON MADHYAMAKĀVATĀRA 6.26

A. Wayman, in an article<sup>1</sup> that makes some good points about translation practice in general, has accused L. de La Vallée Poussin of mistranslating<sup>2</sup> Verse 26 of Chapter 6 of Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*;<sup>3</sup> he states in particular that de La Vallée Poussin failed to translate the particle *kyan* in the Tibetan translation (the only version that seems to be extant). But de La Vallée Poussin did translate it, as *même*, which is within the range of meaning of *kyan* in general, and which (as we shall see) is a defensible translation in this particular verse. Professor Wayman, on the other hand, translates it in such a way as to deprive it of most or all of its contrastive force. By this means, and also by separating *yod* from the immediately following *min*, he arrives at an interpretation of the verse that is not borne out by the commentary or by the context of the surrounding verses, and that is not the sort of thing that we expect a Mādhyamika to say in general. Here is the verse in question:<sup>4</sup>

mi śes gñid kyis rab bskyod mu stegs can /  
 mams kyis bdag ñid ji bzin brtags pa dañ /  
 sgyu ma smig rgyu sog la brtags pa gañ /  
 de dag 'jig rten las kyañ yod min ñid //

de La Vallée Poussin translates: 'Les conceptions imaginaires des hérétiques (*tīrthikas*) troublés par le sommeil de l'ignorance, — comme l'*āīman* — et les conceptions imaginaires comme les magies optiques, les mirages, etc., sont également inexistantes du point de vue même du monde.'<sup>5</sup> Wayman translates: 'The things imagined, according to (misled) personal theories, by the heretics corrupted through the sleep of ignorance; the imaginary conceptions of phantoms, mirages, and so on; as well as those things (horses, water, etc.) which exist according to the world — are (all) nonexistent.'<sup>6</sup> Now first of all it must be stated that de La Vallée Poussin's translation of *tīrthika*, a translation unchallenged by Wayman, is not in accordance with the historical meaning of the word chosen, 'hérétique', for this probably originally Christian term refers to someone who claims to be a Christian but really is not one, on doctrinal grounds, in the eyes of those deemed orthodox. But *tīrthika* does not mean someone who claims to be Buddhist but is not; it means someone who makes no such claim, hence a



'pagan', 'heathen' or more simply non-Buddhist or 'outsider'. Another point concerns *bskyod*; this means 'moved' or in this context perhaps 'troubled', but 'corrupted' is rather too strong. As for *kyan* 'même' 'even', the force of this particle is best understood in the philosophical context of Candrakīrti's discourse. He discusses here the well-known 'two truths'; by the higher truth or *paramārthasatya* the things of this world can hardly be said to 'exist' in any meaningful sense; on the lower level of the *samvṛtisatya* we can speak of certain 'things' as 'existing', because the standard is more lenient, so to speak. But *even* by this more lenient standard, there are some things such as mirages that still do not exist. In the verse under discussion Candrakīrti writes of this particular group of putative things, and his '*jig rten las kyan* 'even by [the standard of] the world' corresponds to de La Vallée Poussin's *du point de vue même du monde*, though one could also suggest *même du [point de vue du] monde*. That we are dealing with such things that are really inexistent not only *sub specie aeternitatis* but also here below is borne out by the examples given of mirages and illusions, and by the commentary, which gives the three *gūṇas* of the Sāṃkhya school; these by Buddhist standards will be inexistent even in the world (the really existing things in the world are sense-objects, and the three *gūṇas* are certainly not such). (Things seen in mirages and the like are not sense-objects, because faults of perception are at work.)

Wayman however believes that this verse concerns both the things that do, and those that do not, exist on the level of the world; as examples of the former he gives 'horses' and 'water', which do not occur either in the verse or in its commentary.<sup>7</sup> In so doing he apparently takes *yod* with what precedes and translates *de dag 'jig rten las kyan yod* by 'as well as those things (horses, water, etc.) which exist according to the world'. Thus *kyan* is reduced to 'as well as', which is no more than a sort of elegant 'and'; moreover by Wayman's interpretation *kyan* ought to have been at the end. Moreover, while Candrakīrti will say that horses do not exist on the level of the *paramārthasatya*, we are here (in this verse) dealing with the *samvṛti* level, on which horses do exist, as all Mādhyamikas affirm, denying the charge of nihilism. So it is unlikely that Candrakīrti will deny the existence of horses *here*, as he appears to do by the word *min*.

And it is difficult to believe that *yod* does not belong with the following *min*. As M. Hahn in his *Lehrbuch der klassischen tibetischen Schriftsprache* bids us, 'Man merke als besonderen Ausdruck *yod pa ma yin* oder kürzer *yod pa min* "es gibt nicht, existiert nicht".<sup>8</sup> The even shorter *yod min* is of course often seen in verse. If *yod* does belong with *min*, then de La Vallée Poussin's 'sont inexistantes' is perfectly correct.

The commentary is consistent with de La Vallée Poussin's interpretation. It states of the non-Buddhists; *bden pa gñis mthoñ ba dañ bral bas hbras bu mi thob par hgyur ro // dehi phyir hdi dag gis gañ brtags pa yon tan gsum la sogs pa de dag ni hjig rten gyi kun rdsob tu yod pa ma yin pa ñid do /* 'Divorced from the vision of the two truths, they will not attain the fruit. Therefore their imaginings, the three *gūṇas* and the like, do not exist [even] by the *samvṛti* [*satya*] of the world.' If, with Wayman, we read *yod* with what precedes, Candrakīrti will be made to say that the three *gūṇas* do exist on the level of the world. And can *ma yin* or *min*, without a preceding *yod*, mean 'do not exist'? Usually *yin* is a copula, used in such expressions as 'A is B', not a verb affirming the existence of some A.

The context of the verse also supports the idea that it deals with things not existing even by the indulgent standard of the world. The previous verse, Verse 25, mentions two kinds of things, those that do exist in the world, things perceived by the unimpaired sense organs, *gnod pa med pañi dhan po drug rnam kyis*,<sup>9</sup> and those that do not, the *hjig rten ñid las log pa* 'wrong by the world itself'.<sup>10</sup> As the commentary states, *gzugs brñan la sogs pa gañ ſig dhan po rnam la gnod pa yod pa na yul gyi no bo ñid du snan ba de ni hjig rten ñid la bltos nas log pa yin no /*<sup>11</sup> 'Reflections and the like, when the sense organs are impaired, appearing as real objects, are nonveridical with regard to the world itself'. This topic is mentioned last in the verse and in the commentary, so it is not impossible to believe that the following verse, Verse 26, continues the topic. Verse 27 also does so, opening as it does with mention of the *tāmirika* or *mig ni* [*sic*, but should this not be *na?*] *rab rib can*,<sup>12</sup> those with eye disease who see things that are not there. Horses and water, then, would seem to be out of place in Verse 26.

Concerning *bdag ñid*, literally 'selfness', in the absence of any help from the commentary we may tentatively interpret this as 'the [supposed] fact of there being a self', which is the sort of thing that a Buddhist writer would consider to be an example of delusion. Wayman, however, reads 'personal theory', although any theory is in a sense personal to the one who holds it and it is usually unnecessary to say so by using a word like 'personal'. In the subcommentary that Wayman consulted, 'the personal theories are for example, the self (*ātman*) and primary matter (*pradhāna*) (*bdag dañ gso bo la sogs pa*).<sup>13</sup> Would it not be better to take *bdag ñid* itself as 'self theory', which is then glossed as a theory of self proper (*ātman*) or alternatively of *pradhāna*-type self ('supreme or universal soul' is given in the Macdonell dictionary s.v.)?

Lest this discussion end on too negative a note it should be reiterated

that Professor Wayman's article on translation contains a number of important and valuable insights and wisely stresses the literalist side of the whole debate among translators; but it is always possible to disagree concerning individual words and phrases.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> "Observations on Translation from the Classical Tibetan Language into European Languages", *Indo-Iranian Journal* 14.3/4 (1972), 161–192.

<sup>2</sup> In *Le Museon*, n.s. 8 (1907), 302.

<sup>3</sup> Bibliotheca Buddhica IX. *Madhyamakāvātāra par Candrakīrti: traduction tibétaine* (St.-Petersbourg, 1912), 105.

<sup>4</sup> From Wayman, op. cit., 186 and de La Vallée Poussin's edition (see Note 3 above), loc. cit.

<sup>5</sup> See Note 2 above; also Wayman, loc. cit.

<sup>6</sup> Wayman, op. cit., 187.

<sup>7</sup> See Note 3, 105–106 for this commentary. Wayman refers to his earlier "Introduction to Tsoñ kha pa's *Lam rim chen mo*", *Phi Theta Annual* 3 (July 1952), 53. The horses and water may derive from the dGe-lugs-pa subcommentaries to which he refers (without direct quotation) here; but if we are not mistaken, dGe-lugs-pa subcommentaries are not even binding on all the dGe-lugs-pa, much less on all Buddhists and Buddhologists.

<sup>8</sup> Hamburg: Michael Hahn, 1971, 148 (Section 16.1).

<sup>9</sup> See Note 3 above, 104.

<sup>10</sup> Loc. cit.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 105.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>13</sup> Wayman, op. cit., 187 n. de La Vallée Poussin's second thoughts on this point (in his note on p. 302) seem unnecessary.

## REVIEWS

Oskar von Hinüber: *Die Sprachgeschichte des Pāli im Spiegel der südostasiatischen Handschriftenüberlieferung* (Untersuchungen zur Sprachgeschichte und Handschriftenkunde des Pāli I). pp. 29. Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz. 1988. DM 12.60.

Thanks to the work of scholars earlier in this century, especially Sylvain Lévi and Heinrich Lüders, we now know something about the unattested antecedents of Pāli and the other languages of early Buddhism. By comparing Pāli texts with those in Buddhist Sanskrit these scholars were able to point to anomalous forms which shed light upon the dialects and languages on which the language of those texts was based.

What is not so well understood, however, is the process by which the form of the Pāli canon which was commented upon by Buddhaghosa, Dhammapāla and others from the fifth century A.D. onwards, has been handed down to us. It seems clear that the Pāli canon, as we know it, has been greatly influenced by the writings of the grammarians, and Helmer Smith, in the introduction to his edition of Aggavaṃsa's *Saddanīti*, the great Pāli grammatical text composed in Burma in A.D. 1154, stated (p. vi) that Pāli as we know it is the product of the 12th century. If we wish to understand the Theravāda canon better we must endeavour to find our way back to an earlier form of Pāli.

The position with regard to the use of Pāli in South-East Asia is particularly complicated. The early western investigators soon found that each Buddhist country in that area had its own tradition, each differing somewhat from its neighbour's, which made the production of critical editions of Pāli texts a difficult matter. It became clear that, from an early date, there had been a highly complicated interchange situation, with Buddhism and Buddhist texts being exported from one country to another, and then perhaps being re-imported again at a later date when Buddhism was in decline in the donor country. Buddhism was, moreover, brought to some countries by two or more different routes, with one influx being superimposed upon an earlier one. In some cases there had been a superimposition of Hīnayāna upon earlier Mahāyāna Buddhism, and even in a country such as Ceylon, which has been basically Hīnayāna since the in-

roduction of Buddhism at the time of Aśoka, there have been times when there was a strong Mahāyāna influence. We know that there have been councils in the various Buddhist countries, at which the canon was freed from errors and then recited, although, except for the most recent which was held in Burma in 1954—56 to mark the 2,500th anniversary of the death of the Buddha, we know little or nothing of the process by which this was done, nor the criteria which were adopted to enable the task to be performed. All this makes the unravelling of the history of the Pāli language in the area very difficult.

The investigations of Professor von Hinüber himself in North Thailand have shown the existence there of early manuscripts of Pāli texts which in some cases seem to have preserved better readings than those we find in the traditions hitherto available to us. In the book under review he gives (pp. 15 foll.) the example of the reading *aviyattena sāmāññaṃ* found in a manuscript of the Saṃyutta-nikāya<sup>1</sup> datable to A.D. 1549 from Lampang, where the PTS edition at S I 7, 13\* (7, 23\* would seem to be a mistake) has *avyattena ca sāmāññaṃ*. Since the form with the svarabhakti vowel is the one to be expected in Middle Indo-Aryan, we can deduce that that is the original reading, and those manuscripts which have the conjunct *-vy-* were obliged to augment the pāda with a particle (*ca* or *hi*) to make it scan when the number of syllables was reduced. The writing of *-vy-* in this context could be taken as an example of Sanskritisation, although von Hinüber says "besser ein semi-tatsama" (p. 20). We see something similar at S I 39, 4\*, where the PTS edition reads *sabb' eva vasam anvagu* in the cadence of an even śloka pāda. Here the presence of the group *-nv-* is suspicious, and von Hinüber is able to point (p. 24) to old Thai manuscripts which have the reading *annagu*, which shows the assimilation of *-nv-* > *-nn-*.

A combination of the confusion of similar akṣaras and unusual phonetic developments sometimes produces forms which are hard to identify. Professor von Hinüber shows (pp. 25 foll.) how a knowledge of the common scribal mistakes and emendations current in the countries of South-East Asia can sometimes help to uncover the correct reading, although it may no longer be extant in any of the traditions. So a knowledge of the facts that the akṣaras *bha* and *ha* are similar in the Sinhalese and Burmese scripts, and that *dra* and *dā* can sometimes coincide, gives the possibility of reading *udāheyyuṃ* in place of *udrabheyyuṃ* at M I 306, 12\* (glossed *khādeyyuṃ* at Ps II 372, 17). This can then be derived from \**udāñheyyuṃ* < Sanskrit \**ud-aśnāti*, giving a meaning which agrees with the gloss.

This excellent monograph raises some interesting questions, which

perhaps point the way along which further investigations in the field of Pāli studies should go:

(1) The first problem is to understand how the superior readings mentioned above could have been preserved. In the case of the Thai readings von Hinüber is able to point (p. 13) to the council held at Chiang Mai in North Thailand under King Tilaka between 1475 and 1477, and it is possible that these readings may be based upon manuscripts which follow the "uncorrected" forms of the texts, i.e. those which had not been brought into line with what the holders of the council thought was the authentic reading in each case. This explanation, however, only pushes the problem one stage further back, for we now need to understand how these superior readings could be available in Thailand in the fifteenth century, and had not already been "corrected" before that as a result of councils held earlier. There would seem to be three possible explanations:

(a) The earlier councils were not as effective as might be thought, and despite the adoption of an approved text, in remote vihāras "incorrect" readings were still being copied and circulated.

(b) Until the 15th century all manuscripts had these superior readings, and the inferior "corrections" are of quite recent date — due perhaps to the influence of the medieval grammarians. The fact that all the Theravāda traditions agree about some readings might seem to make this less likely, but some such phenomenon certainly seems to be responsible in such cases as the total disappearance of certain words and forms, e.g. *bārasa* "twelve", which must have been in the canon until the time of Aggavamsa, who quotes it, although it does not now appear in any tradition of the canon.

(c) These superior readings have been introduced into individual traditions at a late date, from some external source, possibly mainland India. This theory would explain how it comes about that only the Thai tradition with *appabhūssa* agrees with the Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit tradition's reading *aprabhūssa* in the Upālisutta (M I 386, 25\* where the other traditions have *appahinassa*), and why the Burmese tradition preserves *kantana* at Dhṛp 275 (cf. Udāna-varga XII 9—10 *kṛntana*) where the Sinhalese tradition has *santhana*.

(2) One difficulty in handling Pāli texts from South-East Asia is that we do not know enough about the relationship between the pronunciation and the spelling of Pāli in the various countries at the relevant times. In particular we know little about the pronunciation of svarabhakti vowels. We know that even in Sanskrit, as attested by the grammarians and phoneticians, a

svarabhakti vowel was introduced into the pronunciation of conjunct consonants, and this feature of pronunciation sometimes had an effect, even when it was not written, e.g. the tri-syllabic scansion of the word *Indra* in the Rgveda, and the appearance of *vaiyākaraṇa* as the vṛddhi form of *vyākaraṇa*. There is evidence that at the time of Aśoka there was an ambiguity about the pronunciation and therefore the writing of conjunct groups, so that we find *hveyu* written in the Aśokan inscriptions for *huvēyu* (Jaugada, Separate Edicts, I.6, II.5), presumably because the scribe, mistaking the vowel *-u-* for a svarabhakti vowel, wrongly assumed that it was to be ignored in writing although still, presumably, pronouncing it. The appearance of the reading *avyattena* might have been due to Sanskritisation, but it could equally well have arisen in the first place from a scribe writing *avy-* although he pronounced it as *aviy-*, i.e. it might in origin have been a discrepancy between writing and pronunciation.

When we consider the reading *anvagu* at S I 39, 4\* mentioned above, we might assume that the correct reading was *anuvagu*, with a svarabhakti vowel between the two consonants. We can then see that the scribes were faced with the same problem which faced them elsewhere in canonical texts, e.g. at Th 500, where *arahati* occurs in the cadence of an even śloka pāda. To make the pāda scan they needed to pronounce the word as *arhati*, although they still wrote it as *arahati*. In the case of *anuvagu*, they both pronounced and wrote it as *anvagu*. Any tradition, however, which objected to this non-Middle Indo-Aryan form had the alternative assimilated form *annagu* available to them, whereas there was no assimilated form of *arahati* available.

Resolution of a consonant group may also lie behind the diversity of readings at Sn 239—40, to which von Hinüber refers (p. 27). Lüders' study of this problem (*Beobachtungen über die Sprache des buddhistischen Urkanons*, §178) was based entirely on the variant readings listed by Andersen and Smith in their PTS edition of 1913. Those editors adopted the Sinhalese reading *añhamāna* for both verses, and Lüders regarded this as a genuine western assimilated form. The three Burmese manuscripts used for the edition have *asamāna*, *asmamāna* and *asnamāna* in 239, and *asamāna* and *asnamāna* in 240, and von Hinüber suggests that *asamāna* is derived from *\*asanāna* < Sanskrit *asṇāna*, i.e. it is an eastern form with a resolved consonant group, with *-nāna* doubtless being "corrected" by a well-meaning scribe to the more common participial ending *-māna*. The matter is not, however, a simple opposition between Burmese *asamāna* = eastern form and Sinhalese *añhamāna* = western form, because at Sn 239 the two Sinhalese manuscripts also have the reading *asamāna*, and the reading *añhamāna* is an editorial conjecture based upon its occurrence in

240. The reading *asamāna* will not scan in either Sn 239 or 240, and the Burmese Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition in fact reads *asnamāna* in both verses. The Burmese reading *asmamāna* is doubtless a mistake for *asnamāna*, and we should probably explain *asamāna*, not as a "corrected" version of *asanāna*, but as a mistake for *\*asanamāna*, i.e. a resolved form of *asnamāna*. This reading would only scan if two short syllables were allowed to stand in place of one long syllable, and it is possible that the scribal tradition which retained this reading, finding what appeared to be hyper-metric Triṣṭubh and Jagatī pādas, "regularised" the number of syllables by omitting one. The Siamese edition, not quoted by any of these scholars, reads *assamāna*, an assimilated form, in both verses.

(3) We need to find the best way of describing anomalous features in Pāli. Some of these are usually explained as being Sanskritisations, and Pāli is assumed to have undergone the same type of Sanskritisation as we find in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit. As already noted, however, in this study von Hinüber introduces an innovation into our way of considering these features by stating (p. 17) that some of them, e.g. *katvā* and *disvā*, are rather to be regarded as semi-tatsamas. The Indo-Aryan portion of the vocabulary of Middle Indo-Aryan is normally divided into two categories: tatsamas where the word is identical with its Sanskrit form, e.g. *sama* < *sama*, and tadbhavas, where the word is derived from Sanskrit, but is not identical with it because certain phonological changes have taken place, e.g. *padesa* < *pradeśa*. In New Indo-Aryan the word tatsama is also used of words borrowed from Sanskrit in their Sanskritic form, e.g. Hindī has the tatsama *sthāna(a)* < Sanskrit *sthāna*, as well as the tadbhava *ṭhāna(a)* from the same source. Such borrowing of Sanskritic forms is very rare in Middle Indo-Aryan, but we could point to the word *brāhmaṇa* in Pāli as an example.

The term semi-tatsama was invented to deal with words which seemed not to fit conveniently into either of these two categories. It is normally reserved for those words which were borrowed into Middle Indo-Aryan or New Indo-Aryan from Sanskrit at a date after the normal phonological developments had finished their operation. So we find in Hindī the tadbhava *kām(a)* < Sanskrit *karman*. We also find the tatsama *karm(a)*. There is, however, a third derivative, *karam(a)*, which represents a borrowing of *karman* into Hindī from Sanskrit at a time when the assimilation of *-rm-* < *-mm-* had ceased to operate. Nevertheless, since being borrowed, a certain amount of Middle Indo-Aryan development has taken place, viz. the insertion of a svarabhakti vowel.

It would seem that Hoernle was the first to use the term "semi-tatsama",

in his *Comparative Grammar of the Gaudian Languages* in 1880. Beames, in his *Comparative Grammar of the Modern Aryan Languages of India* (1872–79), had earlier written of “early and late tadbhavas”, while in his *Wilson Philological Lectures on Sanskrit and the Derived Languages* (delivered in 1877 but not published until 1914) R. G. Bhandarkar wrote of “modern tadbhavas”. In the introduction to their *Comparative Dictionary of the Bihāri Language* (1885) Hoernle and Grierson wrote: “. . . Mr Beames (pp. 13 foll.) divides tadbhavas into ‘early and late tadbhavas’ and Dr Hoernle (pp. xxxviii foll.) divides tatsamas into ‘tatsamas and semi-tatsamas’ the two terms ‘late tadbhavas’ and ‘semi-tatsamas’ being intended to distinguish those tatsamas which, having been early adopted into Gaudian, have more or less widely diverged from their Sanskrit prototypes. In this Dictionary we have thought it better to limit ourselves to the simpler classification into tatsamas and tadbhavas”. Writing on the modern Indo-Aryan vernaculars in the supplement to *Indian Antiquary* LX (1931), Grierson stated (§ 68) that the grammarians included under the name “tadbhava” those “tatsamas which had been distorted in the mouths of the Prakrit-speaking population into apparently Prakrit forms”. These he preferred to call “semi-tatsamas”. As he said, “It is evident that, in the course of events, the tendency must have been for all tatsamas to become semi-tatsamas, and for the latter ultimately to become so degraded as to be indistinguishable from tadbhavas”.

It appears that neither Pischel nor Geiger makes use of the term “semi-tatsama” in their respective Grammars of Prakrit and Pāli. Chatterjee (*Origin and development of the Bengali language*, pp. 190–91) writes of semi-tatsamas as being “modified loan words”, and refers to “Old Bengali *kaṣaṇa* [*<* Skt. *kr̥ṣṇa*], now lost, which is based upon a Middle Indo-Aryan semi-tatsama”. Mehendale explained Prakrit *tiranhu* as being a semi-tatsama (*<* *trisnu*), and compared it with the New Indo-Aryan numerals in *tir* which he described in a similar way (*Bulletin of the Deccan College*, Vol. XIV, pp. 163–67). I have, however, explained *tiranhu* otherwise (*Journal of the Oriental Institute (Baroda)*, Vol. X, p. 348).

When all these scholars wrote, current ideas about the Sanskritisation of Prakrit which we see in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, and to a lesser extent in Pāli, had not been much developed, and consequently the terminology which they employed, based as it was upon the language of the Prakrit grammarians, did not take account of the possibility of Sanskritisation and back-formation. There are many examples in Pāli, e.g. such hyper-forms as *brūheti* (= \**būheti*), *udraya* (= *udaya*), and *vyappatha* (= \**vappatha* *<* *vāpatha*), to show that we are dealing with conscious efforts to Sanskritise Pāli. If we are to regard Pāli *katvā* as a semi-tatsama, then we should have

to assume that the users of Pāli borrowed the word *kr̥tvā* from Sanskrit, and changed the *-r-* to *-a-*, but did not change the *-tv-* to the expected *-tt-*. This was perhaps the view of the majority of scholars until recently. They would have regarded such Sanskritisms as archaisms and as evidence that Pāli was at an earlier stage of development than other Prakrits. In the index (p. 1146) to his edition of *Saddanūti*, for example, Helmer Smith suggested a connection between *disvā* and the rare Sanskrit word *dr̥śvan*, found only at the end of compounds, rather than seeing it as a backformation from *dissā/dissam* *<* *dr̥śya*, with *-vā* “restored” by analogy with *-tvā*. As, however, von Hinüber himself has shown that the expected change of *-tv-* *<* *-tt-* did take place in Pāli, or the dialect upon which it is based, but was later replaced by *-tv-* in all places where the redactors recognised the underlying conjunct, we can see that Smith’s suggestion is not correct. Where the redactors were confused by the syntax or for some other reason, they sometimes omitted to make the change or they made it incorrectly for the same reasons, e.g. they wrongly wrote *udāpatvā* in place of *udapatā*, which they failed to recognise as a reduplicated aorist *<* Sanskrit *udapaptat*.

In the same way, the usage of the term semi-tatsama would only be appropriate as a description of the word *avyattena*, mentioned above, if we assume that when Sanskrit *avyakta* was taken into Pāli the usual Pāli assimilation was applied to the *-kt-* conjunct but not to the *-vy-* conjunct. I do not believe that this is the situation here. I think that von Hinüber is correct in believing that the earlier form of this pāda had *aviyattena*. At a later date, either because of pronunciation or because of a conscious attempt to Sanskritise, the conjunct *-vy-* was written, damaging the metre, which had to be repaired by the insertion of a particle.

Neither *katvā* nor *avyattena*, then, is an example of a semi-tatsama, and von Hinüber’s terminological innovation would seem to be, if not an error, at best an unnecessary complication in our way of analysing such anomalous features in Pāli. It would be preferable to follow the example of Hoernle and Grierson and confine ourselves to the terms “tatsama” and “tadbhava”.

## NOTE

The abbreviations of the titles of Pāli texts are those adopted by the Critical Pāli Dictionary; PTS = Pali Text Society.

A BUDDHIST VERSE INSCRIPTION FROM  
ANDHRA PRADESH

1. *Indian Archaeology 1974—75 — A Review* (New Delhi, 1979, p. 53) reported the discovery of an “inscription, engraved on a plaque . . . written in Pali language and Brahmi characters of about the third-fourth century A.D.”, bearing “a stanza on *dukha* (*sic*) or misery and on the eightfold path of Buddhism”. The plaque was found at Guntupalle, District West Godavari, Andhra Pradesh.
2. Guntupalle, located inland between the Krishna and Godavari Rivers, was an important centre of Buddhist activity from before the Christian era until the latter part of the first millennium A.C. Set in a horseshoe-shaped escarpment overlooking a ravine, it has yielded both structural and rock-cut remains. The former include a brick *caitya-gr̥ha*, more than thirty votive *stūpas*, several pillared halls (*mandapa*), and a brick apsidal sanctuary; the latter a number of celled cave residences (*vihāra*) and a circular *caitya-gr̥ha*. Other finds include limestone images of the standing Buddha in the Amarāvati style; pillars, slabs, and other architectural elements, both carved and plain; reliquaries, pottery, and a fair number of inscriptions. The latter (numbers I-3, -7, -8, and -14) establish that the ancient name of the site was Mahānāgaparvata.<sup>1</sup>
3. I. K. Sarma gives further details of the inscription mentioned in §1. He states that it was found in the vicinity of a large *stūpa*, and “was originally fixed to a stone stump which held the *chatrāvalī* of the *stūpa*”.<sup>2</sup>

This inscription, in four lines, was found on a brown squarish slate tablet with raised borders. The characters are quite deep and boldly incised and display closeness to the Visnukunḍin and Śālaṅkāyana copper plate grants. The language is Prakrit mixed with Sanskrit. The text reveals a Buddhist creed i.e., exposition of four truths (*catvāri āryasatyāni*). . . . The present example is a stone plaque with a formula not met with so far in any Buddhist site of the region.<sup>3</sup>

Sarma does not deal specifically with the date, but includes the text in a section on “inscriptions of early 5th and 6th centuries A.D.”.

4. Sarma reads the verse as follows:<sup>4</sup>

1. *Dukha Dukhi samutpādam*

2. *Dukhasya va (d) tikkramam*
3. *Ariyāṅca Ajamgikam ma-*
4. *tiṃ Dukhopasama sāmikaṃ*

5. This immediately brings to mind a verse found in both Pali and Sanskrit.

The Pali version occurs in the *Dhammapada*, verse 191, *Samyuttanikāya* II 185.23, *Itivuttaka* 17.22—18.2, *Theragāthā* verse 1259, and *Therīgāthā* verses 186, 193, 310, and 321:

*dukkhaṃ dukkhasamuppādaṃ  
dukkhassa ca atikkamaṃ  
ariyaṅ c' atthaṅgikaṃ<sup>5</sup> maggaṃ  
dukkhūpasamaḡāminam*

The Sanskrit version occurs in the *Udānavarga*:<sup>6</sup>

*duḥkhaṃ duḥkhasamutpādaṃ  
duḥkhasya samatikramam  
āryaṃ cāṣṭāṅgikaṃ mārgaṃ  
duḥkhopaśamaḡāminam*

The meaning of the Pali and the Sanskrit is the same:

*Suffering, the arising of suffering,  
the transcendence of suffering,  
and the noble eightfold path  
that leads to the appeasement of suffering.*

6.<sup>7</sup> The verse also occurs with a variant in line d in the *Vidyāsthānopama-sūtra*:<sup>7</sup> *kṣemaṃ nirvāṅgāminam* (“secure, leading to Nirvāṅga”), and in the *Prātihāryasūtra* of the *Divyāvādāna*<sup>8</sup> with the same variant in line d, plus a variant in line b, *nirodhaṃ samatikramam*. It is cited in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>9</sup> and in the *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* on the *Abhidharmadīpa*,<sup>10</sup> with the same variant in line d.<sup>11</sup>

7. The Tibetan versions of the *Udānavarga*,<sup>12</sup> the *Udānavargavivarana*,<sup>13</sup> the *Vinayakṣudrakavastu* version of the *Prātihāryasūtra*,<sup>14</sup> and the *Abhidharmakośa*<sup>15</sup> all maintain the variant in line d (line c of the Tibetan):

*sdug bśial sdug bśial kun 'byuṅ daṅ  
sdug bśial yaṅ dag 'das pa daṅ  
bde ba mya ṅan 'das 'gro ba'i  
'phags lam yan lag brgyad pa ste<sup>16</sup>*

The verse also occurs in the shorter Tibetan *Dhvajāgrasūtra*,<sup>17</sup> with the same variant in d, and an additional variant in line b, *sdug bśial yaṅ dag 'gags pa daṅ*.

8. As an enumeration of the four noble truths, the verse does not occur alone in literature: in the *Udānavarga* (*Paśyavarga* 27:31—35), the *Prātihāryasūtra*, the *Dhvajāgrasūtra*, and the *Dhammapada* (*Buddhavagga* 14:10—14) it occurs as the fourth of a group of five verses dealing with *śaraṇa*, refuge. Both the *Abhidharmakośa* and *Abhidharmadīpa* quote all five verses to illustrate “the meaning of refuge” (*śaraṅārtha*). Four of these verses, omitting the verse under discussion, occur together in the “Patna *Dharmapada*” (*Śaraṅavarga* 13:1—4).<sup>18</sup> Thus the verses may be considered an early and authoritative group on the subject of refuge.

9. In the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivādin tradition the verses occur in two *sūtras*, the *Prātihārya-* and the *Dhvajāgra-*. The former (presumably originally an independent text, later incorporated into the *Kṣudrakavastu* and included in the *Divyāvādāna*) seems to have been considered their primary source by that tradition, since both the *Udānavargavivarana*<sup>19</sup> and the *Upāyikā-ṭikā* on the *Abhidharmakośa*<sup>20</sup> refer the verses to it, calling it the *Mahāprātihārya-nirdeśa* and *Mahāprātihārya-sūtra* respectively. Furthermore, the Sanskrit *Dhvajāgra-sūtra*<sup>21</sup> from Central Asia does not include the verses.

10. In the *Samyuttanikāya* and *Itivuttaka*, the verse occurs with a different group of verses, identical in both texts, and attributed to the Buddha. Here it is introduced by “when one sees the truths of the noble with true wisdom” (*yato ca ariyasaccāni / sammappaññāya passati*).

In the *Theragāthā* and *Therīgāthā* the verse occurs five times in the context of the spiritual quests of five different individuals, representing the stage — meeting the Buddha and hearing the dharma — that leads him or her on to enlightenment. Thus it is a set formula summarizing the teaching of the Buddha.

11. The question that now arises is whether the Guntupalle verse is equivalent to the verse just dealt with, and has been either misread or wrongly engraved. Although the photograph published by Sarma (pl. 30) is not entirely clear, a number of his readings are questionable, and may be improved upon.

11.1. Sarma reads *dukkha* four times, with various endings; these will be

referred to in the order that they occur as 1 to 4 in this section. In all cases the initial *du-* is clear. The *-kha* is also clear, in a well-attested form, but in all cases a small superscript appears above it. In 1 the superscript is obscure, but in 2, 3, and 4 it appears as a small cross, and may be thus recognized as a *ka*, making the compound *-kkha*. In 2, Sarma has read the superscript as *-i*, but it is clearly not the semi-circular *-i* rising from the right seen in lines b, c, and d. In 4 Sarma seems to have read the superscript as *-o*, which is not attested in the form of a cross, and he ignores the subscript, which is clearly *-ū*.

The only real difficulty, then, is with 1, since the superscript is unclear and since the *-kha* is about half the height of the other examples. However, the superscript may be interpreted as a cross when compared with the other examples, and the size may be only an engraver's vagary: the *ka* in lines b and c, the *ya* in line c, and the *pa* in line d are also about half the size of the other *akṣara*. Although I have not been able to find any other examples of such a miniscule compound *ka*, neither is a *kha* with a cross at the top anywhere attested; furthermore, the superscript can only be a consonant, since 3 has the ending *-sya* and 4 *-ū*. Thus I would read *dukkha* as the root word in all four cases: *dukkha* for 1 and 2, *dukkhasya* (the *-sya* is clear) for 3, and *dukkhū-* for 4.

11.2. In line b, the initial *dukkhasya* is clear. This is followed by a *ca*, and not a *va* as read by Sarma. Since the stone is cracked or chipped, the next *akṣara* is unclear; however, from the long vertical ending in a hook curving to the left it can be read provisionally as an initial *a*. The final *-ti* and *-maṃ* are clear, but Sarma's *-kra* is not — here again there seems to be a crack — and it seems more probably to be a *-kka*, giving us *-(a)tiik(k)amaṃ*.

11.3. In line c, *ariyañca* is clear, there being no sign of a long *ā* with the *ya*, as read by Sarma. This is followed by an initial *a*, and then a letter read by Sarma as *ja*. However, the *ja* is generally much more angular, with a distinctive "back" and longer "arms". Since *ṭa* has a long history as a shallow half-circle, open to the right, quite identical to either the upper or lower half of the *akṣara*, the reading must be *-ṭa*. The following *aṃgika* is clear; since an *anusvāra* may be discerned over the *ka*<sup>22</sup> it should be read as *aṃgikaṃ*. This is followed by *ma-*.

11.4. Sarma reads the first *akṣara* of line d as *tiṃ*. However, the distinctive "box-head" and lower circle of *ta* as clearly seen in lines a and b are absent

in the lower figure, and the upper figure is different from the *i* as seen in lines b, c, and d. The letter may clearly be read as two superposed *ga*'s with *anusvāra*. With the final *ma* of line c, this gives us *maggam*. This is followed by *dukkhū-*, as noted in §11.1 above, after which the *-pasama* is clear, giving us *dukkhūpasama*.

11.5. The last three letters have been read by Sarma as *sāmikaṃ*. The first does not resemble the *sa* of lines a, b, and d, and is clearly *gā*. The second is *mi*. The third does not have the crossbar bending downwards of the *ka*; it appears to be a notched, box-headed *na* with *anusvāra* above, although the horizontal base is not clear. This would give *-gāminam*.

12. On the basis of the above, I would read the verse as follows:<sup>23</sup>

1. *du(k)kha[m] dukkhasamutpādam*
2. *dukkhasya ca (a)tiik(ka)maṃ*
3. *ariyañca aṭṭaṃgikaṃ ma-*
4. *ggam dukkhūpasamagāmi(na)m*

13. It is much easier to read an inscription if one knows beforehand what it says, and it is also much easier to read things which are not there if one assumes that one knows beforehand what it says. In the present case, there is sufficient evidence, both internal — from the inscription itself — and external — from inscriptions of the same period and region — to conclude that the Guntupalle inscription contains a version of the *Dhammapada* and *Udānavarga* verse. My reading is tentative, and based on a rather unsatisfactory photograph; I hope that someone more skilled in palaeography and with access to a better copy may some day improve on it.<sup>24</sup>

14. Since the *ta* in *samutpāda* and the *-sya* in *dukkhasya* are clear, the language of the verse may be described as Prakrit or Pali showing Sanskrit influence.

15. The verse is also known from an inscription from the old city of Ū Dāñ, Subarnapurī, Thailand.<sup>25</sup> A baked clay tablet found there, broken in half, bears on one side the *ye dhammā* verse in Pali, on the other a fragmentary verse clearly equivalent to *Dhammapada* verse 191:<sup>26</sup>

1. *dukkham dukkhasamu [ppādam dukkhassa ca ati-]*
2. *kkamaṃ ariya [ñcatṭhangikaṃ maggam]*
3. *dukkhūpasama [gāminam]*



16. The editor dates the script, which may be described as (South-east Asian) Pallava,<sup>27</sup> to the 11th century B.E. [7th C.E.]. The script shows some relationship to that of the inscriptions of the Andhra region.

17. From Sarma's statement about the find-spot of the Guntupalle inscription cited above and from the association of the Ū Dān inscription with the *ye dharmā* verse, it is probable that in both cases the tablets were enshrined within *stūpas*. In the *Theragāthā* and *Therīgāthā* the verse plays a role identical to that of the *ye dharmā* verse in the spiritual careers of both Śāriputra and Mahāmaudgalyāyana: a summary of the Buddha's teaching, the hearing of which leads to a "conversion". But in sharp contrast to the omnipresent *ye dharmā* verse, found in countless epigraphs throughout the ancient Buddhist world, the present verse is known from only two inscriptions. Inscriptions dealing with the four truths are rare, and only one other is known from India: a four line prose passage from a *sūtra* "in letters of the late Kushāna period" on a fragment of the top of a stone umbrella from Sārnāth.<sup>28</sup> The language and text are very close to that of *Samyuttanikāya* v 425.14, with interesting differences in case endings.<sup>29</sup>

18. Several other inscriptions dealing with the four truths have been found in Thailand:

18.1. a verse on the *tivattaṃ dvādasākāraṃ dhammacakkam*, untraced in literature, known from:

(1) the base of a stone *dharmacakra* from Nagara Paṭhama, in Pallava script of the 12th–14th century B.E. [7th–9th C.E.],<sup>30</sup>

(2) the hub of a stone *dharmacakra* from Nagara Paṭhama, in Pallava script of the 12th–14th century B.E.; other parts of the wheel give the *sacca, nāṇa*, etc. in detail,<sup>31</sup>

(3) a broken stone pillar from Jāp Cāmpā, Labapurī, in Pallava script of the 12th–14th century B.E. Here it follows the *ye dhammā* verse, and is followed by a number of canonical verses;<sup>32</sup>

18.2. verses and prose that explain the *tivatta-dvādasākāra* from Vāt Jambhūveka, Nandapurī, inscribed on a stone footprint of the Buddha (*buddhapāda*), along with the *ye dhammā* verse, in Khmer script dated to about 1800 B.E. [1300 C.E.].<sup>33</sup>

## NOTES

31 give a good picture of the structure, layout, and appearance of the monuments, and the nature of some of the finds. See also D. Mitra, *Buddhist Monuments*, Calcutta, 1971, pp. 44–46, 216–218, and photos 132 to 134. Sarma's work includes further discoveries made during excavations that he conducted in 1975 and 1976.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 64–65. Here Sarma refers to five lines of text, but on pp. 67 and 81 to four, as in photograph 30. I assume that this is the same inscription because he gives the same number, I-13, in all cases.

<sup>3</sup> P. 81. Sarma also refers to *Annual Report on Indian Epigraphy, 1974–75*, which is not available to me.

<sup>4</sup> P. 82; numbering, lines, capitalization, and punctuation as given by Sarma.

<sup>5</sup> V.J., *SN, Th, ariyaṅgaṅgikam*. References are to editions of the Pali Text Society, London.

<sup>6</sup> Ed. F. Bernhard, pt. 1, Göttingen, 1965, ch. 27, verse 34.

<sup>7</sup> E. Waldschmidt, *Kleine Brāhmi-Schriftrolle*, Göttingen, 1959, p. 6, verse 15.

<sup>8</sup> Ed. E. B. Cowell and R. A. Neil, rep. Delhi 1987, p. 164.13.

<sup>9</sup> Ed. P. Pradhan, Patna, 1975, p. 217.15 (ad 4:32); ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, pt. ii, Varanasi, 1971, p. 630.13.

<sup>10</sup> Ed. P. S. Jaini, Patna, 1977, p. 127.11.

<sup>11</sup> A parallel to line d of the *Dhammapada* and *Udānavarga* occurs in the *Gāndhārī Dhammapada*, ed. J. Brough, London, 1962, verse 247d, p. 158: *dukkha-vaśama-kamī'a*.

<sup>12</sup> The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking edition, rep. Tokyo-Kyoto, 1955–1961, no. 5600, vol. 119, mñon pa'i bstan bcos, du, 33a8 (p. 69.3.8).

<sup>13</sup> Ed. M. Balk, vol. ii, Bonn, 1984, p. 762.7, 12.

<sup>14</sup> The Tibetan Tripitaka, no. 1035, vol. 44, 'dul ba, ne, 49b1 (p. 142.1.1).

<sup>15</sup> The Tibetan Tripitaka, no. 5591, vol. 115, mñon pa'i bstan bcos, gu, 213a3 (p. 201.3.3).

<sup>16</sup> The Tibetan given here is that of the *Udānavarga*; the *Vivarana* does not give the verse in full, while the *Kośa* phrases it differently.

<sup>17</sup> The Tibetan Tripitaka, no. 959, vol. 38, mdo, lu, 293a2 (p. 285.3.2).

<sup>18</sup> G. Roth, "The Language of the Ārya-Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādins", in H. Bechert, ed., *The Language of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition*, Göttingen, 1980, p. 117.

<sup>19</sup> Op. cit. p. 759.30, *cho 'phrul chen po bstan pa las*.

<sup>20</sup> The Tibetan Tripitaka, no. 5595, vol. 118, mñon pa'i bstan bcos, tu, 249b7 (p. 198.1.7), *cho 'phrul chen po'i mdo las*. Since the verses are not given in full, the verse under discussion is omitted.

<sup>21</sup> Ed. E. Waldschmidt, *Kleine Sanskrit-Texte, Heft iv, Bruchstücke Buddhistischer Sūtras aus dem Zentralasiatischen Sanskritkanon*, rep. Wiesbaden, 1979, pp. 43–53; *Kleine Brāhmi Schriftrolle*, pp. 8–13.

<sup>22</sup> *Anusvāra* appears as an open circle at the end of line a, but as a solid dot at the end of line b, after what I have interpreted as *ṭṭa* in line c, and at the beginning and end of line d. The mark here appears as a squashed open circle.

<sup>23</sup> Uncertain readings are enclosed in parentheses, additions in square brackets.

<sup>24</sup> I am grateful to Prof. B. N. Mukherjee of Calcutta and Prof. O. von Hinüber of Freiburg for having gone through the Guntupalle and Ū Doñ inscriptions with me and having offered valuable suggestions.

<sup>25</sup> First published with photographs in the journal of the Thai Fine Arts Department, *Sūpākara*, 10th year, vol. 1, 2509 [1966] pp. 81–82, and reprinted without photographs in Subhābarṇa na Pāñchāñ *Vivāḍhanākāra ān khian bhāṣā pālī nai prahdeśa daiy*, Bangkok, 2529 [1986] p. 28.

<sup>26</sup> The photographs are blurred. Line 1 is very unclear, but lines 2 and 3 are clear enough to confirm the editor's readings. The phrases in square brackets are a restoration of the missing portions from the *Dhammapada*, as given by the editor. The reproduction of the *ye dhammā* verse is clearer, and has been read correctly.

<sup>27</sup> The description of the script as "old Khmer" (*khām nāṅān*) by the editor...

the Museum of Archaeology at Sarnath, rep. Delhi 1972, p. 230, \*D(c) 11; B. Majumdar, *A Guide to Sarnath*, Delhi, 1937, p. 105.

<sup>29</sup> The question of case endings of the four truths has been dealt with in detail by K. R. Norman, 'The Four Noble Truths: A problem of Pāli Syntax', in L. A. Hercus (ed.), *Indological and Buddhist Studies, Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday*, 2nd. ed., Delhi, 1984, pp. 377–391.

<sup>30</sup> Subhābarrṇa, p. 37.

<sup>31</sup> Subhābarrṇa, pp. 34–36.

<sup>32</sup> Subhābarrṇa, pp. 21–27.

<sup>33</sup> Subhābarrṇa, pp. 29–33.

Bangkok, Thailand

## THE LĀSYĀNGAS IN BHARATA'S THEATRE TREATISE

### TWO EXPOSITIONS, TWO REALITIES

Both in Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* and in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, its commentary by Abhinavagupta, there are some concepts made conspicuous to the reader's attention through their many occurrences. Among them, the *lāsyāṅgas*, dealt with in no less than two long accounts in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* — namely: one in chapter XIX, the *itivṛttādhyāya*, treating of the plot, and the other headed *tālādhyāya*, or rhythm chapter — and celebrated in many a place by the *Abhinavabhāratī* for their beauty, theatricality and absolute perfection.

For after all, why should there be two expositions on the *lāsyāṅgas* in Bharata's treatise? As a vigilant reader, but, most of all, as an accomplished exegete, Abhinavagupta reveals and demonstrates that the answer is to be found in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* itself,<sup>1</sup> in that chapter XIX where the *lāsyāṅgas* are being first investigated. Such is the answer: the *lāsyāṅgas* in chapter XIX are but fragments (indifferently termed *aṃśa* or *bhāga* in the *Abhinavabhāratī*) borrowed from those *lāsyāṅgas* fully stated in chapter XXXI. Abhinavagupta's thesis is a daring one, insofar as no commentator before him would have contemplated such an idea — which he supports by putting forward two arguments of a different nature.

The first one is rooted in *kārikā* 138 which closes, in chapter XIX, the development about the *lāsyāṅgas*, and whereby the reader is duly warned by Bharata himself against the fragmentary character both of the definitions which have just been given and of the object just defined. The text reads as follows:

*eteṣāṃ lāsyavidhau vijñeyam lakṣaṇam prayogajñāih  
tad ihaiva tu yan noktam prasāṅgavinivṛttahetos<sup>2</sup> tu*

"It is in the exposition on the *lāsyā* [in chapter XXXI] that those who have a knowledge of representation must derive the exact definition of these [*lāsyāṅgas*]. The reason for not formulating that definition at this stage is the desire to avoid any redundancy."

Abhinavagupta thus comments:

COURT BRAHMANS OF THAILAND AND THE  
CELEBRATION OF THE BRAHMANIC NEW YEAR

*The Evidence of the People of Ayudhyā (Kham Hai Gān Chāo Grung Gao)*, ( คัมหัยกานจ้อกรุงเก้อ ) a history of that kingdom, first mentions a royal installation ritual in a myth of kingship. Formerly, a Ṛṣi performing austerities near a lake came upon a boy child lying in the heart of a blooming lotus with divine ornaments beside him. Realizing that the child was a person of great merit, the sage prayed for a miracle in the form of milk flowing from his finger. With this divine nourishment, he raised the boy to manhood and by ritual sprinkling consecrated him king over the people.<sup>1</sup> The chronicle goes on to report the installation of King U Thong ( พระเจ้าอู่ทอง ) whose consecration was performed by Brahmins imported from Benares to carry out the installation ceremony according to authentic ritual.<sup>2</sup> In another history, *The History of Siam (Phra Rāchaphongsāmadān Krung Sayām)* ( พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงสยาม ), Brahmanic rituals of consecration of cities and kings occur regularly in various reigns from the beginning of the Ayudhya period onward.<sup>3</sup>

In these chronicles of Thailand, as in Cambodian inscriptions, the role of Brahmins in the monarchy is shown to be vital. In the process of expanding and maintaining their kingdoms against ritual sovereigns, constructing and administering new cities, consecrating protective deities, establishing religious cults that support monarchic ideologies — in short, in war and in peace — kings have to depend on the knowledge and expertise of Brahmins who are chaplains and ministers, as well as doctors and court poets.<sup>4</sup>

Although their roles have diminished or been taken over by non-Brahmanic ritual and religious personnel — Buddhist monks and village elders — the significance of the rites has not entirely changed but is subsumed under unnamed, or renamed, categories of rituals often performed without an awareness of their Brahmanic origin. Even before their advent into Southeast Asia, Buddhism and Brahmanism in India have existed in the same cultural continuum sharing precepts and practices that are the foundation of their differences. It is natural, therefore, that the same religions in Southeast Asia are not always neatly separable. Yet, there are differences between the two religions that the centuries have not reconciled. These differences, muted by mutual respect between both religions, are seldom displayed. The seams of contradiction, however, are nowhere more

evident than in the person, and everyday life, of the royal Brahmins who are charged with the performance of public ceremonies.

Some of the most visible and elaborate rituals are connected with kingship — the royal person, and the welfare of his family members. In the broadest sense, rituals performed for a king differ only in degree, not in kind, from those of commoners. The Vedic royal consecration, the *Rājasūya*, for example, consecrates a man who has strength and dominion over others, but who is a common sacrificer, a *yajamāna*.<sup>5</sup> Epic and medieval texts emphasize the king's being a portion of the divinity of Viṣṇu, but theologically speaking not only kings but commoners and, indeed, the entire universe are materially emanated from god.<sup>6</sup> Medieval theism, particularly the *bhakti* movements, urges ordinary men to be reabsorbed in the divine through devotional contemplation.<sup>7</sup> In this sense, the divinity of kings is a differentiated status in political rather than philosophical and religious terms. In the latter perspectives, the essential form and idea of rituals do not differ qualitatively for kings and commoners.

Why, then, are Brahmins necessary for rituals connected with royalty when similar rites performed for commoners do not require the officiation of Brahminic priests? The retaining of court Brahmins in royal rituals, in contrast to their dispensability in commoners' rituals, indicates not only an ideological importance of Brahminism for the monarchy, but also the wish to make manifest symbols of kingship and a well-defined conceptual sphere constituted by these symbolic forms in the case of a royal person but not in the case of a commoner. In royal ceremonies, Buddhist-Brahminic polarities are displayed with splendor, and functional differences between the two religions alone do not suffice to explain the coexistence of two sets of rituals and their corresponding concepts. Each religion has a theory of kingship and supporting legends that might have been employed to the exclusion of the other. The explanation for and the manner of their coexistence must be sought elsewhere in addition to their complementary functions, if, indeed, these functions are complementary.

Although Buddhism is the state religion of Thailand, and Brahminism has long diminished in religious and ritualistic significance, the culture carries complexes of ideas and practices that cannot be clearly identified as belonging to one or the other sectarian tradition. The real situation does not conform to textbook descriptions of doctrines. It is the real situation that we wish to describe, in the forms that have emerged from cultural interactions, with reference to scriptural sources that have sought to prescribe these forms in their ideal states.

The best place to begin our description is the Brahmin Temple of

Bangkok. When King Rāma I began the building of Bangkok, he placed the Brahmin Temple, juxtaposed to the Wat Suthat ( วัดสุทัศน์ ), at the center of the city. Between these two religious edifices stands a giant red swing where yearly Brahmins used to swing to celebrate the descent of the gods on earth. The placement of the temple juxtaposed with a Buddhist temple, in accordance with the ancient tradition, betokens a high estimation of Brahminic efficacies at the time of the founding of the city 200 years ago.<sup>8</sup> Today as the traffic roars past the Temple gate, the three temples of Śiva, Gaṇeśa, and Nārāyaṇa welcome few steady worshippers. Passersby make gestures of reverence as they walk past the figure of Brahma in the courtyard. Otherwise the temple guards its mysteries behind a plain facade of white stucco, with few architectural ornamentations except a pair of heavy red-painted wooden doors.

The two temples of subordinate presiding deities, Gaṇeśa and Nārāyaṇa, are functionally closed. Only the main temple is in use. It is dedicated to Śiva, and the sectarian identity of the Temple is Śaiva. Its interior contains a large hall flanked by two narrow aisles, separated from the nave by large square pillars. At one end of the hall stands the altar containing images of dancing Śiva and his consort Parvatī, the goddesses Umā, Maheśvarī, and Lakṣmī, the flute-playing Kṛṣṇa with Rādhā, Viṣṇu in various avatars, four-faced Brahma, and a pair of Śiva-figures astride his bull Nandi. Central among the images is a standing figure of Viṣṇu in his avatar as a Buddha in a fear-dispelling attitude, wearing the *yajñopavīta* of a twice-born. Before the group of deities, flowers and incense add bright colors to the whiteness of the chapel pervaded by the fragrance of an old-fashioned scent.

A desk stands by the entrance where the astrologer sits, making calculations on a piece of paper in consultation with his handbook of stars. He gives advice and dispenses appropriate mantras. Beside the astrologer, few other Brahmins are present, dressed in white dhotis and white shirts, their long hair coiled in chignons at the back of the heads. Their wives and children, who live closeby, make for a homely atmosphere, in contrast to a Buddhist temple that derives a characteristic sanctity from the monks' celibacy.

Visitors to the temple come to seek remedies, to remove the ills and woes of everyday life. Brahmins, as a part of their priestly duty, talk over personal problems of people who seek their advice. Other visitors frequently come from the Department of Fine Arts and the Office of Royal Ceremonies to confer on matters of royal and official Brahminic ceremonies. A cycle of annual and monthly rites, and other minor ones — performed for the royal family, the government, and private commissioners

— give the royal Brahmans a year-round busy schedule. Householders also come to ask Brahmans to perform private rituals. Although Brahmans are sought after primarily to perform ceremonies, particularly those that dispel inauspicious things, they think of themselves also as religious teachers who give spiritual assistance and lead people to the path of dharma.

The number of Temple Brahmans has greatly decreased. Formerly there was a strong tradition in Nakhonsithamarāt ( นครศรีธรรมราช ) in the south of Thailand. After the fall of Ayudhya, court Brahmans fled Burmese soldiers and carried their ritual texts to that city. King Rāma I of the Cakri ( ชกาล ) dynasty brought some Brahmans from Nakhonsithamarat, and others from Phthalung ( พัทลุง ), to Bangkok to restore court rituals and to perform the royal coronation. The southern tradition meanwhile has lost its vigor altogether, and the temple was closed down.

Traditionally members of the royal families regularly patronize certain Brahman families. The ancestors of the last Rāchakhrū ( ราชครู ) (Skt. *Rājaguru*) have been attached to the court of the *Uparāja* ( *Wang Nā* อนุชา in Thai) since the reign of the fourth king. Brahmans from that family perform ceremonies for the royal family today. Eight Brahmanic families still produce sons who undergo the ordination and actively carry on tradition through ritual performances and the study of texts, the *sāstra*.

#### THE TRADITION

Brahmanic status is passed down from father to son regardless of the mother's lineage or social status; marriages are made not only among Brahmanic circles. This practice is made possible by the fact that social hierarchy in Thailand has never been formally conceptualized; social disparities exist with a degree of fluidity and intermarriages among the strata. A man may become a Brahman-priest through a Brahmanic patrilineal descent and his own desire to be ordained when he comes of age.

In Thailand today, there are few compelling reasons to do so. To many Thais, Brahmanism is an anachronism associated with irrational and superstitious religiosity. An ordained Brahman is a conspicuous presence in the everyday worldly pursuits because of his long hair worn in a chignon. A Brahman can think of four reasons to become ordained: to continue the learning and tradition, to honor and worship the gods, a sense of gratitude and obligation to the ancestors, and a duty to society. According to an older Brahman, he became a Brahman after having been ordained as a

monk for a year. He was an only son of a Brahman in Nakhonsithamarāt, and the only Brahman left to officiate in the temple of that city. At the urging of senior Brahmans in Bangkok, he was ordained in order to keep alive Brahmanism in the south. For several years he shuttled between the temples in Bangkok and in his native city, until the latter was closed down and he was permanently installed in the capital.

The perception of their history and tradition, according to the son of the late Rāchakhrū, is as follows. There has never been one centrally structured Brahmanic tradition. There are official posts for Brahmans specified by the Three-sealed Code of Law, enacted in the first reign. Officially, only the Temple in Bangkok has the power to ordain Brahmans. In reality, however, because traditional learning and ritual knowledge are passed down in the family, or from a teacher to pupils in his school, there are many branches of independent Brahmans. Historically as well, there were few connections between different groups of Brahmans who came from India at various times and were either attached to certain kings, or became prominent officiants in their geographical areas. Each group of Brahmans had its own ritual texts and mantras, and transmissions between the groups occurred culturally when a vassal kingdom received the influences of its suzerain.

Authentic Brahmans have been and are dispensable because their official positions in the government can be filled by non-Brahmans, and Brahmanic rites can also be performed by monks and respected elders for the common people. Brahmanic tradition and learning have become by and large mixed with Buddhist and folk practices, or they have become nominally Buddhist. Specifically reported by our source are such as the tantric Śaiva rituals, the knowledge magic of the Atharvaveda, war rituals called the Science of Weaponry (*thanurasāt* วิชาอาวุธ, Skt. *Dhanuṣśāstra*). Furthermore, real Brahmans are reluctant to give out their knowledge and practice because of their belief that knowledge is received from the teacher (*rab cāk khrū* วิชาครู ) who also is blamable when his teaching is wrongly used. As a result of their substitutability, Brahmanism and Brahmanic ceremonies, and recitations, have been absorbed into the culture, and performed "according to tradition" (*tam prapheni* ตามประเพณี ), often without an awareness of their Brahmanic origin.

A reconciliation with imperfect ritual correctness is made by an explanation that the heart and the intentions of the performers are the important thing, rather than the actual performance itself. Brahmans maintain, however, that when monks and elders perform Brahmanic rituals, they do not utter the correct mantras; nor do they know their real meanings of the performance.

## SACRED TEXTS AND LANGUAGE

The Rāchakhrū's ancestors came from an unspecified area in South India. Their sacred texts are written in modified grantha script (*akson Chiang phrām* อักษรเขียนพราหมณ์), a medieval script related to modern Tamil. Thai Brahmanic grantha has been influenced by the Khmer cursive forms as well as usage in Thailand, so that it has distinctive characteristics of its own. The stylized, melodious chants of Brahmans seem also to be of a mixed origin of South and Southeast Asian melodic patterns and intonations. Most Brahmans at the Temple can chant, but only a few can read the script of the sacred texts. Some can read the grantha script phonetically, but their knowledge of Sanskrit and other Indian languages is negligible.

Texts have been in the family from the Ayudhya period. After the Burmese war, the family fled to the South. A number of these Thai books (*samut thai* สมุดไทย, *samut khoi* สมุดขอม) have been lost or damaged. The depository in Nakhonsīthamarāt lost its collection. When Prince Damrong became the director of the National Library, a collection was donated and otherwise acquired. Some texts have been transcribed by John Marr,<sup>9</sup> and Neelakantha Sarma.<sup>10</sup> Marr shows that there are definite affiliations with devotional songs of Tamilnādu such as the Śaiva hymns of Manikkāvācakar and the Vaiṣṇava hymns of Aṅṅal, among others.<sup>11</sup> Ritual texts show tantric influences (ritualization of syllables), among others. Texts donated to the library are only a part of the collection, and the heart of the sacred and ritual texts remains securely guarded in the possession of its owners. Other texts of this sort most probably exist in private hands and are yet to be studied. If a search were carried out, different textual traditions possibly will come to light in the process. Although grantha script cannot be read fluently by Brahmans, ritual handbooks are functional for such performances such as the Tripavai and the Triyampavai ceremonies which will be described below.

## BRAHMANIC EDUCATION

Brahmanic education takes place strictly in the family. Each family, or teacher's establishment (*sāmnak ācān* สำนักอาจารย์), guards its sacred knowledge and texts with utmost secrecy. In the ritual and social circles of Brahmanic families, of which several remain without producing ordained Brahmans — male children grow up observing how rituals are performed, learning how to read and recite texts with proper intonations, studying astrology. Such knowledge is not often set down in writing or made public;

and through this familial channel, strains of tradition, ancient and not-so-ancient, are preserved, often without the Brahmans' conscious awareness. Their sense of history and genealogy is not vital; and they do not have the meticulous, constant ritualism of their Indian counterparts.

A royal Brahman relates that he grew up as an ordinary Thai boy, not having undergone the tonsure and ordination ceremonies at an early age. His family maintains contact with India, and he was taught from childhood by Indian swamis. He witnessed official ceremonies and participated in the First-plowing ceremony from the age of ten. Because of his interest in photography, he was given the job of photographing events and was thus accountable for ceremonial details. On a daily basis, he was also informally taught how to read the Brahmanic calendar in order to fix auspicious times. He went to the university and became ordained on his father's death to carry on the tradition, while his older brothers turned to other professions. His younger brother, now ordained, attends the university in regular clothing and wears white Brahmanic habit only on religious occasions.

## BRAHMANIC RITES IN A BUDDHIST MILIEU: AN OVERVIEW

According to our source, the son of the late Rāchakhrū, personal daily rituals of a Brahman are not many. He does not say the *gāyatrī*, nor does he maintain the sacred fires. He prays (*suat mon* สวดมนต์) when there is time, and reviews the learning (*michā kān* วิชา ), rituals, dharma. He tries to practice dharma in order to calm his mind for making merits (*kusan* กุศล, Skt. *kuśala*) for the gods, the ancestors, and for himself. He is a devout Buddhist, but also does daily *pūjās*. When an appropriate mantra cannot be found for proper worship, a gesture in its stead suffices. Often, rites that are purely Brahmanic are performed in the private circles of priests; these take place late at night or the very early hours of the morning and are finished by dawn. Outsiders are not present on these occasions.

There are two main divisions of Brahmans: *phrām phrthibāt* พราหมณ์พริบท, and *phrām phithi* พราหมณ์พิธิ, or, says our source, black and white respectively. The former's area of efficacy includes magical and occult rituals, and those having to do with inauspiciousness, unnatural deaths, and destruction, such as war. This category died out after the sixth reign. Its rituals have been taken over by *phrām phithi*, including elephant ceremonies (because elephants are war weapons involving death and destruction); the purification of abodes or cities from inauspicious and impure elements of lingering souls that have died unnatural deaths in accidents, homicides, and suicides; the blessing of soldiers and weapons. Our Brahman equates impurity with inauspiciousness by saying that such rituals purify

(*tham saād* ท่าสะอาด) and get rid of inauspicious things (*tham hai prātsacāk sing apamonkhon* ท่าให้ปราศจากสิ่งอัปมงคล). The latter division of Brahmans, *phrām pithī*, performs rituals of auspiciousness such as honoring the gods. Adherents of both groups may worship any god of choice, and the division is not made on a sectarian basis. Rituals are of three kinds: royal rituals (*rāchaphithī* ราชาพิธี), official state rituals (*rathaphithī* ราชพิธี), and private citizens' rituals (*rātsadon phithī* ราชพิธี).

According to our source, he performs private rituals for the welfare of individuals in the course of everyday life (*damnoen chīmit chāobān* ดำเนินชีวิตประจำวัน). They are such as the rites of passage — cutting the fire hair (*phom fai* หมูปไฟ the hair that is ceremonially clipped by a Brahman when the baby is one month old<sup>12</sup>), naming ceremony, singing at the cradle, tonsure, etc., ceremonies for house constructions, and memorials for the ancestors. It appears that each has his specialties and does not perform certain rituals. Royal ceremonies are private ceremonies, such as rites of passage, performed for the royalty. State ceremonies are performed specifically for public events, such as the laying the corner stones of government buildings, the consecrations of public monuments and shrines, commemorations of the city pillar and memorials of war heroes. Sometimes royal and state ceremonies are combined. In 1988, for example, the celebration of the king's birthday entailed a presentation of sacred water collected from the provinces; this personal, royal ceremony was an official occasion on which the branches of Government expressed its loyalty on behalf of the people. The Ministry of Interior sponsored a ritual, in which Buddhist and Brahman priests joined in the ritual to sanctify the waters. Another ceremony which combines the royal and state rituals is the annual bathing of the Emerald Buddha, an event officiated by Brahmans and personally performed by the king on behalf of the nation.

According to our source, the forms of rituals are flexible: they can be modified and ornamented, made long or short, to suit the occasion and the desire of the commissioner. The commissioner is equivalent to the Sanskrit sacrificer, *yajamāna*, who in Thai is called the inviter, *phū choen* ผู้เชิญ. The practice of a real sacrifice in which an offering is killed is not acceptable in Buddhist Thailand, and the idea of sacrifice is merely suggested by the presence of a pig's head, among other non-vegetarian food offerings of various kinds. According to the son of the late Rāchakhrū, such offerings of living beings are a reminder of dharmic teachings against killing and are meant to incite compassion.

The same Brahman relates that there are different paths (*thāng doen* ทางเดิน) leading to the heart of the ritual (*hua cai khong phithī* หัวใจของพิธี), the knowledge of which is transmitted from the teacher to his pupil. The priest's task is to devise a ritual that fits the occasion and demand of the commissioner, and the complete fulfillment of his role consists in the ability to lead the assembly of worshippers through these paths to the heart of the ritual. The commissioner and other participants in the ceremony are not privy to the mysteries of the sacrament. They are witnesses, outsiders to the transaction between the sacred and its intermediary who leads the congregation through the necessary gestures and utterances to the goal of the ritual. This goal comprises what he calls the aims of life — comfort (*khwam sabai* ความสบาย), society (*sangkhom* สังคม), and liberation (*khwām lud phon* ความหลุดพ้น). The true object of a ritual is dharma and *mokṣa*, or alternately: the outward forms of ritual serve to modify the mind, *cit*, leading it to the ultimate goal.<sup>13</sup>

The practical, immediate object of the ritual is to honor the gods and the souls of places and ancestors by offering food and gifts. The manner of honoring them is that of greeting a guest in the traditional way that is now still done in the countryside. The priest sets up a platform bearing objects to be offered and calls to the gods to come and partake of the offerings. When the gods are present and have eaten the offerings, the priest states his purpose and asks for their favor. Then, depending on the type of ceremonies, he bids farewell (*lo* ลอ) or sends them off on their return (*song* ส่ง). Our Brahman gives four reasons to commission a ritual on the part of the commissioner: a desire of security and refuge, wishing for success in life, a desire for wealth, and faith.

#### FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE COMMON PEOPLE WHO INITIATE THE CEREMONY

From the perspective of the common people who initiate the ceremony, they do not have a clear notion of Brahmanism or Brahmans, but they understand that a certain kind of power or efficacy issues from Brahmanic rites, to be distinguished from the efficacies of Buddhist and other rites. Buddhist rituals are routinized in the life of Thai people: they are regularly performed for social and religious reasons among families, friends, and relatives. Brahmans are sought out usually in times of trouble, such as sickness or repeated ill luck, where other Buddhist remedies have failed. In this respect, people would often resort to a famous monk-healer, or they

would invite a monk to consecrate a spirit-house, before they would a Brahman. If the trouble persists and other measures have failed, then they are likely to repair to a Brahman.

The principle of interactions between an offerer and monks is different from that with Brahman priests. Buddhist monks are invited to make recitations, blessings, and to be offered meals as a part of making merit (*tham bun* บุญ ); auspiciousness accrues from the act of giving and receiving during which merits are created for the giver. The interaction between the monks and his lay supporters is at the heart of the ceremony. A transfer of the monk's ascetic power to the layman flows from an interdependency of worldly and otherworldly connections and exchanges: the monks themselves represent the spiritually potent world, and bring that potency to the ordinary world by the eating of gift foods.

The ritual-performing Brahman, unlike a monk, is an intermediary between the ordinary world and the spiritually potent world. The latter, a world of the gods and extraordinary power existing, as it were, alongside the mundane life, can be communicated with through the rituals that are performed by Brahmans. The priests call a ritual "sacrifice" (*buangsuang* ប្រឡង , a word of Cambodian origin) in which there is exchange of gifts for blessings over a specific entreaty, as opposed to 'worship' (*būchā* បូជា , Skt. *pūjā*), in which the sole purpose is to honor the gods with various objects such as flowers, candles, incense and songs.

In people's minds, nothing in Buddhism prohibits them from contacting supranatural powers, to help meet their needs. After all, Buddhist legends abound with divinities whose powers are to be reckoned with. Minor, local, cultic figures (*cao* ថេ , *cao phaw* ថេវ) make their appearances in prominent places such as shrines near busy intersections, hospitals, very large trees, or peculiarly shaped natural objects. The number of worshippers increases after the deity has been known to grant favors, and contrarily to punish people for not observing their vows to return favors. To repair to these deities does not entail changes of a religious and ideological nature. Thai Buddhists rarely go to Chinese Buddhist temples, and almost never to a Christian church or a mosque.

Divinities such as Śiva and Brahma are not perceived as a contradiction to Buddhist doctrines. On a popular level, neither does Buddhism contradict the existence of the gods; it gives deities supporting roles in religion and its mythology. The *ātman-anātman* controversy can be reconciled by an explanation of a conditioned existence of the self, and its absolute nonexistence. For some who find the self-reliant doctrines of philosophical Buddhism inadequate for their emotional religious needs, the gods of

Brahmanism are alternate foci for their fervent prayers. Thus, even a deep attachment to a certain god is not regarded as a breach of the Buddhist faith, but rather as a personal predilection that is tolerable so long as it does not flagrantly violate Buddhist practices.

Brahmans themselves emphasize similarities and compatibility between the two religions. Yet, in private circles, in the heart of the Brahmanic religion, a deep well of fundamental tenets remains, absorbing doctrinal antitheses that go undiscussed while keeping harmony with Buddhism. Compatibility and cooperation between the two religions have not altered the basic form of Brahmanism, but have only reshaped it so as to put forward features that create least conflicts for religious minds. Brahmans think of themselves as Buddhists as well, some have been ordained as Buddhist monks. However, it is not clear that they think of themselves as Buddhists first, and, furthermore, they are never called upon to make such a choice. Some are attached to religious teachers including well-known Buddhist monk-philosophers. Their devotion to Gaṇeśa on the one hand, and a deep faith in the teachings of *Luang Pū Waen* หลวงปู่แหวน , a Buddhist mystic, on the other, do not clash in so far as both can lead to wisdom and liberation.

Needless to say, the self-identity of court Brahmans is Thai; they live and think as Thai people do. Although they are vegetarian and are relatively abstemious on food matters, they do not have many causes for pollution and ablution. Their rules of commensality are as open-ended as the rules for connubialism. Rigid observation of caste rules and religious tenets certainly would not have conduced to the survival of Brahmanism in any form in a Southeast Asian culture. The religion of Brahmans in the royal service, still relatively distinct from Buddhist and folk practices, affords us apparent interactions of cross-cultural factors that have produced it.

While Thai Brahmanism gives the appearance of flexibility and conciliation, not far below the surface the opposition of purity and pollution, clean and unclean, acceptable and unacceptable,<sup>14</sup> still remains the basic principle of ritualism. The abstract force of life is the ultimate auspiciousness defilable by pollutions ending in death, the most polluting entity in principle. In the absolute polarity between life and death, intermediate degrees of purity and pollution exist situationally, to be confronted and manipulated in moral and physical terms to effect a most beneficial outcome for an individual.

This observation of such a principle proceeding from life/death, pure/impure categorical distinctions grows out of an interpretation of what the Brahmans themselves say. To begin with, their functional divisions of



Brahmans — one dealing with auspicious, life-furthering ceremonies and the other with inauspicious, destructive ceremonies involving death — gives an indication of the basic, corresponding, ritual-conceptual, categorical divisions. The separation between the categories of life and death seems to allow little overlap to the extent that different types of rituals and ritualists are required to deal with them. Of the two categorical entities, death is the extrinsic intrusion into life. Or, in the theoretical framework of Mary Douglas, death is dirt, matter out of place.<sup>15</sup>

In one instance, remarking an mortuary rites, our source is very careful to point out the difference in purpose and significance between Buddhist and Brahmanic ceremonies involving death. He says Buddhist monks perform funerary rites, which is to say the religious, ceremonial treatment of physical aspects of death — the wake, recitation by monks at certain intervals, cremation of the body — in the social context of friends and families. Brahmans, however, deal with lingering souls of the dead which have to be sent away to their proper places: this is the process of purification or, in Thai, cleansing. (*tham saad* กำล้าง ). In this view, the soul of the dead in itself is not defiling, but it becomes an impure element when it remains in places that are not proper to it. Defilement is caused by the soul's attachment to life, which attachment is construed as a malignancy of the troubled, violent manner in which death has occurred. This sort of impurity, the cause of a soul's being out of place, ultimately is linked to the moral and mental condition of the circumstances of death, and the relatively pure or impure mind of the deceased at the moment of death.

In a sense, rituals institute something by getting rid of something else before it. To use the phraseology of an elderly Brahman: a ritual is a process of cleaning — sweeping away — the old and an initiation of the new. On the occasion of purifying a building site for a new edifice, he says, "This site is old, and one never knows who all were here before and who are still lingering here. So we have to sweep the place and make it clean." On the next day, after its purification, the site is consecrated for the new building. Thus, death and termination properly framed gives way to a new life that can in turn be instituted by a consecration. Without these rituals there are no ends and no beginnings, and pollution in the broadest sense is just that — chaos, a lack of boundaries, formlessness, the cold and dis-integrating process of entropy.

BRAHMANIC NEW YEAR: TRIPAVAI AND TRIYAMPAVAI

Each year in December the Brahmans celebrate their New Year. The year begins with self-purification, invocation to the gods to descend on earth and

tarry awhile. During their stay, ceremonies of auspiciousness in divine attendance are performed each night, the most beautiful being the sending away of the gods. While the descent is ushered in with solemn rites of invocatory recitations and gestures, the farewell is a sentimental journey of bathing and anointing the deities who are serenaded by songs as they ascend on a golden goose (Skt. *hamsa*). On the morrow of the return of Nārāyaṇa, children are tonsured to mark their coming of age. Gifts are given with which to start a new life. The tonsure ceremony<sup>16</sup> is jointly officiated with Buddhist monks, the head monk giving a sermon on the responsibilities of adult life.

For the New Year, the Temple has been festively decorated with strands of light in the courtyard and around the building. The chapel is laid with red carpets. Fresh flowers and candles decorate the altar before which a large table stands loaded with a white mound of popped rice, bananas, oranges, yams, and taros. Beneath the table are coconuts and stalks of sugar cane. At the other end of the hall, opposite the altar, is a low table laden with images brought by people to be sanctified by the ceremonies. The fragrance of flowers and incense fills the hall.

In the middle of the room stands a gateway, two white posts with two crossbars, from which the chariot of the golden goose (Skt. *hamsa*) hangs. The posts are topped by golden balls tapering to a point, to which are tied five-tiered umbrellas, sugarcane stalks, and garlands. Before the chariot is a stone slab lying on top of a tubular grinding stone, set on a banana leaf. In the sending off rites, the gods ascend this *hamsa* chariot and rise to the heavens to the accompaniment of a chant.

The observances continue for a period of sixteen days in the second month of the lunar calendar, on the 6th waxing moon to the 6th waning moon. In 1987, this period fell on the 25th of December, 1987, through the 9th of January 1988. These rites used to be in the first month in the cycle of monthly Brahmanic celebrations<sup>17</sup> that occasioned pageantry, grand processions, public festivity and merry-making.<sup>18</sup> This New Year celebration now coincides with the solar New Year although festivities have been by and large curtailed. During the two holy weeks, Brahmans honor the presence of three gods — Brahma,<sup>19</sup> Śiva, and Nārāyaṇa. Most attention is lavished on Śiva in the Triyampavai ceremony which formerly was highlighted by the spectacular feat of swinging on the giant swing<sup>20</sup> in the square. Nārāyaṇa is honored with the Tripavai ceremony lasting four days, and Brahma is given a short farewell rite.<sup>19</sup> King Rāma V in his description of the cycle of monthly rituals (*Phrarāchaphiṭhī Sibsong Deun* พระราชพิธีสิบสองเดือน ) remarks on the reversed roles of Śiva and Nārāyaṇa

in Thai and Indian Brahmanism: Śiva is benign and merciful to his worshippers while Nārāyaṇa is wrathful and destructive. Hence, the honoring of Śiva is festively done on the nights of a bright moon to suit his preference for brightness, and that of the reclusive Nārāyaṇa on the nights of a dark moon, according to a popular saying.<sup>21</sup>

Today, the celebration consists mainly of religious rituals in the temples. Nightly worships are attended by Brahmans and their families, and not more than thirty devotees. Only on the last night, before the morning of the tonsure ceremony, the Viṣṇu temple is filled, overflowing with people who have come to join in sending off Nārāyaṇa. Worshippers are ordinary people — women of all ages and a large number of children. Most men who attend are neither very old or very young. Some country women who have travelled a long distance with their offspring spend the night on mats outside the temple. A general feeling of welfare and blessing rises during the last night's ceremony, as the priests sprinkle worshippers with the bathing water of Nārāyaṇa, and climaxes on the next morning with the blessings of Buddhist monks over excited parents and their children whose topknots are sheared.

A crowd of about two to three hundred people participate in the tonsure rite. By dawn, the Temple ground has already been prepared for Buddhist merit-making such as giving alms to monks and releasing birds. Before dawn, Buddhist monks made their round by the Temple gate. After the tonsure has been performed inside the chapel, a festive atmosphere takes over with the visible joy of mothers and grandmothers who fuss over children, their heads clean-shaven, being photographed performing pious acts in the first moments of their new life. Feasting follows under tents that have been set up around the Temple.

This ceremony ending with a rite of passage also begins with another kind of initiation. On the first day, from three to six o'clock in the morning, there is a private Brahmanic ceremony to declare the intention of carrying out the ceremony and to pronounce the commencement of the holy period. This event, probably the equivalence of the *saṅkalpa* of Hindu rituals, is followed by a rite of initiation of Brahman priests, the *upanayana*. On the second day (seventh waxing moon) at eight o'clock in the morning, the door of Kailāsa is opened for Śiva and his family to descend. During their stay, they are attended by the Earth Goddess, Gaṅgā, the Sun and Moon, on the fourth through the sixth day (9th through 11th waxing moon). Their attendance is ushered in by the Board Deity (*Nāṅ Gadān* น่านกาดาน), for whom a ceremonial arcade (*sum nāṅ gadān* ซุ้มน่านกาดาน) is made. The event is called *Nāṅ Gadān long lum* น่านกาดานลางลุม.<sup>22</sup> Śiva and his family are sent off on the eleventh night.

On the return of Śiva, Nārāyaṇa and his consorts, Lakṣmī and Maheśvarī (Thai *Hesamadī* or *Hesamari* หะสะมาดี, หะสะมาวี), arrive from the Sea of Milk and are sent off on the 15th night of the ceremony. In the middle of Nārāyaṇa's stay, Brahma is sent off on the thirteenth night (3rd new moon), but there is no sending off rite because he is omnipresent, having no mythic, heavenly abode. At dawn of the last day begins the tonsure ceremony.<sup>19</sup>

#### RITUAL STRUCTURE

The New Year is a time of inauguration and initiation. The year, the gods, and human beings undergo a transition, passing from one state into another. The old year ends, and the new begins. Young men are initiated into the life of the twice-born in order to act as consecrating priests. Children begin their adult life with the cutting of their top-knots, an auspicious event that signals a moral and prosperous life in the world. The gods descend on the earth to be worshipped and installed on their throne with the sprinkling of water offered by humans, and to confer sanctity on the New Year together with its initiation rites. In this event, calendrical, life-cycle, and divine passages are ritually, if not symbolically, identified. The world of nature, humans, and the gods are all subject to transition of different kinds, but changes in their respective states are a mutually conditioning unity: the three parties — nature, humans, and the gods — are interdependent in fostering the growth and prosperity of one another. In this sense, there is no prior, self-dependent source of efficacy unilaterally bestowing benefits on others, but all the worlds are created and rejuvenated within the context of reaffirming and substantiating a collective identity which can be displayed to society's members by myths and rites. In the Durkheimian sense, a ritual represents the ideas and ideals of society — the collective consciousness — to the people, and thereby lifts them from the mundane into sacred time and space.<sup>20</sup> Time, the gods, and humanity, which are images of this collective consciousness, are touched and shaped by design and by the hands that consecrate them all together in one ritual complex.

Mutual dependence between gods and humans is treated in the earliest Vedic hymns about sacrifice. Creation in the abstract is personified by Prajāpati, the sacrificer who is the sacrifice, and thereby constitutes the world and all its elements.<sup>24</sup> Once the whole is created there is no break between the worlds of god and humans: the life and vigour of deities, who are to some extent personifications of natural forces, are sustained by the offerings from mortals. Thus, in agreement with some Vedic ideas, we see the calendrical cycle, human life cycle, and divine rejuvenation as symbolically interlocking elements that find ritual expressions in one ceremonial

continuum. Although the ceremonies we observe are not Vedic sacrifice, but *pūjā* (the priests make a clear distinction between sacrifice and honoring, as between giving leave, *la m* and sending off, *song ṣṭ*, rituals), the rites of calling down, installing on the throne, and sending off the gods affirm the crucial role of worshippers in the sustenance and recognition of divinity.

The worship, however, is no longer entirely Vedic in form and content. The center of the Vedic ritual — around which the gods sit to take their share of the sacrifice — the god *Agni*, or the fire into which the oblations are poured, is not a dominant feature. Fires that are present in these Thai Brahmanic rites are lit candles, a part of worshipful offering or markings of sacred boundaries. The aniconic nature of Vedic sacrifice has given way to a theistic, puranic, iconic form of the deity's image which is treated with lavish care as toward a human guest, and in devotional and submissive attitudes of bodily prostrations. Puranic myths about the gods and their consorts are an integral part of the rituals. Tantristic elements of worship are also observable in the form of imaginative meditation that brings the sacred into the person of the officiating priest and the ritualized boundaries, along with the ritualization syllables representing the form of the gods to be honored.<sup>25</sup> In this latter process, the appropriate metaphysical idea is acted out, namely, the conjoining of the sacred and profane, the otherworldly and the worldly, by means of mental concentration with the body as the focal point of union. Practices attendant on this idea — such as the *mudrā*, the *maṇḍala*, *mantra* and *yantra* — are a part of activating otherworldly potencies in ritual time and space through symbolic identifications of bodily parts with natural elements (micro- macro-cosmic identifications) and with images of the gods.<sup>26</sup> Even disregarding joint Buddhist-Brahmanic contributions, the entire ritual event is a composite of ideas and practices from different ages. Structurally considered, there is no singular, monolithic continuum, but rather blocks of individual rites that have been composed to achieve a reciprocal interaction between humans and the divine within the basic form of the ceremony: calling down the gods, honoring, and sending them away.

The whole of the ceremony is structured as frames within frames, making progressive approach to the heart of the sacred, the center of the ritual. In the reception, divine descents are celebrated by rituals of Opening the Door of Kailāsa and Opening the Milk Sea. Once descended the gods are attended nightly with gifts of songs and foods (pure foods) leading to the sending off ceremony, chanting to the ascension of the god on his *hamṣa* chariot and closing the door of heaven. The heart of the ritual is the

offering of songs, foods, and waters in the *abhiṣeka* rite of installing god on his throne. Framing the center are the prior ritual of self-purification and divinization of ritual objects, and the concluding rite of consecrating god on his throne and singing to his ascension on the divine vehicle.

The principle of the ceremony is reciprocity: the priests purify themselves to make offerings which they return to offerers with blessedness. Presumably blessedness translates into material prosperity in the world as well as psychic welfare. The production of efficacy occurs with the encounter, the moment when the human and divine meet in exchange of gifts and blessedness. Through the gifts, transference and mutual affirmation occur. Things given to and enjoyed by the gods — food, songs, bathing water and perfume — become efficacious through contact and, imbued with a touch of the divine, are returned to givers. In some sense, the gift of waters is most pervasively efficacious because they symbolically sustain god's dominion in heaven and over the world. With these waters the priests bless not only people but the world and the passage of the year into a new one. It is not the case, however, that worshippers install the divine on his throne, but the latter consecrates himself through the officiation of priests with the offering of water by worshippers.

With the moment of gift-giving as the ritual center, outer ritual frames are also symmetrical with respect to the center. The purification and initiation of brahmans commencing an inward passage to the gods, we have a closing ceremony of tonsure opening a passage to life in the profane world. Inside the largest frame, around the innermost center, are symmetrically aligned passages of descent/ascent, sacred/profane, leading the gods to humans and vice versa. Similarly structured are nightly rituals centered around paired offerings of songs and pure foods, framed by symmetrically aligned rites of self-purification and divinization at the start, and the distribution of blessed gifts to offerers at the end. What is given is returned. What begins by being pure is made holy and redistributed in the world.

To a large extent, I believe that the symmetry of ritual actions comes about partly for aesthetic reasons. To achieve a solemn and harmonious effect, subsidiary parts of a ritual must have a certain order and rhythm that can put across the meanings of the whole; specific activities and their sequence must be visually and aurally suggestive of their ideational significance. The ritual that we are considering involves three parties: the ordinary people, the priests, and the gods. In the hierarchy of purity, the gods are the most pure, and the ordinary people the least: there is no direct contact and exchange between them. In a ritual situation, a kind of communication between humans and the gods occur through the agency of the priest. The

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latter, an intermediary between the two, whose task is to effect a contact and exchange between them, can undergo different degrees of purity in order to bring the offerings from humans to the gods and the return of these gifts, blessed by a touch of the gods, back to the people.

In the first stage of this symmetrical structure with respect to the center of the ritual, the priest and ordinary people are at the threshold between the sacred and the profane. The symmetry existing here is their comparable but reversed liminal states: like laymen, the priest is at first unsanctified and then becomes sanctified during the ritual in order to make gift-offerings; like the priest, the layman who is at first unsanctified during the ritual becomes sanctified at its ending because the layman gets back his offerings which have now been purified by the gods' enjoyment of them. Purity transformed into auspiciousness, materially represented by the *prasāda* food or the *ucchiṣṭa* of the gods, bestows auspiciousness on the layman who receives it. In this way, the priest and layman stand in a symmetrical position at the outer boundary of the ritual precinct conceptually marked by the opposition of purity/impurity, and locationally marked by the seating of worshippers to one side of the temple and the officiants on the other.

When the priest calls down the god into the water vessel and into his body, he imposes a layer of sanctity overall which is terminated by the rite of sending the god away. These two rites are conceptually and obviously symmetrical, and they are placed near the beginning and the end of the ceremony respectively, framing the rites of offering. Having become divinized by the self-consecration, the officiant is empowered to consecrate other officiants by sprinkling them with water. These officiants in turn make offerings of food and songs, and the offering water in the installation rite, *abhiṣeka*. The water from this last offering is sprinkled on the worshippers. Thus, the center of the ritual — the offering by priests and enjoyment by the god — is framed by sprinklings: the initial sprinkling consecrates Brahmans to come before the god, the latter sprinkling bestows the consecrating water on the worshippers who have proffered the gift. Practically and conceptually these two instances of sprinkling are paired: in the first the chief priest, now divinized, bestows sanctity on assistant Brahmans. In the second instance, the assistant Brahmans who have come into the numinous presence bestow the consecrating water in which the god has bathed on the lay worshippers. The act of sprinkling — purification and consecration — proceeds from the divinized priest toward the center of the ritual by way of Brahmans who duplicate the sprinkling action away from the center to the worshippers. (See Figure 2)

I have made the interpretation that there are structural frames enclosing

Calendar of Events

Dec. 25	6 waxing moon	Declaration and Upanayana
26	7	Descent of Śiva
27	8	
28	9	<i>Sum Nāṅ Gadān</i> ; Descent of minor deities
29	10	
30	11	Ascent of minor deities
31	12	
Jan. 1	13	
2	14	
3	15	
4	1 waning moon	Nārāyaṇa descends; Sending off Śiva
5	2	
6	3	Sending off Brahma
7	4	
8	5	Sending off Nārāyaṇa
9	6	Tonsure of children

Fig. 1. Ritual frames of the holy weeks.




Fig. 2. Ritual frames of sending off ceremony.

the heart of the sacred because of Phram Chawin's remark that the priest leads worshippers to the heart of the ritual; although the heart of the ritual is the same, the form may be made shorter or longer by varying the ornamentations. This remark, together with the observation of the function of the ritual and the ritualist, points to the necessity of a patterned set of activities that can achieve a particular, meaningful purpose. Such a structure is not necessarily indicative of an ideological or metaphysical significance alone but seem also to have evolved over time from a practical necessity to achieve the aims of the ritual constrained by an original form to which later ideational and formal innovations must be added. Similar ritual frames developed by the accretion of innovations from different historical periods have been demonstrated by Witzel in the case of the Nepalese Agnihotra sacrifice.<sup>27</sup>

#### THE RITES

Although three gods are worshipped, rituals for all of them are basically the same: mantras vary to suit the deities. There are three types of rituals: 1. initiation, 2. reception and attendance, and 3. sending off.

1. *Initiation.* (This was a private Brahmanic ceremony. I obtained its description from a Brahman.) On the first day at three o'clock in the morning, Brahmans, clothed in white with their right upper arms tied in a white band to signify a sanctified period (Thai *phrot* ฟรอต Skt. *vrata*), assemble in the main chapel.<sup>28</sup> Having declared to the gods the beginning of the holy weeks of ceremonies and observances, Brahmans carry out the ordination (*upanayana*) of new priests at the same time. The ceremony is finished around six a.m. as the sun rises, giving its energy to the congregation. This year there was no ordination. A Brahman's report of a typical ordination, however, follows.

The entire assembly of Brahmans is present in the chapel. The officiant who confers the ordination is called the *Upachā* อุปชา (Skt. *Upādhyāya*). Senior Brahmans are witnesses (Thai *Sakhiphayān* สกัทธิพยาน Skt. *Sākṣī*). After honoring the gods, those who are to be ordained bring paraphernalia of daily life — a mat, a pillow, clothing, a water bowl — together with objects for worshipping, namely flowers, candles, incense, coconuts, and beetle nuts. These two sets of objects are put in separate trays, the former tray for his own use and the latter to be offered to the deities.

The ordaining priests sit in a circle, with the initiates before them and closest to the altar. The chief ordainer, the *Upachā*, purifies himself (Skt. *ātamavisuddhi*, Thai *ātamamisūt* อาตมวิสุทธิ) and recites unspecified Atharvaveda mantras (according to our source). Thus purified, he calls the

initiates into the circle; they recite after him. After this recitation, the ordainer teaches dharma, and the reasons for doing *pūjā* (Thai *būchā* บูชา): why there is a candle; what is the reason for lighting it, and so on. The teachings come from the yoga philosophy of Patañjali as well as Buddhism. Two sets of mantra ślokas are in Sanskrit — one for ordination and the other for *pūjā*. According to our source, they have no name. The teachings are in Thai. It is interesting to note that Buddhist terms are used to designate ordination (*buad* บูด), *Upachā* (the ordainer and mentor of an Buddhist monks), the presiding image of the chapel (*phā prathān* พระประธาน, the term for the presiding Buddha image in a Buddhist chapel). At the end of the ceremony the ordainer places the thread of the twice-born (Skt. *yajñopavīta*, Thai *sāi sin* สายสิญจน์ meaning literally the thread of sprinkling, from Skt. *siñc*, 'to sprinkle') over the shoulder of the ordained. The new priests make offerings of vegetarian food, fruits, and sweets. As the sun comes over the horizon, the ordained ones are reborn. The participants in the ceremony then remain in the temple for the entire two weeks of rituals.

During these two weeks of solemn rites and purification, there are no festive celebrations except the sharing of blessed food left over from the gods' eating (probably the *ucchiṣṭa* of Vedic rites). Formerly the swinging ceremony, its spectacular sight of Brahmans swinging on a board suspended from the crossbar between two towering red posts, was presided over by the King. Such affairs of royally sponsored rituals were usually accompanied by a fair offering sideshows and shop stalls for general amusement of the populace. In *Phrarāchapithī Sibsong Deun* พระราชพิธีสิบสองเดือน, King Rama V describes his eager expectation and excitement to view the swinging. A make-belief Śiva oversees the swinging while standing on one foot during this event. The swingers, called *nāliwan* นาลีวัน, high up in the air try to snatch with their mouths a bag of coins attached to a tall bamboo pole. After the spectacle, there is some splashing of the water as a part of the merry-making.<sup>29</sup>

The legend of the swing is that Śiva and Pārvaṭī are testing the stability of the earth which Śiva has newly created. For this test, the Nāga king binds himself from two trees over a river and swings back and forth while Śiva stands one-footed on the river-bank. If the earth is stable, then Śiva will not fall. The swinging is carried out and Śiva does not fall, proving that the earth is stable. The Nāga is very happy and plays in the water, splashing about.<sup>30</sup>

2. *Reception and Attendance of the Gods.* This type of ritual is the *pūjā* to which Brahmans often refer with the buddhist term *swat*. The latter term

refers to the laymen's attendance at Buddhist monks' recitation, whatever the occasion may be — funeral, wedding, house warming, and so on — usually accompanied by an offering of food. In this kind of Brahmanic *pūjā*, purification is an essential, initial process that prepares the ground for seeing god. The chapel which is ordinarily a sanctified hall now becomes a matrix in which ritual centers are activated by purificatory processes such as sprinkling with water, and marked off by ritual devices such as candles. Within this space, mantras in Sanskrit are structural parts of the rituals, while songs of Tamil origin are offerings, like gift foods. More segments of rites may be set into the basic structure with the creation of a new spatial boundary and an addition of mantras.

A nightly worship begins with the self-purification and self-identification with the god on the part of the main officiating priest, followed by paired offerings of songs and foods, and ends with distribution of offered food among worshippers. It is interesting to note that purification is not a process of taking away impurities such as washing, but rather one of overcoming them by means of ritual objects and words. For this service, the Rāchakhrū wears a white dhoti, and a white shirt with one shoulder uncovered, the sleeve being thrown over the other shoulder. He has a silver arm band and a glass rosary in addition to the sacred thread. The ritual space is a mat overlaid with white cloth before which is a tray containing a brass water pot, and another containing popped rice and fruits. By the trays are coconuts and sugarcane stalks. On one side is a stand of sacred texts, and the other a tray of ritual paraphernalia, a bowl of water and brush, a many-pronged candelabra and a bell, a pot of paste, roses, candles, and incense.

The ritual of self-purification and identification with the gods is tantristic. In this process it appears that the officiating priest goes through the prescribed actions of purification (*ācamana*, *prāṇāyāma*, etc.) and *nyāsa*, touching various parts of his body and dabbing it with sacred paste. In a comparable Vaiṣṇava ritual, by touching various parts of the body and saying appropriate mantras accompanied by mental images, the priest transforms himself from a person in a human body into a form of the god. Worship is then done mentally with the priest concentrating with his mind on offerings to the god who now instills the officiant's own body.<sup>31</sup> A text entitled *pūjāprayoga* transcribed by Sarma substantiates the tantristic process of *nyāsa* and meditative concentration on various ritual objects.<sup>32</sup> All ritual texts used by the priest, however, are not now available to us, but observable ritual actions clearly exhibit tantristic characteristics.

After lighting candles and anointing the sacred texts the Rāchakhrū calls the god into the *kalaśa*, anoints it with dabs of paste on which rose petals

are affixed, and places a rose at the mouth of the vessel. He then sanctifies his seat with some water from the pot brushed on the borders of the seat, and marks it with a rose in each corner. He takes off his officiating ring (worn on the index finger of the right hand) holds it in folded hands to his forehead and puts it back on, and repeats the process with his sacred thread and crystal beads. Making a *mudrā*, he then performs a *nyāsa*, touching his lips, inside of the mouth, top of the forehead, eyes, back, his two sides. He shakes the bell and candelabra.

The Rāchakhrū then anoints with paste his knuckles, toes, back, and other spots of the body; he then performs a *prāṇāyāma*,<sup>33</sup> stopping his nostrils with fingers and breathing deeply three times, and does likewise with his ears. He fingers the crystal beads, sips water from his hand (*ācamana*), makes a *mudrā*, makes a *yantra* (Thai *yan* ยันต์) with paste in the palm of his left hand and writes on his forehead, cheeks, back, arms. He then runs water from the jar into the tray with a sliding motion of his hand. He puts out the pair of candles in front of the *kalaśa*, rinses his hands. These actions are punctuated by readings from the text. At the end of the rite, he sprinkles the bowl of fruit in front of him and waves the candelabra over it.

The ritual focus now shifts to the long offering table in front of the presiding altar. In contrast to the Rāchakhrū's mental offerings, here songs and real foods are offered by Brahmans who are sanctified by the purified and divinized officiant. Four Brahmans come to receive a sprinkling, kneeling and bowing low before the Rāchakhrū. This sprinkling officiates them to perform the act of offering to the gods. Standing in a row before the table of offerings, they chant the Triyampavai, each taking a phrase and all joining in on the chorus in unison. Conchs play after the chant. The Rāchakhrū rises from his seat and the long table where offerings are to be made, sprinkling it with water and shaking his bell and candle over it. Two assistants then prepare three trays piled high with popped rice, which are offered by three priests each with an accompanying recitation.

The ceremonies of receiving Śiva and Nārāyaṇa are basically the same as above, to which the recitative segments *Poet Praiū Krailāt* พิธีรับองค์ไกรลาส and *Poet Kasian Samut* พิธีเปิดประตูน้ำ , Opening the Door of Kailāsa, and Opening the Sea of Milk, are added. The former was done at eight o'clock in the morning on the 26th of December, 1987, and the latter on the night of the 4th of January, 1988, before sending off Śiva.

3. *Sending Off*. For this ritual, the *haṃsa* chariot is decorated with garlands and candles; next to it stands a two-tiered tray with a peeled coconut

wrapped in white cloth. Before the altar of images, opposite to the main altar, two diagrammed maṇḍalas are made of tapioca flour on each tier of a two-tiered table. The top tier represents the abode of the divinity. On the lower surface, in each of the squares of the six-squared diagram is placed a vessel of gold, silver, brass (*nag* นาก), copper (*samrid* สัมริด), representing the vessels of the *pañcagavya* (Thai *bencakhap* เบญจคัพ), and the sixth is glass which is left empty during the rite. Outside the square are a conch sitting on bilva leaves on a raised tray and a *kalaśa* (Thai *klod* กลอด). Prepared at the same time are the *khlāng* กลัง, strands of sacred grass representing the ritual maṇḍala of which each direction corresponds to a certain number of strands; and a name inscription, *batr* บัตร, which a Brahman explained to me is like a pass permitting entry to heaven. Next to this two-tiered table are three small *bai sī* ไบศรี, a bowl of fruit and bottles of perfume that worshippers have brought to bathe the god.

During the ceremony, an image of god stands over the diagram. After the Rāchakrū's purificatory rite, he performs the *pūjā* of the *khlāng*, the vessels (Skt. *kumbha*, Thai *kum* กุม), the *kalaśa*, and the conch (Skt. *śaṅkha*, Thai *sang* สัง), while reading from four texts which are probably Sanskrit mantras. Water, poured into the cups, except the glass cup (said by a Brahman to represent the atmosphere), is combined in the gold cup and then poured into the *kalaśa*. The Rāchakrū now reads a mantra. He then sprinkles himself with the sacred water, says a mantra, then lights three candles that together with three roses are placed on the *bai sī* tray. A candle and a rose is likewise placed on the coconut that sits on the two-tiered tray next to the chariot. Here the ritual actions are accompanied by readings of texts.

The image is then bathed in the sacred water from the *kalaśa* and the *śaṅkha*, and perfume from all bottles. Conchs play while the image is being bathed. The priest puts a bilva leaf on the image, and having raised it to his head places it in the center of the diagram of Kailāsa. He gives it the sacred thread of the twice-born, anoints it with three dabs of paste, and sprinkles the maṇḍalas with the water of the bath.

The Rāchakrū then proceeds to the *hamsa* chariot, and sprinkles it with sacred water from the *kalaśa* and the conch, dabs the divine mount with paste, waving his bell and candles over the carriage while conchs play. Candles on the chariot are lit, while the Rāchakrū returns to his ritual mat.

Placing a medallion between the fourth and fifth fingers of his right hand, he reads another passage from the text. Carrying a lit candle in one arm and the image in another, he walks to the chariot and makes three clockwise circumambulations, each time putting his foot on the grinding stone, a

white rectangular stone slab with a rolling-pin shaped grinder placed on top of it. It is said in the *Phrarāchapithi Sibsong Deun* to represent a mountain.<sup>34</sup> This done, a Brahman ties a sacred thread to a chariot post. The Rāchakrū kneels before the chariot as a Brahman sprinkles the worshippers with the god's perfumed bath. The perfume is now poured back into bottles to be returned to their donors, while the chief officiant recites more passages from texts.

When the pouring is finished, the focus of the ritual is shifted to the *hamsa*. The Rāchakrū goes to the chariot with his texts, reads from them as more candles are lit about the chariot. Eight are placed on the ground at the eight directions around the sacred mount. A Brahman places himself next to the chariot, and two chanters wearing gilt-edged robes sit facing it within the confines of the candles. The two singers sing a long melodious song, while the other Brahman gently rocks the *hamsa* chariot in rhythm with the chant, accompanying the god to heaven. The resonance of the song fills the temple, and with its ending the door of heaven is again closed.

#### CONCLUSION

The gods are the mystery at the heart of rituals, approached through multiple walls of purity penetrable by the guidance of the ritualist. Efficacies issue from reciprocity — the meeting and exchange between humanity and divinity. Worshippers work their way inwardly to the gods, and the latter in turn bestow outwardly their blessings toward worshippers. In this manner offerings are blessed and returned to humans. Purification of the self, the water, and the offerings mark off ritual areas from the profane world, and make ready for the numinous presence. In tantristic rites of purifying and identifying the priest with the god, indeed, the boundaries of the human body are overcome, extended into the universe (the natural elements and the directions), and then into a form of the god himself. From this presence in puranic and tantristic forms, blessings and auspiciousness imbue objects and are reflected back to the donors.

Ritual structure accommodates to this reciprocity, symmetrically arranging ritual parts with respect to the center. Thus, a ritual begins with the purity of the person in order to make offerings to god at the center, and ends with the sharing of purity in the form of blessed food. The bathing of the god with perfume from donors — pouring of perfume over the image — is reflected in returning perfume in their bottles to the donors and sprinkling people with god's bathwater.

This symmetric structure also orients the two-week continuum in which ritual time-space continuum is ensconced in two rites of initiation: first, the rite of the twice-born who are initiated in order to perform rituals for others, and last the rite of ordinary people who take auspiciousness with them into the everyday world.

What other connections are there between the initiation of children and the divine installation? If we ask why the frames are not reversed, so that the human initiations, rebirths, are set within the frames of descent of the gods, we will see a vertical axis at the center that orients humans with the divine, the ordinary life with the world beyond. Such a vertical, in contrast to horizontal, spatial relation suggests a conceptual difference between an approach and a descent.

The spatial structure of the ceremony — its environmental context from the outermost layer to the center, the potency — also invites analysis. Ritual space shares the same concentrically framed and reciprocally directed structure. Such a ritual space can be as small as the area around the god's chariot circumscribed by candles, or it may be as large as the whole of Bangkok. Inside the chapel, spatial continuum is the ceremonial hall whose shifting sacred foci are marked by ritual devices such as flowers, candles. A study of sequential sanctification of certain areas, in the context of the whole, will be useful for mapping out relations between ritual/conceptual centers and their contributory areas.

Relations between man and the divine ritually considered can thus be interwoven with the religious context of Buddhism and Brahmanism in which life and death are relative stages: there are lives framed in a whole of life, just as there are deaths and redeaths. The gods are not above the laws of transformation, and obviously are subject to transitions that necessitate sacrifices and installations proffered by human hands.

The myths and rituals of sprinkling and installation (*abhiṣeka*) of the gods are clearly of the same substance as those of kings. Because of the principle of reciprocity we see operating between the divine and human, the idea that divinity confers legitimacy on kingship unilaterally seems to overlook these essential, reciprocal reinforcements. However, it is not being suggested that in reality there is mutual support or tacit contractual agreement between the king and the people who consent to the latter's use of divinity. Rather, it is to be seen that a unilateral influence of religious ideas on the practical, worldly actions cannot furnish the complete explanation. To what extent, one might ask, did medieval theism develop by assimilating characteristics of and thereby affirming absolute rulership? In the case of Thailand, replication of the administrative order in the formal sangha order

has been amply demonstrated in Tambiah's *World Conqueror and World Renouncer*: the title of the 'King of the Sangha' leaves no doubt that the religious order shares a structure of the worldly order, and thereby derives a necessary kind of authority from the latter.<sup>35</sup>

Furthermore, ritual complexes of Thai Brahmanism have puzzling components that suggest a possible genetic model beside Indian Brahmanism and Buddhism. What is the meaning of the omnipresent *bai sī*? Who is the *Nāṅ Gadān*, and what is she doing in the *Śiva pūjā*? The whole composition of the ritual still remains to be studied more closely — the texts and their sources, songs, melodies, ritual ideas and objects, associated myths — especially in relation to aspects of kingship to which Thai Brahmanism is intimately linked. A further study of available texts and their elucidation by Brahmans is necessary to further shed light on the practical and ideational details of this and other Brahmanic rituals in Thailand.

To a large extent, the forms of Thai Brahmanic rituals are congruent with textual prescriptions and Brahmanic religious ideas. Such a conformity suggests linkages of historic connections and developments that can be looked for in such things as script, specific types of mantra, other textual or formal evidence. On the other side, ritual ideas and actions together form a complex, and a grasp of the synchronic arrangements, as a structural orientation, of ritual components can also lead to comprehending the way that the complex — myths and rites, words and acts, time/space divisions — map out conceptual interdependencies of kingship, divinity, and humanity. In the case of court Brahmanism of Thailand, both directions are not only advantageous, but necessary to understand this religious minority and its significance in the ideology of today.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> *Kham Hai Kān Chāo Krung Kao* (Bangkok: National Library, 1928) pp. 2–10.
- <sup>2</sup> *Kham Hai Kān Chāo Krung Kao*, pp. 58–60, cited in Charnwit Kasetsiri, *The Rise of Ayudhya* (Kuala Lumpur; New York: Oxford University Press) 1976.
- <sup>3</sup> Tri Amatyakul, d. *Phrarāchaphongsāmadān Krung Sayām* (Bangkok: Samnak Phim Kao Na, 1964) p. 21 ff.
- <sup>4</sup> G. Coedès, *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia*, Walter F. Vella, ed., Susan Brown Cowing, tr. (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968) pp. 110 ff. — Unless stated otherwise, the information in this article stems from personal observation and interviews at Bangkok, in 1987/88.
- <sup>5</sup> J. C. Heesterman, *The Ancient Indian Royal Consecration* (The Hague, Mouton & Co., 1957) introduction.
- <sup>6</sup> Jan Gonda, *Aspects of Early Viṣṇuism*, see pp. 164–167 on Viṣṇu and kingship. Viṣṇu is identified with kings. See pp. 55–66 Viṣṇu as the pervader of the universe, having obtained for the gods the all-pervading power which they now possess. Rāmānuja's interpretation of



the *Bhagavadgītā* sees Viṣṇu as the internal ruler, pervading the spiritual and non-spiritual entities of the universe. For Śaiva devotionism and *bhakti*, see Narayana Ayyar, *Origin and Early History of Saivism in South India* (Mandras: University of Mandras, 1974).

<sup>7</sup> Friedhelm Hardy, *Viraha-Bhakti: The Early History of Kṛṣṇa Devotion in South India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) pp. 25–29.

<sup>8</sup> King Chulalongkorn, *Phra Wicān nai Phra Bātsomdat Phra Culacomklaocāyūhua Duai Rueng Codmaihei Khwām Songcam khong Kromluang Narinthathehi* (Bangkok: National Library, 1908) pp. 307–11.

<sup>9</sup> J. R. Marr, *Some Manuscripts in Grantha Script in Bangkok*. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 32 (1969): 311–319.

<sup>10</sup> Neelakanta Sarma, *Textes Sanskrits et Tamouls de Thaïlande*. Publication de l'Institut Français d'Indologie, No. 47 (Pondicherry: Institut Français d'Indologie, 1972) entire.

<sup>11</sup> J. R. Marr, *Some Manuscripts in Grantha Script*, pp. 303–308.

<sup>12</sup> UraKin Wiriyabun, ed., *Prapheni Thai* (Bangkok: Pracak Kan Phim, 1970) pp. 43–53.

<sup>13</sup> It is not clear if the Brahman has the Hindu *Puruṣārtha* in mind, but it seems that he intends to present a comparable hierarchy of values.

<sup>14</sup> Our source speaks of the propriety of giving and receiving, and the relation between the giver and the receiver, as the source of hierarchy which in turn is the basis of dharma. If receivers do not know the value of a gift, then there is no dharma in society. Values come from the labor (*roeng ai ไร่ ไร*) and spirit (*roeng cai ใจ ใจ* or literally the power of the heart) of people.

<sup>15</sup> Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger* (New York: Praeger, 1966) pp. 29–40.

<sup>16</sup> G. E. Gerini, *Chulakantamangala: The Tonsure Ceremony as Performed in Siam*, 2nd ed. (Bangkok: Siam Society, 1976. First edition, 1893).

<sup>17</sup> The change of the Brahmanic New Year Ceremony from the first to the second lunar month was made by King Rāma IV. The reason is explained in *Phrarāchapithi Sibsong Deun* in two places. On page 6, King Rāma V notes that the date has been changed because in the first month the streets of Bangkok are still muddy, and it is inconvenient to have the ceremony together with its processions at that time. On page 63, he explains that the original ceremonies of the first month are believed to induce the recession of the water level. By changing them to the second month, the water level remains high for a longer period of time. The change has been intended to keep the water in the fields for agricultural benefits.

<sup>18</sup> King Chulalongkorn, *Phrarāchapithi Sibsong Deun*, pp. 87–103.

<sup>19</sup> The honoring of Brahma is reported by a Brahman, but it is not mentioned in *Phrarāchapithi Sibsong Deun* or in *Prapheni Thai*. I have mentioned it here because it may be a short ritual that has been recently inserted into today's ceremony.

<sup>20</sup> A myth accompanying the swinging ceremony is related in *Prapheni Thai*, pp. 551–553. After Śiva has created the world, the Goddess Umā is worried that it is not very sturdy and may easily sink into the ocean. In order to test its sturdiness, Śiva has the Nāga king hang by his head and tail from two trees over a river while Śiva stands on one foot on the river. When the Nāga king swings, the earth will sink if it is not stable enough, and Śiva will fall down. The Nāga swings, and the earth is stable enough so that Śiva remains standing. The Nāga is so happy that he plunges into the river and splashes about, spouting water from his mouth. This myth was re-enacted in the pageantry of the swing.

<sup>21</sup> King Chulalongkorn, *Phrarāchapithi Sibsong Deun*, pp. 83–4, p. 100.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 98–99. Before dawn on the eighth day of the waxing moon, the Rāchakhrū consecrates three boards engraved with the sun and the moon, the earth goddess, and the goddess Gaṅgā respectively. The boards are then taken outside the temple and placed in three holes dug in the ground ritually enclosed by a fence-like structure to the corners of which ceremonial umbrellas, banana leaves, and sugarcane leaves are tied.

<sup>23</sup> Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Joseph Ward Swain, tr. (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1947) pp. 415–447.

<sup>24</sup> Sylvain Lévi, *La Doctrine du sacrifice dans les brāhmaṇas* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966), pp. 31–35.

<sup>25</sup> Neelakanta Sarma, *Textes Sanskrits et Tamouls*, p. 37 ff. The text of *Hamsapūjā* reads *om am akāramūrtaye anādidevāya namaḥ* and so on.

<sup>26</sup> Guiseppe Tucci, *Maṅḍala*, pp. 21–48. See also, K. Rangachari, *Śrī Vaiṣṇava Brahmanas*, pp. 87–114; and Sanjukta Gupta, *Hindu Tantrism*, pp. 121–157.

<sup>27</sup> Michael Witzel, *Agnihotra-Rituale in Nepal* (Sankt Augustin: VGH Wissenschaftsverlag, 1986).

<sup>28</sup> King Chulalongkorn, *Phrarāchapithi Sibsong Deun*, p. 96. The king describes the process of taking up the vow: Brahmanas assemble in the chapel, and each ties his arm with a band. They abstain from beans and sesame seeds, meat, and sexual activity. All Brahmanas except the chief officiant keep the vow on the 7th, 8th, and 9th days of the waxing moon except for the chief officiant who retains the vow throughout the holy period.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 93–96.

<sup>30</sup> UraKin Wiriyabun, *Prapheni Thai*, pp. 551–553.

<sup>31</sup> K. Rangachari, *Śrī Vaiṣṇava Brahmanas*, pp. 87–114.

<sup>32</sup> Sarma, *Textes Sanskrits et Tamouls*, pp. 29–33.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 135.

<sup>34</sup> King Chulalongkorn, *Phrarāchapithi Sibsong Deun*, p. 103.

<sup>35</sup> Stanley J. Tambiah, *World Conqueror and World Renouncer* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 230 ff.

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Phonetic System of Transcribing Thai Words

English	Thai	Sanskrit
k	ก	क
ng	ง	ङ
kh	ข, ก, ฃ	ख, क, ङ
c	จ	च
ch	ช	च
t	ต	ट
th	ถ, ฑ, ฒ, ฒ	ठ, ड, ढ, ण
d	ด	ड
n	น	न
p	ป	प
ph	ฟ, ฝ, ฝ	फ, भ, ष
b	บ	ब
m	ม	म
y	ย	य
r	ร	र
l	ล	ल
w	ว	व
s	ศ, ษ, ษ	स, श, ष
h	ห	ह
a	อ	अ
i	อิ	इ
ii	อี	ई
u	อุ	उ
uu	อู	ऊ
r	เ	ए
e	เอ	ऐ
ae	เ	เ
ai	ไ	ः
ai	ไ	ः
o	อ	ः
ao	อ	ः
ao	อ	ः
ia	อิ	ः
eu	เอ	ः
ua	อุ	ः
uai	อู	ः
oe	เ	ः

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. S. Lienhard (with the collaboration of Th. L. Manandhar), *Nepalese Manuscripts: Nevāri and Sanskrit*, Wiesbaden 1988, *Introduction*, S. XXVII.

<sup>5</sup> Der letzte Satz wörtlich: 'Wozu (nun noch) mich?' (*je chāya*).

<sup>6</sup> Von *naie*, 'erfahren', 'erleiden'.

<sup>7</sup> Bei Brinkhaus als . . . *thāya dūra* wiedergegeben.

<sup>8</sup> Auch das Deutsch ist hier inkorrekt.

<sup>9</sup> Siehe u.a. R. L. Turner, *A Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-Aryan Languages*, London 1965, Eintragung 8164 *pitaku*; T. Burrow and M. B. Emeneau, *A Dravidian Etymological Dictionary*, Oxford 1961, Eintragung 3637; und R. Walldén, *Studies in Dravidian Phonology and Vocabulary*, Uppsala 1982, S.161–163.

<sup>10</sup> *eko* (= *yuko*), 'soviel als lieb ist'.

<sup>11</sup> Die entsprechenden Newari-Worte sind in diesem Passus vom Rezensenten eingesetzt worden.

<sup>12</sup> *dhara* ist ein best. Mass.

<sup>13</sup> D.h. für jedes Kommen und Gehen.

<sup>14</sup> Eine Geldmünze niedrigen Werts.

<sup>15</sup> S.171, A.88.

<sup>16</sup> Vom Rezensenten eingesetzt.

<sup>17</sup> *yāvamta* / *yābamta*, von *Skt. yāva(n)t*.

<sup>18</sup> *anū yū* im Text, *anūyū* S.174, A.136.

<sup>19</sup> Zum Zweck der Verdeutlichung vom Rezensenten eingesetzt.

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## OMNISCIENCE IN THE MAHĀYĀNASŪTRĀLĀNKĀRA AND ITS COMMENTARIES\*

### §1 METHODS AND GOALS

After about the second century of the Christian era the intellectuals of the Indian Buddhist traditions came to regard omniscience as an essential property of Buddhahood, a vital part of being a Buddha. It is true that in early Buddhism there seems to have been, at best, an ambivalent attitude towards omniscience considered in this way, or at least a somewhat limited idea of what it is logically possible for an omniscient being to know.<sup>1</sup> But by the time of the *Kathāvattu*, the epithets of the Buddha were normally taken to include *sabbaññū* and *sabbadassavī* ("all-knowing" and "all-seeing"), and a strong claim is made for the possibility and importance of omniscience in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*.<sup>2</sup>

This notion has as yet been given rather little attention, systematic or historical, by Western scholars. Padmanabh Jaini's brief comparative analysis of Buddhist and Jaina ideas about omniscience draws almost all its Buddhist materials from early Theravāda texts, and thus has little to say about the complex terminological and conceptual innovations which took place in India between the first and sixth centuries of the Christian era.<sup>3</sup> And almost everything else available in Western languages on this topic deals exclusively with much later materials. For example, Ernst Steinkellner's study of what can be reconstructed of Jñānaśrīmitra's *Sarvajñāsiddhi* is suggestive and offers very important materials for an analysis of the late (post-Śāntideva) Indian Buddhist position on omniscience.<sup>4</sup> The same is true of Gudrun Bühnemann's recent translation and study of Ratnakīrti's *Sarvajñāsiddhi*;<sup>5</sup> it is considerably more detailed than Steinkellner's work, and is the most systematic presentation to date of the late Indian Buddhist arguments for and against the possibility of omniscience. But because both Steinkellner and Bühnemann deal with late authors, thinkers whose work presupposes all the philosophical innovations that postdate Dignāga, their work is of little help in tracing or understanding the earlier terminological and conceptual developments surrounding the idea of omniscience as an essential property of Buddhahood.<sup>6</sup>

There is, then, no study in a Western language of which I am aware that explores terms for and ideas about omniscience in scholastic Indian

Buddhist texts from an earlier period, specifically from the fourth to sixth centuries CE, a period which saw that great flowering of Buddhist scholastic thought connected with the names of Vasubandhu and Asaṅga. Such terminological analyses are, of course, needed in almost every area of Buddhist studies, but their lack is especially obvious in the study of the technical philosophical texts of this period, and even more especially in the study of those texts connected with the Yogācāra tradition.

An example: a distinction was made by some Indian Buddhist thinkers as early as the second century CE between straightforward omniscience, denoted by *sarvajñāna* and similar compound terms, and a more exalted kind of omniscience denoted by the compound *sarvākārajñatā*. This latter is not present in the texts of early Buddhism: it does not, for example, appear anywhere in the *Nikāyas*. It is used, however, in some Prajñāpāramitā texts,<sup>7</sup> where the distinction between the two kinds of omniscience is conceptually fairly clear and the semantic distinction between the terms used for each is well-marked. Commentaries to this literature often at least mention this distinction, as, for example, does the \**Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*<sup>8</sup> and they sometimes make a great deal of it, as most obviously in the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* and the commentarial tradition following that text.<sup>9</sup>

Several terms for omniscience (including *sarvākārajñatā*) are also found in the texts of the early and classical Yogācāra, most often as one element in a more-or-less systematized list of the good qualities (*guṇa*) of a Buddha,<sup>10</sup> a list some of whose members go back to the texts of early Buddhism but which appears to have become fully standardized as a list only by the time of the systematic Yogācāra works of Asaṅga (ca. late fourth century CE).

One way of pursuing the study of what Buddhist intellectuals meant by claiming that the Buddha was omniscient, then, would be to trace the elaboration of terms for omniscience (with special attention to *sarvākārajñatā*) in the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*-corpus. Since this corpus is large I shall not undertake that task here, although it would prove a fascinating complement both to the studies already mentioned and to that under way here.<sup>11</sup> Instead, I shall analyze the use of terms for omniscience (and especially *sarvākārajñatā*) in one important early Yogācāra text, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* (MSA), and three of its Indic commentaries. My goal, briefly, is to examine *all* those terms which appear to denote (some form of) omniscience; to arrive, through an analysis of all the relevant text-places, at a more precise sense of the semantic range of these terms than has hitherto been available; and to show, by examining the contexts within which talk about omniscience is found in this literature, how ideas about omniscience fit into Yogācāra

epistemology and soteriology. This study is limited in scope (to a single important text and three of its commentaries), but what it loses in that respect it gains, I hope, in depth and completeness. By the end of the study we should have a good idea of how omniscience was understood in one important Yogācāra text-corpus.

The textual base for this study is the following: (1) the verses of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* (MSA), a verse text which may date from the fourth century CE. Its authorship is not well established.<sup>12</sup> The text has 805 verses divided into 21 chapters,<sup>13</sup> and survives in its original Sanskrit only embedded in a prose commentary, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkārabhāṣya* (MSABh, discussed immediately below). The verses of the MSA may never have had independent circulation in India; all the Indic commentaries upon them know them as part of the MSABh. In Tibetan translation the MSA is preserved as an independent text,<sup>14</sup> while in Chinese, as in Sanskrit, it exists only as part of a prose commentary. (2) The MSABh, already mentioned, a systematic prose commentary upon the MSA in which all the MSA's verses are cited and expounded. The authorship of this text too is uncertain, though it is unlikely to have been written very much later than the MSA.<sup>15</sup> It survives in a single Sanskrit manuscript, as well as in Tibetan and Chinese translation.<sup>16</sup> (3) The [*Mahāyāna*] *sūtrālaṅkāravṛttibhāṣya* (MSAVBh),<sup>17</sup> an extensive prose sub-commentary on both MSA and MSABh. This work is attributed to Sthiramati, and thus dates from (perhaps) the mid-sixth century CE.<sup>18</sup> It survives only in Tibetan translation. (4) The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāraṭīkā* (MSAT)<sup>19</sup>, a shorter sub-commentary, attributed to one Asvabhāva.<sup>20</sup> This text is probably later than the MSAVBh, though not by more than a few decades.<sup>21</sup> It too survives only in Tibetan.

Using this body of material I begin by isolating all significant technical terms used to denote omniscience in the MSA and the MSABh.<sup>22</sup> These are listed and discussed, and an attempt is made to ascertain whether the textual strata considered reveal any well-marked semantic and conceptual distinctions among the relevant terms. Then I look more closely at the semantic range of some of the key terms used to denote what it is that a Buddha knows when he knows everything, and how he knows it. Specifically, I concentrate on *artha*, *ākāra*, and derivatives of the verbal root *jñā*. I then analyze the contexts in which omniscience-terms are used in the MSA-corpus. My purpose here is to locate ideas about omniscience within the broader context of early and classical Indian Yogācāra thought. Finally, I offer a few suggestions as to the philosophical implications of the ideas discussed.

This study is thus intended to provide an overview of how terms for

omniscience were used and understood by Indian Yogācāra thinkers from approximately the late fourth century CE to approximately the mid-sixth. The study will be truly systematic, though, only for the MSA and MSABh; for these texts every occurrence of omniscience-terms will be discussed. The comments offered in the MSAṬ and MSAVBh to all the text-places in the MSA and MSABh in which omniscience-terms are found are examined; but naturally this does not mean that every instance of the use of such terms in these commentaries has been located.

§2 OMNISCIENCE-TERMS IN THE  
MAHĀYĀNASŪTRĀLĀNKĀRA-CORPUS

Omniscience-terms occur in the verses of the MSA twelve times: 2.11b; 9.2a; 9.68c; 9.69a; 11.2d; 11.60b; 14.46a; 19.75b; 19.78b1; 19.78b2; 21.12b; and 21.12c. They also occur in the MSABh's comments upon all these text-places (except MSA 19.78b1). Four omniscience-terms are used in the MSABh's comments on MSA 21.12 and two in its comments upon MSA 9.1—2. In addition, a number of omniscience-terms are found in the MSABh in places where no such terms are found in the verse being commented upon: MSABh on MSA 1.12a; MSABh on MSA 1.15; MSABh on MSA 11.1; MSABh on MSA 14.45cd; MSABh on MSA 18.25d; MSABh on MSA 21.8; and MSABh on MSA 21.16 (five terms). This provides a total of thirty-seven separate uses of omniscience-terms, some of them (notably those in MSABh on MSA 21.12 and 21.16) in clusters. The following list gives, in Sanskrit alphabetical order, the terms that occur, together with their frequency if they occur more than once. Terms are given in stem (uninflected) form, and are thus not distinguished from one another if, in the text, they differ only in case and/or number. They are differentiated if, though in other respects identical, they are found as members of compounds whose other members are not identical. So, for example, *bhūtārthasarvajñatva* is listed separately from *sarvajñatvapraptyartha*, even though both compounds contain the same omniscience-term (*sarvajñatva*). Two of the terms (those in MSA 2.11 and MSABh thereto) are given in Tibetan with conjectural Sanskrit forms in parentheses; this is because this portion of the second chapter of the MSABh is missing in Sanskrit.

- asarvajña (MSABh on MSA 21.12)  
asarvajñaceṣṭita (3 occurrences: MSA 21.12b; MSABh thereto,  
twice)  
bhūtārthasarvajñatva (MSABh on MSA 21.12)

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- sakalārthabodha (MSA 19.78b2)  
sarvakleśajñeyāvarāṇanirmala (MSABh on MSA 14.45 cd)  
sarvajña (MSA 21.12c)  
sarvajñajñānamārga (MSABh on MSA 1.15)  
sarvajñatā (MSABh on 11.2d)  
sarvajñatva (MSA 11.60b)  
sarvajñatvapraptyartha (MSABh on 11.60b)  
sarvajñāna (MSABh on 9.69a)  
sarvajñānanimitatva (MSA 9.69a)  
sarvajñeya (2 occurrences: MSA 9.68c; MSABh thereto)  
sarvajñeyaviṣaya (MSABh on MSA 1.12)  
sarvajñeyasarvākārajñāna (2 occurrences: MSABh on MSA  
21.16, twice)  
sarvajñeyasarvākārabodha (MSABh on MSA 19.78b2)  
sarvajñeyārthasaṅgraha (MSABh on MSA 11.1)  
sarvadharmasarvākārajñatā (MSABh on MSA 18.25d)  
sarvākārajñatā (5 occurrences: MSABh on MSA 9.1—2; MSA  
11.2d; MSA 14.46a; MSABh thereto; MSABh on MSA  
21.16)  
sarvākārajñatāvāpti (2 occurrences: MSA 9.2a; MSABh thereto)  
sarvākārajñatāvibhāga (MSABh on MSA 21.16)  
sarvākārajñānavāṣitā (MSABh on MSA 21.8)  
sarvākārabodhyupagamatva (MSABh on MSA 21.16)  
sarvākārasarvārthabodha (MSABh on MSA 19.75b)  
sarvārthabodha (MSA 19.75b)  
sarvāvabodha (MSA 19.78b1)  
mnam pa kun mkhyen «sarvākārajña-?» (MSA 2.11b)  
mnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid «sarvākārajñatā?» (MSABh  
on MSA 2.11b)

All of these omniscience-terms contain a universality-term (*sarva* or *sakala*) and a knowledge-term (some form of the roots *jñā-* or *budh-*). I shall have more to say later about the sense of 'knowledge' in play here. The omniscience-terms are of two basic types. The first I shall call *simple omniscience-terms*: those in which no term intervenes between the universality-term and the knowledge-term to further specify what the knowledge is of. These simple omniscience-terms are, grammatically, of two kinds. First, there are those compounds wherein the universality-term directly modifies the knowledge-term with no oblique case relationship between them. Included in this category are all those compounds in which the gerundive

(*jñeya*) figures, plus two compounds in which the nominal item *jñāna* is directly modified by *sarva* (MSA 9.69a and MSABh thereto). Technically, these are *karmadhāraya* compounds. The correct translation in such cases would be 'all objects of awareness' (for *sarvajñeya* and variants) and 'all awarenesses' (for *sarvajñāna* and variants). A gloss on an omniscience-term of this kind would tend to be a listing of the objects of awareness or kinds of awareness in question — not, of course, an exhaustive listing since this would, presumably, be infinite in length, but more often a listing of types or categories. Second, there are those simple omniscience-terms in which there is an oblique case-relation between the universality-term and the knowledge-term (usually a genitive relationship); such terms would best be translated 'awareness of everything' (for *sarvajñāna* and the like), or 'the condition of being aware of everything' (for *sarvajñatā* and the like).<sup>23</sup>

Complex omniscience-terms are those in which some term does intervene between the universality-term and knowledge-term: it specifies more precisely what the knowledge is of. Good examples are *sarvākārajñatā* and *sakalārthabodha*; in the former the specifying term is *ākāra* and in the latter *artha*, both terms to be discussed in more detail later. These two items might be translated, respectively, 'awareness of all modes of appearance' and 'understanding of all objects'.<sup>24</sup>

The way in which the commentators treat omniscience-terms in the MSA-corpus reveals some patterns, but none that are completely consistent. One of the questions before us in what follows is whether any of the textual strata under examination here shows patterns of use for any of these terms which suggests that clear semantic distinctions among them had yet developed. If there are indeed such patterns of use, one would expect them to be evident in the glosses given by the commentators to the various terms as they occur in the MSA and MSABh. If, for example, there was a well-marked semantic distinction between, on the one hand, complex omniscience-terms such as *sarvākārajñatā*, and, on the other, simple omniscience-terms such as *sarvajñāna* (and I have already suggested that such a distinction was made by some), commentatorial glosses should clearly show it. Such glosses do not, however, reveal any decisive pattern. Complex omniscience-terms are not infrequently glossed with simple omniscience-terms, and vice-versa.<sup>25</sup> This is not a practice that would have been followed without further explanation by these precise and painstaking commentators, unless the terms used were regarded as (near-)synonyms. Simple word-glosses, in which one term from a basic text is glossed by another in a Sanskrit commentary, do not, it is true, indicate strict synonymy between the word glossed and the word glossing.<sup>26</sup> But it would

be very unusual for a commentator to use, as a gloss for a term with a precise technical denotation, a term that he regarded as less precise and more general.<sup>27</sup> It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the use of a simple omniscience-term to gloss a complex one indicates that the difference between them was not always regarded as well-marked.

There is another important indication that, at least in some contexts, the difference between *sarvākārajñatā* and *sarvajñāna* was regarded as insignificant. The translators of these texts into Tibetan sometimes translated *sarvākārajñatā* by a Tibetan term that does not reflect the presence of *ākāra*.<sup>28</sup> While it is true that instances of translation of complex Sanskrit omniscience-terms by simple Tibetan equivalents are not common, that they exist at all supports my suggestion that the semantic distinctions between complex omniscience-terms and simple ones are not well-marked in these texts.<sup>29</sup> More illumination should be gained from a contextual analysis of the ways in which these terms are used in the texts, but, before undertaking that analysis, some comments on the technical terms employed are in order.

### §3 TECHNICAL TERMS: JÑĀNA, ĀKĀRA, ARTHA

I have spoken so far of 'omniscience' as though the Sanskrit term *jñāna* can be straightforwardly translated by the English term 'knowledge'. Unfortunately, matters are not so simple; *jñāna* is not *scientia*, and the semantic range of neither is identical with that of 'knowledge'. So a few comments on the term are necessary before we proceed.

*Jñāna* is a term used in an enormous variety of ways, some vague, some precise. Perhaps most often it is used in connection with discussions of the path (*mārga*). For example, Asaṅga defines the 'path of vision' (*darśanamārga*) in part with the important phrase *samasamālambyālamba-kajñāna*,<sup>30</sup> "the awareness that what takes an object and what is taken as an object are identical." The *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* comments that such an awareness is possible in virtue of "penetration to suchness, which is the non-existence of apprehender and apprehended."<sup>31</sup> What is at issue here (recall that this is offered as a definition of the path of vision, that section of the path upon which one learns to directly perceive the nature of reality) is a certain kind of experiential awareness, an awareness in which no separation between subject and object is present. There is no hint that *jñāna* is being used here to describe assent to the proposition that (*iti*) there is no separation between subject and object (though, of course, if the awareness in question is veridical, this proposition must be true). Instead, it denotes a particular kind of awareness, and in so doing is entirely represen-

tative of the term's use in Yogācāra epistemology and soteriology.<sup>32</sup> *Jñāna* is not, though, just any kind of awareness; it is an awareness with intentional objects (*ālambana* or *artha* or *viṣaya*), an awareness whose content is well-defined and clear.<sup>33</sup> Further, it is an awareness that has functions: its occurrence suggests some action or points toward some goal.<sup>34</sup>

*Jñāna* is not, then, a propositional attitude of any kind, and therefore not any species of belief. This, given standard Western accounts of knowledge (as justified true belief), entails that *jñāna* is not knowledge. Equally, *jñāna* is not a disposition, and the verbal forms derived from *jñā-* in Buddhist philosophical texts (and often in non-Buddhist Indian texts) are thus not, as Ryle claimed *in re* 'to know', verbs of capacity.<sup>35</sup> Rather, such verbs denote cognitive episodes or occurrences (when the episode in question is veridical), or simply mental episodes with specifiable phenomenological characteristics (when the episode in question is not veridical).<sup>36</sup> These are the term's most important connotations in epistemological contexts.

Just as important are the term's uses in soteriological contexts. As one progresses through the *darśanamārga*, the path of vision with its sequence of *dharmajñānāni* and *anvayajñānāni*, one accumulates awareness (*jñānasambhāra*) to the point where one realizes accomplishment in awareness (*jñānasampat*).<sup>37</sup> At this point (see MSA 9.1–3), one's awareness becomes universal. One abandons all constructions (*vikalpa*) and attains the 'awareness of all modes of appearance' (*sarvākārajñatā*). Before turning to an elucidation of what is meant by 'mode of appearance' (*ākāra*), it's worth noting that there are also uses of *jñā-* and derivatives (almost always outside the technical epistemological and soteriological contexts just discussed) which are more general than those just described. One can speak, for example, of the *jñāna* of technical treatises (*sāstra*), and in such cases the meaning of *jñāna* approaches more closely to that of 'knowledge' in English. So I shall usually translate *jñāna* by 'awareness', but sometimes (in less specialized contexts) by 'knowledge'.

*Ākāra* is the specifying word that occurs most frequently in the complex omniscience-terms of the MSA-corpus. When one has a cognitive episode whose scope is universal, one knows all *ākārāḥ*. Etymologically, *ākāra* is a nominal form derived from the root *kr-*, 'to do, to make', together with the prefix *ā*. In conjunction with verbal forms this prefix can sometimes suggest 'back' or 'towards'; so *āgacchati* from *ā* + *gam* (a root meaning 'to go') often means 'to come' ('to go back', 'to go towards'). With *kr-* the prefix *ā* sometimes gives the sense 'to bring near' (towards), or 'to confront'. This derivation had some effect upon the ways in which *ākāra* is used in technical philosophical texts; it often has the sense of 'to confront' or 'to bring face-to-face with'.<sup>38</sup>

In non-technical Sanskrit *ākāra* often denotes simply something's shape or external appearance: to be *ākāravat* is to be shapely. In Pali texts the adjectival form *ākāravatī* is often used to modify *saddhā*; an appropriate translation might be 'well-formed confidence' and an appropriate gloss 'confidence with the right components in the right configuration'. A cognate term *ākṛti*, also a nominal item derived from *ā-kr-*, is extremely important in Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta theories about meaning and reference. A word's *ākṛti* is "a sort of composite, class-contour or concrete universal in virtue of which members of a particular class become individuated."<sup>39</sup> It would not, perhaps, be misleading to think of this "concrete universal" as having a shape (*ākāra*) in virtue of which it is the universal it is and not some other. Indeed, based on this use of *ākṛti*, adherents of the Mīmāṃsā regard a word as producing an *ākāra* in its speakers and hearers. This *ākāra* is, as Madeleine Biardeau puts it, "... l'objet direct de la perception,"<sup>40</sup> a meaning which, as we shall see, is close in some respects to the technical Buddhist usage.

Among Buddhist uses of *ākāra* the most significant for the purposes of this study is its use in basic Buddhist theory of cognition. It was (and is) one of the *termini technici* of this theory, and it is in this context that its use in talk about omniscience is best understood. In the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, an important Buddhist scholastic encyclopaedia by Vasubandhu (also perhaps the author of the MSABh, one of the texts under consideration here), *ākāra* is defined thus: "*ākāra* is that mode under which all thought, together with its concomitant mental events, apprehends objects."<sup>41</sup> The implication is, as the text goes on to state, that every mental event which has an intentional object also has an *ākāra*.<sup>42</sup> Further, according to the basic theory, every mental event does in fact have an intentional object, variously called *ālambana*, *viṣaya*, *vastu* and so forth.<sup>43</sup> These terms are not quite synonymous but the subtle differentiations among them do not need to be explored here. The important point is that every mental event necessarily has some particular phenomenological characteristic or set of such characteristics, some *flavor*. Every mental event has (or, perhaps better, is) a particular way of appearing to its subject. This is its *ākāra*, its 'mode of appearance'. Naturally, any given mental event's *ākāra* will be correlated in some more-or-less precise way with its intentional object.

This view that every mental event has both an intentional object and some phenomenological content (both *ālambana* and *ākāra*) was the subject of much controversy among later Indian Buddhist epistemologists. Notoriously, those later Indian school-books (Buddhist and non-Buddhist), in which the philosophical views of the various sects and schools are schematically set forth for educational purposes, tend to divide Yogācāra

thinkers into *sākāravādinah* and *nirākāravādinah*.<sup>44</sup> The latter are those who think that consciousness is essentially pure and without phenomenological content (*ākāra*) of any kind. The former think that consciousness is essentially intentional and that even the consciousness of an awakened being, a Buddha, must have phenomenological content (though not, of course, the same kind of phenomenological content as that occurring in most instances of everyday consciousness). However, most of the explicit references to this controversy postdate Śāntideva, and the most detailed discussions of it are found in the works of Ratnākaraśānti and Mokṣākara-gupta.<sup>45</sup> There are, however, some hints that the controversy was present, at least *in potentia*, in the texts being studied here. Most significant in this regard is the statement in MSABh on MSA 9.68 that *ādarśajñāna* is *anākāratva*: that the mirror-like awareness (which is identical, as I shall show, to *sarvākārajñatā*) in fact has no modes of appearance, no phenomenological content.<sup>46</sup>

Leaving aside for the moment this debate about whether consciousness is or is not essentially *sākāra*, basic Buddhist theory of cognition yields the following picture. Suppose I have a cognitive episode whose intentional object is a patch of blue color. Whether this intentional object is also thought of as an external object and, if so, what kind, will naturally depend upon one's ontology, and Buddhist scholastics differed seriously among themselves about that. Without, for the moment, taking any ontological decisions, the basic model can be pursued. Our blue patch's mode of appearance (*ākāra*) will be 'blue-patchness' (*nīlatva*). An approximate description of what goes on when the *ākāra* of a mental event comes to the consciousness of a subject (or, perhaps, constitutes it at a given time) is that there will be at that time a blue-patch-appearance.<sup>47</sup> It's important to note that awareness of a mode of appearance, an *ākāra*, on the basic Buddhist theory, precedes both affective reactions to the mode of appearance in question (feeling good or bad about it), and conceptual classification of that mode as something-or-other (for instance, saying to oneself 'this is a blue patch').<sup>48</sup>

This basic account suggests that one can have a mental event whose phenomenological content (its *ākāra*) is very rich and complex without classifying or categorizing it *as* something. The blue-patch example given here is used only for simplicity: it is perfectly possible, for example, to have a mental event whose *ākāra* is the impermanence entailed by the first noble truth (that of suffering, *duḥkha*). Using the jargon so far established, it might be said that the mode of appearance of such a mental event is phenomenologically rich: it consists in something like an 'everything-is-

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suffering-because-it-is-impermanent' appearance. That such a mode of appearance is possible suggests that the category of mental events is not limited to sensory mental events. It includes not only those mental events whose objects are sensory (whether visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, or tactile), but also those whose objects are themselves mental (ideas, concepts and the like). This, of course, is because the class-concept 'consciousness' (*vijñāna*) is not limited in Buddhism to the five sensory consciousnesses. It includes also the mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*).

It is also important to notice that identical objects may produce quite different modes of appearance in different subjects. This fact may be used (together with other ideas) to account for the difference between illusory cognition (accepting as veridical modes of appearance which do not in fact reflect the way things are), and non-illusory cognition (accepting as veridical modes of appearance which do reflect the way things are). This latter, of course, is what Buddhas do. A splendid example of this use of *ākāra* is in the *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* on *Madhyāntavibhāga* 5.15:

[An object] appears dualistically, [split into] subject and object, because it arises [in awareness] with that mode of appearance (*ākāra*). Seeing that [the object] does not exist in the way that it appears [i.e., dualistically] is what not being under a misapprehension about it means.<sup>49</sup>

Here an intentional object's (*artha*) mode of appearance (*ākāra*) is linked explicitly with a verb of appearance (*pratibhāsate*) and contrasted with reality. There is perhaps a suggestion that modes of appearance tend, just because they are appearances, to be appropriately so contrasted; a suggestion, that is, that the very term carries with it some negative connotations. It is not uncommon to find *ākāra* used quite straightforwardly in contexts where 'illusion' is meant. A good example is in the *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa* (verse 27), where an illusory elephant, produced by the power of a mantra (*mantravaśāt*), is said to be "only a mode of appearance" (*ākāramātra*) and is contrasted with a real elephant.<sup>50</sup> It may be, then, that in certain contexts *ākāra* suggests something which is only an appearance and thus necessarily not reality. But I shall return to this point.

I note, finally, a text-place in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* which shows clearly that an instance of conceptualization (*saṃjñā*) can properly be said to have a mode of appearance (*ākāra*), that is, to have phenomenological content;<sup>51</sup> and a series of text places in the *Ālokamālā*, a relatively non-technical digest of Yogācāra thought, in which the significance of *ākāra* for Yogācāra epistemology, ontology, and soteriology is well demonstrated.<sup>52</sup>



Enough has perhaps been said about the use of *ākāra* as part of the battery of technical terms involved in basic Buddhist theory of cognition to suggest that 'mode of appearance' is a possible, if clumsy, translation. The glosses given to *ākāra* in the MSA-corpus support this view of what the term means. Complex omniscience terms with *ākāra* occur seventeen times in the MSA/MSABh, accounting for almost half of all the omniscience terms in those texts, and there are several important glosses and comments upon the term in MSAVBh and MSAṬ. Perhaps most importantly, in his comments on MSA 9.1–3 Sthiramati says:

"Attainment of the awareness of all modes of appearance" [MSA 9.2a = 9.2b in Tibetan]: this [quarter-verse] refers to accomplishment in awareness (*jñānasampar*) which should be understood to mean awareness of all modes of appearance. Here, in virtue of having accurate awareness (*aviparītajñāna*) of impermanence (*anityatā*), suffering (*duḥkhatā*), emptiness (*sūnyatā*), and absence of self (*anātmatva*), one has awareness of all modes of appearance. In being aware of all dharmas without exception — [dharmas] such as the aggregates and the spheres — one has awareness of everything (*sarvajñatā*).<sup>53</sup>

Here, awareness of all modes of appearance (*sarvākārajñatā*) is differentiated from simple omniscience (*sarvajñatā*) in terms of what it is that one is aware of. In the former case, when one is aware of all modes of appearance one's percepts have certain specifiable phenomenological characteristics: they appear characterized by emptiness and so forth. In the latter case these phenomenological characteristics are lacking; when one has simple omniscience one may have direct perceptual acquaintance with all *dharmas* (all existents) and yet not perceive them as they are (*yathābhūtam*). One might, that is, be appeared to by something that actually does exist (spheres, aggregates and so forth, all the usual categories of the ābhīdhārmika), but not in the way that it exists. Recall the extract from the *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* translated earlier. Modes of appearance can be 'mere appearances' if some part of their phenomenological content is inappropriate to that which they represent. Such misrepresentation, it seems, may occur when one has simple omniscience; it does not occur when one has the awareness of all modes of appearance.

It appears that the distinction made here by Sthiramati (between *sarvākārajñatā* and *sarvajñatā*) is roughly the reverse of that made in the \**Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*. Étienne Lamotte's translation of this text suggests that the object of *sarvākārajñatā* is the totality of all the specific defining characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa*) of every specific existent, that which makes each thing (*dharma*) what it is and not something else.<sup>54</sup> In contrast, the object of *sarvajñatā* is those general properties (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) that all specific existents share simply in virtue of being such — properties such

as emptiness and lack of enduring substantive existence.<sup>55</sup> If I have understood Sthiramati's remarks correctly it seems that he is proposing a quite different understanding of these terms. Whereas in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature (and especially in the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*-corpus) śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are aware of the general characteristics of things (that things are empty and so forth) but are not aware of every specific existent, here, in the classical Yogācāra śāstras, the cake is cut differently: *sarvākārajñatā* pertains to the general characteristics of things and *sarvajñatā* to the specifics. I can do no more than speculate about why this is the case. Perhaps the interests of (some of) the Yogācāra theorists in the inherent purity and radiance of consciousness and (in some cases) in its essential freedom from the awareness of specifics and from any phenomenological content led them to downgrade the importance of the awareness of specifics and to upgrade the importance of contentless (*nirākāra*, *nirālambana*) non-dual consciousness (that is, *sarvākārajñatā* understood as contentless mirror-like consciousness). This, if true, is of course paradoxical since the very name of the omniscient state to which they (may have) been giving such a reading indicates that it has phenomenological content.

Sthiramati's interpretation of the difference between *sarvākārajñatā* and simple *sarvajñatā* also points up the fact that an identical object (*ālambana*) can appear in different modes to different subjects. One subject might experience a blue colour-patch, say, as empty and without self, in an essentially non-dualistic mode. Another might experience the same colour-patch as possessing substantive independent existence of its own.

Other glosses on *ākāra*, both in the MSA-corpus and in other approximately contemporaneous texts, fall into two categories: either a list of the standard dharma categories is given (*skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, etc.),<sup>56</sup> or one finds some gloss which uses the basic Buddhist theory of cognition already outlined. In the latter case there is usually a contrast between *ākāra* and *ālambana*, and examples are given of each. It is common to gloss *ālambana* with *rūpādi* ('form/color and so forth'), and *ākāra* with *nilādi* ('blue and so forth'), where *ālambana* denotes the cognitive act's intentional object and *ākāra* its mode of appearance or phenomenological content. For example, Asvabhāva provides such a gloss in his commentary upon MSA 9.68.<sup>57</sup> But perhaps the broadest interpretation given in these texts to *ākāra* is that which makes *sarvākāra* simply equivalent to *sarvajñeya*: 'all modes of appearance' is sometimes understood to be the same as 'all objects of awareness.'<sup>58</sup>

This usage provides a link to that other important specifying term in the complex omniscience-terms of the MSA: *artha*. This word has an extremely

broad semantic range. It can mean 'meaning' (of a word); 'referent' (of a word or an act of cognition); 'object' (in the sense of both goal or aim, and external support), and many other things. It is an important term in many areas of technical Sanskrit discourse, both Buddhist and other, and no full exploration of it can be undertaken here. I shall simply look briefly at the glosses given to it as part of complex omniscience-terms in the MSA-corpus. The majority of its occurrences as such are in MSA 19.75–80; here we find *sarvārthabodha* (19.75b) and *sakalārthabodha* (19.78b2), effectively synonymous expressions meaning something like 'understanding of all objects'. There is also *sarvākārasarvārthabodha* (MSABh on MSA 19.75), meaning 'understanding of all objects in all their modes of appearance.' Asvabhāva and Sthiramati frequently simply identify *artha* and *jñeya*, but sometimes they (especially Sthiramati) are a little more explicit. In his comments upon MSA 19.75b (*sarvāvabodhāt*<sup>59</sup> *sakalārthabodhāt*) Sthiramati says the following:

"Understanding everything" (*sarvāvabodha*) refers to the constructed aspect (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) [of experience]. It is an understanding whose object is all constructed things (*parikalpitadharmā*) [including both] those things that are objects of cognition (*grāhya*), such as form/color, and those things that are cognizers (*grāhaka*), such as the eye. All these are without essence (*svabhāva*), just like a hare's horn (*śaśāsrīga*). "Understanding of all objects" (*sakalārthabodha*) is an understanding of all surface occluded truth (*saṃvṛtīsatya*); it pertains to such objects of awareness (*jñeyadharmā*) as aggregates, spheres, realms, the defiled and the undefiled, and so forth.<sup>60</sup>

On this view, 'objects' (*artha*) are fundamentally unreal (*niḥsvabhāva*). To be aware of all of them is, for Sthiramati, only to be aware of things that are unreal. This goes a good way towards explaining why, in his comments upon the difference between *sarvākārajñatā* and *sarvajñatā* cited above, he devalues awareness of the specific defining characteristics of things so radically. Since he identifies these specifics as belonging to the constructed or imaginary aspect of experience (not, significantly, to the dependent (*paratantra*) realm, a position which would have allowed them more reality) it must follow that there can be no awareness of them when experience is perfected (*pariṇiṣpanna*). Once again we find the paradox: *sarvākārajñatā*, on Sthiramati's view (and perhaps also on that of the MSA) is, in spite of its name, *nirākāra*.

To summarize the investigation so far: the complex omniscience-terms containing *ākāra* and *artha* as specifying terms suggest that omniscience involves being aware of every possible object of awareness. The glosses and comments given, however (especially those in the MSAVBh), suggest that there is some difficulty in understanding exactly what this entails. There is a

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tendency to radically modify the standard-issue Buddhist theory of cognition, which involves 'objects' (*ālambana*) and 'modes of appearance' (*ākāra*), by rejecting the idea that either have any reality. If this is taken seriously it suggests that a genuinely omniscient being, a Buddha, would not have such imaginary (*parikalpita*) things as objects of his awareness, and would therefore not have the modes of appearance that go with them as part of his experience. What this means for the understanding of omniscience found in the MSA-corpus should become clearer after an examination of the broader contexts within which talk about omniscience occurs in that corpus. These contexts may be broadly divided into two kinds. First, that wherein it is linked with mastery of the five sciences; second, that wherein it is identified with Buddhahood proper.

#### §4 THE FIVE SCIENCES AND OMNISCIENCE

In MSA 11.60ab it is said that application to the five sciences is a necessary condition for the attainment of omniscience (*vidyāsthāne pañcavidhe yogam akṛtvā sarvajñatvaṃ naiti*). The MSABh explains that the purpose of gaining mastery over these five sciences considered collectively is precisely the obtaining of omniscience (*sarvajñatvapṛāptyartha*). The 'five sciences' are a standard Buddhist division of knowledge into separate areas, largely for educational purposes; their purpose is analogous to that of the *trivium* or *quadrivium* of the Latin West, or to the departmental structure of a modern American university. The five are: spiritual science (*adhyātmavidyā*); logical science (*hetuvidyā*); grammatical science (*śabdavidyā*); medical science (*cikitsāvidyā*); and the science of fine arts and crafts (*śilpakarmasthānavidyā*). Sthiramati, in his commentary to MSA 11.60, gives extensive analysis to each of these,<sup>61</sup> but his comment on why, considered collectively, these five lead to omniscience, is somewhat disappointing. He says only that knowing all five divisions, completely and accurately, produces omniscience (*sarvajñatā*). It is consonant with his general position that he follows the MSA in using *sarvajñatā* rather than *sarvākārajñatā* here: mastering the five sciences clearly brings one to awareness of specifics, objects with their corresponding modes of appearance, but not to the (perhaps) phenomenologically contentless *sarvākārajñatā*.

In its eighteenth chapter the MSA devotes two verses (18.25–26) to the "knowledge of technical treatises" (*śāstrajñatā*). The MSABh explains that the subject-matter of these technical treatises is precisely the five sciences, and that the result of mastering these sciences is the "awareness of all the modes of appearance of all dharmas" (*sarvadharmasārvākārajñatā*).<sup>62</sup> The

MSABh here uses a different term from that used in its comment on MSA 11.60: there, *sarvajñatva* was used, a simple omniscience-term; here a complex term is introduced, even though the context (mastery of the five sciences) is exactly the same. This is another indication that, in the MSA/MSABh at least, no firm distinction between these terms was recognized.

Sthiramati's comment on MSA 18.25–26 cites the MSABh's use of *sarvadharmasarvākārajñatā*, and explains it using the term *sarvajñajñāna* (*thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes*). He then explains this term (perhaps to be translated as 'the awareness of all awarenesses' or 'the awareness that consists in all awarenesses') as referring to awareness of all dharmas without exception, and gives as examples *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, *āsrava* and *anāsrava* dharmas.<sup>63</sup> *Sarvajñajñāna* is functionally equivalent to *sarvākārajñatā* for Sthiramati as the comment on MSA 18.25–26 suggests, and as is further suggested by the following comment on MSA 11.2:

"As a result of knowing them, the wise obtain the awareness of all modes of appearance." [Citing MSA 11.2c.] "The wise" here means bodhisattvas. "Them" refers to the [texts of the] Tripiṭaka. The meaning is that the bodhisattvas attain the awareness of all awarenesses (*sarvajñajñāna*) upon coming to know [the texts of] the Tripiṭaka. Śrāvakas, in contrast, merely arrive at the awareness of the destruction and non-arising [of the passions]. It is because they do not arrive at the awareness of all modes of appearance (*sarvākārajñatā*) and do not know the [texts of the] Tripiṭaka that they obtain [only] the awareness of the destruction and non-arising [of the passions].<sup>64</sup>

The MSA/MSABh, in this same context, shows once again that these texts make no clear distinction between simple omniscience-terms and complex ones: *sarvākārajñatā* is used in MSA 11.2d, and glossed with *sarvajñatā* in the MSABh.<sup>65</sup>

In sum: the MSA and MSABh teach that mastery of the five sciences leads to *sarvajñatva* (11.60ab). Sthiramati follows them in this. The MSA and MSABh also teach (18.25–26) that these five sciences can be mastered through those śāstras that explain them, and that when this is done *sarvākārajñatā* results. Sthiramati also follows them here, using the term *sarvajñajñāna*. Finally, in MSA/MSABh 11.1–2, both simple and complex omniscience-terms are used to describe the results of mastering the Tripiṭaka; Sthiramati uses only complex omniscience-terms (*sarvākārajñatā* and *sarvajñāna*). The only evidence to suggest any meaningful attempt to differentiate among the terms used is in Sthiramati's comment on the MSABh's discussion of MSA 11.1. The MSABh says that the Tripiṭaka comprises all objects of awareness (*sarvajñeyārthasaṅgraha*), and Sthiramati's list of such shows an interesting difference from the usual list (*skandhadhātvaḍi*, on which see above). Here he extends the list to include "bodies" (*skukāya*)

and "awarenesses." (*ye shes/jñāna*).<sup>66</sup> I take these terms to refer to the (four) kinds of awareness for which *sarvākārajñatā* is an umbrella-term, and with which Buddhahood itself is identical,<sup>67</sup> and to the (three) Buddha-bodies.<sup>68</sup> The addition of these terms extends the list of what is known when omniscience is attained beyond the usual categories of the (so-called) śrāvakayāna ābhidhārmika, to include specifically Yogācāra doctrinal items. And in such a context, something more than simple omniscience — the awareness of all defining characteristics of all specific existents — is required. This appears to be why Sthiramati uses *sarvākārajñatā* here, in contrast to the MSA/MSABh. It is relevant to remember at this point that one of the themes of the MSA is the importance of establishing the validity of the Mahāyāna scriptures (and especially their salvific efficacy) over against the criticisms of their cultured 'Hīnayāna' despisers. Sthiramati takes this enterprise a step further than did the MSA/MSABh by linking it to the distinction between *sarvajñatā* and *sarvākārajñatā*, a distinction not firmly and clearly made in the earlier texts.

#### §5 BUDDHAHOOD AND OMNISCIENCE

According to Sthiramati, Buddhahood simply is *sarvākārajñatā*.<sup>69</sup> It is also identical with the four kinds of awareness that collectively constitute awakening and that occur at the culmination of the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*). In MSA 14.42–46 the concluding phases of this path are described, including, as its culmination, the attainment of that "unexcelled position" (*anuttarapada*) which is the awareness of all modes of appearance.<sup>70</sup> According to the discussions given to this by both Sthiramati and Asvabhāva, the term *sarvākārajñatā* in this context is to be identified with that transcendent unconstructed awareness (*lokottaranirvikalpajñāna*) which occurs at the moment when all cognitive and affective obstacles are removed; it is *not* the same as the subsequently-attained worldly awareness (*laukikapṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna*) which follows the transcendental awareness and whose function it is to allow Buddhas to teach dharma, help sentient beings, and so forth. Sthiramati explicitly identifies *sarvākārajñatā* with "accomplishment in awareness" (*jñānasamṣat*) and with "accomplishment in what is of benefit to oneself" (*svārthasamṣat*). It is the actions made possible by the occurrence of such awareness that are identified with "accomplishment in what is of benefit to others" (*parārthasamṣat*) — and this is based upon subsequently-attained worldly awareness.<sup>71</sup> Following this reading, it seems that *sarvākārajñatā*, when identified with Buddhahood, is not different from transcendent non-discriminative awareness; this, in turn, is identical with the

first of the 'four awarenesses', *ādarśajñāna* or 'mirror-like awareness', treated in MSA 9.68–69. This mirror-like awareness is, according to the MSA, the basis (*āśraya*) and cause (*hetu*) of the other three; the key verse on this is MSA 9.68, which I here translate in full together with the MSABh's commentary:

[MSA]: Mirror-like awareness is without anything of its own/It is not demarcated and always follows/It is always free from confusion about objects of knowledge/And never confronts them/ [MSABh]: Mirror-like awareness is without "anything of its own." From spatial viewpoint it is "not demarcated" and from a temporal viewpoint it "always follows." It is "free from confusion about objects of awareness" because it is always separated from obstacles. It "never confronts them" because it has no modes of appearance.<sup>72</sup>

Here a number of properties are said to belong to mirror-like awareness. First, it is "without anything of its own", literally "without mine" (*amama*), without any possessions or possessiveness. Then it is "not demarcated" (*aparicchinna*), without boundary, not marked off from other things, without shape. The term "always follows" (*sadānuga*) is ambiguous as it stands; it could have either a spatial or a temporal reference. The MSABh gives it a temporal one (*kālataḥ*) and understands it to mean that mirror-like awareness is present at all times. Then it is "free from confusion about objects of awareness" (*sarvajñeṣv asaṃmūḍha*); this too is imprecise since it doesn't specify what the objects of awareness about which it is not confused are (ontologically) like. Being aware of them without confusion could mean anything from being aware of nothing at all (if there are no objects of knowledge) to being aware of, precisely and accurately, an infinitely large number of spiritual monads (on, say, a Leibnizian ontology). The MSABh's comment here is purely formal. Finally, and most interestingly, mirror-like awareness is said not to "confront" objects of awareness, not to place itself face-to-face with them, not to direct itself towards them. The MSABh explicitly says that mirror-like awareness does not engage in (epistemic) confrontation because it is without "modes of appearance". This statement, more than anything else yet mentioned, seems to favour the *nirākāravāda* view of consciousness and to point up the paradox that *sarvākārajñatā* may actually be *anākāratva*. What then do Asvabhāva and Sthiramati make of this?

Asvabhāva's commentary on this verse begins by quoting the first two predicates applied to *ādarśajñāna* — that it is "without mine" (*amama*) and "not demarcated" (*aparicchinna*) and goes on to say:

This means that there is no 'mine' because [the mirror-like awareness] does not create the ideas 'I' or 'mine', and there is no cognizer (*grāhaka*) or object of cognition (*grāhya*) in it.<sup>73</sup>

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On the statement in the MSABh that "it never confronts them because it has no modes of appearance" (*na ca teṣv āmukham anākāratvāt*) Asvabhāva says:

[The mirror-like awareness] does not function in accordance with the division of objects into such things as form/color, nor in accordance with the division of modes of appearance into such things as blue. This is because it is an unconstructed awareness (*nirvikalpajñāna*) in which what takes an object and what is taken as an object are identical (*samasamālambyā-lambakanirvikalpajñāna*),<sup>74</sup> and whose object is suchness.<sup>75</sup>

Having suchness — the way things really are — as the object of one's awareness entails, it would seem, that one's awareness has no modes of appearance.

Sthiramati's comments on MSA 9.68 consist largely in extensive citations from the *Buddhabhūmisūtra* (BBhS) one of the few texts which it seems fairly certain was a source for whoever wrote the MSA.<sup>76</sup> Sthiramati's first citation from the BBhS runs thus:

In a mirror-maṇḍala there are many and varied modes of appearance (*ākāra*) and yet there are no modes of appearance therein. Also, in a mirror-maṇḍala there is neither effort (*ābhoga*)<sup>77</sup> nor directed activity (*abhisamskāra*). In just the same way, the reflected images (*pratibimba*) in the mirror-like awareness belonging to Tathāgatas have many and varied modes of appearance, and yet there are no reflected images at all in this mirror-like awareness. Also, the reflected images belonging to the mirror-like awareness are free from effort and directed activity.<sup>78</sup>

Śīlabhadra's commentary<sup>79</sup> on this section of the BBhS stresses the effortlessness and spontaneity with which a mirror reflects its objects; these characteristics of Buddhahood are fundamentally important for all our texts. But he makes no attempt to deny, or even to question, that mirrors do reflect objects and that the reflected images produced do have phenomenological content, specific modes of appearance (*ākāra*). By extension, it would seem, a Buddha's mirror-like awareness must also have modes of appearance.<sup>80</sup>

Sthiramati's comment on the line "is always free from confusion about objects of knowledge" makes still more explicit the comparison between the mirror-like awareness and the workings of a mirror:

As for what appears in the mirror-like awareness: since it is free from those obstacles that are the passions and those obstacles to knowable objects, then, just as reflected images (*pratibimba*) with a variety of modes of appearance appear in the surface of a mirror (*ādarśatāla*), so the awareness of all modes of appearance of knowable objects (*jñeyasarvākārajñatā*) appears therein. It is because such awareness has been arrived at that [a Buddha] is said to be free from confusion about all knowable objects.<sup>81</sup>

Sthiramati then goes on to cite another long extract from the BBhS in

support of the idea that the Buddha's awareness is based upon a completely clean and dust-free mirror-surface.<sup>82</sup>

Sthiramati's comment on the line "and never confronts them" stresses the difference between the usual activity of the sensory consciousnesses (that of demarcating one object from another and labelling the demarcated results as members of some class-category) and the 'activity' of a mirror. This latter, while it reflects images, neither discriminates nor labels them, and it is in virtue of this absence of conceptual construction (*vikalpa*) that mirror-like awareness is said to not confront objects.<sup>83</sup> This too is supported by a lengthy quotation from the BBhS.<sup>84</sup>

Finally, in commenting upon MSA 9.69ab, which says of mirror-like awareness that it is the cause of all awarenesses and thus like a great mine (*ākara*) of awareness, Sthiramati says explicitly that the other three awarenesses (*samatā*, *pratyavekṣaṇa*, and *krtyānuṣṭhāna*) come from it, and then quotes both the *Tathāgatoṣṭipattisaṃbhavanirdeśasūtra* and a further extract from the BBhS in support of this.<sup>85</sup>

It is interesting to note that Sthiramati, unlike Asvabhāva, does not choose to comment on the MSABh's statement that mirror-like awareness is *anākāratva*. It is probable that by Sthiramati's time the use of this term as a predicate for mirror-like awareness was already controversial, while for the MSA/MSABh it could be used simply because its philosophical implications had not yet been fully worked out. Asvabhāva does cite the term, as we have seen, and in commenting upon it comes close to an interpretation of consciousness which sees it as essentially pure, empty, and contentless, the position that was later to be labelled *nirākāravāda*. Sthiramati, in this context at least, is more circumspect.

This yields the following picture: in the MSA and MSABh a consistent semantic distinction between *sarvākārajñatā* and *sarvajñatā* is not made. The terms are used almost interchangeably, and the idea of omniscience which they are used to express seems relatively imprecise. For these texts, omniscience can result either from mastery of the five sciences (or, more precisely, from mastery over the technical treatises in which the matter of these sciences is contained), or from the following of the Buddhist soteriological path to its end. In the second case, omniscience results from that radical transformation of the cognitive and perceptual mechanisms of the practitioner which occurs at the final moments of the path of cultivation. These cognitive and perceptual mechanisms usually operate with discriminative effort: they are both intentional, in the technical sense (*sālabhāna*, *sākāra*), and also attentive, pushed by the conscious and subconscious needs and desires of the individual (his *bija* and *vāsanā*) to seek certain

things and reject others. All this changes suddenly at the end of the path of cultivation: instead of functioning as a searchlight does, questing and focusing, consciousness becomes like a perfectly clean and pure mirror. As such, it becomes capable of reflecting *every* knowable object.

This is the general picture. But I have also tried to show that the later commentators occasionally try to make further and more precise distinctions. They show a stronger tendency to reserve the term *sarvākārajñatā* for contexts in which universal awareness of the specific defining characteristics of existents is *not* what is intended (for this they reserve the term *sarvajñatā*). They also, as a natural consequence of making that distinction, show a greater interest in the possibility that mirror-like awareness actually has no modes of appearance at all: that, paradoxically, the awareness of all modes of appearance is without modes. This is suggested by the idea that suchness, the way everything really is and the object (*ālambana*) of mirror-like awareness, is not internally differentiated and thus cannot possibly give rise to variegated and changing modes of appearance. Omniscience, on this view, becomes empty, pure, contentless: the mirror reflects nothing but its own inherent radiance.

There is another possible reading, suggested perhaps most strongly by the BBhS and by some elements in the MSA and MSABh: that suchness should not be interpreted in the radical sense just described, but should rather be understood simply as the totality of all modes of appearance. If this line is followed, *sarvākārajñatā* becomes a truly variegated reflection of everything that is, a phenomenologically rich cognitive state (than which there is none richer) which reflects, simply, everything just as it is. The only cognitive properties lacking in *sarvākārajñatā* on this second view would be those proper to erroneous cognitions — including, of course, a dualistic subject-object structure and the like. If this reading is accepted, then mirror-like awareness is still *nirvikalpa* but not *nirākāra*.

Which of these two readings is accepted depends, in large part, on how one understands the ontological status of the variegated modes of appearance that constitute everyday experience. All our texts (and, I think, the entire Yogācāra tradition) agree that the dualistic nature of everyday experience is delusory. But they do not agree as to the status of what is left when the delusion is removed. For Sthiramati, as I have suggested, all objects of knowledge are imaginary, constructed (*parikalpita*); this means, *ex hypothesi*, that all separate and variegated modes of experience are also such, and the attainment of mirror-like awareness means precisely that one reaches a condition in which there are no modes of appearance: *sarvākāratva* entails *anākāratva*. But it might be possible to categorize non-dualistic modes

of appearance not as non-existent but rather as dependently existent (*paratantra*), and thus real (though not, of course, independently and substantively real). If this view is taken, the variety of modes of appearance which constitutes experience can be validated as (dependently) real, and the mirror of mirror-like awareness can appropriately be said to reflect everything, every specific mode of appearance rightly cognized.

#### §6 PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS

It has become almost entirely standard in recent Anglo-American philosophy of religion to assume that for any being to be omniscient it is certainly necessary (and probably sufficient) for that being to know every true proposition.<sup>86</sup> This assumption is parasitic upon the standard propositional account of what it is to know: if belief is a propositional attitude and knowledge a species of belief, then it would seem to follow that a being who knows everything has all and only true beliefs. Once this basic account is accepted, debate centers upon the difficulties generated by it. Notable here is the problem of whether it is possible to give an account of *de re* and *de se* beliefs (beliefs that apparently have as their object things, in the former case, and oneself in the latter) which shows them to be species of *de dicto* (propositional) beliefs. Pressing also is the question of counterfactual conditionals: for example, *if Geraldine Ferraro had been elected vice-president in 1984 she would have run for president in 1988*. Do such sentences (and the propositions they express) have truth-value? There is also a certain amount of attention now being paid to the basic issue of whether the (post-Frege) 'standard' account of belief as a propositional attitude holds water, even for normal human beliefs.<sup>87</sup> All of these problems (and more I haven't mentioned) have generated an enormous literature, and a full exploration of any one of them would require a substantial monograph to itself. My purpose here is different: I mention this semi-universal<sup>88</sup> propositional account of God's omniscience for the purpose of contrast. It should have become abundantly clear by now that the model of omniscience set forth in the MSA-corpus is very different. The knowledge at issue here is not a species of belief but rather a species of direct unmediated awareness, and a discussion of some of the implications of this will conclude this study.

I have tried to show that *ākārah*, modes of appearance, are phenomenological properties of mental events. In the Yogācāra tradition generally (and the remarks that follow will apply in broad outline to the MSA-corpus as well), mental events are all that exist. Representations (*vijñapti*) in mental continua (*saṃtāna*) are the furniture of the universe. This is what is meant

by *vijñaptimātratā*. Representations have modes of appearance; they are phenomenologically marked. It is by its phenomenological characteristics that one representation can be individuated from another. However, since each representation and its corresponding mode of appearance is radically dependent upon others for its existence (it belongs, in terms of the *trisvabhāva* theory, to the *paratantra*), any individuation of one from another must necessarily be a purely conventional enterprise, much like individuating a pond's ripple from the pond. What exists, on the Yogācāra view, is a (relatively) seamless fabric of representations with modes of appearance, variegated and complex, changing through time, but emphatically not composed of substantively separable parts.

Given this view, the awareness of all modes of appearance must be an atemporal and changeless cognitive condition, a condition in which all modes of appearance (and their causal connections) are immediately present to the awareness of the experiencer. It must be atemporal because time is constituted by the causal process and *sarvākārajñatā* is emphatically not part of this; it must be changeless because it knows (reflects, is directly aware of) the entire seamless (though variegated) fabric of reality. This is what is meant by phrases such as the 'thingness of things' (*dharmāṇām dharmatā*) and 'suchness' (*tathatā*). The model of knowledge used here, then, is clearly an intuitive one, one of direct unmediated presence: one is aware of a mode of appearance at any given time if and only if that mode of appearance is a constitutive element of one's awareness at that time.

For a human knower this would be a radical constraint on the range of knowledge. For if we could know only what is directly present to our awareness at any given time, we would know very little of what we ordinarily take ourselves to know. As I sit in my study writing this, for example, I do not have immediately present to my awareness my mother-in-law's maiden name or the fact that  $2 + 6 = 8$ . What I do have, of course, is the disposition to assent to the propositions expressed by *my mother-in-law's maiden name is Rudd* and  $2 + 6 = 8$  in the proper circumstances (such as those constituted by my writing this sentence). And this is why we ordinarily want to say that we know much more than what we are currently aware of.

But it can plausibly be argued that this is a limitation and imperfection in us, that the ideal knower would have no dispositional knowledge of this sort, but only occurrent knowledge.<sup>89</sup> A Yogācāra theorist would say that it is the presence of cognitive blocks of various kinds (*jñeyāvaraṇa*) that creates the limitations upon our modes of knowing, and that since a Buddha has no such blocks, all of his knowledge is occurrent. It is, of course, also

unmediated; Buddhas do not construct class-concepts, categorize, or label the objects of their experience. To do so would be to engage in *vikalpa*, using *saṃjñā*, *prapañca* and so forth. Instead, Buddhas directly reflect the objects of their awareness without any distortion. Some elements of this model of omniscience, I think, deserve attention from Anglophone philosophers of religion. It seems that this model avoids many of the pressing conceptual problems inherent in any propositional model of omniscience, and that it works with a model of what it is to know that is intuitively more perfect, more proper to an omniscient being, than is the propositional one.<sup>90</sup>

In conclusion: the model of omniscience developed in the MSA-corpus (and in the Yogācāra tradition in general) is intimately linked with a particular ontology, and probably stands or falls with that ontology. It's important, finally, to note the limitations placed upon a Buddha's *sarvākārajñatā* by this ontology. First, the mirror of a Buddha's mirror-like awareness reflects only representations with modes of appearance not characterized by division into subject and object: Buddhas can therefore not know what it is like to be a subject confronting an object. Second, mirror-like awareness intends nothing: Buddhas can therefore not know what it is to have volitions. Third, mirror-like awareness is not subject to temporal change.<sup>91</sup> Buddhas can therefore have no anticipations and no memories.<sup>92</sup>

APPENDIX: LOCATIONS OF OMNISCIENCE-TERMS  
IN THE MSA-CORPUS

(The *sems-tsam* division of DT is assumed in the references that follow)

MSABh on MSA 1.12: Lévi 5; Bagchi 5; DT PHI 132a4—6

MSAT: no comment

MSAVBh: DT MI 23a7—24a3

MSABh on MSA 1.15: Lévi 6—7; Bagchi 6; DT PHI 132b6—133a5.

MSAT: DT BI 47a2—4

MSAVBh: DT MI 25a5—26b2

MSA 2.11: (Sanskrit text lost). DT PHI 136b2—5

MSAT: DT BI 50a5—6

MSAVBh: DT MI 39a2—39b6

MSA 9.1—3: Lévi 33—34; Bagchi 37; DT PHI 152b2—5

MSAT: DT BI 65b7—66b1

MSAVBh: DT MI 105b4—107b6

MSA 9.68—69: Lévi 46—47; Bagchi 48—49; DT PHI 160a5—160b1

MSAT: DT BI 74a3—74b3

MSAVBh: DT MI 139a3—140b1

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MSA 11.1—2: Lévi 53—54; Bagchi 55; DT PHI 164a2—164b4

MSAT: DT BI 78a1—79a3

MSAVBh: DT MI 157a7—157b4

MSA 11.60: Lévi 70; Bagchi 70; DT PHI 176a2—6

MSAT: no comment

MSAVBh: DT MI 202b2—203b6

MSA 14.42—46: Lévi 96; Bagchi 93—94; DT PHI 194a4—194b3

MSAT: DT BI 115a6—115b5

MSAVBh: DT MI 279b2—280b5

MSA 18.25—26: Lévi 136—137; Bagchi 131—132; DT PHI 223a1—223b1

MSAT: DT BI 143b2—144a4

MSAVBh: DT TSI 191b3—193b6

MSA 19.75—80: Lévi 174—175; Bagchi 166—167; DT PHI 249a5—250a5

MSAT: DT BI 162b6—163b3

MSAVBh: DT TSI 229a5—233a3

MSA 21.8: Lévi 185—6; Bagchi 177; DT PHI 257b5—7

MSAT: DT BI 171b5—6

MSAVBh: commentary lost

MSA 21.12: Lévi 186—187; Bagchi 178; DT PHI 258b2—5

MSAT: DT BI 173b4—5

MSAVBh: commentary lost

MSA 21.16: Lévi 188; Bagchi 179; DT PHI 259b1—4

MSAT: DT BI 174a1—2

MSAVBh: commentary lost

NOTES

Abbreviations

AA	Abhisamayālaṅkāra
AAA	Abhisamayālaṅkāraloka
AKK	Abhidharmakośakārikā
AKBh	Abhidharmakośabhāṣya
AKV	Abhidharmakośavyākhyā [tattvārthanāma]
BBhS	Buddhabhūmisūtra
BBhV	Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna
BoBh	Bodhisattvabhūmi
CE	Christian era
CT	Cone Tanjur
DT	Derge Tanjur
IBK	Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū
MS	Mahāyānasāṅgraha
MSA	Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra
MSABh	Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkārabhāṣya

MSAT	Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāratīkā
MSAVBh	[Mahāyāna] sūtrālaṅkāravṛttibhāṣya
MSU	Mahāyānasāṅgrahopanibandhana
PT	Peking Tanjur
RGV	Ratnagotravibhāga
WZKS	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens
WZKSO	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens

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<sup>1</sup> For example: *natthi so samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā yo sakideva sabbañ ñassati sabbaṃ dakkhīti . . . netan thānam vijjati* (V. Trenckner et al., eds., *Majjhima-Nikāya* [4 vols; London: Pali Text Society, 1888–1925] 2: 127; cp. 1: 519). For some discussion see: A. K. Coomaraswamy, "Rebirth and Omniscience in Pali Buddhism," *Indian Culture* 3 (1936): 19–34; K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1963), 203ff.

<sup>2</sup> See Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, 81ff.

<sup>3</sup> Padmanabh S. Jaini, "On the Sarvajñatva (Omniscience) of Mahāvira and the Buddha," in *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner*, ed. Lance S. Cousins, A. Kunst, and K. R. Norman (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974), 71–90.

<sup>4</sup> Ernst Steinkellner, "Jñānaśrimitra's Sarvajñasiddhi," in *Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems*, ed. Lewis Lancaster (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 383–393.

<sup>5</sup> Gudrun Bühnemann, *Der allwissende Buddha: Ein Beweis und seine Probleme. Ratnakīrti's Sarvajñasiddhi übersetzt und kommentiert* (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien, 1980).

<sup>6</sup> There are many other works (mostly in German) which are relevant to an understanding of the ideas underlying later Indian Buddhist thought about omniscience. Among these are Steinkellner's studies of *yogipratyakṣa* ("Yogische Erkenntnis als Problem in Buddhismus," in *Transzendenzforschung: Vollzugshorizont des Heils: Das Problem in indischer und christlicher Tradition*, ed. Gerhard Oberhammer [Vienna: De Nobili Research Library, 1978], 121–134) and of the spiritual significance of epistemology in the Buddhist tradition ("The Spiritual Place of the Epistemological Tradition in Buddhism," *Nanto Bukkyō* 49 [1982]: 1–15). I have also found many of Lambert Schmithausen's works essential as background for the study presented here: his analysis of Sautrāntika terminology in the *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā* ("Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen in Viṃśatikā und Triṃśikā," *WZKSO* 11 [1967]: 109–137) is a model of how terminological studies of this kind should be done, and his studies of the awakening-experience and its philosophical implications are also very suggestive. For these latter see: "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism," in *German Studies on India II* (Bombay: Nachiketa Publications, 1976), 235–251; "On Some Aspects of Descriptions or Theories of 'Liberating Insight' and 'Enlightenment' in Early Buddhism," in *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus*, ed. Klaus Bruhn and Albrecht Wezler (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1981), 199–250. There are, in addition, a number of relevant studies in Japanese. See especially Kawasaki Shinjō, "Issaichi to issaichichi," *Mikkyōgaku kenkyū* 13 (1981): 1–14; "Shohō o kiban toshite issaichi-issaishūchi," in *Hirakawa Akira hakase kokikinen ronshū: Bukkyō shisō no shomondai* (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1985), 355–372.

<sup>7</sup> For example in the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* and the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*. Étienne Lamotte (*Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse de Nāgārjuna* [Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, 1944–81], 1744) has noted and discussed these occurrences.

<sup>8</sup> Lamotte, *Le traité*, 640–642, 1742–1744.

<sup>9</sup> A distinction between three kinds of omniscience — *sarvākārajñatā*, *mārgajñatā*, and simple *sarvajñatā* — is the first major topic (*padārtha*) of the AA, and it underlies and is important for almost the whole of the rest of the text. All the commentaries thus necessarily give a good deal of attention to the topic: Haribhadra's AA is especially rich in this respect. The AA is, of course, classed as one of the "five books of Maitreya" by a late Tibetan tradition, and thus sometimes discussed as though it belongs to the Yogācāra tradition. Whatever conclusions are reached about the historicity of the attribution to Maitreya, there is no doubt that formally the AA is, as Stcherbatsky long ago put it, "... a *prajñāpāramitā*-upadeśa and it is a śāstra, that is to say a systematical exposition of the *Prajñāpāramitā* doctrine, of its practical side . . ." (Th. Stcherbatsky and Ernst Obermiller, eds., *Abhisamayālaṅkāra-Prajñāpāramitā-Upadeśa-Śāstra, the work of Bodhisattva Maitreya* [Tokyo: Meicho-fukyu-kai, 1983], v). It thus makes more sense to consider it as representative of a different (though not entirely separate) textual tradition from that represented by the MSA and MS.

<sup>10</sup> This list is found in embryonic form in the twenty-first *adhikāra* of the MSA, in which nineteen verses are devoted to listing them. I regard these verses as constituting a separate chapter of the MSA. The Sanskrit manuscript of MSABh does not mark a chapter-division here, but the Tibetan translation of MSA (PT, though not DT) does, and the manuscript witness to the chapter divisions of the MSABh, as both Sylvain Lévi and Sitansusekhar Bagchi have already noted in their editions of this work, is confused. See Lévi, *Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṅkāra: Exposé de la doctrine du Grand Véhicule selon le système Yogācāra*, (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1907, 1911); Bagchi, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra: of Asaṅga* (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1970). The *gūṇas* are usually said to be 21 in number and are given in the following order: \*1 four *apramāna* (21.1); \*2 eight *vimokṣa* (21.2); \*3 eight *abhibhāvayātana* (21.2); \*4 ten *kṛtsnāyatana* (21.2); \*5 one *araṇā* (21.2); \*6 one *prañidhijñāna* (21.4); \*7 four *pratisamvid* (21.5); \*8 six *abhijñā* (21.6); \*9 thirty-two *lakṣaṇa* (21.7); \*10 eighty *anuvyañjana* (21.7); \*11 four *parisuddhi* (21.8); \*12 ten *bala* (21.9); \*13 four *vaiśāradya* (21.10); \*14 three *araksā* or *āraksā*; \*15 three *smṛtyupasthāna* (21.11); \*16 one *vāsanāsamudghāta* (21.12); \*17 one *asaṃmoṣatā* (21.13); \*18 one *mahākaraṇā* (21.14); \*19 eighteen *āvenikadharmā* (21.15); \*20 one *sarvākārajñatā* (21.16); \*21 one *pāramitāparipūrī* (21.17). The two concluding verses (MSA 21.18–19) are summary verses detailing six *buddhalakṣaṇa*. These same nineteen verses are quoted by Asaṅga in the tenth chapter of the MS. See Étienne Lamotte, *La somme du grand véhicule d'Asaṅga* (Louvain: Bibliothèque de la Muséon, 1938), 1: 87–90; also Noriaki Hakamaya, John P. Keenan, and Paul J. Griffiths, *The Realm of Awakening* (forthcoming from Oxford University Press in 1989), §H\*. A very similar list is found in the AS. See V. V. Gokhale "Fragments from the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaṅga," *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 23 (1947): 37–38; Pralhad Pradhan, ed., *Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaṅga* (Santiniketan: Visvabharati, 1950), 94–101. A lengthy comment can be found in the ASBh. See Nathmal Tatia, ed., *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣyam* (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1976), 124–133. A somewhat similar list is found in the *pratiṣṭhā* chapter of the BoBh. See Nalinaksha Dutt, ed., *Bodhisattvabhūmiḥ* (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1978), 259–282. See also the fourth chapter of the RGV: E. H. Johnston, ed., *The Ratnagotravibhāga-Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra* (Patna: Bihar Research Society, 1950), 98–114. These verses are also preserved as an independent text in the *bṣtan 'gyur* (Tōhoku \*2007), where they are attributed to Asaṅga. On this see Hakamaya Noriaki, "Chos kyi sku la gnas pa'i yon tan la bstod pa to sono kanren bunken," *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyōgakubu Ronshū* 14 (1983): 342–324.

<sup>11</sup> An investigation of this kind is currently being undertaken by Mr. Alex Naughton, a doctoral student in the Buddhist Studies Program at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

<sup>12</sup> The colophon of the Tibetan translation of MSA attributes it to Maitreya (DT sems-tsam PHI 39a2–3; PT, sems-tsam PHI 43b2–3). The question of Maitreya's historicity is too



complex to enter into here. See, classically, Giuseppe Tucci, *On Some Aspects of the Doctrines of Maitreya[nātha] and Asaṅga* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1930). More recently Noriaki Hakamaya, "Chibetto ni okeru Maitreya no gohō no kiseki," in *Chibetto no bukkyō to shakai*, ed. Yamaguchi Zuihō (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1986), 235–268.

<sup>13</sup> Following the Tibetan version of MSA (PT, but not DT), I regard the chapter given as 20–21 in Lévi's and Bagchi's editions of the Sanskrit text of MSABh as consisting in two chapters. The division should be placed after verse 42 of Lévi's chapter 20–21. Chapter 21 of MSA thus has nineteen verses (= 20–21.43–61 in Lévi and Bagchi). There is also a problem with the total number of verses in the MSA: it is unclear whether there are fourteen or fifteen verses in the tenth (*adhimukti*) chapter. The Sanskrit manuscript has fourteen; following the unanimous witness of the Tibetan translation of MSA and the Tibetan translations of all commentaries that I have consulted, I would prefer to read fifteen (a section given as prose in the Sanskrit manuscript could in fact easily be verse). But this is a topic which warrants detailed discussion of its own.

<sup>14</sup> Tōhoku #4020, DT sems-tsam PHI 1b1–39a4; Peking #5521, PT sems-tsam PHI 1b1–43b3; CT sems-tsam PHI 1a1–37a4.

<sup>15</sup> The colophon of the sole surviving manuscript of the Sanskrit text attributes it to one Vyavadātasamayamahābodhisattva (manuscript 217–218). The colophon of the Tibetan translation of MSABh provides an equivalent: Byang chub sems dpa' chen po rtogs pa nam par byang ba (DT sems-tsam PHI 260a5–7). But Bu-ston, in his *dkar-chag*, attributes it to Vasubandhu (Nishioka Soshū, "Bu-Ston Bukkyō-shi mokurokubu sakui," *Annual Report of the Institute for the Study of Cultural Exchange* [University of Tokyo 5 [1981]] 56), while the Chinese tradition attributes it to Asaṅga.

<sup>16</sup> The Sanskrit manuscript has been edited by Sylvain Lévi and by Sitansusekhar Bagchi. It (or possibly a copy of it) is available in microfiche from the IASWR, ms. #MBB-1971–83. It is legibly written on paper in *devanāgarī* and comprises 218 sheets. Tibetan translation: Tōhoku #4026, DT sems-tsam PHI 129b1–260a7; Peking #5527; CT sems-tsam PHI 124b1–255a7. Chinese translation: Taishō #1604. See also Ui Hakuju, *Daijō Shōgon Kyōron no Kenkyū* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1961) for the Chinese text and a complete Japanese translation (based on the Sanskrit original as well as on the Chinese version).

<sup>17</sup> Tōhoku #4034, DT sems-tsam MI 1b1–283a7; TSI 1b1–266a7.

<sup>18</sup> On dating see Erich Frauwallner, "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic," *WZKS* 5 (1961): 125–148; Kajiyama Yuichi, "Bhāvaviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla," *WZKS* 12–13 (1968): 193–203; Hakamaya Noriaki, "Sthiramati and Śūabhadra," *IBK* 25 (1977): 35–37.

<sup>19</sup> Tōhoku #4029, DT sems-tsam BI 38b6–174a7.

<sup>20</sup> The author's name is not certain. The Tibetan Ngo bo nyid med pa could reflect either Asvabhāva or Nihsvabhāva and I have not been able to trace a reference to the author in a Sanskrit text.

<sup>21</sup> Asvabhāva must postdate or be approximately contemporary with Dharmakīrti since he cites the latter's *Nyāyabindu* in the MSU (DT sems-tsam RI 106a7–106b2). If we follow Chr. Lindtner's suggestion of ca. 530–600 CE for Dharmakīrti's date ("A Propos Dharmakīrti: Two Works and a New Date," *Acta Orientalia* 41 [1980]: 27–37; "Marginalia to Dharmakīrti's Pramānaviśāyā," *WZKS* 28 [1984]: 149–175), this would yield a late sixth-century date for Asvabhāva.

<sup>22</sup> Nagao Gadjin's *Index to the Mahāyāna-Sūtrālamkāra* (Tokyo: Nippon Gakujutsu Shinkōkai, 1958–61), a multi-lingual index to the MSA and MSABh, has been invaluable for this part of the task, but I have not found it to be either truly exhaustive or error-free. For example, the compound *sarvākārajñānavasīṭayā* (MSABh on MSA 21.8, ed. Lévi, 186) can be found only under its final member (Nagao, *Index*, 1: 214), and then without mention of the remainder of the compound. Similarly, the compound *sarvajñeyārthasaṅgrahāt* (MSABh on MSA 11.1, ed. Lévi, 53) is not listed under *sarva-*, *-jñeya-*, *-artha-*, or *-saṅgraha*. There are other errors of omission and commission.

<sup>23</sup> Technically, these are *taipuruṣa* compounds. Among them are: *asarvajña*; *asarvajñācestita*; *bhūārthasarvajñatva*; *sarvajña*; *sarvajñatā*; *sarvajñatva*; *sarvajñatvapraptyartha*; *sarvajñāna*; *sarvajñānanimitatva*; *sarvāvabodha*.

<sup>24</sup> Among these complex omniscience-terms with an oblique case-relation between the knowledge-term and the universality-plus-specifying-term are the following: *sakulārthabodha*; *sarvajñeyasarvākārajñāna*; *sarvajñeyasarvākārabodha*; *sarvadharmasarvākārajñāna*; *sarvākārajñāta*; *sarvākārajñātāvāpti*; *sarvākārajñātāvibhāga*; *sarvākārabodhyupagamatva*; *sarvākārasarvārthabodha*; *sarvārthabodha*.

<sup>25</sup> See MSABh on MSA 11.2cd. MSAVBh on MSA/MSABh 18.25 is especially instructive here. MSABh reads *phalāsamudāgama* (referring to the results of *sāstrajñatā*, the study of technical treatises) *sarvadharmasarvākārajñatā*. Sthiramati cites this and goes on to gloss it with *sarvajñatā*: *rig pa'i gnas lnga la mkhas par byas na mjug tu 'bras bu thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes thob par 'gyur te* (DT sems-tsam TSI 193b4). I shall return to this passage below.

<sup>26</sup> For a very useful discussion of the whole rather muddy notion of synonymy, see Hilary Putnam, "Two Dogmas Revisited," in Putnam, *Realism and Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 87–97. Bruce Hall ("The Meaning of Vijñapti in Vasubandhu's Concept of Mind," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 9 [1986]: 10–13) provides a useful discussion of this issue in his analysis of whether, and in what sense, it is proper to say that *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna* are synonymous. See also Ronald M. Davidson, "Buddhist Systems of Transformation: *Āśraya-parivṛtti*-*parāvṛtti* among the Yogācāra" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1985), 116–125.

<sup>27</sup> For a good example of a simple word-gloss in which something close to synonymy is intended, see Sthiramati's gloss of *dhi* (*Trīṃśikā*, verse 10c) with *prajñā* in the *Trīṃśikā-bhāṣya* (Sylvain Lévi, ed., *Vijñaptimātratāśiddhi: Deux traités de Vasubandhu* [Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1925], 26).

<sup>28</sup> This is true in the Tibetan translation of MSABh on MSA 9.1–3: *sarvākārajñātāvām dvau ślokaū* is translated by *thams cad mkhyen pa nyid la tshigs su bcad pa gnyis te*. It may also be the case that the translation of MSA 2.11b found in the MSAVBh falls into this category. MSA 2.11 does not survive in Sanskrit. The translation of MSA 2.11b given in MSA (Tib) and MSABh (Tib) reads *nam pa kun mkhyen*. The comment given in MSABh (Tib) uses the term *nam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid*. Both of these translations indicate a Sanskrit original containing *ākāra*. But the translation of MSA 2.11b in MSAVBh reads *thams cad mkhyen pa*, and the same expression is used in the commentary on this verse. Given this evidence, it is impossible to be quite sure what the Sanskrit original of MSA 2.11b was, though, for reasons to be mentioned later, I shall assume that the Sanskrit original of both MSA/MSABh and that of MSAVBh contained *ākāra*.

<sup>29</sup> See Lamotte, *Le traité*, 1744, for some discussion.

<sup>30</sup> This definition is taken from the AS. The relevant section survives only in Tibetan: *dmigs par bya ba dang dmigs par byed pa mnyam pas mnyam par shes pa* (DT sems-tsam RI 93a1). The only edition of the Sanskrit text of the ASBh (ASBh, ed. Tatia, 76) reads *samasamālambyālanbanajñāna*, but I emend following the Tibetan version and Schmithausen's comments on this passage. See Schmithausen, "The Darśanamārga Section of the Abhidharmasamuccaya and its Interpretation by Tibetan Commentators, with special reference to Bu Ston Rin Chen Grub," in *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy*, ed. Ernst Steinkellner and Helmut Tauscher (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien, 1983), 262, note 25.

<sup>31</sup> *grāhyagrāhakābhāvatahatāpravedha*, ASBh, ed. Tatia, 76.

<sup>32</sup> The same is true, for example, of another of the definitions of *darśanamārga* offered in the AS: *pratyātmam apañītasaitvasamketadharmasamketasarvato 'pañitobhayasamketālanbanadharmajñānam* (cited in ASBh, ed. Tatia, 76; this section of the AS does not survive in Sanskrit. Tibetan: *so so rang la sems can gyi brda dang/ chos kyi brda bsal bu dang/ thams cad du gnyi ga'i brda bsal ba la dmigs pa'i chos shes pa*, DT sems-tsam RI 93a2). The ASBh

then comments that this is an awareness that operates without constructing (*vikalpana*) images (*nimitta*) of persons and things in one's own mental continuum (ASBh, ed. Tatia, 76). An awareness that did so construct would also be *jñāna*; it would simply be false (*mithyā*) or conventionally occluded (*samvṛti*) awareness.

<sup>33</sup> See AKV on AKK 7.1a: *niścītam ca jñānam isyate nāniścītam* (Dwārikādās Śāstrī, ed., *Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphūṭārthā commentary of ācārya Yaśomīra* [Varanasi: Bauddha Bharatī, 1981], 1034). This view was held much more widely than by Buddhists. See *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.4, in which perception is defined as an awareness (*jñāna*) that, among other things, is "of a definite character" (*vyavasāyāmaka*). For some discussion of this see Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968), 39–40. See also Karl Potter, "Does Indian Epistemology Concern Justified True Belief?" *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 12 (1984): 307–327.

<sup>34</sup> This stress on *jñāna* as functional is clearest in Dignāga and his successors, with their attempt to define accurate awareness (*samyajjñāna*) as that which brings about some desired end. See, among many other places, the first verse of Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*, in which it is said that the accomplishment of all human ends is preceded by accurate awareness (*samyajjñānapūrvikā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhir iti*, Dwārikādās Śāstrī ed., *Nyāyabindu of Acharya Dharmakīrti* [sic] with the commentaries by Arya Vinūdeva and Dharmottara and Dharmottara-Tika-Tippāni [Varanasi: Bauddha Bharatī, 1985], 4). Dharmottara's *īkā* makes the point quite explicit. See also Masatoshi Nagatomi, "Arthakriyā," *Adyar Library Bulletin* 31–32 (1967–68): 52–72; Mikogami Esho, "Some Remarks on the Concept of arthakriyā," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 7 (1979): 79–94.

<sup>35</sup> Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London: Hutchinson, 1949), 133–134.

<sup>36</sup> See Bimal K. Matilal, *Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 101–140.

<sup>37</sup> Sthiramati makes the connection between the two accomplishments (*prahānasampat* and *jñānasampat*) very clear in his exegesis of MSA 9.2–3 (MSAVBh, DT sems-tsam MI 106b7ff). Compare his exegesis of AKK 1.1 in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyaṭīkā* (DT snathogs THO 12a6ff).

<sup>38</sup> As, for example, in the AKBh: *sākārās tasyaivāmbanasya prakāreṇa ākaranāt* (AKBh on AKK 2.34, ed. Śāstrī, 208–209) and the MSABh: . . . *na ca teṣv āmukham anākāratvāt* (MSABh on MSA 9.68, ed. Lévi, 46). This connection between 'confronting', 'coming face-to-face with', or 'making visible' (*āmukhi-kr-*) some intentional object will prove to be important when *ākāra* is used in the context of discussing 'mirror-like awareness' (*ādarsujñāna*).

<sup>39</sup> Julius Lipner, *The Face of Truth* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 20.

<sup>40</sup> Madeleine Biardeau, *Théorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le Brahmanisme classique* (Paris: Ecole Pratique des Hautes Études, 1964), 75.

<sup>41</sup> *surveśām cittacaitānām ālambanagrahaṇāprakāra ākāra iti*, AKBh on AKK 7.13, ed. Śāstrī, 1062.

<sup>42</sup> *sarve śāmbanā dharmā ākārayanti . . .*, AKBh on AKK 7.13, ed. Śāstrī, 1062.

<sup>43</sup> The AKBh, in discussing the sense in which three important words for the mental (*citta*, *manas*, *vijñāna*) all have the same referent (*eko rthah*), explains that all mental events share the same basic characteristics: *ta eva hi cittacaitāh sāśrayā ucyante indriyāśrīatvāt/ śāmbanāh viśayagrahaṇāt/ sākārās tasyaivāmbanasya prakāreṇa ākaranāt/ samprayuktāh samam samprayuktām*, AKBh on AKK 2.34bc, ed. Śāstrī, 208–209. This links the attribute 'having an object' with the attribute 'having an *ākāra*', both essential to any member of the class-category 'mental event' (*cittacaitta*, *manas*, *vijñāna*). This necessary co-existence of *ākāra* and *āmbanā* is also made clear by Asvabhāva in the MSU: *dmigs pa dang bcas pa'i chos rnumis ni rnam pa dang bcas pa'i phyir dmigs pa dang 'dzin par byed do* (DT sems-tsam RI 267b2). Compare also Sthiramati's denial that consciousness without *ākāra* and *āmbanā* is possible: *na hi nirāmbanā nirākāram yā vijñānam yujyate* (Lévi, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, 19).

<sup>44</sup> See Kajiyama Yuichi, "Controversy Between the Sākāra- and Nirākāra-vādins of the Yogācāra School — Some Materials," *IBK* 14 (1965): 26–37; "Later Mādhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation," in *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice*, ed. Minoru Kiyota and Elvin W. Jones (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1978), 114–143.

<sup>45</sup> Ratnākaraśānti probably flourished in the eleventh century CE. He wrote, *inter alia*, an *upadeśa* on the Prajñāpāramitā; see Kajiyama, "Some Materials," 36–37; Shōryu Katsura, "A Synopsis of the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa," *IBK* 25 (1976): 38–41. Moksākāragupta was probably a little later than Ratnākaraśānti. His discussion of this issue is found in his *Tarkabhāṣā*. See B. N. Singh, ed. & trs., *Bauddha-Tarkabhāṣā of Moksākāragupta* [sic] (Varanasi: Asha Prakashan, 1985), 97–98.

<sup>46</sup> Many of the later sources on this controversy are given and discussed in Kajiyama, "Some Materials." There is important material in the *"Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi"* (Louis de La Vallée Poussin, trs. *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: La Siddhi de Hiuan Tsang* [Paris: Geuthner, 1928–1948], 688–689). See also the *Triṃśikābhāṣya*'s discussion on the nature of the *ālayavijñāna*'s object which I have analyzed elsewhere (*On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem* [La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986], 96). But on the whole it seems improper to read the details and terms of the purely epistemological debate that grew up around the *sākāra* and *nirākāra* positions into the texts of the MSA-corpus (even though both Indian and Tibetan scholastics freely did so).

<sup>47</sup> See Roderick M. Chisholm, *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957); *The First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981).

<sup>48</sup> This basic theory (one which makes the position of *ākārah* very clear) is given a clear statement in the AKBh and AKV: "[The AK says] 'Mental states have a support, an object, a mode of appearance, and are associated.' Mental states are said to have a support because they are supported by the physical sense-organs. [Mental states are said to] have an object because they grasp sensory fields. [Mental states are said to] have a mode of appearance because they appear in a mode that accords with the aspect of their objects. [Mental states are said to] be associated because they are similar [in kind] and connected [to one another]." (*cittacaitasah/ sāśrayāmbanākārāh samprayuktās ca . . . ta eva hi cittacaitāh sāśrayā ucyante indriyāśrīatvāt/ śāmbanā viśayayagrahaṇāt/ sākārās tasyaivāmbanasya prakāreṇa ākaranāt/ samprayuktāh samam prayuktatvāt*, AKBh on AKK 2.34, ed. Śāstrī, 208–209). The AKV comments on this that no mental states occur without an object (*na hi vināmbanena cittacaitā utpadyante*, ed. Śāstrī, 208), and goes on to say that: "Consciousness cognizes such things as blue or yellow objects, which means that it apprehends them. Sensation [then] affectively experiences precisely the same object, cognition delineates [its characteristics], volition acts intentionally [upon it], and so forth. Or, rather, consciousness grasps physical form in accord with its general characteristic as something apprehensible; sensation grasps physical form in accord with its specific characteristics as something affectively experiential; cognition grasps physical form as something whose [characteristics] are capable of delineation — and so forth." (*vijñānam hi nīlam pītam vā vastu vijānātī/ upalabhaia ity artha/ tadeva tathāmbanāh vastu vedanānubhavati samjñā parichinatti cetanābhisamskārotīty evam ādī/ aha vā tasyaivāmbanasya vijñānam sāmānyarūpeṇopalabhyatā rūpam ghrñātī viśesarūpeṇa tu vedanā anubhavanīyatārūpam ghrñātī samjñā paricchedyātārūpam ghrñātīty evam ādī*, AKV on AKK 2.34, ed. Śāstrī, 209). Studies of the Theravādin version of this basic theory may be found in E. R. Saratchandra, *Buddhist Psychology of Perception* (Colombo: Ceylon University Press, 1958), and Nānānanda, *Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought* (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1976).

<sup>49</sup> *dvayena grāhyagrāhakatvena pratibhāsate tadākārotpattītas tathā ca na vidyate yathā pratibhāsate ity arthe yaddarśanam sa tatrāvīparyāsaḥ*, R. C. Pandeya, ed., *Madhyānta-Vibhāga-Śāstra* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971), 162.

<sup>50</sup> *mayākṛtam mantravaśāt khyāti hastyātmanā yathā ākāramātram tatrāsti hasī nāsti tu*

*sarvathā*, Louis de La Vallée Poussin, ed. & trs., "Le petit traité de Vasubandhu-Nāgārjuna sur les trois natures," *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 2 (1933): 156.

<sup>51</sup> The context here is the extensive discussion of the eight liberations (*vimokṣa*). The third of these is called the "pleasant liberation" (*śubhāvimokṣa*), and the practitioner who attains this state is said to be liberated through a concept whose mode of appearance is that of unmixed pleasure (. . . *śubhataikarasākārayā samjñayā vimucyate*, ASBh, ed. Tatia, 125).

<sup>52</sup> See, *inter multos alia*, verse 15 of the *Ālokaṃālā*, which reads: "Even misapprehensions such as mirages, [hallucinations produced by] cataracts, dreams, and [visions of] the city of the heavenly musicians have their uses: they remove the modes of appearance [in consciousness] of other misapprehensions" (*sūryāmbuṭimirasvapnagandharvanagarādayah/ bhrāntayo 'pi upakārayā bhrāntiyantarānirākṛteḥ*, Chr. Lindtner, "A Treatise on Buddhist Idealism: Kambala's *Ālokaṃālā*," in *Miscellanea Buddhica*, ed. Lindtner [Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1985]: 124–125). My translation differs from that given by Lindtner. He renders the ablative *nirākṛteḥ* simply as 'for they dispel . . .' This does not, I think, give the term enough weight. See also *Ālokaṃālā*, verses 19, 25–26, 51, 53, 79, 94, 100, 102, 119, 165. Verse 243 is especially interesting since there the absence of *ākāra* is identified with *parinispāna*.  
<sup>53</sup> *mam pa thams cad mkhyen pa thob/ ces bya bas/ ye shes phun sum tshogs pa bstan te/ de yang nam pa thams cad mkhyen ces bya bar sbyar ro/ de la mi rtag pa dang/ sdug bsgal ba dang/ stong pa dang/ bdag med par de lta bur phyin ci ma log par shes pas ni nam pa thams cad mkhyen pa zhes bya/ o/ phung po dang kham la sogs pa/ i chos kun ma lus par mkhyen pas na thams cad mkhyen pa zhes bya ste*, DT sems-tsam MI 106b7–107a2. Śhīramati goes on to provide a similar gloss on the term *buddhātā* from MSA 9.3: *mam pa thams cad mkhyen pa thob/ ces bya ba/ i don rgya cher bstan pa/ i phyir/ sangs rgyas te zhes bya ba smos te/ nam sangs rgyas pa/ i dus na chos thams cad phyin ci ma log par thugs su chud pas sangs rgyas zhes bya/ o*, MSA VBh, DT sems-tsam MI 107b3.

<sup>54</sup> Lamotte, *Le traité*, 1744ff. See also Kawasaki, "Shohō o kiban toshite issaichi-issaishūchi."  
<sup>55</sup> Compare AA 4.1–5 for a list of the attributes of each of the three kinds of omniscience (*sarvajñatā*, *mārgajñatā*, *sarvākārajñatā*) distinguished by that text. See Ernst Obermüller, "The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā as Exposed in the Abhisamayālamkāra of Maitreya," *Acta Orientalia* 11 (1933): 62; *Analysis of the Abhisamayālamkāra* (London: Luzac, 1933), 5; P. L. Vaidya, *Aṣṭasahasrikā Prajñāpāramitā with Haribhadra's Commentary Called Āloka* (Dārḥanga: Mithila Institute, 1960), 415–420.

<sup>56</sup> For example, Śhīramati glosses the compound *sarvadharmasārvākārajñatā* ('the knowledge of all modes of appearance pertaining to all dharmas', used in MSABh on MSA 18.25–26) with a standard list of things known: *skandhadhātāvāyatānāsravānāsravādi* (DT sems-tsam TSI 193b3). Similarly, in the AS *sarvākārajñatā* is said to have as its object the aggregates, spheres, and realms (*mam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid gang zhe na/ phung po dang kham dang skye mched mams la mam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid yang dag par 'byor pa/ i ting nge 'dzin dang/ shes rab gang yin pa dang/ de dag dang mtshungs par ldan pa/ i sems dang sems las byung ba/ i chos mams so*, DT sems-tsam RI 114b4–5 — this portion of the AS does not survive in Sanskrit). Śhīramati comments on this that when one possesses *sarvākārajñatā* one is accomplished in being aware of the limits of and the divisions in the essential nature and defining characteristics of these categories (*skandhadhātāvāyatānesu sarvākārajñatāsamrddhāv iti skandhādīnām svabhāvaviśeṣalakṣaṇaprabhedaparyantajñāna-nispattāv ity arthah*, ASBh, ed. Tatia, 133).

<sup>57</sup> MSAT, DT sems-tsam BI 74a7–74b1. It is worth mentioning here that the MS introduces the compound *sarvākārarajñatā* (*mam pa/ i mchog thams cad mkhyen pa nyid*, Lamotte, *La somme*, 1: 88). The extra adjective (*vara*) here indicates that there can be modes of appearance which are not excellent (i.e., which are misapprehended). Asvabhāva comments: *phung po dang skye mched la yod pa/ i nam pa/ i mchog thams cad mkhyen pa ste* (DT sems-tsam RI 282a2). The compound *sarvākārarajñatā* is also used in the BoBh (ed. Dutt, 279).

<sup>58</sup> This broad interpretation of *sarvākāra* is suggested by the description of omniscience given in the BoBh, a description which appears in many respects to be older in both terminology and conceptual basis than that found in the MSA-corpus. The BoBh says: "Omniscience is that awareness which functions without obstruction at all times in regard to all the aspects of all realms and all things" (*sarvadhātuṣu sarvavastuṣu sarvaprakāresu sarvākāleṣu yad jñānam avyāhatam pravartate tat sarvajñānam ity ucyate*, BoBh, ed. Dutt, 62). The term *prakāra* used here is effectively synonymous with *ākāra*, and the text goes on to explain it thus: "The divisions of the aspects of these compounded and un-compounded things are innumerable; they are divided according to their individual defining characteristics and the class-membership that follows from these; according to their general characteristics; according to their causes and effects; and according to their realms and destinies, which may be good, bad, neutral, and so forth." (*tasyaiva ca saṃskṛtāsamskr̥tasya vastuṣu 'pramāṇah prakārabhedah svalakṣaṇottarajātīprabhedena sāmānyalakṣaṇaprabhedena hetuḥphalaprabhedena dhātugatikūśalākūśalavyākṛtādīprabhedena*, BoBh, ed. Dutt, 62). Finally, Asvabhāva also identifies *ākāra* and *jñeya* in the MSU (DT sems-tsam RI 286a1).

<sup>59</sup> There is a textual problem here. I follow the Sanskrit manuscript (202.5). Lévi gives this reading. Bagchi gives both this reading and *sarvārthabodhāt*, but prefers the latter in his corrigenda. MSA (Tibetan) and MSABh (Tibetan) both give *don kun rtags*, which suggests *sarvārthabodhāt*. MSAVBh gives *thams cad shes*, suggesting *sarvāvabodhāt*, and in its extensive commentary on this verse (DT sems-tsam TSI 231a2–231b5) confirms that this reading must have stood in the Sanskrit text available to the Tibetan translators of MSAVBh. I suggest that the Tibetan translators of MSA and MSABh read a Sanskrit text in which *sarvārthabodhāt* stood, even though this reading is less perspicuous than *sarvāvabodhāt*. For the purposes of understanding Śhīramati's commentary, though, we have to read *sarvāvabodhāt*.

<sup>60</sup> *thams cad shes pa ni kun tu brtags pa/ i mtshan nyid shes pa ste/ guzgs la sogs pa/ i guzng ba/ i chos mams dang/ mig la sogs pa/ i chos de guzng 'dzin du kun brtags pa/ i chos thams cad ni ri bong gi rva bzhin dang mtshan nyid med par shes pa/ o/ ma lus pa/ i don shes pa ni phung po dang kham dang skye mched dang/ zag pa dang bcas pa dang/ zag pa med pa la sogs pa/ i shes bya/ i chos kun rdzob kyi bden pa thams cad shes pa ste*, MSAVBh, DT sems-tsam TSI 231a7–231b2.

<sup>61</sup> MSAVBh, DT sems-tsam MI 202b2–203b6.

<sup>62</sup> *tatra śāstrajñatāyāḥ pañca vidyāsthānāni vastu/ adhyātmaavidyā hetuvidyā śabdavidyā cikitsāvidyā śilpakarmasthānavidyā ca . . . phalasamudāgamah sarvadharmasārvākārajñatā*, MSABh on MSA 18.25–26, ed. Lévi, 136.

<sup>63</sup> "The occurrence of its [i.e., of the knowledge of the technical treatises in which the five sciences are contained] result is the awareness of all the modes of appearance of all dharmas. This indicates the awareness of all awarenesses, which is the awareness of all dharmas without exception, including aggregates, spheres, realms, defiled and undefiled dharmas, and so forth." (*'bras bu thob pas ni chos thams cad kyi nam pa thams cad shes pa/ o zhes bya ba la/ phung po dang kham dang skye mched dang zag pa dang zag pa med pa la sogs pa/ i chos thams cad ma lus par shes pa ni thams cad mkhyen pa/ i ye shes la bya ste*, MSA VBh, DT sems-tsam TSI 193b3–4).

<sup>64</sup> *blo ldan pas ni de shes pas/ mam pa thams cad mkhyen pa 'thob/ ces bya ba la/ blo ldan pa ni byang chub sems dpa/ o/ de zhes bya ba ni sde snod gsum la bya ste/ byang chub sems dpa/ mams kyi sde snod gsum shes na thams cad mkhyen pa/ i ye shes 'thob par 'gyur ro zhes bya ba/ i don to/ nyan thos mams ni zad la mi skye ba/ i ye shes tshol ba tsam du zad de/ mam pa thams cad mkhyen pa mi tshol bas sde snod gsum ma shes kyand zad la mi skye ba/ i ye shes 'thob ste*, MSA VBh on MSA 11.2c, DT sems-tsam MI 157b2–157b4).

<sup>65</sup> MSA 11.2 reads: "The sūtra, the abhidharma, and the vinaya each, in brief, has four senses; as a result of knowing them the wise man arrives at the awareness of all modes of appearance." (*sūtrābhīdharmavinayās caturvidhāṛthā matāḥ samāsenā teṣāṃ jñānād dhīmān*

*sarvākārajñatām eti*, MSA 11.2, ed. Lévi, 54). The MSABh's comment on the last clause (*dhimān sarvākārajñatām eti*) simply substitutes the term *sarvajñatā* for *sarvākārajñatā*: *teṣāṃ jñānād bodhisattvaḥ sarvajñatām prāpnoti*, MSABh on MSA 11.2 ed. Lévi, 54.

<sup>66</sup> MSAVBh, DT sems-tsam MI 154b6—7.

<sup>67</sup> "Omniscience consists in the four awarenesses." (*ye shes bzhi'i bdag nyid thams cad mkhyen pa*, MSAVBh on MSA 2.11, DT sems-tsam MI 39a6), using *sarvajñatā* instead of *sarvākārajñatā*; but, for reasons mentioned already, I assume that an omniscience-term with *ākāra* stood in the original Sanskrit of this section of MSAVBh. The four awarenesses are examined in MSA/MSABh 9.67—76.

<sup>68</sup> These are analyzed at length in MSA 9.60—66 and in the commentaries thereto.

<sup>69</sup> Sthiramati makes this point by saying that MSA 9.2a (= 9.2b in Tibetan), which reads *sarvākārajñatāvāptih*, refers to MSA 9.3c2, which reads simply *buddhatā*: (*nmam pa thams cad mkhyen pa thob/ ces bya ba'i don rgya cher bstan pa'i phyir/ sangs rgyas te zhes bya ba smos te*, MSAVBh on MSA 9.3c, DT sems-tsam MI 107b3).

<sup>70</sup> "... and he obtains the awareness of all modes of appearance, that unexcelled position from which he acts for the well-being of all sentient beings." (*sarvākārajñatām caiva labhate 'nuttaram padam/ yatrasthah sarvasattvānām hitāya pratipadyate*, MSA 14.46, ed. Lévi, 96).

<sup>71</sup> "... he obtains the awareness of all modes of appearance, that unexcelled position ..." [citing MSA 14.46ab]. This means that one attains a position of unexcelled awareness — which is the awareness of all modes of appearance — when one attains the stage of being a Buddha. In virtue of this one possesses accomplishment in awareness and accomplishment in what benefits oneself. "... position from which he acts for the well-being of all sentient beings" [citing MSA 14.46cd]. Here, 'position from which' refers to the position of unconstructed awareness. From here one acts for the benefit and well-being of all sentient beings. Though [subsequently attained] worldly awareness one attains complete awakening, tames Māra, sets the wheel of doctrine turning, and teaches Nirvāṇa. [All this] indicates accomplishment in what benefits others." (*nmam pa kun gyi ye shes nyid/ bla na med pa'i gnas thob nas zhes bya ba la/ gzhan yang sangs rgyas kyi sa'i dus na nmam pa thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes bla na med pa'i ye shes kyi go 'phangs yang 'thob ste/ des ye shes phun sum tshogs pa bstan nas bdag gi don phun sum tshogs pa bstan to/ gang la gnas nas sems can kun/ bde phyir rab tu 'jug par 'gyur zhes bya ba la/ gang la gnas nas zhes bya ba ni nmam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes la gnas nas zhes bya ba'i don to/ de la gnas nas sems can thams cad la phan pa dang bde bar bya ba'i phyir dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes kyi mngon par byand chub pa dang/ bdud 'dul ba dang/ chos kyi 'khor lo bskor ba dang/ mya ngan las 'das pa bstan pa la sogs pa la 'jug par byed del 'dis ni gzhan gyi don phun sum tshogs pa bstan to*, MSAVBh on MSA 14.46, DT sems-tsam MI 280b2—5). The AS and ASBh make a somewhat similar distinction between what *sarvākārajñatā* is and what it does: its function, above all, is to remove the doubts of sentient beings, to teach them, and so forth (AS, ed. Gokhale, 38; ASB, ed. Tatia, 135—136), but this is not what it is. See also the tenth chapter of the MS (Lamotte, *La somme*, 1: 90), in which MSA 21.16 is quoted and discussed in terms which place a great deal of stress upon the salvific usefulness of *sarvākārajñatā* for others.

<sup>72</sup> *ādarsājñānam amamāparicchinnam sadānugam/ sarvajñeṣv asammūḍham na ca teṣv āmukham sadū ādarsājñānam amamam aparicchinnam deśatah sadānugam kālatah/ sarvajñeṣv asammūḍham sadāvaranavigamāt na ca teṣv āmukham anākāravāt*, MSA/MSABh 9.68, ed. Lévi, 46.

<sup>73</sup> *ngar 'dzin pa dang/ nga yir 'dzin pa dang/ gzung ba dang 'dzin pa med pa'i phyir nga yi ba med pa yin no*, MSAT, on MSA 11.2a, DT sems-tsam BI 74a5.

<sup>74</sup> On this term see AS, DT sems-tsam RI 93a1, and Schmithausen, "The Darśanamārga," 261—267.

<sup>75</sup> *shes bya dag la gzugs la sogs pa la dmigs pa bzhin du dmigs pa'i bye brag gam/ sngon po la sogs pa'i nmam pa'i bye brag gis 'jug pa ma yin pa'o/ de ni dmigs par bya ba dang/ dmigs par byed pa nmyam pas mnyam pa nmam par mi rtog pa de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i ngo bo*

*nyid de/ de nyid kyi phyir mi gyo ba yin no*, MSAT on MSA 11.2b, DT sems-tsam BI 74a5—6.

<sup>76</sup> The BBhS, written in Sanskrit probably during the third (?) century CE, is extant now only in Chinese and Tibetan translation. I have used the edition of the Tibetan text by Nishio Kyōo (*The Buddhabhūmi-Sūtra and the Buddhabhūmi-vyākhyāna of Śīlabhadra* [Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 1982]). This text, though of vital importance for the understanding of early Yogācāra, has been remarkably little studied by Western scholars. The only work to make extensive use of it of which I am aware is a doctoral dissertation produced by John Keenan ("A Study of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa: The Doctrinal Development of the Notion of Wisdom in Yogācāra Thought," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1980).

<sup>77</sup> This reconstruction is far from certain. *ched du 'jug pa* is not the usual Tibetan translation for *ābhoga*, but I base this reconstruction upon the fact that Sthiramati is here citing the BBhS (ed. Nishio, 9) in which the relevant line reads: *de la me long gi dkyil 'khor de ni rtsol ba yang med* ... The expression *rtsol ba* usually translates either *ābhoga* or *vyāyāma*, and so I assume that *ched du 'jug pa* in the Tibetan version of the MSAVBh does the same. The Tibetan translation of the MSAVBh is by Muncandra and Lee bkra shis, and contains many such nonstandard Tibetan equivalents.

<sup>78</sup> *me long gi dkyil 'khor du gzugs brnyan nmam pa du mar nmam pa mang po skye ba yang me long gi dkyil 'khor de la de dag med de/ me long gi dkyil 'khor de la ched du 'jug pa med cing mngon par 'du byed pa med pa de bzhin du de bzhin gshegs pa nams kyi me long lta bu'i ye shes kyi gzugs brnyan nmam pa du mar nmam pa mang po snang ste/ me long lta bu'i ye shes la gzugs brnyan med de/ me long lta bu'i ye shes kyi gzugs brnyan de la ched du 'jug pa med cing mngon par 'du byed pa med do zhes gsungs so*, MSA VBh on MSA 9.68, DT sems-tsam MI 139a4—6; BBhS, (ed. Nishio, 9). Although both texts survive in Tibetan, they had different translators and thus differ in minor ways from one another.

<sup>79</sup> This is the BBhV, edited by Nishio together with the sūtra upon which it comments. On Śīlabhadra and the BBhV see Hakamaya Noriaki, "Sthiramati and Śīlabhadra." Frauwallner's calculations ("Landmarks," 133, 136, 137) would make Sthiramati a slightly older contemporary of Śīlabhadra — the latter would have been about forty when the former died. Hakamaya's finding that Sthiramati cites Śīlabhadra, though certainly not impossible on Frauwallner's chronology, perhaps suggests that the dating could be modified somewhat. Whatever the correct dating is, it is almost certain that both thinkers had their *floruit* in the first half of the sixth century CE.

<sup>80</sup> See BBhV, ed. Nishio, 89—90.

<sup>81</sup> *me long lta bu'i ye shes la ni nyon mongs pa dang shes bya'i sgrig pa med pas me long dag pa'i ngos su gzugs brnyan nmam pa sna tshogs pa snang ba dang 'dra bar shes bya'i nmam pa thams cad ye shes de la snang zhing ye shes thugs su chud pas na shes bya thams cad la ma rmongs pa zhes bya'o*, MSAVBh on MSA 9.68c, DT sems-tsam MI 139b1—3.

<sup>82</sup> BBhS, ed. Nishio, 9.

<sup>83</sup> See MSAVBh, DT sems-tsam MI 139b5—6.

<sup>84</sup> BBhS, ed. Nishio, 9—10.

<sup>85</sup> See MSAVBh, DT sems-tsam MI 140a2—5. Compare BBhS, ed. Nishio, 9. The *Tathāgatopattisambhavanirdeśa* is a part of what is now the *Avatamsakasūtra*. For some discussion see Takasaki Jikidō, "The Tathāgatopattisambhava-nirdeśa of the Avatamsaka and the Ratnagotravibhāga — with special reference to the term tathāgata-gotra-sambhava," *IBK* 7 (1958): 348—343.

<sup>86</sup> See, among many instances, Alvin Plantinga, *God, Freedom and Evil* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 68; Stephen Davis, *Logic and the Nature of God* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 26; William J. Wainwright, *Philosophy of Religion* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1988), 22—26; Jonathan L. Kanvig, *The Possibility of an All-Knowing God* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), xiii—xiv.

<sup>87</sup> See Stephen Schiffer, "The Real Trouble with Propositions," in *Belief: Form, Content and Function*, ed. Radu J. Bogdan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 82–117; Stephen Stich, *From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1983).

<sup>88</sup> For a fascinating recent exception see William P. Alston, "Does God Have Beliefs?" *Religious Studies* 22 (1986): 287–306.

<sup>89</sup> See Alston, "Does God Have Beliefs?" 295–296.

<sup>90</sup> Alston makes a strong claim to this effect, and actually makes use of the mirroring metaphor to describe this kind of knowledge ("Does God Have Beliefs?" 297).

<sup>91</sup> A more detailed defence and exposition of this point may be found in another paper of mine entitled "Buddha and God: A Contrastive Study in Ideas about Maximal Greatness," forthcoming in *The Journal of Religion* (1989).

<sup>92</sup> This has interesting implications for the Yogācāra understanding of *pūrvanivāsānusrīti*, but the exploration of these will require another study.

## REVIEWS

Saskia Kersenboom-Story, *Nityasumaṅgalī, Devadasi Tradition in South India*, Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi 1987, xxi + 226p.

Trop peu d'ouvrages ont jusqu'ici traité des Devadāsīs, ces danseuses de temples dont une loi de 1947 a sonné le glas dans le Tamilnad, pour que la publication de Saskia Kersenboom-Story (SKS) laisse les indianistes indifférents. Avant toute autre remarque, félicitons donc sans réserve l'auteur d'avoir eu le courage de s'attaquer à ce difficile et épineux problème. Ajoutons vite que SKS a apporté à cette tâche, outre un grand enthousiasme et une évidente sympathie pour ses objets d'étude, des qualifications rarement réunies. Elle allie en effet à une solide formation universitaire, qui inclut la connaissance de plusieurs langues indiennes (sanskrit, telugu et surtout tamoul) une pratique personnelle de la danse même qui fut longtemps l'apanage exclusif des Devadāsīs, le *bharata-nāṭya*. Cette danse, elle l'a apprise selon les méthodes traditionnelles et elle l'exécute en artiste accomplie. Si nous disons encore que SKS possède une connaissance intime du pays tamoul, avec ses coutumes, ses croyances, ses interdits, ses superstitions, on ne doutera point qu'elle fût très bien placée pour tenter de nous expliquer ce que furent réellement le fonctionnement et le rôle de cette institution des Devadāsīs, si mal comprise en général.

SKS fait usage dans ce livre de plusieurs sortes de sources: des sources littéraires d'abord, qui comprennent de nombreux ouvrages en tamoul, quelques traités sanskrits, ainsi que des travaux d'ethnologues, d'indianistes, d'historiens et autres spécialistes touchant de plus ou moins près au sujet étudié; des corpus d'inscriptions, ensuite; enfin, des témoignages oraux, recueillis au cours de trois enquêtes sur le terrain, de chanteurs, de musiciens, de maîtres de danse et surtout de danseuses, anciennes Devadāsīs pour la plupart, qui ont bien voulu lui confier leurs souvenirs.

A nos yeux, ce sont ces derniers témoignages qui constituent l'intérêt principal de l'ouvrage, et nous regrettons un peu que SKS n'en ait pas fait le cœur de son travail et ne les ait pas exploités plus largement et plus systématiquement. Elle aurait certainement pu en donner un commentaire personnel plus nourri, ne serait-ce qu'en utilisant plusieurs des remarques qu'elle cache dans ses notes. En contrepartie, elle aurait pu sans incon-

## ANIMALS AND HUMANS IN EARLY BUDDHISM

There has been long-standing evidence, from the Aśokan edicts to the still popular ceremony of releasing life, of the Buddhist concern for an ethically grounded relationship between humans and animals. The intent of this paper is to trace themes relevant to this issue as found in the *Sutta* and *Vinaya Piṭakas* of the Pāli Canon.<sup>1</sup> The idea of the interconnectedness of human and animal existence is implicit in even so basic a set of concepts as that of *kamma* and rebirth. The Buddha is said to have known "that beings are inferior, exalted, beautiful, ugly, well faring, ill faring according to (the consequences of) their *kamma*".<sup>2</sup> According to this view, beings pass from existence to existence being reborn in accordance with the nature of their deeds.<sup>3</sup> The usual position of the *Nikāyas* is that there are five possible courses, or realms of existence (*gati*), to which an individual's *kamma* may lead. Among these, rebirth as a human or in the realm of animals are especially to be noted in this context.<sup>4</sup> After the breaking up of the body after death, individuals of comparatively good conduct will be reborn in a relatively satisfactory state of existence (*sugati*), such as the human state. Those of bad conduct and wrong views, to the contrary, are destined to attain a miserable rebirth (*duggati*) as an animal or worse.<sup>5</sup> Thus, for example, if they do not end up in hell itself, individuals who creep or slink along in this life, be they bloody-handed hunters, robbers, or whatever, are most likely to be reborn in the form of a sneaky or creeping creature — as a "snake, a scorpion, a centipede, a mongoose, a cat, a mouse, an owl", or the like.<sup>6</sup>

It is possible, then, for a human being to be reborn as an animal if this is consistent with his or her *kamma*.

The inverse is also true. Animals can be reborn as humans. They too are conceived as subject to *kamma* and their deeds to bear fruit. Thus many of the *Jātaka* tales are concerned with meritorious and wicked deeds done in the past by various kinds of animals. These are then linked up with the present, the good creatures being identified through the process of rebirth with the Buddha and his followers, and the wicked with Devadatta, or the like.

That animals as well as humans are considered capable of truly ethical behavior is underlined by a striking passage from the *Vinaya Piṭaka*.<sup>7</sup> Here a partridge, a monkey, and a bull elephant are pictured as having under-

taken the five moral precepts, and living together, "courteous, deferential, and polite to one another." Their life-style is referred to as "Partridge Brahma-faring," and set up as a model of morality upon which even the Buddhist *bhikkhus* should pattern their lives.

Animals and humans, then, are considered part of the same chain of becoming, the same universal flux that in the Buddhist view constitutes phenomenal existence. This is made explicit at *S. II. 189—190*, where the Buddha is recorded as saying:

This repetition of rebirths, O monks, has neither beginning nor end; and the beginning of beings, who are possessed by ignorance and hindrance, thirst and attachment, and who run through and migrate from birth to birth, cannot be known. It is not easy, O monks, to find out any being who has not been mother, father, brother, sister, son, or daughter to us during this long time. Why is that so? For this repetition of rebirths, O monks, has neither beginning nor end; and the beginning of beings, who are full of ignorance and hindrance, thirst and attachment, and who run through and migrate from birth to birth, cannot be known.<sup>8</sup>

Nonetheless animals as such are not considered to be capable of growth in the *dhamma* and the *vinaya*. For this reason the *Parivāra* and *Mahāvagga* of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* both declare the ordination of animals into the monastic order to be an invalid practice.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, to recite the *Pāṭimokkha* in the presence of an animal is reckoned an offense of the class of wrong-doing.<sup>10</sup> It is perhaps significant that in this instance the prohibition against *Pāṭimokkha* recitation in the presence of animals is included in the midst of a list of similar prohibitions against its recitation in the presence of eunuchs, thieves, matricides, parricides, hermaphrodites, arhaticides, schismatics, and those who have seduced nuns — clearly suggestive of a low estimation of the spiritual qualifications of animals.<sup>11</sup> For this reason it is further forbidden to ordain a man who has had an animal as a preceptor.<sup>12</sup>

Although animals on the whole are generally seen to be more violent, less wise,<sup>13</sup> and their experience less satisfactory than that of humans, it can still be said that within the *samsāric* scheme there is no permanent or ultimate distinction between beings within these two courses of existence (*gati*).<sup>14</sup>

This being the case, it becomes incumbent upon humans to relate to animals on the basis of the same ethical principles that govern their relationships with other people. Within the Buddhist context, morality (*sīla*) is seen to embrace right speech, right action, and right livelihood. It is to these principles and their application to animal/human relationships that we now turn our attention.

Right speech involves truth-telling to be sure, but more important for our purposes, it means to refrain from malicious talk, and from harsh and

abusive language. That the principle applies equally to human dealings with animals is made clear by the story of the ox Nandivisāla from the *Suttavibhaṅga* of the *Vinaya Piṭaka*.<sup>15</sup> Here the ox convinces his Brahmin master to bet with a merchant that Nandivisāla can pull a hundred carts tied together. Having made a sizeable wager to this effect, the Brahmin goads the ox on in the feat, calling him a hornless rascal (*Kūta*). In response the ox stands there making no effort at the pull. Having thus lost the wager, the Brahmin, who is overcome by grief at his loss, is finally confronted by Nandivisāla, who asks why he has been disgraced with such deceitful and abusive language. He then suggests that the wager be placed anew, but that this time his master refrain from insults. This the Brahmin proceeds to do, now encouraging the ox with the words: "Go, good creature (*bhadra*). Let the good creature pull them along." The *gāthā* concludes: "Speak only words of kindness, never words/Unkind. For him who spoke him fair, he moved/A heavy load, and brought him wealth for love."<sup>16</sup>

More obvious still is the application of the principle of right action to animal/human relationships. Right action may be seen to begin with observance of the five precepts (*pañca sīla*) which are binding on all Buddhist laymen.<sup>17</sup> The first of these precepts (*sikkhāpada*) is to abstain from the taking of life (*pañātipāta*). The precept against killing is also included in the eight precepts (*aṭṭhanga sāmāññāgata*) observed by Buddhist laity on the four fast (*uposatha*) days of the month,<sup>18</sup> the ten precepts (*dasa sīla*) observed by novices and fully ordained monks,<sup>19</sup> as well as in a list of twenty-six precepts found at *D. I. 4—5*, *D. I. 63—64*, and *A. II. 208—209*. In each of these lists the precept against taking life is listed first. It is further included as first in the category of ten good actions (*dasa kusala kamma*).<sup>20</sup>

In each of these instances the precept is taken to refer to abstinence from the conscious destruction of any sentient being, from human to the smallest animalcule.<sup>21</sup>

In the rules of the *Vinaya Piṭaka*, however, the precept against taking life is broken down in a significant way. The taking of human life is listed here as the third of the *pārājikas*, the most serious class of offenses, requiring expulsion from the order for its violation. This is distinguished from the destruction of non-human sentient life, which is classified among the less serious *pācittiyas*, a category of offenses entailing only expiation in the case of their violation. An additional *pācittiya* forbidding monks the use (*paribhoga*) of water containing living beings (*pāṇo*) which might thereby be destroyed makes clear the intent to apply the rule against the destruction of life even to insects and the smallest of one-celled creatures.<sup>22</sup>

A number of post-canonical texts go to great lengths to assign those who have destroyed various types of animal life under diverse circumstances to appropriate hells. *The Sūtra of the Remembrance of the True Law*,<sup>23</sup> a Sanskrit text from the fourth or fifth century C.E. which is generally ascribed to Gautama Prajñāruci, is an early example of this pattern. To illustrate selectively: those who kill birds or deer without remorse are destined for a sub-hell known as the Place of Excrement; those who boil alive camels, boar, sheep rabbits, bear, and the like suffer retribution in the Place of the Cooking Pot; those who smash turtles or smother sheep are doomed to the Place of Darkness.<sup>24</sup> Later texts describe still other hellish regions reserved for those who kill fish for market;<sup>25</sup> for those who suffocate foxes, pythons, etc. with smoke;<sup>26</sup> and so forth. One modern writer even notes that the "Buddha explained, unequivocally, that the man who takes the life of even one insect goes to hell for quite a long time."<sup>27</sup>

In the words of Winston King, though

killing is always a crime . . . and productive of grave consequences at whatever level, . . . it is generally held to be a greater crime to kill a being of more intelligence and fuller life-force than ones of lesser attainments. To kill a human being is more sinful than to kill a snake. And to kill those worthy of reverence . . .

is more serious still.

Nonetheless, even to injure an animal is unacceptable behavior, as is made clear at *Vin. III. 76*. Here it is decreed that if a monk digs a pitfall and an animal falls in, there is an offense of wrong-doing. If the animal should die as a result, the offense requires expiation. Even though it is still a case of wrong-doing, no expiation is required if the animal survives, no matter how great the pain it experiences in the fall. Thus it is clear that, albeit nonetheless impermissible, to do injury to an animal is considered a less serious offense than killing one.

A humorous story from *Samyutta Nikāya I. 224* illustrates the extremes to which the ideal of avoiding injury to animals could be taken: Long ago, or so the story goes, there was a battle between the *devas* and the *asuras* in which the *devas* were defeated. In retreat with the enemy in hot pursuit, Sakka, king of the *devas*, warned his charioteer:

See that the chariot pole, O Mātali,  
Keeps clear of nests among the silk-cotton trees.  
Let us choose to give up our lives to Asuras,  
Rather than make these birds nestless.

Responding to this warning, Mātali turns the chariot around in order to avoid injuring the birds. Seeing the chariot of Sakka thus reverse direction

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unexpectedly, the *asuras* panicked in the face of what they thought was an impending attack; and terrified, they themselves now retreated. The *sutta* closes by noting that in this instance Sakka was saved by his righteous concern for the birds, the implication being that the monks to whom the story is addressed should show a similar concern for the well-being of such creatures.

Closely related to the Buddhist proscription against the killing of animals is the Buddhist attitude toward animal sacrifice. In numerous places in the *Tipitaka* animal sacrifice is rejected.<sup>29</sup> At *A. II. 42ff* the Buddha is asked by the Brahmin Ujjaya and the Brahmin Udāyin whether he praises sacrifice (*yañña*). To each he responds:

In whatever sacrifice, brahmin, cows are slaughtered, goats and sheep are slaughtered, poultry and pigs are slaughtered and divers living creatures come to destruction, — such sacrifice, brahmin, which involves butchery I do not praise. Why so?

To such a sacrifice, brahmin, involving butchery neither the worthy ones nor those who have entered on the worthy way draw near.<sup>30</sup>

The *gāthas* underline the point that such sacrifices are to be rejected because they are barbarous and inhumane, rather than essentially as a protest against the Brahmanic deities:

The sacrifice of horse and human life.  
Have little fruit. Where goats and sheep and kine  
Of divers sorts are sacrificed, go not  
Those sages great who've traveled the right way.  
But sacrifices free from cruelty  
Which men keep up for profit of the clan,  
Where goats and sheep and kine of divers sorts  
Are never sacrificed, — to such as these  
Go sages great who've traveled the right way.  
Such should the thoughtful celebrate: and great  
The fruit of such; profit they bring, not loss.  
Lavish the offering, devas therewith are pleased.<sup>31</sup>

With such an unqualified opposition to the killing of animals, even for the purposes of sacrifice, it might seem logical to expect to find that the early Theravāda Buddhists were strict vegetarians. This is not the situation, however, even in the case of the fully ordained monks and nuns whose discipline was usually much stricter than that of the laity. Even apart from the hotly debated case of the Buddha's last meal donated by Cunda the Smith,<sup>32</sup> there is evidence of the Buddha himself partaking of meat. Thus at *A. III. 491* we read how Ugga, a Vesāliyan householder, provided the Buddha with a meal of pork (*sūkhara mamsa*) cooked with a good jujube sauce — a meal he himself considered good, but recognized as unsuitable for the *Tathāgata*. "And the Exalted One accepted the *sūkhara mamsa* out



of pity." The Buddha permitted his followers to eat meat and fish provided that they do not see, hear, or suspect that the animal was killed specifically for their own consumption.<sup>33</sup>

This qualification at times proved problematic for the Buddhists, for lack of prior knowledge is virtually impossible to prove. *Jātaka* II. 262–263, for example, records an instance where Nigaṅṭha Nāthaputta, a Jain, accuses the Buddha himself of eating meat specifically prepared for him. Similarly, at *A. IV.* 185–189, a group of Jains wrongly accuses General Sīha of having slain a great beast specifically for a feast for the Buddha, and further claims that the Buddha intended to eat the meal knowing that the deed had been done on his account.<sup>34</sup>

The Buddha held that one does not become pure as a result of the food he or she eats, but rather as a result of practicing self-restraint.<sup>35</sup> And conversely, the *Āmagandha Sutta* attributes to Kassapa Buddha the view that it is evil action that defiles an individual, not meat-eating.<sup>36</sup>

Nonetheless certain restrictions applied. With respect to meat, for example, the recluse was expected to abstain from accepting it if it was raw or had not been completely cooked through in a fire.<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, in addition to human flesh, the meat of the elephant, horse, dog, snake, lion, tiger, leopard, bear, and hyena were specifically forbidden.<sup>38</sup> It is striking, however, that the reason that the monks were denied the flesh of these animals as part of their diet was not in most instances because of any impurity inherent in them. In fact, only in the case of dog and snake is there any question of the impurity of the meat *per se*. The general populace considered dog and snake flesh "disgusting and loathsome."<sup>39</sup> Apparently in the case of dogs it was the nature of their life in the villages that led to this opinion, because the commentary says that the flesh of wild wolves may be used, but that the meat of pups from the union of a wolf and a village dog is to be avoided.<sup>40</sup> It was, at least in part, to avoid giving villagers grounds for criticizing the monastic order that the Buddha forbade its members to eat the meat of dogs and snakes. But in the case of snake meat, the more telling reason is provided by Supassa, the serpent-king himself. He argues that if *bhikkhus* were to eat snake flesh, snakes without faith might take it amiss and do harm to the monks who had so indulged.<sup>41</sup> Thus, in the final analysis, it would seem that the real reason the meat of these two animals is denied to members of the order is for their own protection. Such a reason is even more clear in the case of the restriction on meat from the lion, tiger, leopard, bear, and hyena. Here the reasoning is that the odor remains on those who have eaten such creatures, thus enraging their fellows and encouraging them to attack.<sup>42</sup> Monks are to abstain from eating elephant and

horse because of their role as symbols of royalty,<sup>43</sup> that is to avoid the consequences of the crime of *lèse-majesté*.

The third precept — *kāmesu micchācārāveramaṇi* — encourages abstinence from unlawful sexual intercourse or, more literally, wrong conduct stemming from lustful attachment. This is often explained as intercourse with girls who are still under the protection of their parents or other relatives, married women, female convicts, and betrothed girls.<sup>44</sup> In the rules of the *Vinaya Piṭaka*, however, the regulation of sexual contact with animals becomes detailed and explicit. Thus, in the *Mahāvagga*, the Buddha decreed: "When a monk is ordained, he should not indulge in sexual intercourse, even with an animal." Should a monk do so, he is no longer a true recluse, a son of the Sakyans.<sup>45</sup> Such an offense entails defeat; and the appropriate penalty is expulsion from the order. As an example of such an offense, the *Suttavibhaṅga* details the case of a monk who kept a female monkey to satisfy his lusts.<sup>46</sup> Specific mention of a deer is also made in this context.<sup>47</sup>

The *Suttavibhaṅga* further specifies that the interdiction against intercourse with animals applies not only to females, but also to males, hermaphrodites, and eunuchs. In each of these instances, violation involves defeat (*pārājika*) as well.<sup>48</sup>

There is greater variety in the seriousness of the offense in cases where a monk engages in sexual contact without actual intercourse. In general, sexual contact with animals, apart from actual intercourse, merely entails an offense of wrong-doing, and is less serious than similar contact with a woman, a *yakkha*, a eunuch, and so forth.<sup>49</sup> However, if there is contact with a woman who is asleep, the offense is less serious still.<sup>50</sup>

Furthermore, if there is a woman and a monk thinks it an animal, becomes infatuated, and rubs against her, there is a grave offense. However, if a monk confuses a man or a eunuch with an animal and rubs against it, there is merely an act of wrong-doing. So too if there is an animal which a monk confuses with something else.<sup>51</sup>

But in no case is there an offense "if it is not on purpose, not intentional, unknowing, without consent, if the monk is insane, deranged, in pain," or the offense occurs prior to the formulation of the rule against it.<sup>52</sup>

The precept against theft is specifically a call to abstain from taking anything that is not given, and hence applicable regardless of the nature of the object taken. Thus, it goes without saying that to steal an animal is a serious offense.<sup>53</sup>

A group of cases where monks release certain animals from traps sheds interesting light on the Buddhist attitude toward animal/human relationships, however. Where a monk releases an entrapped pig, deer, or fish

intending to steal it, there is an offense entailing defeat and warranting expulsion from the order. However, if a monk releases such an animal out of compassion, there is no offense at all.<sup>54</sup> As is typical of Theravāda ethics, motive is paramount in these cases.

A distinction is to be made between animal and human ownership in determining cases of theft. The *Suttavibhaṅga* thus describes cases where a group of monks, descending from the slope of the Vulture's Peak, came upon the remains of the kill of a lion, a tiger, a panther, a hyena, and a wolf respectively. In each instance they had the remaining flesh cooked, and proceeded to eat it. When this was reported to the Buddha, he decreed that there was no offense, saying: "Monks, there is no offense in taking what belongs to animals."<sup>55</sup>

Of the five precepts, the one remaining — abstention from the use of intoxicants — is perhaps of less interest for the topic at hand, the use of intoxicants being frowned upon primarily because it leads to a loss of self-control. Hence observance of this precept is more a matter of self-discipline than a matter of interpersonal relationships, whether with humans or animals.

In Buddhist ethics right livelihood is closely related to right action.<sup>56</sup> Thus the proscription against killing animals finds its counterpart in the discussion of right livelihood. Among the five trades which all Buddhists are explicitly prohibited to engage in, are included trade in flesh and trade in living beings.<sup>57</sup> The work of "sheep-butchers, hog-butchers, fishermen, [and] animal trappers" is considered so heinous that one nun writing in the *Therīgāthā* lumps them alongside "thieves and executioners" in speaking of their evil action.<sup>58</sup> Much the same could be said of the work of hunters.

The *Old Commentary* to the *Suttavibhaṅga* distinguishes between low work which is to be disdained and high, or honorable work which is to be esteemed. The former includes such tasks as those of a store-room keeper or individuals who remove old flowers from a shrine after they have wilted. As examples of noble occupations agriculture, trade, and, most important for our purposes, cattle herding (*gorakkhā*) are specified.<sup>59</sup> In the *Majjhima Commentary*, the term "gorakkhā" is explained as minding cows for oneself or for others, where livelihood is gained through the trade or sale of the five products of the cow.<sup>60</sup> Thus, whereas the good Buddhist is expected to refrain from raising cattle for slaughter, to raise them for their milk, dung, etc. is a noble economic enterprise for laymen to undertake.<sup>61</sup>

The *Mahāgopālaka Sutta* draws an analogy between the qualities that prevent a monk from maturing in the *dhamma* and the qualities necessary

for a successful cowherd. Although intended as a guide for monks, the passage makes explicit what is necessary for successful animal husbandry:

Possessing eleven qualities, monks, a cowherd cannot become the man to lead a herd about and make it prosperous. What eleven qualities?

Herein, monks, a cowherd knows not bodily forms and is unskilled in distinguishing the marks; he does not remove flies' eggs or dress wounds; he makes no fumigation; he knows not the ford, the watering-place or the road; he is unskilled in pastures; he milks dry; pays no special respect to the bulls, the sires and leaders of the herd. Possessing these eleven qualities a cowherd cannot become the man to lead about a herd and make it prosperous.<sup>62</sup>

That the *Old Commentary's* judgment of cattle raising as a noble occupation is intended to apply only to the laity is made clear by the *Cullavagga*, where it is stated that it is an offense entailing wrong-doing for a nun to keep animals, for to do so is to risk the charge of enjoying pleasures of the senses, of being too involved with the concerns of the householder's life which nuns have left behind.<sup>63</sup> For similar reasons the restriction against keeping animals applies equally to monks. Thus, *bhikkhus* are advised not to accept "draught animals, such as elephants, horses, cows, buffaloes and other livestock, such as goats, sheep, hens, pigs, and so on. . . ."<sup>64</sup>

In conclusion, for *bhikkhus* and *bhikkhunīs*, the *Vinaya* prescribes a relationship with animals in keeping with the spirit of the discipline governing Buddhist monastic life in general. More broadly, the proper human/animal relationships are to be governed by the same universal, positive virtues or divine attitudes — the *brahma vihāras* — that govern human inter-relationships, namely: loving kindness (*metta*), compassion (*karunā*), sympathetic joy (*mudītā*), and equanimity (*upekkhā*). The texts make it explicit that these are intended to apply to all living beings.<sup>65</sup>

#### NOTES

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<sup>2</sup> *M. I.* 183; *I.* 23; *I.* 482; *II.* 31; *III.* 99; *A. I.* 164; *III.* 18; etc.

<sup>3</sup> *M. I.* 22. *M. II.* 21; etc.

<sup>4</sup> The others are: rebirth (a) in purgatory, or hell; (b) in the world of shades (*pettivisaya*); and (c) among the *devas*. The five *gatis* are listed at *D. III.* 234; *A. IV.* 459; *M. I.* 73; *Nd* 550; etc.

<sup>5</sup> *M. III.* 178–179.

<sup>6</sup> *A. V.* 289.

Vin. II. 161. Cf. DA. I. 178 and É. Lamotte, 'La conduite religieuse du faisan dans les textes bouddhiques', *Muséon* LIX (1946), pp. 641—653.

As trans. in S. Tachibana, *The Ethics of Buddhism* (London: Curzon Press, 1981 reprint of 1926 ed.), p. 187.

Vin. V. 222 and Vin. I. 86.

<sup>10</sup> Vin. I. 135.

<sup>11</sup> Vin. I. 134—135.

<sup>12</sup> Vin. I. 88.

<sup>13</sup> *Miln.* 32, for example, says that sheep, goats, oxen, buffaloes, etc. have reasoning, but lack wisdom.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. I. B. Horner, *Early Buddhism and the Taking of Life*. The Wheel Publication # 104 (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1967), p. 18.

<sup>15</sup> Vin. IV. 5. Cf. J. I. 191.

<sup>16</sup> Vin. IV. 5, as trans. by I. B. Horner, *The Book of Discipline*, Vol. II: "Suttavibhaṅga," S. B. B., Vol. XI (London: Luzac for P. T. S., 1969), p. 173.

<sup>17</sup> S. II. 68. It is to be noted that false speech (*musāvāda*), to which we have already referred, is included as the fourth of the five precepts.

<sup>18</sup> A. IV. 248f; A. IV. 254 = Sn. 400, 401.

<sup>19</sup> S. IV. 342.

<sup>20</sup> M. I. 47.

<sup>21</sup> DA. I. 69; MA. I. 198; etc.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Somdet Phra MahaSamana Cho Krom Phraya Vajirañānavarorasa, *The Entrance to the Vinaya: Vinayamukha*, 2 vols. (Bangkok: Mahamakut Rajavidyalaya Press, 2512 A.N. [1969 C.E.]—2516 A.N. [1973 C.E.]), Vol. I, p. 176 & Vol. II, pp. 10 & 37.

<sup>23</sup> *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna Sūtra*. Extant only in Chinese and Tibetan translations, it is classed as a Hīnayāna *Abhidharma* text, but shows strong Mahāyāna influence. See Lin Li-kouang, *Introduction au Compendium de la Loi (Saddharma-smṛty-upasthānasūtra)*. *Recherches sur un Sūtra développé du Petit Véhicule*. Annales du Musée Guimet, Bibliothèque d'Études 54 (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1949).

<sup>24</sup> See Daigan and Alicia Matsunaga, *The Buddhist Concept of Hell* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1972), pp. 81—85, 107—109.

<sup>25</sup> *Trai Phum Phra Ruang* (ca. 1345 C.E.). Trans. by Frank E. and Mani B. Reynolds, *Three Worlds According to King Ruang: A Thai Buddhist Cosmology*, Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series 4 (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1982), p. 76.

<sup>26</sup> *Lokāpaññatti* (ca. 11th—12th century C.E.), Chap. XIV. 1. A. See Eugène Denis, ed. *La Lokāpaññatti et les Idées cosmologiques du Bouddhisme Ancien*, Tome I (Paris: Librairie Honoré Champion, 1977), text pp. 92—114, trans. pp. 89—105.

<sup>27</sup> U Ohn Ghine, "Five Precepts," *Buddhist Supplement of The Burman*, Oct. 6, 1958, as quoted in Winston L. King, *In the Hope of Nibbana: The Ethics of Theravada Buddhism*, (La Salle, Ill., 1964), p. 46.

<sup>28</sup> Winston L. King, *In the Hope of Nibbana*, p. 132. Cf. DA. I. 69; MA. I. 198; etc.

<sup>29</sup> See, for example, A. II. 42; A. IV. 151; D. I. 127ff; *It.* 21; *ItA.* I. 93; *Jātaka* # 403; S. I. 76; SA. I. 144ff; Sn. 295ff; Sn. 303.

<sup>30</sup> A. II. 42 as trans. by F. L. Woodward, *The Book of the Gradual Sayings*, Vol. II, P.T.S. Translation Series, No. 24 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul for P.T.S., 1973 reprint of 1923 ed.) p. 49.

<sup>31</sup> A. II. 43. Sacrifices which the Buddha finds acceptable include acts of charity and "oblations for the welfare of the family;" in short, "Oblation fitly made with devout heart/To that good field of merit, — those who live/The godly-life, to them who most deserve offerings," rather than sacrifices in worship of the gods *per se*. (A. II. 42-44.)

<sup>32</sup> For a recent treatment of the Buddha's final meal together with translations of the relevant texts and partial bibliography of earlier treatment of the issue, see G. Gordon Wasson, "The Last Meal of the Buddha with Memorandum by Walpola Rahula and Epilogue by Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 104.4 (Oct.—Dec., 1982), pp. 591—603.

<sup>33</sup> M. Sutta # 55; Vin. Mv. Kh. 6.

<sup>34</sup> This seems to have been a continuing sore point for the Jains, as J. K. Nariman, *Literary History of Sanskrit Buddhism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972 reprint of 2nd ed., 1923) p. 289, reports" notice of a Jain work called the *Darshana sara* containing a virulent attack on the Buddhists charging them not only with the consumption of animal food . . . but also of spirituous liquor . . ."

<sup>35</sup> M. I. 80; Sn. 241—247; A. I. 221.

<sup>36</sup> Sn. 239—252.

<sup>37</sup> A. II. 208—209; D. I.4—5; D. I. 63—64.

<sup>38</sup> Vin. I. 218—220.

<sup>39</sup> Vin. I. 218.

<sup>40</sup> VinA. 1094.

<sup>41</sup> Vin. I. 218—219.

<sup>42</sup> Vin. I. 219.

<sup>43</sup> Vin. I. 218.

<sup>44</sup> See A. V. 264; M. I. 286; PvA. 72, for example.

<sup>45</sup> Vin. I. 95.

<sup>46</sup> Vin. III. 21—22. Cf. Vin. III. 33.

<sup>47</sup> Vin. III. 34.

<sup>48</sup> Vin. III. 28—29.

<sup>49</sup> Vin. III. 126—127.

<sup>50</sup> Vin. III. 126.

<sup>51</sup> Vin. III. 121—122.

<sup>52</sup> Vin. III. 126.

<sup>53</sup> See Vin. III. 46, 48, 49, 52, and 58, for example.

<sup>54</sup> Vin. III. 62—63.

<sup>55</sup> Vin. III. 58.

<sup>56</sup> See, for example, D. II. 217, where it is said that "right livelihood suffices to maintain right action."

<sup>57</sup> A. III. 208.

<sup>58</sup> *Thig.* 241—242.

<sup>59</sup> Vin. IV. 6. Cf. Pv. I. 5.

<sup>60</sup> MA. II. 56. However, MA. III. 435 = SnA. 466, to the contrary, gloss the term "gorakkhū" as "minding the fields, agriculture," taking the word "go" as a reference to the earth. In accepting the interpretation of MA. II. 56, I follow I. B. Horner, trans., *The Book of Discipline*, Vol. II (London: Luzac for P.T.S., 1969 reprint of 1940 ed.), p. 175, fn. 9.

<sup>61</sup> A. L. Herman's statement that Buddhists refrain from the occupation of herdsman because it involves killing needs careful qualification in light of this distinction. See his *An Introduction to Buddhist Thought: A Philosophic History of Indian Buddhism* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1983), p. 63.

<sup>62</sup> A. V. 347—348 = M. I. 220f, as trans. by F. L. Woodward, *The Book of the Gradual Sayings*, Vol. V (London: Luzac for P.T.S., 1972 reprint of 1936 ed.), p. 224. Cf. A. V. 350—351.

<sup>63</sup> Vin. II. 266. See also VinA. 1293.

<sup>64</sup> Vajirañānavarorasa, *The Entrance to the Vinaya: Vinayamukha*, Vol. II, p. 150.

<sup>65</sup> See, for example, *Metta Sutta*, Sn. 143–152 = *Karāṇiyametta Sutta*, Khp. pp. 8f and *Tevija Sutta*, D. I. 235–253.

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### RGVEDISCH *VIPANYĀ-*, *VIPANYŪ-* UND *VIPANYĀMAHE*

Bei der Analyse des kosmogonischen Liedes RV X 72 untersucht THIEME<sup>1</sup> die gesamten Belegstellen von *vipanyā-*, *vipanyū-* sowie *vipanyāmahe* (alle RV, außerdem *vipanyayā* ŚāṅkhŚS<sup>m.2</sup>) und kommt zum Ergebnis, daß hier eine bisher nicht erkannte Wurzel *pan* \*'sich abmühen', *vi-pan/pan* 'sich gegenseitig/wetteifernd abmühen' zugrunde liegt. Die traditionelle Auffassung geht von *pani* 'preisen, bewundernd preisen' aus,<sup>3</sup> z.B. *vipanyā-* (Instr. *vipanyāyā*, *vipanyā*) "mit Bewunderung, in bewundernswerther Weise" (GRASSMANN), "unter Beifall; auf Beifall hoffend" (GELDNER); *vipanyū-* "rühmend, bewundernd; rühmenswerth" (GRASSMANN), "beifallliebend; (laut) preisend, (laut) lobend, lobpreisend, Lobredner, Barde" (GELDNER). THIEME kann für seinen neuen Ansatz "mit wetteiferndem Bemühen; durch Rivalität" (*vipanyāyā*) bzw. "wetteifernd, wettstreitend, im Wettstreit" (*vipanyū-*) vor allem gr. *πένομαι* 'mühe mich ab' anführen.

THIEMES philologische Überprüfung macht es wahrscheinlich, daß diese Wortsippe in jedem Fall nichts mit 'preisen' zu tun hat. Das Adj. *vipanyū-* ist nur im Du. und Pl. bezeugt (: von den Aśvins, den Maruts, aber vor allem von Dichtern, oft in Verbindung mit *vayām*; einmal von den Gedanken *dhiyas*) und THIEME sieht an den Stellen ein reziprokes Verhältnis, "ein gemeinsames wetteiferndes Bemühen oder eine konkurrierende Rivalität", was bei den Dichtern möglich erscheint aber bei den Maruts und Aśvins etwas fremd anmutet. Die Stellen, die THIEME im Hinblick auf die Bezeichnung eines "edlen" Wettstreits als "nicht ganz so sicher" beurteilt, und zwar *vīprāso vipanyāvah* I 22, 21, *vīprā vipanyāvah* III 10, 9, *dhiyo . . . vipanyāvah* IX 86, 17 "die wetteifernden [dichterischen] Gedanken", legen jedoch eine andere Möglichkeit nahe. *vipanyū-*, das neben *vīpra-* 'sich [geistig] erregend, der Begeisterte' steht, kann nämlich ebenso wie dieses aus der Wz. *vep/vip* 'zittern, sich erregen' hergeleitet werden, vgl. z.B. *tur-anyū-*, *riṣ-anyū-*, *prt-anyū-*; *iṣ-anyā-*; *iṣ-anyāti*, *tur-anyāti*, *riṣ-anyāti* u.a.m. Die dann zu erwartende Bedeutung<sup>3a</sup> 'sich [geistig] erregend, begeistert' (als Zustand der fähigen, aktivierten Geisteskraft) für *vipanyū-* bzw. '[geistige] Erregung, Begeisterung' für *vipanyā-* ist an allen Belegstellen vertretbar, z.B. VI 16, 34 *agnīr vṛtrāṇi jaṅghanad draviṇasyūr vipanyāyā* 'Agni soll die Widerstände zerschlagen, nach Reichtum strebend in [voller] Erregung', THIEME: "Agni wird die Widerstände zerschlagen, nach Reichtum (Kriegsbeute) strebend